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In California, non-English speakers involved in judicial proceedings are assisted by a 
language interpreter to give them equal footing with English speakers, a purpose 
articulated in a code of ethics that also requires interpreters to preserve the source form 
in the target language, and keep silent even when non-comprehension is suspected. This 
intercultural communicative event involves judicial officers who use a formal register of 
legal language; Spanish speakers from a different culture, education level, and exposure 
to (a different) legal system; and interpreters who are required to be as invisible as 
humanly possible. This research aims to help gain a better understanding of the 
interpreter's role and the effectiveness of interpreter-mediated judicial proceedings. 
Within a translation-theoretical framework drawing on the concepts of target-text 
function (skopos) and institutional translational norms, a listening comprehension test 
was designed to examine the implied claim of equal access to language by comparing 
the comprehension achieved by English speakers and Spanish speakers, and exploring 
the possibility of enhancing Spanish speakers’ comprehension by simplifying the 
language register. The test results indicate that while the English speakers’ scores were 
not ideal, they were nearly twenty times higher than those of the first group of Spanish 
speakers (equal register), and much higher than those of the second group of Spanish 
speakers (simplified register). Interviews were also conducted with interpreters and 
attorneys to explore their views on Spanish speakers’ comprehension, register 
adjustment, and interpreter intervention. The results show, first, that interpreters and 
attorneys acknowledge the comprehension gap caused by the inaccessibility of the legal 
register for Spanish speakers and their inability to articulate non-comprehension; and, 
second, that although interpreters follow established institutional norms when in plain 
view, when the risk of exposure is low, other norms may obtain: register simplification, 
clarification, explicitation, and intervention in cases of non-comprehension. The results 
also show that attorneys welcome and value interpreter interventions, and ask that they 
intervene and simplify the language to improve communication. In short, the results 
show that established institutional norms prevent interpreters from achieving the equal 
footing purpose. To attempt to achieve it, interpreters behave as experts when 
circumstances allow and the risk of criticism or challenge is low, and attorneys expect 
and request interpreters’ intervention and cooperation. 
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Chapter 1. Introduction 
 
“In a criminal proceeding, rights are conveyed by words. Words have meaning. If the 
words have no meaning to a defendant, then such a defendant has no rights. A trial 
without rights is a proceeding without due process of law and fundamental fairness. It is 
a sham” (Judge Carr 2001). This statement was meant to reinforce and highlight the 
need to provide court interpreters for non-English speakers, in the sense that words 
would have no meaning if interpreters were not provided. However, what if court 
interpreters were provided and words still had no meaning? Would this still apply? The 
purpose of this thesis is to investigate the comprehension of legal language by non-
English speakers in judicial proceedings when assisted by an interpreter. More 
specifically, this research is focused on the Spanish language and on California, where 
the demand for and provision of court interpreters have increased considerably in the 
last decades due to the great influx of immigrants, mostly from Latin America. 
Although the title of the study refers to language comprehension, this comprehension is 
analyzed in the context of interpreter-mediated encounters, that is, as a byproduct and 
consequence of the interpreter’s decisions as constrained by institutional norms and 
purposes. The comprehension of legal language in interpreted judicial proceedings is at 
the core of a particular intercultural communicative event framed by the system and the 
participants. Therefore, in order to develop an understanding of comprehension 
opportunities, all constraining and facilitating angles must be examined: the non-
English speaker, the system and its legal actors, the legal language, and the interpreter’s 
role.  
1.1. Motivation for the study 
The motivation to research the comprehension of legal language in interpreter-mediated 
judicial proceedings was personal as well as professional. I became a court interpreter 
over twenty years ago, after completing an 18-month interpreting program and several 
attempts at the oral certification exam. The program had introduced literally thousands 
of new words and concepts in both working languages and their varieties, words that 
candidates were required to understand, memorize, and retrieve at 140 to 160 words per 
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minute. Despite having over eighteen years of formal education, these words and 
concepts were completely new to me: the judicial system, forensics, firearms, drugs, 
slang, idioms, and the like. Having graduated from the course with considerable self-
confidence and self-assurance that I was more than prepared for the task, two things 
made me reevaluate my presumed readiness when, upon passing the certification exam, 
I began working in different judicial settings, including the court: I had a very hard time 
understanding speakers of Spanish (my first language), and they had a very hard time 
understanding me. Aside from the difference in vocabulary due to the many Spanish 
varieties in play, there was another category of words and expressions that were half 
English and half Spanish, deeply rooted and widely varied, but nevertheless unknown to 
me. The Spanish variety they were using did not match my variety or the variety 
required for the certification exam. On the other hand, instances of Spanish speakers 
asking for clarification or explanation during breaks or after a proceeding had finished 
became too frequent, even in terms of “who won?” or “which one is my attorney?” I 
was following the code of ethics, interpreting as required into a language register that 
took me years to learn, for non-English speakers who not only had not had any exposure 
to the U.S. judicial system, but whose education level was usually elementary school. It 
was clear that communication was not always achieved, but there was really not much 
interpreters could do. Several years later, while pursuing my coursework in Translation 
Studies, I was exposed to different translation theories and other ways of looking at 
translation, outside the Californian context. It was not until I learned about the existence 
of different paradigms that I could start to envision a way to understand the mutual 
misunderstandings. Following a code and rules based on formal equivalence, I then 
learned that it was not only possible but also necessary to take into account the social 
and cultural factors that made up the intercultural communicative event and that target-
audience constraints could also be part of the equation, and the idea of investigating 
court interpreting from a target-oriented approach seemed to offer promising 
possibilities for my quest.  
1.2. Court interpreting in California 
According to the Professional Standards and Ethics for California Court Interpreters, 
non-English speakers involved in legal proceedings are assisted by a language 
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interpreter so that they may be placed on an equal footing with those who understand 
English (CAJC 2013a: 3). Laws and guidelines recommend that target-language 
equivalents be found to elicit the same reaction from target-language listeners as would 
be elicited from source-language listeners (CAJC 2001). Implied in these guidelines is 
the premise that language is the only gap between English speakers and non-English 
speakers, and that using an interpreter would be enough to bridge said gap. However, 
this premise does not seem to account for several other constraints present in this 
intercultural communicative event: on the one hand, a multiple challenge faced by 
immigrants in U.S. courts that far exceeds the language difference, and includes 
linguistic, cultural, social, educational, and contextual factors; and on the other, issues 
related to the interpreter’s role, competence, capabilities, loyalty, and ethics. It would be 
too ambitious to explore in detail every possible constraint on comprehension in this 
intercultural communication event, so this research will focus on the interpreter’s role, 
and more specifically, on the standards requiring source orientedness and invisibility. 
The source orientedness in this context refers to standards requiring interpreters to be 
faithful only to the source text, and invisibility refers mainly to the standards preventing 
interpreters from intervening in cases of non-comprehension. Interpreters are required to 
follow a code of ethics that sets the standards for interpreter performance, among which 
is the requirement to maintain the register of the source text in the target text, and to 
keep silent even when miscomprehension is suspected. The rationale for maintaining 
the register when interpreting into English is related to conveying a true image of the 
non-English speaker for the judge and the jury. The rationale for maintaining the 
register when interpreting into the foreign language is twofold: not interfering with legal 
strategy (during questioning) and not giving the non-English speaker an advantage over 
the English speaker who would hear the same language in the same situation.  
This scenario involves several arguably conflicting factors: (1) an interpreter who 
is bound by a code and must be faithful only to the source language, (2) a language 
accessible for the most part only to members of the judicial discourse community, (3) a 
fundamental cultural and educational difference between interlocutors, and (4) a code of 
ethics interpreters must follow and comply with at the risk of being sanctioned (in 
Dueñas González et al. 2012: 1303). The requirement to conserve the register of the 
source language in the target language seems to be supported by all standards and 
codes, leaving the fate of non-English speakers to be decided in a linguistic framework 
unfamiliar to them and a culture that is not their own.  
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O’Barr describes four varieties of courtroom language: (1) formal spoken legal 
language, which lawyers and judges use when addressing each other and judges use for 
addressing the jury, discussing motions, passing judgment, and “speaking to the 
record;” (2) standard English, which includes a formal lexicon and is used mainly by 
attorneys and most witnesses; (3) colloquial English, similar to everyday talk and used 
by some attorneys and witnesses; and (4) subcultural varieties (1981: 396). In criminal 
cases, the defendant may not be compelled to testify. If the defendant does testify, 
during testimony the interpreter will most likely work in the consecutive mode (both 
from Spanish into English and English into Spanish) and the register used will be 
standard English, colloquial English, or a subcultural variety. The questions and 
answers will be heard by all present, who will most likely be able to identify 
comprehension issues as they will be evidenced either by a non-responsive answer (i.e. 
an answer that is not a direct or relevant response to the question asked; see Montz 
2002: 291), by the defendant’s silence or puzzled look, or by the defendant’s request for 
clarification. Except for the testimony of other lay witnesses, the rest of the proceeding 
will be conducted using the formal legal language described by O’Barr (above) to argue 
motions, objections, legal precedents, during expert testimony or jury instructions, all of 
which together may represent the whole proceeding for defendants who do not testify, 
or most of the proceeding for defendants who do. If the defendant does not testify, the 
interpreter will interpret the whole trial only for the defendant, usually in simultaneous 
mode, by whispering or through electronic devices. It is precisely this English into 
Spanish delivery that this research aims to study, excluding all types of dialogue 
between the Spanish speaker and any other participant, as during this simultaneous 
delivery comprehension issues are not observable and defendants do not have the 
chance to ask for clarification. In other words, this research is not concerned with how 
the non-English speaker will be perceived by the judge or the jury, or how the 
interpreter may impair legal strategy, which are the first two reasons cited above for 
conserving the original register and which may occur only during testimony. This 
research is only concerned with the English into Spanish delivery in non-dialogic 
interpreting, when the only reason for conserving the original register would be to avoid 
placing non-English speakers in an advantageous position over the English speaker; 
when the interpreter’s delivery does not influence witness perception and does not 
interfere with legal strategy; and when the only target-language listener is the non-
English speaker.  
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1.3. Translation theoretical framework 
In keeping with the sociocultural turn that has made itself felt in Interpreting Studies, 
this research seeks to bring the social, cultural, and educational constraints of the target-
language receiver into the equation of modern-day judicial interpreting in California, 
which is still guided by principles of formal equivalence and source orientedness. 
Interpreters are instructed to follow strict performance guidelines that, as court officers, 
they must accept without any challenge or reflection. The reality of the courtroom 
against this backdrop seems to trigger a communicative clash in which an interlocutor 
whose comprehension may be hindered due to cultural and educational constraints must 
confront a high formal register of legal language. In order to account for these target 
constraints, a target-oriented approach was applied to investigate this communicative 
event borrowing concepts from skopos theory and Toury’s notion of norms (1980, 
1995), two conceptual frameworks that challenged the equivalence paradigm (Schäffner 
2010). Functionalist translation theory (skopos theory) seems an appropriate theoretical 
framework to examine this complex intercultural communication scenario because it 
allows giving priority precisely to the sociocultural and situational constraints of the 
target-culture receiver. Since many of these constraints are intimately related to 
institutional and professional norms, this intercultural communicative event will also be 
examined by investigating the norms at play and interpreters’ attitudes toward these 
norms. 
Drawing on these two conceptual frameworks, I will attempt to move from a 
formal equivalence relationship between texts as prescribed by the institution and 
situate this relationship in a sociocultural context, where interpreters’ decisions are 
guided by institutional norms and constraints. I will use the notion of translation as a 
goal-oriented action and borrow concepts from skopos theory to analyze the 
institutional framework of California courts with regards to the norms established for 
interpreting practices in this particular intercultural communicative event. I will attempt 
to determine if the practices established by the skopos-determining and norm-setting 
authorities are effective in meeting the equal footing purpose defined within the system. 
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1.4. Research problem 
In recent decades, there has been extensive research on court interpreting, mostly 
focused on the ways interpreters’ decisions affect a jury’s perception of non-English 
speakers, and there has also been research on the comprehension of English legal 
language by English speakers. However, there is not enough information about non-
English speakers’ comprehension of interpreted English legal language, or about how 
this comprehension compares to that of English speakers. This lack of attention is 
significant because the equal footing premise assumes that non-English speakers are 
receiving the same information as English speakers, when in fact they may not have the 
same tools to understand or apply the information they receive. The Sixth Amendment 
to the United States Constitution guarantees defendants procedural rights in all criminal 
proceedings, including the right to confer with their attorney at any time and the right to 
see and hear all evidence and witnesses presented against them (CAJC 2013a: 33-34). 
The fundamental principle of fairness requires  
 
that an LEP [Limited English Proficient] individual be able to be fully present 
during a legal proceeding: an interpreter is provided in order for him to 
understand what is discussed and decided (including questions asked of him, the 
statements of the judge, and testimony of others), and to participate in the 
proceedings (including consultations with an attorney, cross-examination of 
witnesses, and delivery of his own testimony). (ABA 2012: 20) 
 
In this particular context, the official purpose of interpreting as articulated in the 
code of ethics is to ensure that non-English speakers and English speakers show the 
same level of comprehension (equal footing); however, the same code also requires that 
the source form and register be maintained (CAJC 2013a). Skopos theory posits that in 
order to achieve the purpose of the translation, both linguistic correspondence and 
adaptation to target audiences are equally conceivable and negotiable skopoi. To 
address and begin to develop an understanding of this problem, this study aims to 
compare the comprehension levels achieved by English speakers and Spanish speakers 
in both ways: with linguistic correspondence (as required by the client) and with 
adaptation to target constraints (as allowed by the theory). In skopos theory, the 
translator/interpreter is the expert in charge of making strategic decisions in line with 
the skopos determined for the communicative event, taking into account the 
sociocultural constraints of the receiver. Adjusting the register in order to facilitate and 
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attempt to achieve the purpose of communication may be one of those strategic 
decisions. I will attempt to determine whether by focusing on target audience 
comprehension—as allowed by skopos theory—and hypothetically giving interpreters 
license to adjust the register, comprehension (and communication) during judicial 
proceedings with Spanish speakers can improve. This research is based on the following 
two hypotheses: 
1. English speakers and Spanish speakers will not show the same level of 
comprehension when presented with a spoken text reflecting the same high register of 
legal language.  
2. When the register is simplified, the comprehension level in Spanish speakers 
will increase. 
1.5. Methodology 
Since this research design involves quantitative and qualitative components utilized to 
address different aspects of this intercultural communication event concerning an 
interaction among (at least) three main interlocutors, this study triangulates data from all 
three sources: interpreters, attorneys, and non-English speakers. This quantitative and 
qualitative research consists of three main sections: 
1. The comprehension of legal language by non-English speakers may be hindered 
by several constraints related to sociocultural differences, the interpreter’s role, and the 
limited accessibility of legal register. This study provides an overview of each of these 
factors, but focuses on the adjustment of English legal register when translating into 
Spanish as a way to enhance comprehension. In alignment with the premise in the code 
and literature that providing an interpreter means placing the non-English speaker on 
equal footing with the English speaker, the quantitative component consists of a 
listening comprehension test that was designed to examine the implied claim of equal 
access to language in terms of comprehension. This test involved a listening 
comprehension exercise administered to three groups with ten participants each: one of 
English speakers, and two of Spanish speakers working with different language 
registers.  
For this test, five sentences were selected from sample interpreter certification 
exams and California jury instructions, and each of these sentences was paired with a 
UNIVERSITAT ROVIRA I VIRGILI 
COMPREHENSION OF LEGAL DISCOURSE IN INTERPRETER-MEDIATED JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS 
Julia Lambertini Andreotti
8 
listening comprehension question. These five original English sentences were translated 
into Spanish with conservation of register, and these five translated sentences were later 
modified to reflect a simplified register. The Spanish translation of the five original 
English sentences with register conservation was produced by a focus group having 
nine court certified interpreters, and the register simplification of these five translated 
sentences was produced by a second focus group comprised of six court certified 
interpreters. The first set of original English sentences was used with a group of English 
speakers, the first set of Spanish translations with original register conservation was 
used with a group of Spanish speakers, and the second set of Spanish sentences with 
register simplification was used with a different group of Spanish speakers.  
2. The qualitative component of the design involved gathering data through 
semi-structured interviews with interpreters and attorneys. The interviews with 
interpreters focused on gathering information about their views and attitudes about 
register and the rationale behind the code requirement, adjustment of register, 
intervention, differences in practice across settings, and role constraints in matters of 
facilitating comprehension, mainly in terms of exploring their attitudes toward 
established institutional norms. Interpreters’ views were also explored in the second part 
of the first focus group: after completing the translation task, some of the most relevant 
points of this study were presented to invite a discussion and obtain feedback. The 
interviews with attorneys focused on gathering information about their discourse 
practice while working with English-speaking and Spanish-speaking clients, issues of 
comprehension, and their views on interpreter interventions.  
3. A third focus group with six monolingual lay Spanish speakers was convened 
with two purposes: to obtain feedback about the terminology found in the five original-
register Spanish sentences, and to attempt to collectively produce another set of 
simplified-register Spanish sentences in order to compare them with the simplified-
register Spanish sentences produced by the interpreters in the second focus group, 
mainly in terms of vocabulary. These two sets of sentences were compared to examine 
similarities and differences in criteria on vocabulary comprehension between 
interpreters and monolingual Spanish speakers. 
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1.6. Thesis outline  
Following the introduction, chapter 2 will first examine the demographic, educational, 
cultural, and linguistic aspects of the setting, California. Chapter 3 will examine court 
interpreting in California: the laws that provide for interpreting services in judicial 
proceedings, state requirements for interpreter certification, and the standards 
interpreters must follow once they are certified. Among these standards, this study will 
particularly review the requirement to maintain the register from the source language 
into the target language and its implications. This chapter will also include an overview 
of judicial proceedings and the language of the law. Since one of the main concerns in 
this research involves the standard of maintaining the original register and the impact 
this might have on comprehension, the language register will be examined next in 
chapter 4. This chapter will include a description of register features, and an exploration 
of the register of legal language as well as of the Spanish language varieties most 
commonly found in California. Another main focus of this research involves aspects of 
comprehension and communication, which will be discussed in chapter 5. This chapter 
will also examine the comprehension of legal language and three major events that were 
brought about to facilitate it: the plain language movement, the revision of jury 
instructions in California, and new legislation enacted to provide language access for 
people whose primary language is not English. This new legislation seems to put a 
different view of the interpreter’s role into perspective; this will be presented at the end 
of this chapter. Following the examination of all contextual aspects of this study, 
chapter 6 will present the translation theoretical frameworks of functionalist theory and 
translational norms, and explore the way in which the norm-governed roles assumed by 
all participants shape non-English speakers’ comprehension in this particular 
intercultural communication event. Chapter 7 will describe the research question 
followed by the research design and a pilot study conducted to test the instruments, 
which were designed to collect empirical data to explore English speakers’ and Spanish 
speakers’ comprehension of legal language, attorneys’ views on interpreter intervention, 
and certified interpreters’ views on register and register adjustment. The methodology 
for the main study will be detailed in chapter 8, including the participants, instruments, 
and procedures for each of the components: semi-structured interviews with interpreters 
and attorneys, a focus group with lay Spanish speakers, and the listening comprehension 
test with English speakers and Spanish speakers. It will also describe the procedures 
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followed to design the instrument for the listening comprehension test, including the 
two focus groups conducted with court interpreters to produce the Spanish versions of 
the sentences for the test. Chapter 9 will describe the findings of the research, in which I 
collected information from multiple sources to triangulate the data with the purpose of 
increasing the validity of the results, gaining a better insight into this particular 
communication event, and exploring it from different standpoints. Chapter 10 will 
include a discussion of the main results, and chapter 11 will present a summary of the 
key findings and an outlook on further research.  
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Chapter 2. Sociocultural context  
2.1. Demographic background 
According to the U.S. Census (2014), in 2014 the United States had about 319 million 
residents, including over 55 million Hispanics who represented about 17.4 percent of 
the total U.S. population. As of 2010, the United States had the second largest Hispanic 
population worldwide, following only Mexico (Infoplease 2015). Also in 2014, 
California was home to about 39 million residents, including almost 15 million 
Hispanics—the nation’s largest minority and the fastest growing population—who 
represented 38.6 percent of the state’s total. Long Beach, a metropolitan area in Los 
Angeles, California, is home to about 5.8 million Hispanics—the nation’s largest 
Hispanic population—representing about 11 percent of the nation’s total. The largest 
Hispanic group is of Mexican origin, estimated at 11.5 million and representing 83 
percent of the Hispanic population in California, and 65 percent of the nation’s Hispanic 
population. The Mexican population is followed in size by that of El Salvador and 
Guatemala, at 22 and 21 percent of the U.S. Hispanic population, respectively. The 
Hispanic population grew about 43 percent between 2000 and 2010, including a 54 
percent increase in the Mexican-origin population. From the California Hispanic group, 
the U.S. Census Bureau estimates that 5.4 million or 37 percent are foreign-born from 
Latin America, 78.8 percent of whom are from Mexico. This represents the largest 
immigrant population in the nation: since March, 2014, Hispanics have surpassed the 
White population in California (Latin Post 2014, Take Part 2014).  
“The use of the terms ‘Hispanic’ and ‘Latino’ to describe Americans of Spanish 
origin or descent is unique to the U.S. and their meaning continue to change and 
evolve” (Pew 2012d). The terms Hispanic, Latino, and Spanish are commonly used to 
refer to any person who originates from Spain or any of the Latin American Spanish-
speaking countries, and this origin “can be viewed as the heritage, nationality group, 
lineage, or country of birth of the person or the person's parents or ancestors before their 
arrival in the United States” (U.S. Census n.d.). For the U.S. Census Bureau, however, 
Hispanics are “anyone who says they are” and they can be from any country, any race, 
any immigrant status, and not all Hispanics from Spanish-speaking countries identify 
themselves as such (Pew 2009a: 1). For example, in 2010 over 19 million people 
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selected the category “some other race” in the Census questionnaire, most of whom 
were Hispanics (Pew 2012c: unpaginated). A Hispanic survey conducted by Pew found 
that while half of Latinos identified their race as “some other race” or 
“Hispanic/Latino,” 36 percent categorized themselves as White, and 3 percent as Black 
(Pew 2012d: 3). 
2.2. Education 
The education data collected by the U.S. Census Bureau for California does not 
differentiate foreign-born from U.S.-born Hispanics, so the educational attainment 
levels reported cannot account for the school years completed by Hispanic immigrants 
alone. From the data collected about the United States as a whole, Pew (2012: 
unpaginated) reports that in 2012, about one million U.S.-born Hispanics (7.23 percent) 
and over five million foreign-born Hispanics (32.3 percent) ages 25 and older had an 
educational attainment level of less than ninth grade, while about 1.5 million U.S.-born 
(12.3 percent) and about 2.6 million foreign-born (16.7 percent) had attained an 
educational level of between ninth and twelfth grade. Based on this data, the total of 
Hispanics who had attained less than a high school degree was approximately 68.6 
percent in 2012. However, this information may be somewhat misleading for several 
reasons, among them the reliance on self-identification (see 2.1. above). Other 
problematic aspects of data collecting relate to low response rates due to low education, 
literacy and language ability, distrust and fear of deportation or changes in eligibility to 
participate in government benefit programs, and/or the limited access to rural residents 
(The Leadership Conference 2015: unpaginated). Also, the U.S. Census does not report 
detailed educational attainment levels below the ninth grade, so this category includes 
people who have never attended school, people who are completely illiterate, and 
people who only reached second or third grade. The data about educational attainment 
levels also shows inconsistencies with relevant literature.  
Fortuny et al., for example, indicate that most adults between 25 and 64 years of 
age who have completed less than nine years of schooling are immigrants: “92 percent 
in California and 94 percent in Los Angeles” (2007). While Grogger (2002: 11) finds 
that the average educational attainment of foreign-born Mexicans is about eight and a 
half years of schooling, Palerm et al. (1999: 73) state that over 60 percent of Mexican 
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immigrants have only an elementary education (sixth grade). High school completion of 
Hispanic immigrants over 25 years of age is reported at 30-35 percent (CDC 2012a: 15, 
EDD 2007), compared with 86.4 percent for the general U.S. population (Pew 2012: 15- 
17).  
In general, it is reported that the educational attainment levels of Hispanics 
(Stamps et al. 2006: 4; Pew 2013a: 9, 17; Reyes 2001: viii; Rearick 2004: 544) and 
particularly immigrants from Mexico (Grogger 2002: 11, Brick et al. 2011: 7, Reed 
2005: vii, Hill 2003: 10, Camarota 2001: 17) are significantly lower than the 
educational levels attained by any other ethnic group in the United States. According to 
Valdés et al. (1998: 476), it has been shown that most Mexican immigrants in the 
United States have not attained a high educational level. In contrast, in 2012 only 2.6 
percent of Whites alone and 4.7 percent of Blacks alone had an educational attainment 
level of less than ninth grade. In the same year, the average education attainment level 
for Whites alone was 13.5 years (Pew 2012: unpaginated).  
The educational disparity between non-English speakers and English speakers is 
also noted in the school setting. Echevarria et al. report that non-English speakers show 
significantly lower achievement levels, lower standardized test scores in reading and 
math, and have the highest dropout rate of any group (2004). Erisman et al. (2007: 5) 
also report that immigrants from Latin America and the Caribbean have the highest 
school dropout rate and are the least educated group, particularly those who migrate 
between 13 and 19 years of age. The reasons cited include lack of information about the 
education system, limited English proficiency, financial needs, work and family 
responsibilities, and insufficient academic preparation, even among those who have 
completed high school (see also Pew 2013b: unpaginated). Pew reports that the dropout 
rate in 2013 was almost three times the rate for Whites, and that Latinos grow up in less 
educated families, with over 40 percent indicating their parents do not have a high 
school diploma. Furthermore, 65.7 percent of foreign-born Hispanic youths are not 
enrolled in high school or college (2013b: unpaginated). A report submitted by the 
United States-Mexico Cultural and Educational Foundation to the U.S. Department of 
Labor (Bulow 2005: 4) states that employers develop training materials free of 
language, which rely on colors and pictures because Hispanics lack basic language 
skills.  
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2.3. Sociocultural traits 
Spanish speakers in California include U.S.-born and foreign-born residents with roots 
in many different countries and cultures, and it would be unfeasible to attempt to 
describe individual features of each and all. However, the literature describes some 
strong common traits among the Latino subgroups that are worth mentioning, as they 
are relevant to this research. Marcos et al. (1980: 134) state that psychiatric evaluations 
of Spanish speakers in the United States have found that this population is distinguished 
by certain cultural values, and that clinicians who are not familiar with these cultural 
traits often misunderstand or misdiagnose these patients. These traits include culturally-
bound notions of machismo, respect, dignity, family, and a particular stance toward 
authority, among others. For instance, Hispanics usually prefer not to establish eye 
contact during conversation in order to show respect (Scarcella 1990: 132), or because it 
may be interpreted as challenging or intimidating (Guarnero 2005, CDC 2012b: 15). 
This occurs particularly when communicating with authority figures toward whom they 
would display limited verbal expressiveness (Rivera 1997: 76-77). Respect is inherently 
ascribed to people in higher positions, as opposed to the U.S. mainstream ideology, 
where respect must be earned (Schauber 2001: 135). In school, students may prefer not 
to ask the teacher for clarification because they feel that it is disrespectful or impolite to 
use the teacher’s time to that end (135-136). Nelson et al. (2001: 468) interviewed 
Mexican students in Mexico and native English-speaking students in the United States. 
In comparing the results, they found that the notion of respect held a different meaning 
for Mexican students than for U.S. students. Some of the findings showed that U.S. 
students felt that when they disagreed with a teacher, this teacher would listen with 
respect, maybe thank the student for catching something the teacher may have missed, 
and discuss the disagreement in class based on the student’s intervention. On the other 
hand, most Mexican students in the same situation would blame themselves for 
misunderstanding and fear that teachers would assert their authority and reprimand them 
(2001: 468-469). The U.S. Department of Health and Human Services sets up training 
programs for serving Hispanic consumers, in which they also address the issue of 
respect. They recommend not asking direct questions about problems concerning sexual 
practices, mental health, domestic violence, etc. because Hispanics usually keep this 
information private within the family, and it could prove to be an embarrassment or a 
challenge (HRSA 2001: 30). They also point out that the notion of respect may lead 
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Hispanics to avoid disagreeing, asking questions, or admitting confusion about medical 
treatment, and that patients might withhold information to avoid showing negative 
feelings, which is a cultural norm. Based on values such as respect and dignity, they 
usually avoid interpersonal conflict and disagreement (Triandis et al. 1984: 1363), and 
show politeness (Guarnero 2005) and formality (Clutter et al. 2009: unpaginated), as 
conveyed by the distinction between the polite “usted” and the familiar “tú” forms of 
address. They are warm, open, and silence can be perceived as punishment, meanness 
(Albert 2004: 256, 273-274) or “doubt, shyness, disapproval, anger, politeness, or not 
understanding” (CDC 2012a: 15).  
The family is considered “the primary group from whom they derive a sense of 
satisfaction, connection, and identity” (Schauber 2001: 135), and “the most important 
social unit” (Clutter et al. 2009: unpaginated). It includes members outside the nuclear 
family (Clutter 2009: unpaginated, Schauber 2001: 134), and values privacy, which may 
apply to domestic issues that Mexicans consider private and outside the state’s 
jurisdiction (Palerm et al. 1999: 84). Having a domestic issue tried in public may be 
“seen as a humiliating and intolerable violation of privacy and loss of control,” and it 
would be hard to accept restraining orders because they cannot accept the court’s 
involvement in their family life. For example, women are commonly unwilling to 
discuss the particulars of sexual crimes (Bauer 1999: 25). Palerm et al. also refer to the 
pride of the Mexican culture, which may prevent Spanish speakers from providing 
negative information about themselves or members of their family. This pride is related 
to a Latino trait of masculinity, whereby the family relies on the men for support and 
safety (1999: 92-93).  
Chavez explains that undocumented immigrants live in constant wariness and 
fear of being apprehended or deported. He adds that their participation in tax-supported 
programs such as health care, education, and housing is limited by government policies, 
and that they are the targets of workplace raids undertaken by INS agents (1992: 19). He 
stresses that “as illegal aliens, they are not members of the community” (emphasis in 
original), and thus are cast as outsiders. This fear of apprehension and deportation may 
lead immigrants to do things that authorities may question, such as delivering their 
children at home to avoid hospitals (1992: 168) and avoiding procuring medical care 
(CDC 2012a: 14). Pew estimates that among Hispanics, about 41 percent of those 
foreign-born and 58 percent of the foreign-born youth are unauthorized immigrants 
(2013b: unpaginated), and that 32 percent of Hispanics and 45 percent of unauthorized 
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foreign-born Hispanics “know someone who has been deported or detained by the 
federal government in the past 12 months” (2010: v, 11). Pew (2013a: 7) also reports 
that the naturalization rate of Mexicans is “half that of legal immigrants from all other 
countries combined” at 36 percent, and that the largest group of illegal immigrants are 
Mexicans, who account for “6.1 million (55%) of the estimated 11.1 million in the U.S. 
as of 2011” (Pew 2013c: 5). Among the legal residents, the reasons for not becoming 
U.S. citizens include language and financial barriers, as the cost is currently $680 per 
application. Paired with language barriers and lack of information, the unauthorized 
status of most Hispanics also precludes them from voting and having a voice in the 
political arena (Rearick 2004: 544, Johnson 2009). Due to lack of education, English 
proficiency, and legal status in the United States, the employment of about 52.4 percent 
of foreign-born Hispanics involves low-skill occupations such as agriculture, food and 
hospitality service, construction, manufacturing and production, and cleaning and 
maintenance (Fortuny et al. 2007: viii, Pew 2013b, Portes et al. 2004: 11927). These 
occupations pay low wages and usually do not offer health insurance: Hispanics have 
the highest uninsured rates among all ethnic groups in the United States, at 32 percent 
for the U.S.-born and 50 percent for the foreign-born (CDC 2012b: 11). 
2.4. Hispanics in court 
While the U.S. legal system originated in the Anglo-American or common-law system, 
Latin-American countries based theirs on Roman law or civil law. The common and 
civil law systems have numerous and fundamental differences, both in the meaning and 
the application of the law. One of the main differences is that while in civil law 
decisions are based on codified laws, in common law decisions are mainly based on 
judicial precedents. These are previous judicial decisions for comparable cases that the 
judge applies to make a ruling on each new case, and these new decisions become new 
binding precedents to be applied in subsequent cases. Common law operates within an 
adversarial system in which two opposing sides submit evidence and present their case 
before a judge who oversees the proceeding and decides the case. Civil law, on the other 
hand, is an inquisitorial system in which the judge examines the witnesses, clarifies the 
issues, and interprets and applies the written laws to make a decision based on what he 
determines as true. While civil law relies more on written evidence, common law relies 
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on oral arguments. Among the most significant differences relevant to this research is 
the fact that Latin-American countries have not had a tradition of oral trials, which are 
just now being implemented in Argentina (AAJJ n.d.) and Mexico (CJF 2011: 
unpaginated) for the first time. Messitte also points out that in civil law, the questioning 
of witnesses is conducted by the judge, who takes notes that will comprise the record, as 
opposed to a verbatim account of the proceedings (1999: unpaginated). Lastly and also 
of relevance to this study, civil law does not allow attorneys to prepare witnesses before 
the proceedings, while witness preparation is an important part of common law systems 
(Pejovic 2001: 834, Robbins 2010: unpaginated).  
Besides the differences in laws and judicial systems, another relevant factor is the 
scarce contact that U.S. immigrants and refugees may have had with the criminal and 
civil systems in their home country, and the scarce knowledge they may have of the 
legal language and legal features that characterize the U.S. legal system (Moore 1999: 
25, 167). Palerm et al. state that in Mexico the administration of justice is not open to 
ordinary citizens, and the use of juries is very recent. Therefore, it is highly unlikely that 
Mexican immigrants would be familiar with judicial roles or proceedings, and that the 
fact that the outcome of the case is decided by a jury of “peers” might confuse them 
(1999: 81-91). In other countries, low-income parties may not be afforded the right to a 
court-appointed attorney. Consequently, they view their attorneys as giving priority to 
the government’s interests over their own (DeMuniz 1999: 160). In summary, if there 
has been any contact at all between immigrants and the law in their home countries, this 
contact has been with a different legal system than the one they will find in California, 
where very few of the jurors, whether of Hispanic origin or not, will be their peers in 
terms of education level, sociocultural background, and English language proficiency. 
This lack of knowledge will probably also affect their comprehension of U.S. judicial 
proceedings when they have their day in court.  
The relationship between Mexicans, the government, and police authorities is 
also highly significant to this research. Palerm et al. explain that “Mexico continues to 
operate in a complex hierarchy and culture of institutionalized corruption and vigilante 
activities that intimidate the general population” (1999: 79). They also report that the 
police victimize, threaten, and rob citizens; that international and domestic human rights 
organizations often cite government agencies, and that judges and lawyers are seen as 
“the ultimate and powerful authorities to be feared” (1999: 81). In a study by Demuth, it 
was found that Hispanic defendants may be more reluctant to cooperate with authorities 
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out of fear, distrust, and lack of familiarity with the judicial system. They are also more 
likely to be detained, deported, or treated harshly, and “more likely to be denied bail, 
more likely to have to pay bail to gain release, required to pay higher amounts of bail, 
and more likely to be held on bail” (2003: 901). In a report on language use and 
interpreter need submitted to the California legislature in 2010, the Judicial Council 
reported that Spanish was the language most used in the five-year period of 2004-2008, 
representing 83 percent of all mandated service days (ISR 2010: xvi). This showed a 
strong Hispanic presence in the courts, one which has increased faster than the U.S. 
population in all parts of the criminal justice system (Pew 2009b: i). Pew also reports 
that about 31 percent of Hispanics are friends with, or related to, a current or former 
gang member, more so among the U.S.-born (40 percent) than the foreign-born (17 
percent). Also, about 56 percent report the presence of gangs in schools (2013b: 
unpaginated). 
Although English speakers may never have been involved in a judicial 
proceeding, the U.S. legal system is part of every high school curriculum, and it is 
displayed in the movies, news, and various media outlets. Noteworthy trials, such as 
O.J. Simpson’s, are broadcast for several hours on different channels instead of the 
usual programming. Spanish speakers not only come from countries with different legal 
systems, but a large part of the Hispanic population in California comes from rural areas 
where the concept of a courtroom does not even exist.  
2.5. The Spanish language in California 
In 2012, over 38 million U.S. residents spoke Spanish at home, representing about 74 
percent of the U.S. Hispanic population (Infoplease 2015: unpaginated). For 2009-2013, 
the U.S. Census Bureau indicates that there were close to 10 million Spanish speakers in 
California, of which roughly 4.5 million speak English less than “very well.” Also in 
California, about 75 percent of Hispanics speak Spanish at home (U.S. Census 2015). 
Hispanic immigrants in California bring with them many varieties of Spanish; however, 
as Craddock points out, the English language exerts a powerful influence over all 
immigrant dialects (1981: 206). Since Spanish speakers do not always have enough 
vocabulary and education to fully adjust to the new culture, their language incorporates 
words and constructions from English (Gonzalez Echevarria 1997: unpaginated). The 
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long-term contact between English and Spanish in California has given birth to a new 
hybrid variety of Spanish, commonly called U.S. Spanish or Spanglish, which according 
to Stavans is “a vital social code, whose sheer bravura is revolutionizing both Spanish 
and, to a lesser extent, English” (2000: unpaginated). The term Spanglish, however, has 
given rise to much controversy as to its use, definition, classification, users, and the 
elements it should include (Lipski 2008: 38-40, Montes Alcalá 2009: 97-99). According 
to Lipski, this “third language” shows significant differences with English and Spanish, 
and is increasingly replacing the Spanish language in the United States: “Despite the 
lack of empirical evidence, the view that Spanglish constitutes a specific type of 
language is widespread” (2008: 39). For Otheguy et al., the term “is generally reserved 
for speech in casual oral registers” (2010: 86). 
Despite the characterization in the literature of this language as the U.S. Spanish 
variety, California is home to Hispanics from many different geographical areas, and 
their contact with the English language varies to such a degree that it would be 
inaccurate to speak of “one” variety. Stavans (2000: unpaginated) explains that this 
variety is not just one language or dialect, but that there are many variations according 
to nationality, age, and class. The variety spoken by Cuban-Americans is different from 
the Dominicanish (or Nuyorican), for example. These different varieties present 
localisms, slang terms, and geographical and ethnic differences: Mexican-Americans in 
the Southwest, and Cuban-Americans in Florida, among others. Given the length of 
contact between these groups, their diverse origins, the number of Spanish dialects, 
English dialects, and U.S. Spanish varieties, the possible combinations are endless. 
According to Stavans, “Spanglish is proof that Latinos have a culture that is made up of 
two parts.” Of this variety, Nobel Prize-winner Octavio Paz has said, “Ni es bueno ni es 
malo, sino abominable” (It is neither good nor bad, but abominable) (2000: 
unpaginated). Heather Williams, an assistant professor of Politics at Pomona College, 
states that “It's a way of celebrating their culture, it's a way for them not to be quite part 
of the United States and not quite from their homeland” (Sorokin 2001: unpaginated). 
According to Stavans, this variety is not defined by class, as it is used regularly by 
people of all social strata: from immigrant workers to politicians, academics, and TV 
anchors (2000: unpaginated). 
U.S. Spanish is the basic means of communication in most of the Hispanic 
communities in California. Most U.S. Spanish speakers are first generation immigrants, 
and to a lesser degree, second generation. When immigrants arrive in California, they 
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find a new world, new jobs, and a new language. They are faced with situations and 
vocabulary that are completely new to them, and basically, concepts that are either 
unknown to them or that have no equivalent in their language. Newcomers are trained 
for their new jobs by coworkers who have arrived before them, and who have learned 
U.S. Spanish vocabulary in the same way, from their coworkers. The general opinion 
seems to be that U.S. Spanish is born out of an unfamiliarity with the languages and a 
need to communicate. Children of immigrants attend school and learn enough English 
to communicate by switching back and forth between languages in response to the 
situation in which they find themselves (code switching), but their Spanish variety is 
really the U.S. Spanish they learned at home. These children usually speak good 
English by the time they start high school, and tend to neglect whatever Spanish or U.S. 
Spanish they have learned at home. Their children, that is, the third generation, will 
most likely speak only English.  
Although Hispanics of different nationalities cluster geographically and socially, 
the vast majority moves within closed circles that allow limited access to strangers, 
even to members of other Hispanic groups. These groups, particularly the monolingual 
Hispanics, attend their own church in Spanish, watch Hispanic TV channels, and listen 
to Hispanic radio stations, which seem to be the most important linguistic influences. 
Hispanic immigrants also find this language variety at work, at the market, at school, 
and very frequently when they approach an official or private agency or hospital, which 
often do not retain the services of professional translators to translate their informational 
materials, and which are also often computer-generated. The Washington Times 
reported recently that the website for the healthcare reform law Obamacare was written 
in Spanglish, sending users back to the English version (2014: unpaginated). 
In general, the U.S. Spanish variety seems to include anglicisms with and without 
phonological and morphological integration, syntactic calques and loans from English, 
code switching, literal translations, and any combination of English and Spanish syntax 
(Lipski 2008: 53, 2004: unpaginated, Otheguy et al. 2010: 88-90, Olague 2003: 
unpaginated, Montes Alcalá 2009: 104-107, Valdés 2000: 110-114, Roca 2000, Silva 
Corvalán 1994). U.S. Spanish takes words from English and subjects them to Spanish 
phonological and morphological rules. New or unknown terms are usually either 
borrowed, in which case the orthography may be modified to conform to Spanish rules, 
or used in code-switching situations with their original phonology and morphology. For 
example, it is common to see signs that read Prepare su income tax aquí (Prepare your 
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income tax here). Borrowings may be core, for concepts that exist in the original 
language (troca, for truck), or cultural, for concepts that do not (dónas, for doughnuts). 
Borrowed terms appear in the workplace: words are created for almost every position 
(trimeador, for trimmer), tool (paleta, for pallet), and working condition (obertáin, for 
overtime). Borrowed terms also seem to begin as partial code switching, such as the 
term show, which has become chóu in Spanish TV programs. Other influences from the 
English language can be seen in terms and phrases that are calqued into Spanish, such 
as amenidades (for amenities), llamar para atrás (to call back, literally ‘to call 
toward/for the back’), and buscar por (to look for), where Spanish does not require a 
preposition. Other calques produce false cognates, such as elegible, which in Spanish 
refers to someone who can be elected, carpeta (for carpet), which in Spanish commonly 
means folder or table runner, and sortear (to sort), which in Spanish means to raffle, or 
to avoid. This process of affixation is also used to create non-words such as submitar* 
(for ‘to submit’) and accesar* (for ‘to access’). Most of these terms seem to be formed 
following phonological and morphological constraints (Poplack 1980: 586, Lipski 1985: 
64), however, some of them seem to not follow said rules, such as fidear* (to feed). 
Another frequent occurrence is the confusion of similar verbs, such as the use of the 
verb mirar (to look) instead of ver (to see), so it is common to hear mirar al doctor (to 
look at the doctor) instead of ver al doctor (to see the doctor).  
The Spanish variety mostly spoken in California has several important 
implications for the setting of reference. First, many candidates bring this variety to the 
interpreter certification exam, a variety that does not conform to the formal variety 
required to pass. Second, interpreters who are used to the standard Spanish variety will 
need a command of the U.S. variety to understand (and interpret) the speech of 
Hispanics in California. Finally, when Hispanics bring this variety of Spanish to the 
courtroom, they may have a difficult time communicating in the formal variety required 
in a verbatim rendition of high-register courtroom language. Implicitly, the use of a 
variety other than U.S. Spanish may not be conducive to comprehension for Hispanics 
who are not familiar with other varieties. 
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Chapter 3. Judicial interpreting in California 
3.1. Legislation governing interpreting 
Although the United States Constitution does not explicitly grant the right to an 
interpreter, the courts have found that this right is embedded in the guarantees to due 
process: the right to confront witnesses, be meaningfully present at one’s trial, and be 
assisted by counsel as articulated in the Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments. At 
the federal level, Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 provides that  
 
No person in the United States shall, on the ground of race, color, or national 
origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or otherwise 
be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal 
financial assistance from the Department of Justice. (USDJ 2015a: unpaginated) 
 
This indicates that non-English speakers would be provided with an interpreter in 
courts receiving federal funds. The implementation and enforcement of Title VI is 
articulated in Executive Order 12250 and Executive Order 13166. The Court 
Interpreters Act of 1978 established the requirement for federal courts to provide 
interpreters in criminal and civil cases heard in U.S. District Courts. At the state level, 
Article 1, Section 14 of the California Constitution, as amended in 1974 (CLIa n.d.), 
provides that “A person unable to understand English who is charged with a crime has a 
right to an interpreter throughout the proceedings.” California Evidence Code Section 
752(a) (CLIb n.d.) states,  
 
When a witness is incapable of understanding the English language or is 
incapable of expressing himself or herself in the English language so as to be 
understood directly by counsel, court, and jury, an interpreter whom he or she can 
understand and who can understand him or her shall be sworn to interpret for him 
or her. (CLIb n.d.) 
 
Following the Court Interpreters Act of 1978 (as amended in 1988) signed by 
President Carter (Public Law 95-539), which provided for interpreter services in federal 
courts and triggered the development of the federal certification examination, California 
Assembly Bill 2400, amended as 2370, provided for the testing and certification of state 
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court interpreters. Also, California Standard 2.10 of Judicial Administration provides 
that  
 
An interpreter is needed if, after an examination of a party or witness, the court 
concludes that: (1) The party cannot understand and speak English well enough to 
participate fully in the proceedings and to assist counsel; or (2) The witness 
cannot speak English so as to be understood directly by counsel, court, and jury. 
(CAJC 2013a: 49) 
 
According to Government Code Section 68561 (CLIc n.d.) and Rule 984.2 of the 
California Rules of Court (CAJC 2015f), interpreters must be certified or registered to 
act in state judicial proceedings. The Judicial Council was thus charged with 
“implementing the legislation that deals with recruiting, training, testing, certifying, and 
evaluating interpreters in California” (Hewitt et al. 1998: 15). A Court Interpreters 
Advisory Panel was appointed in 1993 to assist with the implementation of a 
certification program, which included the responsibility to, among other things, “adopt 
standards and requirements for interpreter proficiency, continuing education, 
certification renewal, and discipline ... adopt standards of professional conduct for court 
interpreters” and adopt “programs for interpreter recruiting, training, and continuing 
education and evaluation to ensure that an adequate number of interpreters is available 
and that they interpret competently” (California Law 2012: unpaginated). In 1998, this 
panel had seventeen members: six judges, four court executive officers, one attorney, 
two certified interpreters, three registered interpreters, and one sign-language interpreter 
(CAJC 1998: unpaginated). In 2014, this panel had five judges, two attorneys, two court 
executive officers, three managers, one court service analyst, and six interpreters: three 
Spanish, one Russian, one Korean, and one Vietnamese (CAJC 2014a: unpaginated). 
For state courts, the certification process entails passing a state certification exam, 
and attending a six-hour ethics workshop provided by the Judicial Council. Interpreters 
of languages for which there is no certification exam in place, take an English fluency 
exam and comply with the same requirements as certified interpreters. These are the 
registered interpreters. For federal courts, the process entails passing a certification 
exam. 
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3.2. Becoming a court certified interpreter 
As stated above, the law requires interpreters to pass a certification exam to be able to 
work in judicial proceedings. Although there is no education requirement, given the 
complexity and low passing rates of these exams, many candidates participate in 
training programs to improve their chances at obtaining a certificate for court 
interpreting.  
3.2.1. Training 
When court interpreting started gaining popularity and salaries began to look appealing, 
private parties and colleges (through Extended Studies) began to develop short non-
credit programs with the exclusive goal of preparing candidates for the certification 
exam. This was also a response to the urgent need to certify interpreters. As Matthews 
indicated,  
 
These certification processes, and the fact that success rates in both the state and 
federal court interpreter exams are notoriously low, has generated an increasing 
demand for the training of hundreds of aspiring interpreters. Interpreter training 
needs have primarily been addressed through short-term workshops and seminars 
offered by court administrators, professional organizations, and entrepreneurs, 
rather than through academia. (2013: unpaginated) 
 
The Middlebury Institute of International Studies (formerly the Monterey Institute 
of International Studies) offers postgraduate programs in translation and interpretation, 
currently the only offered in California. There are also several short non-credit 
programs that focus on the material needed to pass the certification exam: vocabulary 
and technique, that is, offering training rather than an education. The Judicial Council 
offers suggestions of course subject areas for continuing education, and the list includes 
topics from skill areas and knowledge areas. Skill areas include interpreting skills (the 
three techniques: simultaneous, consecutive, and sight) and language skills (grammar, 
syntax, accent reduction, public speaking, etc.). Knowledge areas include only 
specialized terminology and general law. There is no mention of translation or 
interpreting theory, intercultural communication, discourse analysis, or anything outside 
language, vocabulary and techniques (CAJC 2013a: 75-76).  
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Students who take interpreting courses comprise about half of the candidates who 
take the state interpreter exam (ALTA 2007: 52), which some take many times before 
passing, if they pass at all. The rest of the candidates prepare for the exam on their own. 
Mikkelson et al. stated that court interpreters are mostly a diverse group of bilinguals 
who in general have not received formal training (1997: 58). However, the Judicial 
Council reports that 91 percent of candidates who do pass the exam “have completed 
coursework, a certificate program, a bachelor’s degree, or a graduate degree in 
interpretation” (CAJC 2013b: unpaginated). 
The overwhelming majority of training programs offer courses that only cover 
terminology and techniques to interpret in criminal and civil proceedings, and only a 
few cover extremely limited aspects of theory or intercultural communication. Since the 
programs offer no internship opportunities, most interpreters have no actual practice or 
contact with the courts until they get to work on the very first day after becoming 
certified. Future interpreters are therefore under the impression that their work consists 
of memorizing the meaning of thousands of new words, and handling the different 
modes of interpreting: this seems to relate to the concept of the translating “machine” 
(Roy 2002: 348). ALTA found in their report that a significant number of candidates do 
attend these programs, but that this training has little effect on whether they pass the 
exam (2007: 55). 
Another issue relevant to training is the wide diversity of language proficiencies 
future interpreters bring to these classrooms. This diversity is a consequence of the 
many different possible combinations of several factors: place of birth, years of 
residence in the U.S. or abroad, years and place of education, parental educational 
attainment levels, years and place of language learning and/or acquisition, and 
employment history, among others. Although most of these programs have an 
admission exam, these exams are not rigorous, nor do they aim at grouping students by 
language proficiency level. Consequently, the same classroom may have a native 
English-speaking high-school graduate with a high proficiency level in English but low 
literacy levels in Spanish, next to an attorney from Mexico who has had little contact 
with the English language. 
Since many if not most of these students are either foreign-born and/or raised in a 
foreign-born family, many would fit the description of heritage learners, as defined by 
Valdés: “The term ‘heritage’ speaker is used to refer to a student who is raised in a 
home where a non-English language is spoken, who speaks or merely understands the 
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heritage language, and who is to some degree bilingual in English and the heritage 
language” (UCLA 2002: 1). The varied range of skills exhibited by heritage learners has 
been described by Kreeft Peyton et al. (2001: 3), Roca (2000), and clearly described by 
the University of California Consortium for Language Learning & Teaching,  
 
Heritage Learners (HLs) have skills that distinguish them sharply from traditional 
foreign language learners. They typically have high oral/aural proficiency, 
combined with undeveloped, and in some cases non-existent, literacy .... 
Therefore, in a class with both HLs and non-HLs, neither group of students 
receives the instruction that they need to reach their potential. (2002: 2) 
 
According to Hislope, “Although a wide range of proficiencies exists among 
heritage learners, much of their knowledge is normally of a more informal register 
which allows them to function successfully in their home and, perhaps, community 
environment” (2005: unpaginated). It is still true, though, that in order to understand 
and communicate in the register that characterizes the language of the law, future 
interpreters must undergo intensive training, whether institutionally or privately.  
3.2.2. Certification exams 
The only requirement to become a court certified interpreter is to pass a certification 
exam: the Federal Court Interpreter Certification Examination—or FCICE—to work in 
federal court, and the State Court Interpreter Examination to work in state courts. Both 
exams are administered by the National Center for State Courts (NCSC) through the 
Consortium for Language Access in the Courts, which was established in 1995 with 
four states to “establish court interpretation test development and administration 
standards and provide testing materials, in order that individual states and jurisdictions 
may have the necessary tools and guidance to implement certification programs” 
(NCSC 2008: unpaginated). With time, other states joined the NCSC, which now covers 
all fifty states. The National Association of Judiciary Interpreters and Translators 
(NAJIT) also offers a certification exam, but it is currently not accepted in California. 
The FCICE is administered by the National Center for State Courts under the 
supervision of the Administrative Office of the Courts. Currently, this certification 
exam is only offered for Spanish/English, and consists of a written and an oral exam 
each offered in alternate years, which means that the whole certification process will 
take two years if the candidate passes both exams. The written component has 200 
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multiple-choice items that cover reading comprehension, language usage (grammar and 
idioms), error detection, synonyms, and translation, where candidates do not actually 
translate but rather choose the best translation of a word or phrase. The passing score for 
the written component is 75 percent. The oral examination has five sections: two sight 
translations of around 230 words each to be completed in five minutes, one from 
English into the foreign language and one from the foreign language into English; 
consecutive interpreting, where candidates render segments of up to 50 words in length, 
to be completed in 18 minutes; one simultaneous interpreting segment of about 840 
words at a rate of 120 words per minute; and another simultaneous interpreting segment 
of about 600 words at a rate of up to 160 words per minute, both from English into the 
foreign language. The passing score for the oral exam is 80 percent (FCICE 2015: 
unpaginated). This exam has been offered since 1980, and in 2013 there were 924 
Spanish interpreters certified for the federal courts (NAJIT 2013: unpaginated). 
According to the Program Specialist at AOC, the passing rate for the federal written 
exam in 2012 was 24 percent, and the passing rate for the federal oral exam in 2013 was 
7.7 percent. As of December, 2014, there were 1,280 Federally Certified Court 
Interpreters of Spanish (personal communication, December 23, 2014).  
Up until 2010, California was one of the few states that offered its own 
certification exam. In that year, mainly due to budgetary reasons and based on a study 
conducted by ALTA Language Services, Inc., California joined the National Center for 
State Courts’ Consortium for Language Access in the Courts, and adopted the exam 
provided by NCSC. ALTA’s study concluded that the exam offered by California and 
the exam offered by the NCSC were “comparable in structure, content, and level of 
difficulty” (ALTA 2010: 5), however, the study “did not take into account the latitude 
afforded Consortium members in determining their individual policies regarding test 
administration and performance standards set by states” (Dueñas González et al. 2012: 
1187). The exam offered by NCSC consists of a written screening test followed by an 
oral exam for the candidates who pass the written portion. The written screening exam 
has 135 multiple-choice questions in English only, on general language proficiency, 
legal terminology and usage, and ethics and professional conduct (NCSC 2012: 1). The 
oral exam consists of three parts: consecutive interpreting, where candidates render 
segments of up to 40 words in length, to be completed in 22-30 minutes; two sight 
translations of around 225 words each to be completed in six minutes, one from English 
into the foreign language and one from the foreign language into English; and a 
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simultaneous interpreting section of approximately 850 words from English into the 
foreign language at a rate of 120 words per minute, a rate that is “much slower than 
most ordinary courtroom speech” (emphasis in original). This exam is designed to test 
candidates in three areas: the ability to speak both languages fluently and without 
hesitation, the ability to transfer meaning faithfully between both languages, and 
pronunciation in both languages without interfering with meaning and comprehension 
(NCSC 2011: 3).  
There are some very relevant differences between the NCSC exam and the 
California state exam offered until 2010. The California written test included both an 
English and a Spanish component and 155 multiple-choice questions in each language, 
which covered vocabulary, word usage, grammar, reading comprehension, and 
translation from English into a foreign language. The California oral exam also 
consisted of three parts; however, sight translations had about 300 words each (almost 
30 percent longer), and the simultaneous component reached about 140 words per 
minute (16.6 percent faster). Another important difference is the cut off rate, at 70 
percent for NCSC and 80 percent for California. NCSC shares financial resources with 
the other member states, offers exams in more languages, and also offers certification 
reciprocity among the member states. This would mean that interpreters from other 
states who pass the exam may now be deemed certified in California, a major cause of 
concern that “people who passed a flawed exam in another state will now have a 
negative impact by lowering standards in California” (CFI 2011b: unpaginated). 
Candidates may now pass the oral portion just by hitting the key words, as the exam 
“assumes that meaning is constructed by the accumulation of isolated parts of speech” 
(CFI 2011c: unpaginated) and “has eliminated the subjective scoring component, which 
tests for various elements that impact comprehension” (CFI 2011a: unpaginated). The 
elimination of the foreign-language written component of the exam is and has been 
another major concern for the California interpreting community. The California 
Federation of Interpreters (CFI) circulated a petition to maintain certification standards 
(CFI 2011a: unpaginated) and voiced significant complaints in the Court Interpreters 
Advisory Panel: by not screening foreign-language ability, candidates without proper or 
even acceptable skills would eventually pass the exam by becoming familiar with its 
contents (CFI 2011b: unpaginated). Also, by eliminating the foreign-language screening 
section, candidates lacking foreign-language proficiency may sit for the oral exam with 
no real chance of passing, which translates into a waste of effort and funds. Candidates 
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may also pass the exam and become certified interpreters without actually having a 
clear understanding about the law or the legal system. Lastly, court interpreters are 
usually assigned the (written) translation of court documents; however, this exam does 
not test reading or writing skills in Spanish or translation skills, as the foreign-language 
component has been eliminated from the written portion of the exam. 
The California Judicial Council reports that in 2010-2011 there were 2,196 exams 
administered, and only 7 percent of exams resulted in certification. The written exam 
though, had a passing rate of 57 percent (CAJC 2014: unpaginated). The Judicial 
Council also reports that interpreting had been the main occupation for 71 percent of the 
candidates, and that 94 percent have attended college. For the two-year period July 
2010-2012, the passing rate was 10.8 percent for the oral exam and 57.9 percent for the 
written. However, this information is for all languages testing; no information is 
provided for Spanish alone (CAJC 2013b: unpaginated). Although they may range from 
acceptable to excellent, the bilingual immigrant’s English writing skills and the 
bilingual U.S.-born’s Spanish writing skills were often not enough to pass the written 
portion of the state exam, which required at least some formal education or intensive 
preparation in both languages. Also, the United States does not offer bilinguals many 
opportunities to continue developing their native language skills (Dueñas González et 
al. 2012: 176). The elimination of the Spanish component from the State written exam 
seemed to be a solution to half of the problem. However, even though the written 
certification exam passing rate has increased, the oral exam passing rate remains 
significantly low. As of December, 2015, there were 1,890 State Certified Court 
Interpreters of Spanish (CAJC 2015a: unpaginated).  
The Judicial Council states that the passing rate is lower than the California State 
Bar exam because the former has no screening or preparation prerequisites, and because 
“unlike the court interpreters exam, most professional examinations test knowledge and 
not ability” (emphasis added) (CAJCb n.d.). This may seem to imply that interpreters 
are not considered professionals, and that no knowledge is required to be a court 
interpreter, just ability. For Hewitt and Lee, the low passing rates are due to  
 
the inherent difficulty of the work and ... the lack of professional training among 
those people whom courts use to provide interpreting services ... very few 
bilingual people pass the tests because very few bilingual people who think they 
are qualified to interpret in court (or who someone else thinks are qualified) 
actually are qualified. The tests are doing the job they were intended to do. (1996) 
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Some of the reasons for failing the state exam, as indicated by NCSC, include the 
use of false cognates, awkward or unintelligible interpretation, paraphrasing, literal 
translation, inability to maintain the original language register in the translation, and 
language interference (2014: 1), most of which seem to be features consistent with the 
Spanish varieties most commonly spoken in California (see 2.5). The court interpreter 
oral exam also includes very technical terminology from civil and criminal procedure, 
street slang, medicine, forensic pathology, working tools, law enforcement jargon, 
automotive terminology, criminalistics, regionalisms, drugs, financial and banking 
language, fingerprinting, sex offenses, weapons and ballistics, DNA, drug and alcohol 
testing, business, gang slang, etc. in both languages, as well as colloquial and idiomatic 
expressions from a number of English and Spanish varieties spoken in the United 
States. This may partially explain the low passing rate: although California has such a 
huge “bilingual” population, the proficiency level required to pass this exam often 
exceeds the candidates’ varying degrees of literacy and training. People attempting this 
exam may have some degree of bilingualism from childhood, but in many cases Spanish 
was learned at home with no specific formal education, or English was learned only by 
scarce contact with the language. The result is a mostly oral language that may not be 
enough to pass the exam; indeed, passing the exam requires that candidates either have 
some formal education both in English and Spanish or have invested many hours and 
funds in study and practice. Dueñas González et al. state that: 
 
Many of the candidates who have attempted the FCICE are those who have been 
raised in bilingual homes, but who have never had an opportunity to receive 
formal education or training in Spanish. Therefore, they possess a “home” variety 
of Spanish that is not expanded or developed to include other registers and 
semantic domains, and they have not developed a professional-level vocabulary or 
formal understanding of the written and grammatical complexities of the 
language. (2012: 1177) 
 
The last few years have seen the demand for Spanish interpreter services increase 
by 11 percent (ISR 2010: xvi). While the Judicial Council estimated an increase of 11 
percent in interpreter use between 2004 and 2008, EDD estimates a 38.1 increase in the 
job market for interpreters and translators for 2012-2022 (2015: unpaginated), and the 
Occupational Outlook Handbook of the United States Department of Labor’s Bureau of 
UNIVERSITAT ROVIRA I VIRGILI 
COMPREHENSION OF LEGAL DISCOURSE IN INTERPRETER-MEDIATED JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS 
Julia Lambertini Andreotti
32 
Labor estimates an increase of 46 percent for the same period (OOH 2014: 
unpaginated). 
 3.3. Once certified 
Candidates who have passed the state certification exam and become certified court 
interpreters must attend a mandatory one-time-only six-hour ethics workshop provided 
by the California Judicial Council, and complete a five-hour online course entitled 
“Interpreter Orientation: Working in the California Courts.” This course includes five 
areas: overview of the California courts, court proceedings, court environment 
(protocol, glossaries), the role of the interpreter (which only links to the code of ethics), 
and a summary of renewal and compliance requirements (CAJC 2015a: unpaginated). 
After that, interpreters must pay an annual fee and provide proof of continuing 
education and professional experience every two years to renew the certification. There 
is no other mandatory training. In the ethics workshop, the certified interpreter is 
introduced to the Professional Standards and Ethics for California Court Interpreters, 
which contain the guidelines interpreters must follow at work as well as several rules 
and standards of conduct (CAJC 2013a). Candidates who pass the federal certification 
exam are not required to attend any ethics seminar, and are ready to begin working in 
federal court.  
In accordance with the law, the state provides interpreters to defendants in 
criminal courts and, since 2014, in civil courts as well (CAJC 2014b: unpaginated). 
Interpreters may be either employees or independent contractors of the courts, and also 
be retained by interpreting services providers, law firms, insurance companies, and 
private parties for proceedings taking place in or out of court. Out-of-court proceedings 
may take place in law firms, arbitration centers, jail, and even private homes, and may 
include depositions, arbitrations, mediations, medicolegal appointments, interviews, 
settlement conferences, and the like.  
3.4. Judicial proceedings  
Legal proceedings are defined in Black’s Law Dictionary as “all proceedings authorized 
or sanctioned by law, and brought or instituted in a court or legal tribunal, for the 
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acquiring of a right or the enforcement of a remedy,” and proceedings is defined as “any 
action, hearing, investigation, inquest, or inquiry ... in which, pursuant to law, testimony 
can be compelled to be given” (1995). Legal interpreting is defined in Dueñas González 
et al. as “interpretation that takes place in a legal setting such as a courtroom or 
attorney’s office, wherein some proceeding or activity related to law is conducted.” The 
authors divide the field into quasi-judicial interpreting to refer to proceedings that take 
place out of court, and judicial interpreting to refer to proceedings that take place in 
court, commonly called court interpreting. Court interpreting also includes depositions 
because even though they are not conducted in court, testimony is given under oath and 
receives the same treatment as testimony provided in court (2012: 95-96). 
There are a broad variety of proceedings that may fall under the judicial umbrella, 
from arrest to sentencing in criminal law, and from the filing of a complaint to the 
settlement or judgment in civil law. These proceedings may take place in different 
courts such as state, federal, municipal or juvenile courts, or in law offices, jails, 
detention centers, and even private residences. Some of the most common proceedings 
where court interpreters work are civil and criminal trials, including pre and post trial 
hearings, such as “initial appearances, bail applications, pretrial conferences, pleas, 
evidentiary hearings, trials, sentencings, or post-sentencing hearings” (NAJIT n.d.).  
Trials may or may not have a jury. In court trials, the judge hears the case, 
decides the issues of fact, and applies the law. In jury trials, issues of fact are decided by 
a jury of peers, and issues of law are decided by the judge. Jury trials begin with jury 
selection, when attorneys pose a number of questions to potential jurors to determine if 
they qualify to serve as such. Once the jurors are selected, attorneys for each side make 
an opening statement about the main issues of the case and the evidence they expect to 
submit during the trial. Each side then proceeds to present all the evidence, which 
usually includes testimony from lay and expert witnesses. After all evidence has been 
submitted, attorneys present their closing arguments, which are summaries intended to 
persuade the jury to lean in one way or the other. Following the closing arguments, the 
judge instructs the jury on the law that applies to the case at hand. The jury then 
deliberates until they reach a verdict, and the judge sentences the defendant.  
In criminal trials, the defendant may not be compelled to testify. This means that 
if the defendant decides not to do so, interpreters may well interpret the whole trial 
simultaneously only for the defendant, usually in a whispering mode or through 
electronic devices. This is what Hewitt calls proceedings interpretation (1995: 34). If 
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the defendant does testify, the interpreter will most likely work in the consecutive mode 
(both from Spanish into English and English into Spanish) only during questioning, as 
required by law (LIIa n.d.), and this is what Hewitt calls witness interpretation (1995: 
34). For the rest of the trial, the interpreter will work again in the simultaneous mode, 
from English into Spanish only and, once again, only for the defendant. Civil trials work 
mostly in the same way, although parties can be compelled to testify (CAJC 2015b: 
unpaginated). 
Other common proceedings where interpreters usually work are depositions. A 
deposition is a question and answer session that takes place out of court, in which the 
deponent takes an oath to tell the truth and proceeds to answer questions posed by 
attorneys. There is no judge present, and all questions and answers are transcribed by a 
court reporter to become an official and permanent record. Since this proceeding is part 
of the discovery process and attorneys use it to gather information they can use to 
benefit their case, attorneys prepare their clients and teach them the strategies they 
should use when answering questions (Black’s Law Dictionary).  
3.4.1. The language of the law 
Judicial proceedings call for a hypercorrect and highly formal register commonly 
referred to as legal English or legalese. While the terms “legal language” and “language 
of the law” are used in the literature with equal and different meanings, in this thesis 
they are used interchangeably to refer to any language that pertains to the field of law, 
whether written or oral, that may occur in legal proceedings. The language of the law 
has been qualified and described by many authors and scholars. Among them, 
Melinkoff (1963: 11-23) enumerates the features usually found in this variety: familiar 
words with special meanings, such as prayer (pleading), save (except), and serve 
(deliver); words from Old and Middle English, such as thereof and herein ; words from 
Latin, such as prima facie and ex parte; words from French, such as misdemeanor and 
easement ; terms of art, such as negotiable instrument and eminent domain ; argot, such 
as at issue and due care ; formal expressions, such as your honor and may it please the 
court ; words and expressions with flexible meanings, such as reasonable and adequate; 
and “attempts at extreme precision” through words such as uniform and irrevocable 
(1963: 11). Other common features are often ascribed to this type of language: 
euphemisms, calques, false cognates, polysemy, ambiguity, redundancy, mutilated 
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language, lack of connectors, pervasive gerund, passive constructions, word repetition, 
constructions avoided in Spanish, overabundance of modifying clauses, irregular 
punctuation, impersonality, unusual word order, long sentences, and high abstraction 
(Berk-Seligson 1990: 15ff, Alcaraz Varó 1994: 74ff., Dueñas González et al. 2012: 
749ff., and Borja Albi 2000: 23ff.). Melinkoff adds that legal language is wordy, 
unclear, pompous, and dull (1963: 24-28), and that lack of clarity is “one of the oldest 
causes of litigation” (1982: 61); and Crystal concludes, “There is no other variety where 
the users place such store on the nuances of meaning conveyed by language...” (1997: 
390). Berk-Seligson (1990: 17) refers to a lack of cohesion in that legal language is a 
“list of sentences strung together.” Another feature common to this discourse is 
ambiguity, which in most cases is intentional and can be used as a deliberate strategy to 
prevent the listener from understanding the actual meaning of the utterance (Shuy 2005: 
13). Interpreters are warned and instructed in this regard, “Ambiguities may be 
intentional, however, and you should strive to retain them if the target language allows” 
(CAJC 2013a: 12). For example, a frequent question heard in depositions is “Where did 
you have the surgery?” Given that this question can be interpreted as “In which 
hospital/city did you have surgery?” and also as “Where on your body did you have 
surgery?,” its ambiguity can be easily appreciated, and the interpreter’s duty is to 
convey the same ambiguity in order not to disrupt attorneys’ strategies. There are also 
many words and phrases that can produce ambiguous sentences because they have more 
than one sense, such as discharge, committal, issue, provide, sanction, order, and 
consideration, to name just a few.  
Other elements found in courtroom language include doublets and triplets, such 
as null and void or leave, bequeath, and bequest, and the citation of laws, codes, 
authorities, and precedents, which have referents only for the judicial officers. The 
reasons behind the use of the language of the law are stated in Melinkoff (1963: 286), 
who devotes over 150 pages to refute the claim that it is more precise, shorter, more 
intelligible, and more durable (1963: 291-454). Other authors contend that this variety 
may involve a manipulation of language by attorneys to confuse the opponent 
(Mikkelson 2000: 2), and that it is a way to exercise power and social discrimination, 
which, coupled with a complex legal system, puts groups at a legal disadvantage (Borja 
Albi 2000: 12ff.). According to Melinkoff (1982: xi), “Most law can be expressed in 
ordinary English,” and Charrow states that legal language carries sociolinguistic 
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separating functions as well, as it is used to establish “solidarity among its users, and to 
keep out outsiders” (1981: 95). 
This variety has been described as “a profession-specific, relatively antiquated, 
and anomalous category of English” (Dueñas González et al. 2012: 749). According to 
Hale (2003: unpaginated), “The adversarial courtroom has been compared to a battle, 
where language becomes the main weapon.” Other authors agree on the role of language 
in legal proceedings: White (1990: xii) describes the law as “a culture of argument” or 
“a language,” and Melinkoff (1963: vii) indicates “the law is a profession of words.” 
Beyond facilitating communication, the interpreter may very well be in charge of 
directing the brandishing of said weapon on the premise of carrying out justice. In 
interpreted proceedings then, the administration of justice is very much contingent on 
the interpreter’s decisions.  
3.4.2. The interpreter’s role in judicial proceedings 
In a report submitted to the legislature, the Judicial Council offers this definition: “A 
court interpreter is a person who interprets a civil or criminal court proceeding for a 
defendant or witness who speaks or understands little or no English.” “The role of the 
interpreter,” it continues, “is to allow a non-English-speaking defendant or witness to 
participate in judicial proceedings” (CAJC 2006: 5). The Judicial Council also defines 
the court interpreter as follows: “Spoken language court interpreters interpret in civil or 
criminal court proceedings (e.g., arraignments, motions, pretrial conferences, 
preliminary hearings, depositions, trials) for witnesses or defendants who speak or 
understand little or no English” (CAJC 2015c). These definitions only state that an 
interpreter is, in fact, an interpreter.  
Several codes and standards guide the conduct of court interpreters in legal 
proceedings. In California, as stated above, state court interpreters follow mainly the 
Professional Standards and Ethics for California Court Interpreters, now in its fifth 
edition (2013), which includes several other applicable rules and regulations. Also 
included in this edition of the Professional Standards are Rule 2.890 of California Rules 
of Court, California Evidence Code Sections 750–755.5, and California Standards of 
Judicial Administration 2.10 and 2.11. The 2013 edition of the Professional Standards 
also included the Standards for Performance and Professional Responsibility for 
Contract Court Interpreters in the Federal Courts, and the 2008 edition included the 
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Code of Professional Responsibility of the Official Interpreters of the United States 
Courts, these last two applicable to federal court interpreters. Since California joined the 
NCSC, the Model Code of Professional Responsibility for Interpreters in the Judiciary 
(1995), on which this handbook is partly based, is applicable as well. 
Although the authors of the Professional Standards and Ethics for California 
Court Interpreters refer to it as a manual, they also refer to it as a code of ethics by 
citing Solow (2002) indicating that “In the context of court interpreting, a code of ethics 
‘protects the interpreter and lessens the arbitrariness of his or her decisions by providing 
guidelines and standards to follow’” (emphasis added) (2013a: v). Also, the California 
Judicial Council (2015c: unpaginated) and Prometric (2011: 4-5), the agency in charge 
of administering the certification exam in California, refer to the mandatory ethics 
workshop where this manual is introduced to newly certified interpreters as the 
“Judicial Council Code of Ethics Workshop” (emphasis added). The Merriam-Webster 
Dictionary defines code as “a set of laws or regulations” and “a set of ideas or rules 
about how to behave,” and manual as “a small book that gives useful information about 
something.” Since this handbook informs interpreters “of their professional and ethical 
responsibilities” and indicates “In addition to the regulations and recommendations 
provided here ... different courts have their own rules ... It is the interpreter’s duty to 
learn and follow these rules as well” (emphasis added), it would not seem to fit the 
description of a manual but of a code, as it has always been known in the interpreting 
community. Dueñas González et al. make another distinction:  
 
One characteristic that distinguishes professionals from mere employees is that 
they are able to apply independent judgment and the benefit of experience to 
resolve difficult conflicts. Blind adherence to a rigid set of rules serves no one.... 
In short, interpreters must uphold the spirit of the canon of ethics and must not 
become entangled in following the letter of the rules. (2012: 1094) 
 
The authors refer to the National Standards of Practice for Interpreters in Health 
Care, as provided by the National Council for Interpretation in Health Care (NCIHC), to 
describe a “difference between a code of ethics and standards of practice,” whereby 
“standards of practice are a set of guidelines that define what an interpreter does in the 
performance of his or her role,” equal to the “best practice,” and a code, on the other 
hand, provides “a set of principles or values that govern the conduct of members of a 
profession while they are engaged in the enactment of that profession” (2012: 1095). 
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According to these authors, standards are concerned with the “how” while codes are 
concerned with the “should.” However, the language in the canons, codes, standards, 
and laws, includes terms such as what interpreters shall or must do, are required to do, 
and even that sanctions will be applied to interpreters who do not comply. Thus, in this 
research I will refer to this Professional Standards and Ethics for California Court 
Interpreters as the code of ethics or simply the code. 
According to the latest edition of the code of ethics, a court interpreter is 
provided primarily:  
 
To place non-English-speaking participants in legal proceedings on an equal 
footing with those who understand English to the extent reasonably possible.  
To ensure that the official record of the proceedings in English reflects precisely 
what was stated in another language by non-English-speaking witnesses, 
defendants, or other parties authorized to participate in the matter. (CAJC 2013a: 
3) 
 
In general, the code of ethics includes standards and recommendations for 
providing a complete and accurate interpretation, and deals with issues of impartiality, 
confidentiality, giving legal advice, professional relationships, continuing education, 
impediments to performance, and reporting ethical violations. The code of ethics also 
warns interpreters against making “any party sound more articulate or logical in the 
target language ... than they did in the source language” (p. 3); “stepping out of the role 
of interpreter ... as one can inadvertently take on the role of language or cultural expert” 
(p. 4); usurping the attorney’s role “to clarify misunderstandings by posing follow-up 
questions” (p. 16); “advocating for non-English speakers ... teaching them how to 
behave” (p. 20); and visibility: “... to assist professionally, neutrally, and unobtrusively 
so that the proceedings can take place as if no language barrier existed ... strive to attract 
as little attention to your presence in the courtroom as possible” (p. 12). Furthermore, 
the code of ethics defines the role(s) of the interpreter in some of the following terms: 
“An interpreter’s sole responsibility is to serve as a medium of communication” (p. 26); 
“not that of an expert on the culture of the non-English speaking defendant or witnesses 
or on cultural practices referred to in testimony” (p. 37); and “No matter for whom you 
are interpreting, you are an officer of the court” (p. 28). In previous editions of the code 
(2001), other roles were ascribed to interpreters:  
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Section 752(b) further defines this kind of interpreter as an expert witness through 
reference to Section 730 et seq. of the Evidence Code ... In this sense, his 
obligations surpass the normal function of the expert witness, and they 
approximate the services of the court clerk or other attachés...” (CAJC 2001: 55) 
 
Furthermore, 29 CFR 18.604 (LIIb n.d.) and Rule 604 of the Federal Rules of 
Evidence (LIIc n.d.) state that “An interpreter is subject to the provisions of these rules 
relating to qualification as an expert and the administration of an oath or affirmation to 
make a true translation.”  
The Standards for Performance and Professional Responsibility for Contract 
Court Interpreters in the Federal Courts (CAJC 2013a: 79) state that “All contract court 
interpreters, regardless of certification, are appointed to serve the court pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. §1827.” Finally, the Code of Professional Responsibility of the Official 
Interpreters of the United States Courts states that certified court interpreters “fulfill an 
essential role in the administration of justice and in the protection of 4th and 6th 
Amendment rights for non-English speaking defendants,” and that “as officers of the 
court, court interpreters are bound to a professional code of ethics to ensure due process 
of law.” Canon 1 states that “Official court interpreters act strictly in the interest of the 
court they serve;” and Canon 14 states that “Official court interpreters of the United 
States courts willingly accept and agree to be bound by this Code, and understand that 
appropriate sanctions may be imposed by the court for willful violations” (emphasis 
added) (in Dueñas González et al. 2012: 1303).  
The code of ethics includes a long list of constraints and prohibitions but, as 
pointed out by Roy, it rarely “explain[s] what interpreters can do” (emphasis added), 
which may account for the uncertainty interpreters have in their role (1993: 346). The 
standards impose impartiality, but claim the interpreter is a court officer who acts “in 
the interest of the court they serve” (above). The interpreter is an expert but should not 
behave as one; but more fundamentally, the interpreter is there “to place non-English-
speaking participants in legal proceedings on an equal footing with those who 
understand English” (above). This view is also found in Dueñas González et al. (1991: 
17), who state that the court interpreter’s role is “to enable the judge and jury to react in 
the same manner to a non-English-speaking witness as they do with one who speaks 
English,” and Mikkelson (2000: 1), who states that the court interpreter is “an equalizer, 
someone who will put litigants who do not speak the language of the proceedings on an 
equal footing with those who do.” Hale adds that the interpreter’s role is “to place the 
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non-English speaker in a position as similar as possible to that of the speaker of 
English” (2004: 10), and Mikkelson also offers that “The interpreter is not there to make 
sure the client understands, but merely to give him the same chance anyone else in his 
place would have if he spoke the language of the court” (2000: 2). Other references to 
the role and purpose of the court interpreter are also found in Dueñas González et al.:  
 
In cases involving LEP persons, the court interpreter is the key legal actor upon 
whom the fair administration of justice rests ... As the human bridge ... certified 
interpreters create the opportunity for meaningful communication that allows LEP 
persons to exercise their inalienable constitutional rights ... It is only when the 
interpreter is able to consistently produce a legally equivalent interpretation that 
LEP individuals are afforded equal treatment on par with English speakers in the 
judicial system. (2012: 12-14)  
 
Another important implication of placing “the non-English-speaking participants 
in legal proceedings on an equal footing with those who understand English” (above) is 
the idea that providing a language interpreter will grant the non-English speaker the 
same access to due process and opportunity as an English speaker. In other words, it 
presumes that the provision of an interpreter is enough to equalize English and non-
English speakers, and that the only difference between the non-English speaker and the 
English speaker is, in fact, their respective (national) languages. However, Angelelli 
points out that “The potential [for misunderstanding] becomes even greater when people 
assume that they can understand each other because of either a shared language or the 
presence of an interpreter” (2004: 47).  
Equally evident is the standard regarding interpreters’ invisibility (above), which 
is instilled in interpreters’ minds from the first day of training and the ethics workshop 
and, as will be shown, remains one of the main goals interpreters aim to achieve. The 
notion that the interpreter is invisible has been widely defeated: Roy refers to an “active, 
third participant with potential to influence both the direction and the outcome of the 
event...” (1993: 352); Berk Seligson refers to interpreters feeling that judges “are 
listening to them as persons in their own right, and not merely as mechanical vehicles 
for converting speech from one language into another,” and that, despite the rules, non-
English speakers’ eye contact and politeness forms are often directed to the interpreter, 
and not the attorneys (1988: 280). Wadensjö also showed interpreters as “co-ordinating 
the conversation,” becoming a party when requesting clarification or providing 
explanations (1993: 364). Angelelli showed the interpreter as “an individual who 
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orchestrates language, culture, and social factors in a communicative event” (2004: 24), 
as “a powerful, visible individual who has agency in the interaction” (p. 89), and as 
“participatory agents between cultures and languages” (p. 98). In more informal settings 
such as depositions, attorneys preparing clients to testify usually instruct them to look 
only at the interpreter, communicate only with the interpreter, and completely ignore 
attorneys. Furthermore, attorneys often leave the preparation for depositions in the 
hands of interpreters, only to return at the end to review the facts of the case. Several 
other factors should be considered as well. Both non-English speakers and attorneys 
often use the third person in statements such as “Ask him... ” or “Tell the interpreter... ” 
and exchange documents through the interpreter. Regardless of the effort put forward by 
the interpreter to render an extremely close or equivalent utterance, this utterance is not 
identical and is not the same. This, in itself, denotes a presence. Furthermore, judges 
and attorneys begin proceedings by warning and instructing the parties regarding the 
fact and implications of the interpreter’s presence. It might be interesting to explore 
why it is so important that the interpreter be invisible or unnoticed, as if it were 
necessary to conceal the fact that parties speak different languages.  
Other reasons for the use of this model may be related to an issue of trust, 
whereby the language that is used as a tool to achieve certain goals is now in the hands 
of someone who is a stranger and non-professional, and who may well be closer to the 
culture of the defendant than that of the legal authorities. As Clifford states, not 
following the conduit model, in this case not being accurate, would be seen as a lack of 
impartiality, or as being an advocate for the defendant. In this situation, the most 
practical way to keep control of the situation is to constrain any possible relationship 
that may ensue between the interpreter and the defendant, and thus be reassured that the 
interpreter’s words will be exactly those of the system. Clifford also enumerates some 
shortcomings of this model. Among them, he claims, is the fact that the model 
represents early ideas of translation and interpreting that relate to linguistic forms and 
disregards other more advanced, current, scientific knowledge on the discipline. He 
claims that extralinguistic features are necessary for true communication, which would 
not be achieved if interpreters only “repeat exactly what is said” (2004: unpaginated). 
Other shortcomings include the fact that this model fails to address what interpreting is 
really about and the way interpreters actually behave. The standard of unobtrusiveness 
and invisibility as prescribed by the client are unfeasible, as has been shown above. 
Angelelli (2000: 582) showed how codes and standards of conference interpreting “get 
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transferred to other types of interpreting” and how some of these standards may prove 
inappropriate as “different communicative events require different performances on the 
part of the interpreter,” and Laster and Taylor suggest that the power interpreters have 
over language has led lawyers to purposefully regulate and limit their role to “neutral 
machines, or ‘conduits’” (1994: 111). 
An example should illustrate how this standard of invisibility prevents 
interpreters from stepping out of their role. A very common issue in legal settings is that 
some Spanish speakers may utter the term pie (foot) to refer to the whole leg, or the 
term mano (hand) to refer to the whole arm. When the line of questioning ends in “What 
parts of your body did you injure?” and the answer is “la mano” (the hand) with no 
further clarification by the attorneys, there are several paths the interpreter could follow: 
(1) translate the word literally as hand; (2) risk changing the term in the translation by 
assuming that the witness means arm; (3) request permission to query the witness; or 
(4) warn the questioner that there may be a cultural issue at play. What should the 
interpreter do? Technically, if there were no interpreter, the record would reflect foot or 
hand. But if there were no interpreter, the witness would be an English speaker who 
would not use the word hand to refer to the whole arm or the word foot to refer to the 
whole leg, because this is a lexical designation found only in certain Hispanic cultures. 
This research has failed to find sound bibliographical references that would help explain 
this variation, but the sources consulted claim that it may be due to the fact that in 
Nahuatl, a group of indigenous languages also known as Aztec, the word to denote the 
hand and the arm is the same. Nahuatl is spoken by around 1.5 million people 
throughout Mexico, around 95% of whom are bilingual in Spanish (INEGI 2005). A 
dictionary search revealed that, indeed, the term māitl means both hand and arm (WHP 
2000: unpaginated, Bierhorst 1985: unpaginated), which may help explain why some 
Spanish speakers consider it the same body part. Also, the term māitl is phonetically 
closer to mano than to brazo, which may help explain the choice for mano to denote 
both, the arm and the hand.  
The interpreter may be the only person in the courtroom who is aware that the 
record may be reflecting an error. If the record is not corrected, an injured party may be 
denied treatment for the whole leg or arm, or may receive less compensation because, 
put bluntly, a foot is worth less than a leg, and a hand is worth less than an arm. This 
decision is in the hands of the interpreter, and there are many choices to be made. But 
the most dangerous play is, ultimately, any kind of intervention, because a record that 
UNIVERSITAT ROVIRA I VIRGILI 
COMPREHENSION OF LEGAL DISCOURSE IN INTERPRETER-MEDIATED JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS 
Julia Lambertini Andreotti
43 
reflects a foot instead of a leg may be convenient to the attorney who is defending the 
interests of an insurance company, and the interpreter’s intervention may mean a larger 
monetary loss. It may be safer for the interpreter not to speak up than to face the 
resentment of the court or suffer the consequences of stepping out of the role. The code 
of ethics includes the following in this regard: 
 
There are times, though, when because of your linguistic knowledge you are the 
only one who knows something is amiss. For instance, in some countries, certain 
segments of the population may use the word “foot” to refer to the entire leg. If 
this results in confusion not resolved through ensuing testimony, you may 
momentarily step out of your role and say: “Your Honor, may the interpreter 
clarify a matter regarding the use of the word ‘foot’ in the source language?” The 
judge may then direct you to do so, call a side-bar to hear your explanation with 
the attorneys out of earshot of the jury, or use other means to ascertain the 
witness’s intended meaning. If the term in question is an essential part of an 
answer that others could not possibly understand without an explanation, and if 
communication begins to break down and you feel you can easily resolve the 
issue, then intervention by you may be warranted. But if it appears that the 
attorney will be able to clarify the situation through follow-up questions, you 
should not take any action. (CAJC 2013a: 4) 
 
 
Based on this standard, interpreters may “step out” of their role only in case of a 
“confusion not resolved through ensuing testimony” or if communication breaks down. 
Thus, the interpreter may only intervene to clarify meaning if there is an unresolved 
confusion, and even then the interpreter’s intervention is considered outside his or her 
role. However, the code also states “On the other hand, if a single word can have more 
than one meaning in the context in question, indicate so to the court. The judge will 
typically direct you or the examining attorney to clarify the intended meaning by asking 
the witness” (p. 4), which would seem to give interpreters license to interrupt the 
proceeding and ask permission to clarify. Dueñas González et al. also mention this 
common issue: 
 
For example, if it is clear to the interpreter that the witness uses the Spanish term 
pie (foot) to mean the entire leg, as is common among rural Latin Americans, and 
if the questioning attorney is misled or confused by the usage of the term, the 
interpreter may step out of the interpreting role and say: “Your Honor, the 
interpreter believes there is a misunderstanding based on the usage of a term. 
Would the court entertain a suggestion as to how it might be resolved?” Only if 
the judge agrees should the interpreter proceed to clarify that it is common among 
rural Latin Americans to use the word for “foot” to designate the entire leg. (2012: 
1108) 
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Even though this issue is so common that it appears in codes and manuals, 
interpreters are warned against stepping out of their role and clarifying the term except 
when the attorney is confused or misled. This is a frequent topic of discussion among 
interpreters in court, in interpreter training classrooms, and even in private media 
forums, and there is rarely agreement as to the proper course of action. A similar issue 
arises with the word cintura, which literally means waist, or waistline, but that many if 
not most Spanish speakers use to refer to the low back area. This creates another 
difficult situation for interpreters, who are usually inclined to translate cintura as waist, 
although in English “waist pain” is not a common occurrence and when it is used, it 
may refer to the abdomen, the hips, or even a hernia. A simple online search reveals the 
following:  
- A Mexican medical website: “Dolor de cintura (espalda baja)” (Martínez 2013: 
unpaginated) (“Pain in the waist (low back)”) 
- An Argentinean medical website: “El dolor persistente o recurrente de cintura o 
de espalda baja, que en medicina se conoce como dolor lumbar, lumbago o lumbalgia 
(son todos sinónimos)” (Koval 2012: unpaginated) (Persistent or recurring pain in the 
waist or low back, which in medicine is known as lumbar pain, or lumbago (they are all 
synonyms)” 
- A Chilean medical webiste: “El dolor lumbar se conoce como aquel malestar 
que se localiza en la parte baja de la espalda o cintura” (Clínica Santa María 2010 : 
unpaginated) (“Lumbar pain is known as the discomfort localized in the lower back 
or waist”) 
- A Colombian medical website: “El dolor de cintura (lumbalgia, lumbago) es 
un motivo de consulta común. Consiste en la presencia de dolor en la parte inferior de la 
espalda” (Díaz Murillo 2015: unpaginated) (“Waist pain (lumbago) is a common reason 
to see the doctor. It consists of pain in the low back”) 
- A website from El Salvador: “Lumbago o lumbalgia es un dolor en la espalda 
baja o los músculos a los lados. En El Salvador se le conoce como dolor de la rabadilla 
o dolor de cintura” (La Prensa Gráfica: unpaginated) (“Lumbago or lumbalgia is a pain 
the low back or the muscles at the sides. In El Salvador it is known as pain in the 
tailbone or pain at the waist”). 
As can be seen, the term cintura is used throughout Latin America as a synonym 
of low back. The interpreter’s decision to translate this term literally as required may 
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have dire consequences as well. For example, a worker’s compensation case was 
dismissed because an interpreter from El Salvador translated cintura as waist, which 
conflicted with a Mexican employee’s statement that only his low back was injured. 
The judge who examined this employee found inconsistencies and evasiveness in his 
statements and dismissed the case (Hovland 1993: 473). In this case as in many others, 
the narrowness in the interpreter’s role affects only the Spanish speakers, which would 
not happen if the witness were an English speaker. This also shows that this standard of 
invisibility might not be conducive to the equal footing purpose. 
Morris (1995: 26) acknowledges a conflict between contemporary communication 
research findings and the law’s attitude toward interpreters, who are precluded from 
mediating in the proceedings based on their own judgment. Several authors refer to 
important issues concerning distrust of the interpreter who, according to most codes of 
conduct, is not allowed to interpret for opposing parties, for co-defendants, or for 
defendants if they have served in the pretrial preparation of criminal cases. This 
presumes that there will be issues of confidentiality and a perceived or potential bias or 
conflict of interest. It is not uncommon for attorneys to hire their own interpreter to 
prepare their clients for depositions, because the interpreter for the actual deposition 
will be hired by opposing counsel. This immediately creates distrust in the Spanish 
speaker’s mind, whose first utterance is often “Which side are you on?” or “Who hired 
you?” Another interesting new development in the private sector is the check 
interpreter. This is a second interpreter who is hired by opposing counsel, and who has 
the duty of precisely monitoring the original interpreter’s performance. Check 
interpreters sit in silence until they disagree with an interpretation, and when they do, 
they communicate it to counsel. Involving a check interpreter also results in 
complications; for example, regarding the reconciliation of both translations on the 
record when consensus is not required, or creating “a risk of waiver by the defending 
party” when the check interpreter is silent, among others (Stern et al. 2013). This 
distrust is preemptive: from the first day of work, interpreters already know that the 
system does not trust them. Crooker (1996) goes on to say,  
 
Imagine yourself the non-English speaking victim of a sex crime who tells the 
police all the sordid details through an interpreter. You walk into the courtroom 
and see the same interpreter seated next to the defendant, whispering in his ear! 
Imagine your sense of betrayal. (1996)  
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On the other hand, in the eyes of the law the interpreter is considered an expert 
witness and an officer of the court. There is no suspicion or distrust in the figure of the 
court reporter, another officer of the court bound by the same impartiality and 
confidentiality rules, who records the proceeding for all parties involved. This 
contradictory, dual-role perception creates conflicting perspectives in third parties’ 
expectations of the interpreter (Morris 1999: 14, 26). In addition, the presupposition that 
the interpreter would be the defendant’s ally may be unfounded: besides there being 
different reasons to side with either party, the interpreter “might be pulled in neither 
[direction]” (Anderson 1976: 212). 
  The court interpreter is also, apparently, the only court officer and expert witness 
who needs to be supervised for accuracy and performance. Benmaman, however, 
comments that interpreters’ renditions are seldom monitored for accuracy and 
completeness (2000: 83); Wadensjö indicates that when there are misunderstandings, 
suspicion is first directed at the interpreter (1998: 19, also see Dunnigan et al. 1995: 
106ff), and Hale indicates that interpreters have  
 
... the need to always prove themselves amidst constant suspicions of infidelity to 
the original text, the extremely high demands placed on them, the inherent 
complexities of the interpreting process, the inadequacies of the system they are to 
work in, the misunderstanding of their role by lawyers and witnesses alike, the 
poor working conditions and the low remuneration. (2004: 1) 
 
 
It is not uncommon for judges to welcome opinions and objections from (often 
monolingual) lay persons, jury members, attorneys, and other third parties regarding 
how a word was interpreted, and to act on it. These are actual examples of exchanges 
between attorneys and interpreters: 
 
Attorney: How did you get injured? 
Deponent: Estaba poniendo cajas una arriba de la otra y sentí un jalón en la espalda. 
Interpreter: I was stacking up boxes one on top of the other and I felt a pull in my back. 
Attorney: Miss Interpreter, I don’t speak much Spanish but I heard arriba, and I know 
that arriba means upstairs. Didn’t he say in fact that he was going upstairs 
and he fell? 
 
Attorney: Do you usually go out? 
Deponent: Casi no  
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Interpreter: Hardly at all 
Attorney: Did he say casi no? Casino? Didn’t he just say he goes to the casino? 
 
Many studies and volumes document endless cases of interpreters’ errors, 
unqualified interpreters, and the necessary supervision that everyone in the courtroom 
must exercise, even jurors and monolingual parties. The examples above show that 
these interventions are not always on point, and many times contribute to an adverse 
perception of the interpreter by the community. Also, although it is true that interpreters 
make mistakes, this should not be entirely unexpected, provided the fact that training (or 
education) is not required, and many times the training available is not sufficient. Court 
interpreters may go from passing an exam with little or no instruction to becoming “the 
key legal actor upon whom the fair administration of justice rests” (above), while 
working in an exam-like setting under constant scrutiny, having to instantly translate 
highly technical vocabulary from any semantic field, many different language varieties 
and a wide range of registers, reconciling the grammar and syntax from two languages, 
measuring each rendition to comply with several ethics standards, and managing (and 
blocking) personal reactions to sensitive issues. This is a difficult task, which would 
seemingly require a sound education and intensive practice before assuming 
responsibility for someone’s freedom or recovery. As stated above, these standards and 
rules make reference to issues of accuracy of interpreting, specifically to the duty of the 
interpreter to be unobtrusive and faithful to the original register of the language, the 
conservation of which “is the most essential element in the preservation of the ‘voice’ of 
the speaker in combination with precise word choice and the maintenance of 
paralinguistic elements” (Dueñas González et al. 1991: 249). Since language register is 
central to this study, the next section will present an overview of the register-related 
provisions in the codes, before the concept of language register is discussed in more 
detail in Chapter 4.  
3.4.3. Register-related provisions in interpreter codes and relevant literature  
The Judicial Council (CAJC 2014c: 1) states that “Court interpreters must accurately 
interpret for persons with very limited language skills as well as for individuals that 
possess extensive vocabularies and linguistic abilities.” Furthermore, interpreters “must 
interpret without altering the language register of the speaker.” The code of ethics 
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provided to newly certified interpreters by the Judicial Council contains very specific 
rules about the register of courtroom language. Expressly: 
 
When rendering the source-language message into the target language, you must 
never alter the register, or level of language, to make it easier to understand or 
more socially acceptable. For instance, if the attorney asks, “What did you 
observe the subject to do subsequently?” you should not say in the target 
language, “What did you see him do next?” if more formal synonyms exist. You 
should not try to bring the question down to the witness’s level. You also should 
not intervene and say that you do not think the question is understandable to the 
witness. If the witness does not understand the question, it is his responsibility, or 
that of the attorney who has called him to the stand, to say so. It is not the 
interpreter’s job to evaluate and give an opinion on the witness’s ability to 
understand. (CAJC 2013a: 7) 
 
Based on the above section, the only reason provided for maintaining the 
language register is that jurors’ will evaluate witnesses based on interpreters’ renditions, 
which only concerns interpreting from the foreign language into English. Regarding 
completeness and accuracy in interpreting, California Rules of Court, Rule 2.890(b) 
(previously Rule 984.4) states, “An interpreter must use his or her best skills and 
judgment to interpret accurately without embellishing, omitting, or editing” (CAJC 
2013a: 3). The same code of ethics also states that interpreters 
 
... must retain every single element of information that was contained in the 
original message, in as close to a verbatim form as natural English style, syntax, 
and grammar will allow. By the same token, the non-English-speaking witness 
should hear precisely the questions that are asked, without simplification, 
clarification, or omission. (CAJC 2013a: 3) 
 
There is no explanation or mention of the reasons behind this rule. The 
interpretation of this canon by ALTA in their report elaborates, 
 
This means that even if a litigant with limited English proficiency does not 
understand the possibly high language level of a source message, the interpreter 
cannot, under any circumstances, lower the register so the litigant can better 
understand. (ALTA 2007: 19) 
 
This standard, though, refers to “the questions that are asked” but makes no 
reference to the rest of the proceeding, when the non-English speaker is just listening to 
interpreted discussions among attorneys, judges, and expert witnesses. Mikkelson 
provides an example: “If I were to inquire of you as to who was your treating physician 
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at the point in time that you fell ill, what would your answer be?” cannot be changed to 
“who was your doctor when you got sick?” (1998: unpaginated). Crooker gives an 
example along similar lines. She argues that the sentence “When the officer exited the 
vehicle to effectuate your arrest, did he indicate to you in any manner that you enjoy 
certain constitutional rights to refrain from incriminating yourself?” could not be 
changed by the interpreter into “When the policeman got out of the car to arrest you, did 
he tell you that you didn’t have to talk to him?” because it would be “an adaptation 
beyond the role of the interpreter” (1996) .   
Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility of the Official Interpreters 
of the United States Courts specifically mandates that “[official court interpreters] 
preserve the level of language used, and the ambiguities and nuances of the speaker, 
without any editing.” The Los Angeles Superior Court Interpreters Manual states “The 
interpreter must provide an accurate interpretation of what is said, without 
embellishments, omissions, or editing” and that “As close to a verbatim and literal 
interpretation as possible should be made” (Zolin 1981: 11).  
It is clear from all these rules that interpreters are not allowed to adapt their 
rendition under any circumstance according to the language, education or 
comprehension level of the target-language listener, nor modify language level to 
facilitate non-English speakers’ comprehension. This may conflict with California 
Evidence Code Section 751 (a), which states,  
 
An interpreter shall take an oath that he or she will make a true interpretation to 
the witness in a language that the witness understands and that he or she will 
make a true interpretation of the witness' answers to questions to counsel, court, or 
jury, in the English language, with his or her best skill and judgment (emphasis 
added). (CLIb n.d.) 
 
The literature and the codes reveal few reasons for interpreters to conserve the 
register during interpreting in judicial proceedings. The main one seems to be related to 
the idea that the form of the message is as important as its content. The code of ethics 
states that  
 
It is important to remember that when interpreting a witness’s testimony before a 
jury, the jury will draw certain conclusions about the witness’s sophistication, 
intelligence, and credibility based on word choice, style, and tone, among other 
things. It is your job to faithfully convey all of these factors so jurors get the same 
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impression they would if they could understand the witness directly. (CAJC 
2013a: 7) 
 
This applies to interpreting from the foreign language into English, for the benefit 
of the jurors. Another rationale for maintaining the register when interpreting 
proceedings from English into Spanish may be inferred from Dueñas González et al.: 
 
The conservation of the complete message as spoken by a witness, judge, or 
attorney is necessary for LEP defendants to make critical judgments about any 
factual aspects regarding their cases and be able to participate in their defense. 
This is the same opportunity offered to an English speaker: nothing more and 
nothing less. (2012: 16) 
 
However, the same opportunity may not be realized if the target-language listener 
does not share the same linguistic code as the English speaker (Angelelli 2000: 581), as 
they belong to different cultures and speech communities. The term speech community 
is defined by Hymes as “a social, rather than a linguistic entity,” and “a community 
sharing knowledge of rules for the conduct and interpretation of speech,” where 
“sharing of grammatical knowledge of a form of speech is not sufficient” (1974: 47-51). 
No other rationale is offered for maintaining the register when interpreting from English 
into the foreign language. 
From the first day of class in interpreting courses and later in codes, standards 
and rules, interpreters are charged with conserving the register of the original language. 
The only definition of register offered in the code, however, is that register is the “level 
of language.” This concept will be explored in more detail in the next chapter. 
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Chapter 4. Language register 
4.1. Register features 
The term register was initially used by Reid in 1956 with reference to a language that 
varies according to the situation in which it is used (Ferguson 1982: 55). Since then, 
different definitions have been proposed by scholars who study register from different 
perspectives. Halliday et al., who based the concept of register on the situational 
context, define this term as “a variety of language distinguished according to use” 
(1964: 87). A register is a certain functional language variety corresponding to a certain 
activity in certain context; for example, law is discussed and carried out through a 
special language variety, or register. Register is usually defined in terms of formal vs. 
informal, or high vs. low; however, these terms refer only to the degree of formality or 
politeness, what Trudgill calls style (1992: ) and Halliday calls tenor (1964: 90). Biber 
and Finegan describe register as “a language variety viewed with respect to its context 
of use” (1994: 4); and finally, Crystal characterizes it as “a variety of language defined 
according to its use in social situations” (2003: 393). Most authors offer different 
classifications of registers, and different divisions in the formality scale. Joos finds that 
there are five styles in Spoken English: frozen, formal, consultative, casual, and 
intimate (1967). Halliday et al., however, believe language has many kinds of registers 
that lack clearly defined boundaries, and only describe two kinds of registers: open and 
closed (or restricted) (1989: 39-40). The term register evidently does not have the same 
meaning or application for all authors, and the different terms used to define a language 
variety according to its use or situation sometimes overlap: genre, style, attitude, etc. In 
this research, the term register was chosen because it is the term used in the code of 
ethics (CAJC 2013a).  
According to Halliday et al., while the main difference between dialects is 
substance, the main difference between registers is form: “its grammar and its lexis” 
(1964: 88), and Biber and Finegan agree that registers differ in linguistic features and 
not in semantic features (1994: 6). This means that the way things are said may change 
according to situations and contexts, while the meaning remains constant. Hymes (1984: 
44) states that everyone uses different registers and styles to communicate, because “no 
human being talks the same way all the time.” Although speakers may normally vary 
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the way they speak in different situations, certain registers are not routinely available to 
speakers who are not part of the speech communities where said registers are used, as 
defined above.  
Halliday et al. distinguish registers according to three variable and unidirectional 
dimensions: the field of discourse, which refers to the subject matter; the mode of 
discourse, which refers to the channels used to communicate; and the style of discourse, 
later called tenor, which refers to the participants and the relationships among them 
(1964: 90). Ventola (1995: 7) adds another dimension to the context: the social purposes 
of interlocutors. Biber describes three types of bidirectional features: situational, 
linguistic, and functional, and speaks of the usual associations among them (1994: 33-
35). He explains that registers are differentiated by the patterns of relative distribution, 
co-occurrence, and alternation of markers, such as choices of lexical items or 
grammatical features, as they are evidence of diverse purposes and situations in the 
communicative event. He also offers a situational framework to analyze registers, which 
includes (1) non-hierarchical parameters such as communicative characteristics of 
participants; (2) relations between addressor and addressee; (3) setting; (4) channel; (5) 
relation of participants to the text; (6) purposes, intents, and goals; and (7) topic or 
subject (1994: 40-42). The term “text” is understood here and in this thesis in its 
broadest sense, encompassing spoken as well as written utterances, as used by de 
Beaugrande and Drexler (1981: 12ff), Halliday and Hassan (1976: 1), Halliday (1994: 
311), Stubbs (1996: 4), and as defined in the Longman Dictionary of Language 
Teaching and Applied Linguistics (Richards et al. 2010: 594) and the Cambridge 
Grammar of English (Carter et al. 2006). In a later description of situational context and 
linguistic features, Biber and Conrad explain that the situational context includes all the 
elements in the situation: the participants, their relationship, roles, level of interaction 
and shared knowledge, the channels, the main purposes of communication, the physical 
context, and the topic. The linguistic features are the lexical and grammatical 
characteristics that tend to occur pervasively and frequently because they correspond to 
the situational context, and therefore, are always functional (2009: 6). It is important to 
note that the type of relationship, shared knowledge, and interaction amongst 
participants are factors that correspond to the structure of a register.  
One of the features that differentiate registers is the lexicon, that is, the 
vocabulary that may be relevant to certain social situations. However, lexicons are not 
universal, but individual and communal. As Clark (1997: 580) points out, the 
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differences across lexicons are systematic, and everyone has access to different 
“communal lexicons” pertaining to the different cultural communities people may 
belong to. Bruthiaux states that registers “do not conveniently fit into tidy notions of 
linguistic competence,” but that they “are undeniably central to every speaker’s 
competence” (1994: 136-137). Schleppegrell explains that the requirements for learning 
a new register are similar to those of learning a second language: the input must be 
appropriate, and there must be opportunities to meaningfully interact and negotiate 
meaning in settings where said register is used (2004: 153). Cazden et al. explain that 
“thousand hours per year of compulsory education and post-secondary education” are 
required to acquire “vocabulary richness” (1981: 446), and Ure also states that the 
system of registers used in different language communities corresponds to the activities 
carried out by its members (1982: 5). This entails the idea that belonging to a speech 
community is prerequisite to sharing certain registers.  
4.2. The registers of the Spanish language in California 
Mexican-American bilingual communities in California, as well as other immigrant 
groups, are diglossic: English has become the high-register language of power and 
business, while Spanish has become the low-register, casual language of everyday 
interactions (Valdés 2000: 99ff, Roca 2000, Giambruno 2007: 70, Mendoza-Denton 
1999: 380ff, Otheguy et al. 2010: 86). Due to the lack of access to high-register 
contexts, the language of Mexican immigrants in the United States usually consists of 
“mid to low registers of Spanish” (Valdés et al. 1998). Silva-Corvalán also states that as 
a consequence of the intensive and long-term contact with the English language, the 
Spanish language shows “simplification, transfer, and consequent convergence with 
English” (1991: 152).  
Valdés and Geoffrion-Vinci compared the oral language production of Chicano 
bilingual students in a western U.S. university and Mexican monolingual students in a 
Mexican university. The findings showed that, in general, Chicano students used a 
much more limited vocabulary than the Mexican students, and, additionally, appeared to 
be “unsophisticated, and sometimes even inarticulate” in comparison to their Mexican 
counterparts. Even after years of academic study, bilingual Chicano college students’ 
language production still showed serious flaws, as the lack of higher register repertoires 
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is a consequence of the low language variety acquired from their families and 
communities. Moreover, the Mexican students, despite being native speakers, “had not 
developed the ability to use consistently the high varieties of the language” (Valdés et 
al. 1998: 494). Although many heritage learners may speak fluent English and/or 
Spanish, their education proves challenging mainly due to the different skills exhibited 
by different groups “of newly arrived Spanish speakers who have had some formal 
education in Spanish at one extreme, as well as U.S. Spanish speakers with a low-level 
academic register at the other” (Said-Mohand 2011: 97). This disparity in language 
proficiency levels is also evident in interpreting training classrooms, which usually 
include students with a wide range of written and oral proficiency levels in both 
languages (see chapter 3). 
Another relevant study on Spanish language register was undertaken in 2007 by 
Sánchez Muñoz, aimed at determining if there was register variation according to use 
among heritage Spanish speakers in California. She compared the Spanish language 
register of two groups of students of Spanish within the same college class: Heritage 
Spanish speakers and native English speakers. The language produced by these two 
groups of participants was examined in three situations: conversation, interviews, and 
class presentations. Focusing on different linguistic features such as discourse particles, 
contractions, lexical choices and lexical transfer, she found that although there was 
register variation in both groups, the academic register used by Heritage Spanish 
speakers was not as developed as the register they use for everyday interactions. On the 
other hand, while learners of Spanish as a second language used less informal 
vocabulary, idioms, colloquialisms, and more technical and formal terms, the language 
of heritage speakers contained more informal words, borrowings, colloquialisms, and 
linguistic transfer phenomena. This difference was due mainly to the diversity of input 
and exposure received by the groups (monolingual formal academic vs. oral informal 
interactions). While heritage speakers learn Spanish mostly in informal settings such as 
family interactions, students of Spanish as a second language receive their input in a 
formal academic setting. Sánchez Muñoz explains that a more restricted register range 
can be expected when the language input comes from casual family interactions and 
limited domains (2007: 2).  
In conclusion, there seems to be a gap between the Spanish language registers 
available to many Spanish speakers in California and the high register of legal language 
used in judicial proceedings. This gap is also reflected in the intensive training future 
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interpreters must undergo in order to pass the exam, the low passing rates for 
certification exams, and the difficulties that Spanish-speaking defendants or witnesses 
themselves may have when appearing in court.  
4.3. The register of legal language 
Judicial proceedings make use of several language registers, and each variety is selected 
according to the attorney’s discretion (Melinkoff 1963). O’Barr describes four varieties 
of courtroom language: (1) formal spoken legal language, which lawyers and judges use 
when addressing each other and judges use for addressing the jury, discussing motions, 
passing judgment, and “speaking to the record”; (2) standard English, which includes a 
formal lexicon and is used mainly by attorneys and most witnesses; (3) colloquial 
English, similar to everyday talk and used by some attorneys and witnesses; and (4) 
subcultural varieties (1981: 396). As stated above, this research is concerned mainly 
with the comprehension of the high and formal register of the language of the law, 
which is also heard in expert testimony, objections, briefs, judgments, legislation, 
precedents, sentencing, and during jury instructions, all of which together may represent 
the entire proceeding for defendants who do not testify, or most of the proceeding for 
defendants who do. The register used during these stages is a variety that non-English 
speakers hear mostly while it is simultaneously interpreted to them. Furthermore, if 
there are issues related to comprehension, these can be articulated by the witness and 
more easily observed during testimony when there is a question pending; however, non-
comprehension cannot be articulated during simultaneous interpreting when the 
defendant is not the addressee. These interpreted renditions into Spanish are not part of 
the record, and usually the only person who can hear the interpreter is the defendant. 
The lack of a record in the foreign language has several consequences. Among them, the 
English record will not show if there are errors in the translation (Pantoga 1999: 622), 
and not preserving a foreign-language record places limited English proficient persons 
“at a clear disadvantage compared to English speakers whose testimony is always 
documented and available for review on appeal” (Dueñas González et al. 2012: 79, see 
also Shepard 2007: 645). Furthermore, exchanges between the interpreter and the non-
English speaker are not recorded, and if convicted, the defendant might argue that “he 
was denied the right to due process” (Salimbene 1997: 653). The lack of a record in the 
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foreign language also makes it very difficult for the defendant to prove “that his lack of 
comprehension of the proceeding was so complete that the trial was fundamentally 
unfair” (Messier 1999: unpaginated). Non-English speakers are not expected to speak 
using a high legal register, but they are expected to understand it. To echo the 
fundamental principle of fairness (ABA 2012: 20), it is essential that all parts of the 
proceeding be completely understood in order to grant non-English speakers the 
possibility to participate and be fully involved and present in their proceeding.   
Halliday et al. explain that some registers are intentionally restricted, and 
therefore can “accommodate little idiolectal or even dialectal variety.” They call these 
registers “restricted languages,” among which he includes “various registers of legal and 
official documents and regulations.” They go on to say that “Except in restricted 
languages, it is normally assumed that individuals will differ in their language 
performance,” which inversely implies that there is little difference in language 
performance among individuals who communicate using restricted languages (1964: 
96). 
In an analysis of courtroom language register according to the dimensions in the 
model proposed by Halliday et al. (1964: 90), the different elements found in this 
context can be examined. The field, which refers to the subject matter and setting, 
involves the facts of the case at hand and the subject matter of the law, both of which 
are guided by each speaker’s goal. According to Abril Martí, the communicative 
situation takes place “between a professional who has a deep knowledge of the field and 
a speaker whose knowledge is limited” (2004: 219, my translation). Mason also refers 
to this power imbalance and the distance between the parties involved (1999: 148). The 
field also sets the speakers in physically designed hierarchical places, which are also 
aligned with their roles.  
The mode, which in Hallidayan terms refers to the medium, involves at least two 
languages that, in a given proceeding, are used in simultaneous, consecutive, or sight 
interpretation. It also includes written language in forms, documents, and reports. This 
language is normally regulatory, rigid, and highly regulated (van Dijk 1989: 39). 
Discourse and conversation styles are irregular and do not conform to styles used 
elsewhere. Participants may not speak out of turn unless they have permission from the 
judge, and non-English speakers may not ask or refuse to answer questions at the risk of 
being found in contempt of court. All speech must be relevant to the case at hand as it is 
“context-dependent” (Harris 1984: 6). In her 1984 study, Harris concluded that 
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questions in the courtroom serve primarily two overlapping functions: obtaining 
information and making accusations. The information obtained through questions is 
basically for the benefit of non-speaking parties: the judge and the jury, and these 
questions are linguistically manipulated as “a strategic instrument of domination in the 
legal context” (Rigney 1999: 83).  
The tenor refers to the roles and relationships among participants. Abril Martí 
remarks that it “reflects the relationships of power and solidarity between speakers,” a 
relationship that, based on “their social status, the degree of control of specialized 
knowledge, and the decision power over the service provided,” places the user in a 
lower hierarchical status in relation to the professional (2004: 219, my translation). 
Mason (1999: 148) qualifies this interaction as “particularly sensitive and face-
threatening.” The participants in this interaction include the judge, who has the utmost 
power and control; at least two attorneys, who have defined and opposite roles; a non-
English speaker, who has a lower status because of his lack of knowledge, language, 
decision power, and control; an interpreter, who has an independent or ascribed role; 
and, in some cases, a jury, which is mostly silent but may comment on interpreters’ 
performance and will ultimately decide the outcome of the case. All participants keep a 
maximum social distance; however, the interpreter is sometimes perceived by the 
judicial officers as siding with the non-English speaker, and conversely perceived by the 
non-English speaker as siding with the judicial officers. The roles specifically assigned 
to each party are nonnegotiable and the language is “pre-determined by the law” 
(Moeketsi 1999: 2). The interaction is usually initiated by the stronger side, who aims to 
assign blame, challenge and undermine the weaker side who is usually not there by 
choice, and who is usually on the defensive because he or she violated the law (1999: 
26). Furthermore, Harris points out that in courtroom testimony, speakers usually start 
from two separate and often contradictory “paradigms of reality” with regards to the 
case at hand (1984: 19).  
In a study of courtroom behavior, Erickson et al. distinguished between a 
powerful and a powerless speech style. Each has its own linguistic and discourse 
features, and each corresponds to a different role and status in the courtroom. The 
powerful style was perceived to possess more credibility, intelligence, and power than 
the powerless style (1978: 266ff). There have also been several important studies of 
interpreted courtroom interaction that relate to the issue of register or style. Hale (2004) 
and Berk-Seligson (1990) focused on perceptions of interpreted witnesses’ testimony. 
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Both authors found that changes made by interpreters influenced the way witnesses 
were perceived in terms of credibility, intelligence, competence, and politeness. The 
speech markers and linguistic features that denote credibility, intelligence, competence, 
and politeness, however, are culture and language specific. Therefore, the evaluation of 
Spanish-speaking witnesses’ speech styles by English speakers—not a jury of peers—
does not account for any sociocultural variation.  
This chapter has examined two significantly different language registers: one 
used by most Spanish speakers in California, and the other used by judicial authorities 
in legal proceedings. Since access to registers requires belonging to particular speech 
communities, Spanish speakers might not have access to the high and formal register of 
legal language, which, in turn, might affect their comprehension. This will be discussed 






UNIVERSITAT ROVIRA I VIRGILI 
COMPREHENSION OF LEGAL DISCOURSE IN INTERPRETER-MEDIATED JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS 
Julia Lambertini Andreotti
59 
Chapter 5. Communication and comprehension 
5.1. Communication 
The code of ethics (CAJC 2013a) makes clear statements about the interpreter’s role 
regarding the communication between speakers: “As an interpreter, you must be 
mindful at all times that communication is the primary objective of the interpretation 
process,” (28) and “An interpreter’s sole responsibility is to serve as a medium of 
communication” (26). What is meant by communication in this particular context, 
however, is not articulated in the code. In fact, defining communication at all might 
prove to be a difficult endeavor, mainly because the many existing definitions only 
reflect each author’s point of view, and everyone has a different definition. There are 
countless definitions of communication and what it should entail. Dance, for example, 
did a study in which he analyzed the main themes in 95 published definitions of 
communication from several fields, and found 15 conceptual components: symbols, 
verbal, speech; understanding; interaction, relationship, social process; reduction of 
uncertainty; process; transfer, transmission, interchange; linking, binding; commonality; 
channel, carrier, means, route; replicating memories; discriminative response, behavior 
modifying, response, change; stimuli; intentional; time, situation; and power. He then 
outlined three dimensions of differentiation: level of observation field (broad or 
narrow), presence or absence of sender’s intentionality, and judgment (good-bad, 
successful-unsuccessful) (1970; see also Dainton et al. 2014: 2ff, Samovar et al. 2012: 
8ff). Dance found that none of these definitions includes every possible behavior 
studied by communication scholars or offers a precise concept of communication, and 
in consequence they lead in different directions: “the current concept is overburdened 
and exhibits strain within itself.” He suggests the development of a “family of concepts” 
that would help the systematic study of communication, one of them possibly being 
“effective communication” (1970: 210).  
From Aristotle’s first linear communication model of speaker-message-
audience-effect and occasion, several other models were proposed, each adding new 
elements to the exchange: channels (Lasswell 1948: 219), channel noise (interference, 
distraction or distortion of message), semantic noise (misunderstanding) (Shannon and 
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Weaver 1949: 379ff), interaction and context (Johnson 1951), the role of 
communication in the social context (Newcomb 1953), reciprocal effect between 
speakers and speaker’s experience (Schramm 1954), communicative and 
receptive/perceptual dimensions (Gerbner 1956: 175), linear feedback (Westley and 
MacLean 1957: 37ff), speaker’s attitudes, knowledge, social system and culture as well 
as channel features (Berlo 1960: 47ff), two-way feedback (DeFleur 1966: 31), and so 
on. The legacy these models have left is the gradual awareness of other dimensions of 
communication that go beyond Shannon and Weaver’s basic linear transmission model. 
“Widely accepted as one of the main seeds out of which Communication Studies has 
grown” (Fiske 2011: 5), Shannon and Weaver proposed five constituent elements for 
what was originally a mathematical model developed for telephone communication: 
source (producing the message), transmitter (encoding message into signals), channel, 
receiver (decoding message from signals), and destination (1949: 33-34). It also 
included the element of noise to denote any type of interference that might distort the 
message, such as static (p. 18). Shannon and Weaver described three kinds of 
communication problems: technical (accuracy in transference), semantic (accuracy in 
interpretation of intended meaning by receiver), and effectiveness (effect of received 
meaning on behavior). Scholars from different disciplines soon started finding problems 
with this model, problems which are well described by Chandler: although messages are 
sent and received simultaneously, the sender and receiver are independent roles; the 
sender determines meaning while the receiver absorbs information passively in a 
secondary role; it does not account for feedback; the meaning is fixed and contained in 
message; decoding is a mirror image of encoding not accounting for receiver 
acceptance; it does not account for unintentional communication; it does not account for 
context relevance in construction of meaning (situational, social, institutional, cultural, 
etc.); sender and receiver are isolated from a shared social system; the model does not 
allow for differing purposes, relationships between speakers, power differentials; and it 
is indifferent to the type of channel used. According to Chandler, “The transmission 
model is not merely a gross over-simplification but a dangerously misleading 
misrepresentation of the nature of human communication,” and “... this model’s 
endurance in popular discussion is a liability and underestimates the creativity of the act 
of interpretation” (1994: unpaginated). 
Reddy proposed a framework to show the way speakers describe communicative 
acts by consistently using a “conduit metaphor.” According to this framework, speakers 
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insert (“capture/put into words,” “a loaded sentence”) thoughts, feelings, ideas and 
meanings inside words (“a sentence filled with emotion” or “empty of meaning”), 
which physically carry them (“get an idea across,” “give an idea”) to the listener, who 
extracts these thoughts, feelings, ideas, or meanings from the words (“an impenetrable 
remark”). Whether communication is successful depends on the speaker’s success or 
failure at the insertion process, or the listener’s success or failure at finding and 
extracting meaning from words. The metaphor framework draws from four categories of 
expressions:  
 
- Language functions like a conduit, transferring thoughts bodily from one person 
to another; 
- In writing and speaking, people insert their thoughts or feelings into the words; 
- Words accomplish the transfer by containing the thoughts or feelings and 
conveying them to others; 
- In listening or reading, people extract the thoughts and feelings once again from 
the words. (Reddy 1979: 286-290) 
 
Reddy claimed that the language English speakers use to refer to human 
communication is evidence of the narrow framework used to perceive and refer to 
meanings and thoughts, which are objectified as external to the human brain. 
Furthermore, in this conduit metaphor communication requires no effort, but it should; 
otherwise, once all ideas have been store and recorded, human beings would no longer 
be necessary (1979: 309ff). 
Craig explains that there is yet no coherent field of study that can be identified as 
communication theory, and calls for a dialogue in which to find differences and 
similarities to arrive at a metamodel of communication and an agreement on the way 
theory is defined, although he acknowledges that “the transmission model continues to 
dominate lay and much academic thought” (1999: 125). Scholars from different fields 
continued arguing that the linear transmission model was lacking and that a new model 
should account for communication as a process of producing and reproducing shared 
meaning. Carey, for example, describes a constitutive model that responds to cultural 
diversity, among other current social issues, and does not explain communication but 
implies its symbolic constitution (1989: 25ff).  
In general terms, the initial communication model was understood as the 
sending and receiving of messages, regardless of the message actually being received as 
sent and regardless of effective communication actually taking place. Pfeiffer explains 
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that communication is effective when the messages (including attitudes, beliefs, 
feelings) flow freely between speakers, when the receiver accepts and clarifies meaning 
and intent of the message, when there is feedback, when speakers are not concerned 
about whether they are communicating, and when messages are clear and not mixed or 
contradictory. Two meanings are inferred from messages: the literal meaning and the 
relationship meaning, and the effectiveness of communication depends on these two 
meanings not confusing or distracting each other. The sender encodes a message that is 
decoded by the receiver, and in this encoding process speakers translate intended 
meanings into symbols that can be understood by listeners. This message is transmitted 
via several different channels, such as telephone, media, writing, verbally, but also 
through gestures, eye contact, distance, and contextualization cues. The receiver then 
must decode the message to process and understand the information transmitted, but in 
order to effectively interpret the symbols encoded in the message as sent, the receiver 
must be familiar with the code (1998: 15ff).  
Philipsen explains that some of the main concerns, when studying 
communication, include the way speakers arrive at common understandings, use 
symbols to function cooperatively in society, use symbolic resources (including 
language) to create a sense of shared identity, and understand communicative activity. 
He proposed a speech code theory, explaining that speech codes are “socially 
constructed systems of symbols and meanings, premises and rules, pertaining to 
communicative conduct” (1992: 124-139). Communication is created and interpreted by 
speakers based on their speech codes: they contain terms, scenarios and premises used 
to produce communicative acts and resources to interpret them, so they have a 
“constitutive function in the production of interpersonal meanings.” Philipsen et al. later 
offered a revised version of Philipsen’s original propositions regarding speech codes, in 
which, summarizing, they proposed that cultures have distinctive and multiple speech 
codes that reflect what people are: their nature, constitution, and potential social 
relations; they are symbolic resources for coordinating social life, providing the base for 
constructing meaning among speakers, and can be observed in communicative conduct. 
The construction of meaning, therefore, depends on a shared code (2005: 58ff). 
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5.1.1. Intercultural communication 
Communication can be described in terms of the number of speakers involved, their 
background, and the medium. Since the particular communication that concerns this 
research takes place in a verbal intercultural exchange among several speakers, this 
context involves intercultural as well as interpersonal communication. The notion of 
“intercultural communication,” as used first by Hall (1959: 81), refers to the 
communicative interaction between members of different cultures. As with 
communication per se, there are many theories of intercultural communication, and as 
many definitions of “culture.” The field started by exploring interactions between 
people of different nationalities, ethnicities, or languages, and when the field seemed 
too restrictive, “intercultural” gradually began to include also factors of gender, class, 
sexual orientation, religion, politics, and the like. Some scholars, such as Piller (2007: 
211) and Pratt (2013: 437ff), draw on Anderson’s concept of “imagined communities” 
to argue that studies on intercultural communication usually identify a culture with a 
nation or a language, and explain understanding and misunderstanding from a priori 
assumptions about homogeneous and idealized cultures with shared social norms or 
languages with shared repertoires, instead of explaining them from linguistic 
dimensions (interactional sociolinguistics and bilingualism) or inequality and injustice 
(critical sociolinguistic ethnography and discourse analysis) dimensions. For example, 
approaches that match a certain speech style with a certain culture, or whether we “see 
the world differently depending on the position of the verb in our main language or 
languages” (Piller 2007: 216), do not account for individual and social differences. 
Culture is used to explain differences between speakers from different speech 
communities, and people are defined as belonging to or having the characteristics of 
said imagined culture. To avoid this, they propose to account for context when studying 
language, culture, and communication: “The key question of Intercultural 
Communication must shift from reified and inescapable notions of cultural difference to 
a focus on discourses where ‘culture’ is actually made relevant and used as a 
communicative resource” (Piller 2007: 221). From a simple transfer of a message 
through a conduit to accounting for cultural differences, scholars began to consider 
other contextual elements that contribute to the construction of meaning in 
communication. Accounting for the interaction of language and contextual factors, 
studies from different disciplines such as international studies, anthropology, sociology, 
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linguistics, political science, communication, and others have contributed to developing 
a field that is currently considered as interdisciplinary. Some of these contributions are 
highly relevant to the communicative event this research aims to explore, and this 
chapter will review a few of them. 
5.1.2. Interdisciplinary contributions 
The way meaning is communicated can be examined through the pragmatic elements 
factored into intercultural communication, which are learned in the speech community. 
Tannen explains that since all speakers have different communicative backgrounds, all 
communication is intercultural. She describes several communicative aspects that can 
vary among speakers in intercultural communication: what is said and how it is said, 
when to say it, perceptions of silence, jokes, irony, sarcasm and the way to signal them, 
offering and accepting advice, information or compliments, conversational control 
mechanisms such as speed, pacing, pausing, ways to signal listenership (gaze), 
intonation (pitch, loudness, rhythm), prosody, formulaicity (figures of speech), 
indirectness, cohesion, and coherence. The assessment of individual features in 
intercultural communication is difficult because they are “always measured against 
cultural standards” (1984: 191). This is relevant because, as described in chapter 2, 
participants in the communicative event this research aims to study show several of 
these differences. For example, Tannen explains that Americans do not favor 
indirectness, which is common among Hispanics. Furthermore, people from Latin 
America usually speak faster and use a more roundabout style (JCNSW 2015: 3321). 
Montaño-Harmon (1991: 418) conducted a study in which she compared the discourse 
features of students from four different groups: Mexican students in Mexico, ESL 
Mexican students in the United States, English-dominant Chicano students, and Anglo-
American students. The average number of sentences was 5.38 for Spanish speakers and 
9.90 for English speakers, while the average sentence length was 41.10 words for 
Spanish speakers, and 17.10 for English speakers. Results also showed that Spanish 
speakers do not start paragraphs abruptly: they follow an introductory or anticipatory 
stage before arriving at the topic, using elaborate language, numerous synonyms, and 
run-on sentences with or without conjunctions or punctuation marks. English speakers, 
on the contrary, used simpler and shorter sentences. For Spanish speakers, the “basic 
strategy was to state an idea, place a comma, and then repeat the same idea using a 
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synonym, the same word, or a semantically related word (collocation) to create a build-
up effect,” while English speakers connected ideas by repeating the same word. Another 
interesting finding was that while all English speakers organized ideas by enumerating 
them in chronological or spatial order, none of the Spanish speakers did; instead, they 
showed “many more conscious deviations” between ideas, while English speakers’ 
deviations tended to be unconscious. Relevant to this point is also the fact that English 
into Spanish translators usually factor about twenty percent increase in the word count 
of the target text, a difference not strictly due to language structure. 
The relevance of context in communication has gradually become a common 
element in most studies of intercultural discourse. One of the most important 
contributions in this regard came from Gumperz, who showed that talk must be 
contextualized in order to be interpretable (1995: 105). Speakers make use of 
contextualization cues to indicate “how they mean what they say.” These cues are 
features at different speech production levels: prosody (speed, intonation, stress, pitch), 
paralinguistic signs (pauses, hesitations), and the choice of code, lexical forms, or 
formulaic expressions. They are perceived and interpreted automatically by speakers 
based on their “culture-shaped background knowledge” in the understanding and 
construction of meaning. The correct interpretation of these cues is not noticed by 
participants, but when they are not shared they may lead to misunderstandings. To 
interpret the messages, participants must draw on cultural knowledge acquired through 
sharing experiences while participating in “institutionalized networks of relationships 
where individuals cooperate in the pursuit of common goals” (Gumperz 1995: 105). A 
common cultural knowledge is implied here as a prerequisite to interpreting what is 
being said, as different cultural backgrounds and contexts might lead to different 
interpretations of the same message. As Tannen’s description, this is relevant because 
Spanish speakers and English speakers interacting in judicial settings do not generally 
share many contextualization cues, and therefore might not be able to accurately make 
sense of each other’s communicative acts. This will be discussed further in chapter 10. 
Also highly relevant to this particular intercultural communicative event are the 
contributions of Paul Grice, mainly regarding the distinction between linguistic meaning 
and speaker meaning: the way things are said as opposed to what is actually said. He 
found that speakers usually show cooperation in conversation, and articulated it in a 
cooperative principle: “Make your conversational contribution such as is required, at the 
stage at which it occurs, by the accepted purpose or direction of the talk exchange in 
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which you are engaged.” This cooperation follows some rules, which are translated into 
four maxims: 1) maxim of quantity: contributions should provide no more information 
than required; 2) maxim of quality: contributions should not be intentionally false or 
lack evidence; 3) maxim of manner: contributions should not be obscure or ambiguous, 
but brief and orderly; and 4) maxim of relation: contributions should be relevant (1991: 
26-27). The relevance of this contribution to this study lies in the profound 
conversational differences between English speakers and Spanish speakers in their 
approach to these maxims, which will be analyzed in detail in chapter 10. 
Perhaps one of the most relevant contributions to this field and this research is 
Hymes’s concept of communicative competence. He points out that “What counts as a 
language boundary cannot be defined by any purely linguistic measure” because 
attitudes and social meanings should also be taken into account (1974: 123). He 
expanded on Chomsky’s linguistic competence and performance model to define this 
communicative competence, which takes into account the use of language according to 
the situation to enable a speaker to communicate with society. This competence to 
communicate in a language according to the situation is entirely consistent with the 
definition of register, as discussed in the previous chapter. Bachman also expanded on 
the definition of communicative competence to include “the knowledge of how 
language is used to achieve particular communication goals, and the recognition of 
language as a dynamic process” (1990: 83). Hymes also proposed the SPEAKING 
model to identify and describe all the elements of linguistic interactions in a social 
situation: the scene (setting), the participants, the end: purposes and outcomes of the 
speech, the act sequence, the key or tone, the instrumentalities: form and style of the 
speech (which include registers), socially accepted norms of interaction and 
interpretation, and the genre or type of speech (1974: 54-62). Hymes’s scheme for 
describing the categories that can be used to analyze communicative events is also 
closely consistent with the dimensions of field, mode, and tenor proposed by Halliday et 
al. and discussed in the previous chapter. Although they do so from different 
perspectives, most authors seem to target the same constitutive elements that provide so 
much more to the speech event than the mere linguistic component. 
All these contributions to the field of (intercultural) communication show, from 
different perspectives, the essential role of context in the construction of meaning 
between speakers in an interaction. It is not exactly the context itself, but the “subjective 
interpretation of the context by discourse participants that constrains discourse 
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production, structuration, and understanding” (van Dijk 1999: 110). Language use is 
thus considered a social activity where meaning is co-constructed by speakers, and this 
construction is based on their understanding of the propositional and interactional 
meaning of talk and their understanding of cues from the participation framework 
(Wadensjö 1995: 113ff). Also, all of them describe a code, or a competence, that is 
necessary for speakers to make sense of what they hear and be able to construct 
meaning. This means that without a common code, decoding-interpreting-constructing 
meaning would be difficult, as different decoding systems will produce different 
meanings. In order to construct a common meaning, the decoded message should match 
the original message, which is only possible when speakers share a speech code. 
Members of speech communities share a knowledge of “the linguistic code as well as of 
the socio-cultural rules, norms and values which guide the conduct and interpretation of 
speech and other channels of communication in a community” (Farah 1998: 125). In 
summary, (intercultural) communication requires an understanding of concurrent and 
integrated components such as perception, patterns of cognition (reasoning and problem 
solving), verbal and nonverbal behavior, and the influence of context. Perception 
depends on individual and shared cultural beliefs and values (morality, ethics), which 
lead to holding an attitude system of learned tendencies, social norms, and a worldview 
operating subconsciously (Samovar et al. 2012: 13ff). 
5.2. Comprehension 
As described in the beginning of this chapter, communication per se does not have to be 
successful or effective to be regarded as communication; in other words, it does not 
require that the message is received as sent or that it is understood as intended. In the 
context this research aims to study, however, it certainly does, as is stated in the code 
and relevant literature (emphasis added): 
 
- “The interpreter's only function is to help the court, the principal parties in interest, 
and attorneys communicate effectively with one another” (Hewitt 1995: 130) 
- “There is consensus about the fact that the interpreter must be sensitive to cultural 
dimensions and linguistic differences that might cause misunderstanding and 
ineffective communication” (Lee 2009: 381)  
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- “There are two basic reasons for having an interpreter present in a court case: (1) to 
enable the defendant to understand the proceedings and (2) to enable the court to 
understand all non-English speakers who address the court” (CAJC 2013a: 28)  
- “Sometimes, however, it becomes necessary to intervene in the proceedings in order 
to ensure proper communication and an accurate record of the testimony” (CAJC 
2013a: 4) 
 
As explained above, effective communication requires that the receiver accept 
and clarify the meaning and intent of message, that this message is clear and not mixed 
or contradictory, and that the receiver effectively interpret the message as sent, for 
which a familiarity with the code is required (Pfeiffer 1998: 15ff). Based on the above 
statements from the code, in this context “proper” or “effective” communication is 
regarded as including a component of comprehension: meanings must be understood. 
Understanding language in context implies that the meanings cannot be derived solely 
from literal semantic denotations but are constructed in a way that accounts for the 
intersection of linguistic and contextual meaning. Understanding these meanings 
involves different types of knowledge: linguistic (semantics, discourse structure, etc.) 
and non-linguistic (about the topic, context, etc.). Consequently, besides understanding 
the terminology, non-English speakers would need to be familiar with the subject matter 
in order to understand what they hear, and this comprehension would be based on 
assumptions made on literal meaning combined with information from their own 
knowledge (Buck 2001: 1-25). Isaacs and Clark also refer to a shared knowledge as a 
prerequisite for understanding between participants, and to a common ground of 
“mutual knowledge, beliefs, and assumptions” (1987: 26). This common ground must 
be updated through a basic communication process Clark and Brennan later call 
grounding, which is shaped by the communication purpose and medium. They define 
grounding as the mutual belief that participants understand what they mean in order to 
achieve the purpose (1991: 128).   
Several models and theories have also been proposed from cognitive 
psycholinguistics, a field concerned with the psychological processes underlying 
language production and comprehension in interaction with the cultural environment 
(Harley 2005: 4ff, Hatzidaki 2007: 13ff). Theorists agree that comprehension is a 
dynamic and highly complex act that involves several stages or process levels that start 
operating as soon as the speech (acoustic) signal is perceived and end when new 
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knowledge is integrated with prior knowledge by assigning meaning to the input. Each 
of these stages has distinct and specific functions at different processing structural 
levels. The models proposed to explain the comprehension process differ mainly in the 
degree of autonomy or interaction assigned to each processing level and the system as a 
whole, the degree and timing of contextual influence, the degree of combination of 
bottom-up and top-down processes, and the degree of background knowledge 
involvement. The two main hypotheses proposed to explain the functional architecture 
of language comprehension are the modular and the interactive views (Molinari Marotto 
2008). 
The modular hypothesis claims that there is a modular, unidirectional, and serial 
bottom-up input system that feeds into a central process. Each different module 
(processor) is autonomous and can only access its own information and the information 
from the immediately lower module, but not from the higher modules. The process 
operates in a sequence, where the output of each level becomes the input for the next. 
There are four hierarchically organized and contextually independent tiers in the 
system: phonological, lexical, syntactic, and semantic modules. The central process can 
access any information necessary to contrast the input with the listener’s world 
knowledge and the content of the discourse (Fodor 1983: 11, Forster 1979, Garrett 
1978: 612ff, Marslen-Wilson et al. 1987: 37ff, Swinney 1982: 152ff, Molinari Marotto 
2008). The interactive model, on the contrary, is bidirectional: modules interact and can 
exchange information, so that lower processors can receive feedback from higher 
representation levels (Dahan et al. 2006: 260, Molinari Marottto 2008). Theorists in 
favor of the interactive model claim that the system must be top-down to account for 
ambiguity resolution at the sensory level (Swinney 1982: 153); that the input can be 
mapped onto the discourse level before the linguistic level is complete (Marslen-Wilson 
et al. 1987: 59); and that higher levels can influence word recognition, which implies 
the existence of a bottom-up and top-down integration (Dahan et al. 2006: 260). 
Regardless of level of autonomy or interaction, several stages can be differentiated in 
the process: the comparison of acoustic input with information stored in long-term 
memory, the assignment of meaning by contrasting the input with the word 
representation in the lexicon, the semantic and syntactic identification to integrate words 
into a meaningful sentence, and the integration of said sentence into a discourse that 
must be meaningful when compared to information stored in the long-term memory 
(Molinari Marotto 2008).  
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The first step in word recognition is identifying the phonemes, which leads to 
word identification, and then to word interpretation. In brief, the word is recognized 
after the acoustic information is mapped onto the phonological, morphological, 
syntactic, and semantic information in the lexicon, and a semantic field is activated. 
Once the word has been recognized and its information is found to be consistent with 
the semantic information from the lexicon, the word can be interpreted. When the word 
interpretation fits in its context, the word is understood (Tabossi 1991: 1ff). Several 
models explain the way speech is perceived, mainly the cohort model and the trace 
model.  
Experimental research has been undertaken to determine the influence of context 
on speech perception. Research methods included measuring reaction times (the time it 
takes a listener to recognize the stimulus), priming (the potential influence of previous 
semantic and syntactic information), and lexical decision (listener determines whether 
items are words or non-words). Priming was introduced by Meyer and Schvaneveldt 
(1971: 227) and is commonly used in research. In priming methods, word recognition 
improves when the previous word (primer) is semantically or associatively related 
(teacher/student), or when the context is predictive (apples grow on...) (Moss et al. 
1995: 878, Tabossi 1991: 5). In all these cases, the reaction time is measured, and the 
first item is modified by researchers to determine variation in reaction times. In general, 
research results showed that the context does affect the input. For example, Gordon et 
al. showed that default pronominal interpretations are made based on contextual 
structure, with knowledge-based processes then corroborating or overriding said 
interpretation (1995: 313). Lukatela et al. found that pronouns and verbs facilitate each 
other but through different mechanisms (1982: 298). Other evidence of influence of 
sentential context on word recognition was found by Marslen-Wilson et al. (1980: 6), 
Tabossi (1991: 1), and Swinney et al. (1976: 155), among others. When this influence 
occurs is still under debate. Swinney et al., for example, hold that the influence occurs 
after initial lexical access (2002: 6). Lexical access is an autonomous, automatic, and 
exhaustive subsystem of sentence comprehension constrained only by acoustic and 
phonetic features that provides temporary access to all the meanings of the word, 
regardless of context or frequency. These meanings are then evaluated in terms of 
frequency and contextual information, until a single unambiguous interpretation of the 
word is selected (Onifer et al. 1981: 232). 
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It is generally agreed that high-frequency words are recognized faster than low-
frequency words (Dahan et al. 2006: 264, Tabossi 1991: 8, MacLeod et al. 1996: 132ff, 
Balota et al. 1984: 243, Forster et al. 1973: 627ff), even in noise, when the effect is 
determined by frequency of occurrence and semantic context (Johns et al. 2012: 
unpaginated). It has also been shown that common words are better identified and 
understood than uncommon words (Danet 1980: 484, Charrow et al. 1979: 1307), and 
that words are recognized faster than non-words (Molinari Marotto 2008). Lexical 
decisions will be delayed in cases of syntactic disagreement, which shows that the 
syntactic context intervenes after lexical processing. Likewise, disagreements between 
the word identified and the semantic field activated will significantly increase word 
recognition time, even when there is no syntactic disagreement (Molinari Marotto 
2008). Contextual effect was also shown by experimenting with neighbor words. An 
orthographic neighbor is “any same-length word that differs from the target by a single 
letter” (Pugh et al. 1994: 639), and a phonological neighbor is word that differs from the 
target word by a single phoneme (Grainger et al. 2005: 984). Results showed that 
recognition and lexical access are facilitated when the two words have a semantic 
relationship because the words activated will belong in the primer semantic field. At the 
same time, each identified item will help establish the meaning of the words that follow. 
Word recognition time is longer when the words have many neighbors, and when the 
input is brief, for example, words are frequently mistaken for their frequent neighbors. 
This influence occurs because the input activates several alternatives simultaneously, 
and decisions are maximized by the system. High frequency words with many 
neighbors were also easier to recognize than low frequency words (Luce et al. 1998: 
unpaginated, Chan et al. 2009: unpaginated, Metsala 1997: 47, Molinari Marotto 2008). 
Once a word is recognized, it must be integrated into a sentence by establishing 
associations among words and phrases and interpreting contextually dependent 
expressions. This process requires linguistic, world, and specific contextual knowledge. 
Comprehension involves the construction of a mental model that will include each word 
recognized and syntactically and semantically organized based on listener’s parsing, 
which would lead to the determination of the propositional context or message. Each 
new input will help update this model, which will incorporate inferences triggered by 
sentential, contextual, and general knowledge (Tanenhaus et al. 1995: 218). Once the 
sentence is accurately represented, it is contrasted and integrated with the rest of the 
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sentences to arrive at a meaningful discourse, which would not be possible without 
successful resolution of ambiguities and inferential processes, including anaphora.  
Inference resolution is one of the most important processes that occur during 
comprehension. To make sense of discourse, the listener must connect new and old 
propositions that are stored in the short and the long-term memory. If the process fails, 
an inference must be made (Kintsch and van Dijk 1978: 367). The listener attempts first 
to arrive at a coherent meaning by using logical (literal) meaning, and if this fails, the 
listener will resort to contextual or background knowledge (Searle 1979: 89, Harley 
2005: 313), experience and memories (Rumelhart et al. 1977: 110), and sentence 
meaning (Tabossi 1991: 1). Inferences include the resolution of anaphoric references to 
discern antecedents to pronouns, for example, and some theorists believe that this 
resolution is based only on culturally-acquired pragmatic world knowledge (Dwivedi et 
al. 2005: 112). Resolution of inferences, ambiguities, and anaphora is fundamental for 
establishing cohesion and coherence: while cohesion allows for linking information 
within discourse, coherence allows for linking discourse with the listener’s knowledge 
of the world. Discourse coherence depends greatly on co-referencing patterns (Halliday 
& Hassan, 1976; Johnson-Laird, 1983; Gordon et al. 1995: 313, Kintsch & van Dijk, 
1978: 365).  
The problem of coherence and inferential process has benefitted from schema 
theory, which helps make predictions about future input by partially matching the new 
situation with a subschemata (Rumelhart et al. 1977: 106). Carrel and Eisterhold, who 
work in reading comprehension, explain that words do not carry meaning by 
themselves, they only tell listeners how the meaning should be retrieved or constructed 
from their own background knowledge, and organized in structures called schemata. 
Results of research on schema theory have shown the relevance of background 
knowledge, since “emphasis has been almost exclusively on the language to be 
comprehended and not on the comprehender” (1983: 73). First proposed by Bartlett in 
1932, schema theory holds that individual world knowledge is the basis for 
comprehension because it helps interpret new information by providing a contextual 
framework from schemata, which store all the knowledge a person has developed and 
acquired. A schema is “a representation of members of a category based on the type of 
objects that they are, the parts that they tend to have, and their typical properties” 
(Anderson 2009: 428), powerful “data structures for representing the generic concepts 
stored in memory” (Rumelhart et al. 1977: 101), and “basic building blocks of human 
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information-processing system ... key units of the comprehension process” (p. 111). 
Rumelhart et al. explain that the knowledge stored in schemata is not linguistic but 
abstract, symbolic, conceptual, encyclopedic, and hierarchically organized in 
interrelated networks. Comprehension begins with the ongoing instantiation of schema 
by variable assignment. During comprehension, corresponding schemata are selected, 
and this correspondence is then verified. This process involves finding and selecting 
schemata that would account for the situation, and then verifying or rejecting said 
accounting. The operation is a combination of bottom-up and top-down processes that 
allow for the convergence of input information and the activation of potential candidate 
schemata. It is possible that schemata give only partial evidence for certain situations, 
and in that case the comprehender would achieve only partial comprehension; “The 
problem, then, is only that we cannot find a single schema which satisfactorily accounts 
for the entire situation” (1977: 113). Finally, since the information to instantiate the 
schemata comes from individual experience, the schemata cannot hold information that 
has not been experienced, learned, or acquired: “One of the most obvious reasons why a 
particular content schema may fail to exist for a reader is that the schema is culturally 
specific and is not part of a particular reader's cultural background” (Carrell and 
Eisterhold 1983: 80). 
Some of the most influential work on language comprehension has been done by 
Kintsch and van Dijk, who jointly and separately have published extensively on the 
mental operations taking place during this process. The first step in the initial models 
contemplated the identification of coherently referenced propositions from a text to 
arrive at a representation of meaning. A proposition is “the smallest unit of knowledge 
that can stand as a separate assertion” (Anderson 2009: 123). When propositions are 
repeated, their common elements help the comprehender to arrive at the gist of the text. 
Richgels explains that this model of comprehension involved four processing stages: 
syntactic analysis (via grammar), semantic analysis (via semantic memory and world 
knowledge), pragmatic analysis (via schema), and functional analysis (via one’s goals) 
(1982: 59). In 1978, Kintsch and van Dijk combined their previous work to update the 
model of language comprehension, which now had three steps: the organization of 
propositions in a coherent text base, the transformation of propositions in the text base 
into macropropositions while retaining the gist of the text, and memory recall. The 
transformation of propositions into macropropositions involves the deletion of irrelevant 
propositions and the construction of new propositions that would fill gaps in the text 
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base by global inferential processes, which involve the participation of schemas to 
determine propositional relevance. This process takes place in cycles due to the low 
capacity of short-term memory, which acts as a buffer by temporarily storing 
information that will be integrated with future propositions and deleting information 
that has already been processed. When the listener recalls or summarizes a text, a new 
text base is generated.  
In 1988, Kintsch introduced the construction-integration model of discourse 
comprehension. It had been established that word context did not affect initial semantic 
field activation and that the selection of the appropriate word occurred after filtering out 
inappropriate ones. In consequence, the model was revised to show a strictly data-driven 
and bottom-up initial process. The new process has two steps. The first step is a bottom-
up process that involves the activation of the semantic field to form propositions with 
no contextual influence, that will produce an output lacking full coherence and stable 
associations. The second step is top-down and involves the selection of elements that 
would be appropriate according to discourse context with information from long-term 
memory, and the transformation of construction output into a coherent text base. The 
process still takes place in cycles, and each new sentence updates the representation of 
the whole text and the reorganization of propositions in the text base. The model now 
consists of the combination of a propositional text base construction from linguistic 
information and listener’s linguistic and world knowledge, and the integration of this 
text base into a coherent structure (Gernsbacher et al. 1999: 286, Richgels 1982: 60, 
Kintsch 1988, 1994, Kintsch and van Dijk 1978: 367ff). In summary, this theory also 
establishes that successful comprehension requires accurate word recognition, accurate 
anaphoric and referential resolution, and prior knowledge. 
Every account of understanding discussed so far has shown that achieving 
comprehension during communication requires 1) knowledge of the world and specific 
domains to make sense of discourse, 2) knowledge of language use in context, or 
communicative competence, and 3) that this knowledge be shared by participants. 
Shared knowledge is a requirement called for by many other scholars from different 
fields. For example, Seleskovitch holds that “comprehension is what occurs when new 
information ties in with related knowledge. If such knowledge is absent the new 
information is ignored” (1989: 49), and Cameron states that shared and inferred cultural 
and linguistic knowledge are both critical for “even the most seemingly straightforward 
interaction” (2002: 111). When a person hears discourse that is consistent with his or 
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her expectations and needs, there are more possibilities of understanding than if the 
message is “unexpected, irrelevant or unhelpful.” This implies that information about 
content, situation, and speaker(s) should be provided (Ur 1984: 4). Most authors also 
seem to agree that meaning is arrived at (a) by drawing inferences from the language 
used and (b) from one’s own knowledge of the world, which includes expectations of 
behavior in similar situations, relationships and identities, institutional procedures, and 
the topic discussed (Scollon 1995: 17). Scollon also differentiates between sentence 
meaning, which is based on grammatical features, and speaker meaning, which is based 
on the context. White agrees, stating that communication is a consequence of sharing 
the concepts, not the language (1990: 31). Finally, Gumperz holds that “we cannot 
assume that speakers of the same language share communicative conventions at the 
level of discourse” (1995: 106). Identifying the words heard without being able to 
connect them to some type of context can be defined as non-understanding, which is 
one of the types of misunderstandings described by Grimshaw (1980). 
Misunderstandings (and non-understanding) can be a consequence of different types of 
barriers, which can be internal (fatigue, poor listening skills, lack of interest, fear, 
mistrust, past experiences, attitude, lack of shared experience, emotions) or external 
(noise, distractions, technical vocabulary, environment) (Pfeiffer 1998: 2ff). When 
communication has a common purpose, speakers use strategies to attempt to achieve it 
by using repair mechanisms to eliminate or mitigate said barriers.  
One of the theories that address the mutual influence between culture and 
communication is communication accommodation theory, which explains and predicts 
the strategies speakers might use to establish or modify social distance in an interaction. 
The basic principles of this theory hold that communication is influenced by other 
factors besides contextual and individual orientations, such as the socio-historical 
context of the interaction. Furthermore, social category membership is the product of 
negotiation, speakers expect the most optimal levels of accommodation, and speakers’ 
attitudes toward other speakers are conveyed by precise communication strategies. 
Accommodation is then the integration of these strategies into a “constant movement 
toward and away from others.” One of these strategies is convergence, whereby one 
speaker adopts another’s linguistic, paralinguistic, and nonverbal features in order to 
gain approval and similarity with the other speaker, which will foster respect among 
speakers and enhance communication and cooperation. On the other end, divergence 
heightens the linguistic differences between the speakers in order to highlight 
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individuality and “differing group identities through contrast” (Giles 2005: 10-13). The 
restricted language characterization assigned by Halliday et al. (in chapter 4) to high 
legal registers seems to be consistent with this strategy of divergence (Giles 2005: 10), 
which may be used by judicial officers to “keep out outsiders” (Charrow 1982: 95). A 
third strategy is maintenance, where the communicative style of the speakers does not 
influence others’ personal styles (Giles 2005: 10-12).  
Another strategy used by speakers involves a simplification of linguistic 
features, whereby speakers adjust language form in a way aimed at achieving “optimal 
functional effectiveness” by accounting for speakers’ encoding and decoding abilities. 
These simplified registers facilitate perception and comprehension by simplifying the 
input, and can be defined as “varieties of speech typically aimed at listeners believed 
not to be fully competent in the language – young children, foreigners, or the hard-of-
hearing” (Bruthiaux 1994: 136). These concepts also relate to Ferguson’s idea of 
simplified registers to define a variety used when inadequate language proficiency is 
suspected. Simplification of register in this case may be used for purposes of cognitive 
load reduction, economy of time and effort, and accommodation of others in the 
conversation (1982: 49-59).  
In the translation field, Jakobson describes three types of translation: interlingual 
translation or translation proper (into another language), intersemiotic translation (into a 
nonverbal system of symbols), and a special case of intralingual translation that 
includes rewording, paraphrasing, and simplification of sentence structure (1959/2000: 
114). Drawing on Kirkness’ view that the difference between two speech communities 
in the same language may be the same as the difference between two national 
languages, Zethsen proposed that intralingual translation also involves two codes, not of 
different languages but “of different genres or target groups.” Her analysis revealed that 
this type of translation is generally motivated by parameters such as knowledge, time, 
culture, and space, and usually involves some form of simplification (2009). Improving 
comprehension is also a goal of the plain language movement, which will be described 
later in this chapter.  
5.2.1. Comprehension of legal language 
Following an assessment of current services for LEP persons and court needs at a 
national summit where the states identified the main areas of concern, “A national call 
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to action,” a report containing the action steps necessary to meet said needs is the third 
step of an initiative launched by the National Center for State Courts to provide 
effective LEP services in the court system. The introduction reads, 
 
In order to achieve equal access to justice for all, every litigant, victim and 
witness must have a complete understanding of what is happening in the 
courtroom. However, if language barriers intrude into the process of justice and 
prevent essential communication and understanding, some of the basic strengths 
and values of our justice system are negated (emphasis added). (NCSC 2013: iv) 
 
The same report cites from the White Paper on Court Interpretation: 
Fundamental to Access to Justice, “Not only are court interactions at a significantly 
higher level of difficulty than conversational language, but they also require a 
familiarity with legal terminology and procedure and with the cultural context 
impacting the parties in both proceedings” (Griffin et al. 2007: 5). 
When a litigant, victim, or witness is a non-English speaker, comprehension is 
contingent on the interpreter’s decisions, skills, and role constraints. As stated above, 
the code of ethics contains several provisions for interpreters regarding comprehension 
(CAJC 2013a): “You, as the official interpreter, bear a very important responsibility, as 
other people are depending on you to understand what is being said. This is a 
relationship of trust that must be preserved at all costs” (p. 18), “There are two basic 
reasons for having an interpreter present in a court case: (1) to enable the defendant to 
understand the proceedings and (2) to enable the court to understand all non-English 
speakers who address the court” (p. 28), “As an interpreter, you must be mindful at all 
times that communication is the primary objective of the interpretation process” (p. 28). 
And finally,  
 
Lengthy evidentiary proceedings, such as preliminary examinations and trials, 
require considerable preparation on the part of the interpreter. Because it is 
difficult to know and remember the tremendous scope of technical terms that 
might arise during testimony, it is advisable to work with case attorneys and other 
court personnel to anticipate the subjects that may be covered ... No interpreter 
can be expected to have mastered all areas of specialized terminology. (CAJC 
2013a: 30) 
 
Legal language has been characterized as a technical language (Galdia 2003: 1, 
Cao 2007: 23), a language for special purpose (Pommer 2008: 18, Sandrini 2009: 44), a 
subtype of specialized language carrying legal force (Bednarova-Gibov 2014: 116), a 
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sub-language (Gemar 2006: 69), and “the expression of legal identities that vary 
according to systems and countries matching and weighing legal terms across 
languages” (Peruginelli 2009: 280). The legal discourse shares the features of a 
professional discourse: it is expert discourse related to a specific domain, it is goal 
oriented and situated, it has a conventionalized form, it takes place in a socially ordered 
group, it depends on a societal framework, and it changes dynamically (Gunnarsson 
2009: 1). Furthermore, the “text is often written in a legal register that nonlawyers are 
not likely to comprehend, one that may have led to the dispute in the first place” (Shuy 
2007: 106).  
The complexity of legal language has been extensively studied from many 
fields, and volumes have been written to describe the reasons for its impenetrability and 
lack of comprehensibility and translatability. Some of these reasons refer to the 
linguistic differences between the legal register and the everyday language lay people 
use to communicate, which were described in previous chapters. The other type of 
reasons refer to its nature as a system-bound language (Peruginelli 2009: 280, de Groot 
1987: 796, Jopek-Boslacka 2011: 16, Pommer 2008: 18, Šarčević 1997: 233, Cao 2007: 
23). What this means is that it is mandatorily bound to a specific legal system because it 
is self-referential (Šarčević 1997: 230) and lacks a “common knowledge base or 
universal operative referents” (Harvey 2002: 179, Peruginelli 2009: 286). Legal 
concepts vary across legal systems and may denote divergent realities (Peruginelli 2009: 
286), as “there is, for the most part, no international jargon in jurisprudence” (de Groot 
1987: 796).  
Although court interpreting and legal translation differ in their mode of practice, 
they have in common the conveyance of content between cultural and legal systems. 
The main challenges of legal translation, “translation” being understood and used here 
and in this thesis in the broadest sense of the term, involve lack of semantic 
correspondence across legal systems (de Groot et al. 2006: unpaginated, de Groot 1987: 
799, Šarčević 1997: 233, Mattila 2006: 105), structural asymmetry between common 
law and civil law systems (de Groot 1987: 798, Pommer 2008: 18, Kocbek 2008: 
unpaginated, Galdia 2003: 4, Blomquist 2006: 305), the presence of dangerous 
ambiguities (Peruginelli 2009: 280, Blomquist 2006: 305ff), abstractions (Peruginelli 
2009: 285, Heylen et al. 2014: unpaginated), false cognates (de Groot 1987: 808), the 
poor quality of many legal dictionaries (de Groot et al. 2006, 2008: unpaginated), 
conceptual incongruence between legal systems (Šarčević 1997: 229, Bednarova-Gibov 
UNIVERSITAT ROVIRA I VIRGILI 
COMPREHENSION OF LEGAL DISCOURSE IN INTERPRETER-MEDIATED JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS 
Julia Lambertini Andreotti
79 
2014: 117), lack of correspondence between culture-bound terms (concepts, procedures, 
institutions) (Harvey 2002: 180, Peruginelli 2009: 286) that may be untranslatable or 
non-existent in other cultures (Messier 1999: 1403, Šarčević 1997: 233), varying 
degrees of relevance and meaningfulness across cultures (Goddard 2009: 173), implicit 
or explicit intertextuality (Sandrini 2009: 37), and specialized non-defined terminology 
unknown to the target-language receiver (Gibbons 1999). Communicating in legal 
language is difficult not only for members of other cultures, but also for future 
interpreters who must learn it in order to practice. Learning an expert language and 
discourse, that is, a gradual socialization into a specific professional community, is 
achieved through a specialized education and career (Gunnarsson 2009: 6). Besides 
learning the language, translators also need to acquire skills and interdisciplinary 
knowledge to be able to compare legal terminology across legal systems (Kocbek 2008: 
unpaginated). The fidelity translators must seek has shifted from the source text to the 
“uniform intent” of the legislator’s intended meaning (Šarčević 1997: 112). 
Given the lack of structural and conceptual correspondence between the two 
legal systems, the feasibility of achieving full legal equivalence between source and 
target legal terms from different legal systems is also called into question, and it is 
generally believed to be a serious problem (Perguginelli 2010: 285), rare (de Groot et al. 
2006, 2008: unpaginated), severely challenged (Pommer 2008: 20), incomplete (Heylen 
et al. 2014: unpaginated), or not possible (Sandrini 1999: 102, 1996: 1, 2014: 147, 
Kocbek 2008: unpaginated, Galdia 2003: 1ff): “Since the meaning of legal text is 
determined primarily by legal context, lawyers now admit that the presumption of the 
equal meaning of parallel texts is an illusion that cannot be achieved in practice” 
(Šarčević 1997: 70, citing Didier 1990). The type of equivalence sought for terms 
belonging to different legal systems should be functional (de Groot et al. 2006: 
unpaginated, Simonnæs 2013: 154ff), conceptual correspondence through a flexible 
comparative approach that would establish stages of comparability (Sandrini 1996: 3), 
or even tiered: near, partial, or non-equivalence (Šarčević 1997: 238-239). The slim 
chances of achieving a full equivalence between legal terms across legal systems has 
prompted scholars to propose new techniques to apply in these cases. For example, de 
Groot et al. propose either preserving the source non-translated term (with a comment 
such as “comparable to... ”), paraphrasing (what Šarčević calls descriptive translation 
1997: 252), or creating a neologism (a term not belonging in the target legal system) 
(2006: unpaginated). Sandrini, on the other hand, believes that creating new terms, 
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borrowing, or providing literal translations is very dangerous unless they are 
accompanied by a description of the difference between the terms in their legal context, 
which would prevent the target-language receiver from believing that the neologism or 
literal translation belongs in their language (1996: 7). Target-language receivers’ 
expectations and needs and the intended function and status of the target text will 
determine the translator’s decision to use a functionally equivalent term, a word-for-
word translation, a reproduction or transliteration of the source term, or a descriptive or 
self explanatory translation (Harvey 2000).  
The translation of legal language, accordingly, involves translating between 
different legal systems (Cao 2007, Šarčević 1997: 229, Bednarova-Gibov 2014: 117) by 
comparing and contrasting them, which requires translating the entire context (de Groot 
1987: 795). Sandrini calls for a systematic approach that will allow the “functional 
analysis of concepts within their legal environment” (1996: 5). This type of translation 
for specific purpose (Simonnæs 2013: 150), which aims to arrive at a clear and 
conceptually comprehensible target (Pommer 2008: 18), requires working with far more 
than words because language, thought, and culture are reciprocally related and 
interconnected (Martin et al. 2012: 4). This comparison to find differences and 
similarities between legal systems in context, or comparative law, could be seen as “a 
middle step in a three-step translation process” (Bocquet 1994:7, in Šarčević 1997: 
114), and is the starting point for legal translation, which has been deemed “an act of 
comparative law” (de Groot 1987: 800, de Groot et al. 2006: unpaginated, 1998:2, 
Simonnæs 2013: 154).  
Besides being system-bound, legal language is also culture-bound (Simonnæs 
2013: 153, Peruginelli 2009: 282, Cao 2007: 23, Šarčević 1997: 12, de Groot 1987: 795, 
Harvey 2000: 1). The knowledge gap created by the lack of equivalent legal terms 
across legal systems can lead to asymmetries between experts and lay people, causing 
comprehension problems (Gunnarsson 2009: 7, James 2007, Shuy 2007), and the same 
is true for asymmetries across cultures for people who have no experience with the other 
legal system (Kuykendall et al. 2008, James 2007, Goddard 2009, Martin et al. 2012, 
Roy J. 1990, Goldflam 1995, Powell and Bartholomew 2003). Cultural 
misunderstandings in this context are also due to the fact that the cultural background 
determines the way the justice system is perceived (Messier 1999), including beliefs 
about due process and what constitutes criminal behavior (Martin et al. 2012, James 
2007). The way people relate to the court system and define the fundamental legal 
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concepts is greatly influenced by their culture. The differences between cultures, 
languages, and literacy levels added to the disassociation of language, culture, and 
immigration status can hinder mutual comprehension between courts and non-English 
speakers, mainly in terms of situational expectations and legal consequences (Martin et 
al. 2012). The comprehension of legal language and the justice system in general is 
hindered by the limited exposure to written language, to legal language, to the legal 
system, and insufficient education and resources (Martin et al. 2012, Messier 1999). 
Among non-English speakers, the U.S. language of the law can be considered an 
artificial construct, because the words they hear are either unknown or used with 
different meanings, connected in awkward ways to describe a foreign reality, so much 
so that interpreters continue to argue over which words best express a given 
terminology (Edwards 1995: 97). In legal translation, the information provided about 
the source content should be explicit, extensive, and precise, and the translator should 
complement it with facts that would make target receivers from different cultures 
understand this information fully (Chromá 2004: 49). 
An area of the law that has received a great deal of attention, for example, is the 
comprehension of the Miranda warning (or right) (Pavlenko 2008, Russell 2000, Shuy 
1997, Berk-Seligson 2002, Gibbons 2001, Nakane 2007, Cotterill 2000, Vernon et al. 
1978, Rogers et al. 2011, 2007, Powell et al. 2003). Basically, this is a warning given by 
police to criminal suspects (sometimes in writing) who are informed that they have the 
right to remain silent, that everything they say can be used against them, that they have 
the right to an attorney during questioning, and that one will be provided if they cannot 
afford one. The aim of this warning is to afford suspects protection against self-
incrimination. The right to remain silent will probably be misunderstood by people who 
are not familiar with the U.S. legal system, particularly when they are willing to 
cooperate but authorities, despite having assured them of their right to remain silent, 
keep asking them questions (Powell et al. 2003, Roy 1990). But the bottom line is that 
according to the law, non-English speakers in legal settings must understand the 
proceedings. When people do not understand the law, they may not be aware that they 
are breaking it, or that their own rights may be violated. Therefore, it is essential to 
break any language barriers to justice so that all can understand the law equally and 
communicate effectively (Johnson 1993: 56). 
Some of the most influential research on the comprehension of English legal 
language was undertaken by Charrow and Charrow, who focused on the 
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comprehensibility of jury instructions by prospective jurors. First, they asked jurors to 
paraphrase fourteen jury instructions, and later analyzed the results and identified the 
constructions and terminology that caused comprehension problems. These instructions 
were then redrafted by eliminating these problematic items and the researchers repeated 
the paraphrasing task with new jurors. They obtained positive results that showed an 
improvement in comprehension, and were also able to identify specific features of legal 
language and jury instructions that might be misunderstood by lay people (1979: 1311). 
They also developed an “empirical psycholinguistic methodology” that would allow the 
legal and the private sector to ascertain the comprehensibility of documents for target 
audiences and help understand what linguistic features hinder comprehension (1979: 
1308). They found that only 59 percent of the instructions were understood by jurors in 
this experiment, and concluded that jurors’ lack of comprehension was related to the 
difficulty of the language, and not of the ideas (DuBay 2004: 41-42). Another study by 
Charrow and Charrow showed that the comprehensibility of jury instructions increased 
considerably when they were simplified through “principles derived from linguistic 
theories of syntax and discourse structure, speech acts, and conversational rules” 
(Charrow et al. 1982: 86). In another study conducted by Benson (1984-85) with law 
students and lawyers, he administered cloze tests with three of Charrow and Charrow’s 
simplified instructions. The results showed that law students and lawyers understood 
almost all of the written instructions and that sentence length might have contributed to 
the level of comprehensibility. Gunnarsson conducted another study involving the 
comprehensibility of legal language (1984). She developed a functional 
comprehensibility theory whereby the text perspective and orientation were guided by 
its function. Several legal texts were rewritten with two perspectives in mind: that of the 
court, and that of the citizen. The new version of the documents contained language that 
was simpler, clearer, void of references to other cases, and had more “normal” 
vocabulary. Results indicated that the rewritten texts were better understood by all 
groups. Dueñas González studied the register of courtroom language to “empirically 
devise indices of complexity that could be used as a set of constructs for testing 
functional English proficiency,” and found that this language had an “average difficulty 
level of grade 14 ... comparable to second-year college texts and approximated the 
complexity of graduate record examinations” (Dueñas González 1977). Moore and 
Mamiya state that immigrants must have completed at least twelve years of education in 
both languages to be considered bilingual in a legal proceeding. They go on to state,  
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In addition, to possess sufficient English skills to understand as much of the 
proceeding as an English speaker would, the immigrant party must possess the 
same familiarity with English legal terms as a native English speaker (for 
example, most U.S.-born people know the meaning of words like ‘jury,’ 
‘defendant,’ ‘judgment,’ ‘prosecutor,’ and so forth) (emphasis added). (1999: 32)  
 
This familiarity is not only related to highly technical terminology, but also to 
simple everyday terms used with different meanings. For example, when attorneys 
prepare their clients for a deposition, they explain that there will be a court reporter 
present who will take down the proceedings. Most English speakers are familiar with 
the term court reporter as they see them in movies and TV shows, but its meaning is 
also easy to infer for them because the terms court and reporter are extremely common 
in the English language and are not high register terms. In Spanish, however, this term 
is translated as estenógrafa or taquígrafa, which are very unusual terms generally not 
familiar to lay Spanish speakers unless they are learned in context. 
In the opinion of some authors and authorities, defendants will speak up if they 
do not understand, prompting attorneys to rephrase the questions (Dueñas González et 
al. 2012: 1097, Trabing 2002: 30, Mikkelson 2000: 60), but this may prove rather 
difficult for many reasons. First, many aspects of the proceeding cannot be rephrased, as 
they are elements of the system that would require long and frequent explanations. 
Second, when the high register is mostly used, the non-English speaker is not part of a 
conversation and discourse is not addressed to him: he is listening to simultaneously 
interpreted language and cannot interrupt the judge, the attorneys, or the interpreter. 
Third, for sociocultural reasons and out of acquiescence, they may fail to disagree or 
interrupt the proceedings to ask for clarification. As Bauer explains, immigrants from 
some non-U.S. cultures who come from repressive countries commonly show respect by 
agreeing with the facts presented by government authorities, even when they know the 
facts are not true (1999: 9-18). The way people relate to the court system and define the 
fundamental legal concepts is greatly influenced by their culture. The NSW Bench 
Book explains that cultural differences influence the way people “present themselves 
and behave in court,” the way they address others, the way they perceive and treat 
family members, their relationship to authority figures, their appearance, body language, 
and the “different understanding and experiences of how legal and court systems work 
and what they are capable of.” Cultural differences may also lead people to remain 
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silent or avoid answering certain questions because they do not understand what is 
happening or what they are required to do, because the question is too personal or 
private, or because the answer should not be heard by authorities, family members, or 
people from of the opposite sex (JCNSW 2015). The differences between cultures, 
languages, and literacy levels, added to the disassociation of language, culture, and 
immigration status, can hinder mutual comprehension between courts and non-English 
speakers, mainly in terms of situational expectations and legal consequences (Martin et 
al. 2012).  
In a survey of judges, attorneys, and interpreters that Moore conducted in several 
states regarding the participation of immigrants in court hearings, interpreters reported 
that immigrants’ comprehension is often poor, but that they always say they understand 
(1999: 172). Schauber indicates that “They listen attentively and nod their heads, as if, 
you think, they understand. A few minutes later, you see them doing something entirely 
opposite of what you had just told them to do.” The reasons cited are related to respect, 
an unwillingness to interrupt the speaker or look stupid, to hide the lack of 
understanding, and to please the boss (2001; see also Cooke 1998, Powell et al. 2003, 
James 2007). This tendency to agree and say “yes” in agreement, even when there is no 
comprehension, is known as “gratuitous acquiescence” or “gratuitous concurrence.” 
Moreover, it is frequent among U.S. Hispanics and Mexicans to agree and answer 
affirmatively, no matter the question (Berk Seligson 2009: 104, Dueñas González et al. 
2012: 195, Buys et al. 2010: 471, James 2007, Powell et al. 2003); they “avoid openly 
admitting misunderstandings and have considerable difficulty directly confronting 
issues in the face of authority” (Dueñas González et al. 2012: 605).  
There are also different cultural values at stake, as reviewed in chapter 2. In 
Mexico, for example, contradicting authorities is considered an act of extreme 
impoliteness. It is recommended that authorities “avoid asking questions in forms that 
imply the answer, such as ‘Is it not true that... ?” (Palerm et al. 1999: 92). The code of 
ethics also states that  
 
For instance, expert testimony as to whether a non-English speaker has clearly 
understood a police officer’s questions as uttered in the foreign language is 
beyond an interpreter’s expertise. A psychologist might be better suited to 
provide this kind of testimony. Even if an attorney seeks to consult you on similar 
issues, or you feel you have valuable opinions and experience to offer, it is wise 
to refrain from commenting, even in an informal setting. (2013a: 37) 
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 Interpreters, in fact, might be able to infer when an interlocutor is not 
understanding, just as any other person may infer that the other in an everyday 
conversation is not understanding what they say. According to Clark (2004), speakers 
use voices, faces, workspaces, bodies, and shared scenes to monitor not only 
themselves, but also their addressees in bilateral situations. Furthermore, speakers may 
infer each other’s global understanding, non-comprehension and misunderstandings 
(Foppa 1995: 152). When someone observes two people speaking in a language that is 
unfamiliar to the observer, it would be highly unlikely that this observer will see or 
notice signs of non-comprehension because of the unfamiliarity with the language, 
gestures, or facial expressions that denote non-comprehension. The same situation can 
be applied to the court setting: authorities may not notice misunderstandings or non-
comprehension that interpreters do because English speakers do not share the linguistic 
or sociocultural context of the non-English speaker. The California Commission on 
Access to Justice published a report on the language barriers to justice. In reference to 
the adversarial judicial system, the report stated that just results are “unachievable if one 
party lacks the ability to understand or communicate at any stage of the proceedings,” 
which becomes a “babble of voices.” The report goes on to say that “Allowing 
proceedings to continue when one party is incapable of participating fully significantly 
impairs the quality of the process and its results” (CCAJ 2005: 32).  
Melinkoff (1963: 420) states “the lawyer is primarily a communicating man. His 
words are more and more overheard by non-lawyers ... He runs the constant risk of 
misjudging or forgetting his audience” (emphasis in original). The language of the law 
is a variety that is difficult to understand, even for English speakers and for law 
students, who experience it as a foreign language (Alcaraz Varó 1994: 72), and people 
with little or no education may not understand it at all (Mikkelson 2000: 60). Even 
native English speakers who want to become interpreters or attorneys must undergo 
years of training before they can understand and communicate what happens in court, as 
it is a language that “has to be taught” (Melinkoff 1982: 109). This is supported also by 
Charrow et al., who indicate that it is controlled by a fraction of the population, and its 
acquisition requires a specialized education (1982: 82), and Dueñas González et al.:  
 
The ability to understand the more complex, less frequently used vocabulary and 
syntactic styles representative of formal registers, for example, of legal and 
medical settings ... is typically learned as a result of many years of formal 
education and cultural experience. (2012: 709)  
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Hatim and Munday state that “Language varieties distinguished on occupational 
grounds tend to attract labels such as ‘legalese’ or ‘journalese,’ which reflect the status 
of these registers as ‘languages’ in their own right” (2004: 77). Other authors call this 
variety a sublanguage (Danet 1985, Ferguson 1994), and a separate language or a 
dialect (Charrow and Crandall 1978). O’Barr states that 
 
Without minimizing in any way the significant and serious difficulties which non-
English speakers have in American courts, greater attention should be paid to 
those who must go to court, but who, because of their own linguistic abilities and 
of the peculiar forms of language used in court, do not comprehend the language 
in which the court operates. (1981: 388) 
 
The communicative event between an English speaker and a non-English speaker 
involves different languages, different cultures, different speech communities, different 
contexts, and different knowledge of the world and judicial systems. Furthermore, 
interpreters are charged with performing a verbatim language switching exclusively, 
and must disregard other contextualization cues that might be evidenced by gestures, 
facial expressions, hand movements, and the like. In addition, legal discourse makes 
constant reference to precedents, laws, and concepts that are not accessible or known to 
the non-English speaker, and interrogations are filled with linguistic control devices, 
such as interruptions, coercive and leading questions, and lexical presuppositions (Berk-
Seligson 1990:17). The non-English speaker can rarely connect the concepts heard with 
any other familiar concept to make sense of the discourse. Because Hispanics are new to 
the U.S. legal system and may not have had any kind of interaction within it, they will 
likely be much less prepared than English speakers—who have at least had exposure 
through the media and education—to access and communicate in a register that they 
may have never heard and that relies on concepts and contexts unfamiliar to them. In 
other words, the mandate to conserve the original register takes for granted a register 
participation that is not realized. As described in the previous chapter and as stated by 
Dueñas González et al.,  
 
An LEP person has a narrow vocabulary, usually restricted to the language 
domains of work, family, and daily encounters, with little to no comprehension of 
terms used in formal contexts like the courtroom ... cultural knowledge 
concerning the U.S. justice system provides a context for English speakers to 
interpret the meaning of discourse in the courtroom. Without such knowledge, 
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LEP litigants or witnesses are unable to comprehend the language used by legal 
actors and expert witnesses in court. (2012: 545) 
 
The authors also state that “for LEP individuals, the legal system is largely 
incomprehensible” (2012: 599). The Commission on the Future of the California Courts 
suggests the use of community volunteers to act as cultural interpreters, who can 
explain the basic concepts of of the U.S. legal system to people from other cultures. The 
goal is achieving comprehension and clarity of legal language, which is frequently 
misunderstood by non-white Californians (Johnson 1993: 57-96). An interpreter might 
not be enough when the target legal term lacks the conceptual meaning for target 
receivers (Roy 1990, Powell et al. 2003), because non-English speakers in judicial 
proceedings need “more than interpreters; they need intermediaries to serve as a bridge 
to the justice system ... to take an assertive role, as mediator, counselor, educator, 
translator, spokesperson and guide” (Martin et al. 2012). A complication that arises for 
interpreters is that even if they attempted to become true experts on sociocultural 
aspects of non-English speakers, in this case Spanish speakers, these come from so 
many different countries and cultures that acquiring this knowledge would be an 
extremely ambitious task. It could be achieved through sound education, but there are 
no educational requirements for interpreters, who only need to pass an exam in order to 
practice. The report by the Commission on the Future of California Courts recommends 
that  
 
The public justice system of the future must be “culturally competent”: both 
judicial and nonjudicial personnel must be aware of and sensitive to cultural 
differences in society and among disputants who use the courts. Cultural 
competence training should be routine throughout the system. (Johnson 1993: 12) 
 
This commission calls for establishing cultural awareness, sensitivity, 
appreciation, and training throughout the legal system, and for the accommodation of 
different cultures in the dispute resolution processes by selecting a process that would 
help parties with conflict resolution (Johnson 1993: 78). 
The preamble of the Model Code of Professional Responsibility for Interpreters 
in the Judiciary by the National Center for State Courts in the United States states that 
“A non-English speaker should be able to understand just as much as an English 
speaker with the same level of education and intelligence” (NCSC 1995: 199). 
However, no education or intelligence tests are administered to Spanish speakers or 
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English speakers in order to determine the discourse level that would be required if the 
interpreter were allowed to adjust the translation according to said levels of education 
and intelligence. As the interpreter is charged with maintaining the register, and as 
studies have shown (above) that the high legal register corresponds to 12-14 years of 
education, interpreters are translating into the same high register in Spanish, so no 
education level is assessed or considered. Other laws and guidelines agree with the 
above and also recommend that target-language equivalents be found that elicit similar 
reactions from both target-language listeners and source-language listeners. However, 
as the literature reviewed and the census data indicate, the same level of education is 
neither an easily attainable goal nor a realistic measure. The code states that interpreters 
are not mind readers who divine the level of education that non-English speakers may 
have, but this information can be easily obtained, as it is reported by the U.S. Census 
Bureau and the literature. 
5.2.2. Plain language 
In recent decades, the United States has seen a movement toward using plain language 
in legal documents and settings. The first attempts to simplify language began as an 
effort to provide consumer contracts in a language that would be comprehensible to the 
general population. Plain language is defined as “communication your audience can 
understand the first time they read or hear it” (PLAIN 2015), “the simplest, most 
straightforward way of expressing an idea” (Garner 2001: xiv), and “communication 
designed to meet the needs of the intended audience, so people can understand 
information that is important to their lives” (Stephens 2000).  
The first law to provide for plain English was enacted in New York in 1978. It 
stated that contracts had to be “written in a clear and coherent manner using words with 
common and everyday meanings” (Bowen 1991: 22). President Carter then signed 
Executive Order 12044 in 1978 providing for the clarification of federal regulations. 
This order stated that “Government regulations are usually written by experts, for 
experts. Your clear mandate will be to translate regulations into language a small 
businessman—who must be his own expert—can understand” (Bowen 1991: 21). Other 
states began to enact plain language laws, and now “they have become an important 
new kind of regulatory legislation” (1991: 19). An executive memo issued by President 
Clinton in 1998 and the Plan Writing Act signed by President Obama in 2010 reinforced 
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the plain language requirement for federal agencies (PLAIN 2015). The objective of the 
Plain Writing Act is “to improve the effectiveness and accountability of Federal 
agencies to the public by promoting clear Government communication that the public 
can understand and use” (USGPO 2010). Federal agencies that adopted these guidelines 
now include, among many others, the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Service, 
Environmental Protection Agency, Department of Agriculture, Department of Defense, 
Department of Commerce, Department of Education, Department of Health and Human 
Services, Department of Labor, Social Security Administration, Securities and 
Exchange Commission, and the Department of Justice. The guidelines require agencies 
to use plain language in any document necessary to obtain federal benefits, file taxes, 
learn about federal benefits or services, or the way to comply with federal requirements 
(PLAIN 2015).  
At the State level, California Government Code Section 6215(a)(b), originally 
signed by Governor Jerry Brown in 1982, requires government agencies to use plain 
language in all state documents, forms, contracts, announcements, regulations, manuals 
and “any other written communication that is necessary to carry out the agency's 
responsibilities under the law” (CPR 2007). Specifically, California Government Code 
Section 11342.580 states, “Plain English means language that satisfies the standard of 
clarity provided in Section 11349;” and Section 11349(c) states, “‘Clarity’ means 
written or displayed so that the meaning of regulations will be easily understood by 
those persons directly affected by them” (California Law n.d.). All these laws and 
regulations requiring plain language use were, of course, targeted to English speakers. 
5.2.3. The case of jury instructions 
Jury instructions are a big part of courtroom proceedings, and one that has earned great 
attention from researchers. As described in chapter 3, in jury trials the judge decides the 
issues of law, and jurors decide the issues of fact. After all evidence has been submitted 
and parties have presented their closing statements, it is time for jurors to deliberate 
according to instructions they receive from the judge. The jury instructions are usually 
read by the judge to the jury at the end of the trial in order to instruct jurors on the law 
they should apply when deciding the facts of the case. Some instructions are common to 
all cases, and others are particular to each type of case. Regarding the language in the 
jury instructions, the code of ethics states, 
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Jury instructions present highly technical and complex legal concepts, often 
expressed in archaic or obscure wording. Moreover, since jury instructions are 
read from prepared text, the pace is faster, there are fewer pauses, and intonation 
is less natural than in normal speech. All of these factors combine to make the 
process of jury instruction one of the most difficult types of court proceedings to 
interpret. (CAJC 2013: 30) 
 
Melinkoff states that “Jurors will not learn in an hour what lawyers take years to 
learn” and that “the whole thing is an efficient piece of dramatic fiction. It disposes of 
cases, even though it has very little to do with jurors understanding the law” (1982: 89). 
Hager offers that this language may be chosen for jury instructions to earn the approval 
of eventual appellate courts, not to facilitate the jury’s understanding (in O’Barr 1981: 
392). One of the strategies proposed by the Commission on the Future of California 
Courts indicates that “Jury instructions should be written and available to jurors during 
deliberation” and that “Attorneys have argued that ‘it violates constitutional due process 
and fundamental fairness to have factual issues resolved by [juries] who do not 
understand such issues’” (Thomas Barr, in Johnson 1993: 143). After finding that “jury 
instructions as presently given in California and elsewhere are, on occasion, simply 
impenetrable to the ordinary juror,” the Blue Ribbon Commission on Jury System 
Improvement recommended a revision of jury instructions into “a more understandable 
language.” In 1997, a Task Force on Jury Instructions was created and directed to draft 
“comprehensive, legally accurate jury instructions that are readily understood by the 
average juror” and charged with “accurately stating existing law in a way that is 
understandable to the average juror” (CAJC 2015d). It is relevant to mention that in 
California jurors are required to “understand English enough to understand and discuss 
the case,” so, in effect, all jurors are English speakers (CAJC 2015g). The following are 
a few examples of such revisions as stated by the Judicial Council (CAJC 2015e). 
 
Instruction 107 (previously BAJI 2.21):  
Original version: “Failure of recollection is common. Innocent misrecollection is 
not uncommon” (with a triple negative)  
Revised version: “People often forget things or make mistakes in what they 
remember.”  
CAJC comment: “This is an example of the use of basic English language principles to 
make instructions simpler.”  
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Instruction 202 (previously BAJI 2.00) 
Original version: “Circumstantial evidence is evidence that, if found to be true, 
proves a fact from which an inference of the existence of another fact may be 
drawn. A factual inference is a deduction that may logically and reasonably be 
drawn from one or more facts established by the evidence.”  
Revised version: “Some evidence proves a fact directly, such as testimony of a 
witness who saw a jet plane flying across the sky. Some evidence proves a fact 
indirectly, such as testimony of a witness who saw only the white trail that jet 
planes often leave. This indirect evidence is sometimes referred to as 
‘circumstantial evidence.’ In either instance, the witness’s testimony is evidence 
that a jet plane flew across the sky.”  
 
 
Instruction 200 (previously BAJI 2.60) 
Original version: “‘Preponderance of the evidence’ means evidence that has more 
convincing force than that opposed to it. If the evidence is so evenly balanced that 
you are unable to say that the evidence on either side of an issue preponderates, 
your finding on that issue must be against the party who had the burden of proving 
it.” 
Revised version: “A party must persuade you, by the evidence presented in court, 
that what he or she is required to prove is more likely to be true than not true. This 
is referred to as ‘the burden of proof.’” 
CAJC comment: “These are familiar words to lawyers. But the task force had to ask 
whether the average juror ever used the noun ‘preponderance’ and, more pointedly, the 
verb ‘preponderates.’” 
 
Instruction 403 (previously BAJI 3.36) 
Original version: “The amount of caution required of a person whose physical 
faculties are impaired is the care which a person of ordinary prudence with 
similarly impaired faculties would use under circumstances similar to those shown 
by the evidence.” 
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Revised version: “A person with a physical disability is required to use the amount 
of care that a reasonably careful person who has the same physical disability 
would use in the same situation.”  
CAJC comment: “Most judges and attorneys understand that sentence. But the phrase 
‘person of ordinary prudence’ is not normally in the vocabulary of a tenth grader. Nor 
does the same tenth grader speak of people whose ‘physical faculties are impaired’” 
(emphasis added).  
 
The new revised version of jury instructions brings them closer to a standard or 
even colloquial register (in O’Barr’s terms) and is proof that, in their own terms, 
language simplification to improve comprehension can be done without affecting the 
articulation of the law. No thorough linguistic analysis is necessary to appreciate the 
magnitude of the syntactic and semantic changes effected in this redrafting, which go 
far beyond register simplification to include explanations and examples. It is clear that 
the Task Force went to great lengths to assure English-speaking jurors would be able to 
understand the jury instructions. Unfortunately, in the courtroom this language 
simplification involves only the jury instructions, and not all courts have adopted them 
yet. It clearly follows that if English speakers need this kind of clarification and register 
adjustment, so might Spanish speakers, who may not have the same level of education, 
knowledge of context, or exposure to the legal system. Lastly, the revision of the jury 
instructions by the Judicial Council implies an acknowledgment that meaning can be 
preserved despite changes in grammar, structure, or register. There is also a different 
standard applied for English-speaking jurors and for Spanish-speaking defendants and 
witnesses in terms of facilitating comprehension: whereas the register of jury 
instructions has been simplified for English-speaking jurors, interpreters are prevented 
from doing the same for Spanish speakers in any stage of the proceedings. There have 
been, however, some efforts to provide language assistance for non-English speakers. 
In 2000, President Clinton issued Executive Order 13166 called “Improving 
Access to Services for Persons with Limited English Proficiency” (USDJ 2004), which 
“requires Federal agencies to examine the services they provide, identify any need for 
services to those with limited English proficiency (LEP), and develop and implement a 
system to provide those services so LEP persons can have meaningful access to them” 
(LEP 2015). In this context, the meaningful access standard includes an assessment of 
four factors:  
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1. The number or proportion of LEP persons eligible to be served or likely to be 
encountered by the program or grantee; 
2. the frequency with which LEP individuals come in contact with the program; 
3. the nature and importance of the program, activity, or service provided by the 
program to people's lives; and 
4. the resources available to the grantee/recipient or agency, and costs. As 
indicated above, the intent of this guidance is to find a balance that ensures 
meaningful access by LEP persons to critical services while not imposing 
undue burdens on small business, or small nonprofits. (LEP 2015) 
This Executive Order directs federal agencies to assess the services they provide, 
identify the services needed by LEPs, develop a language plan, and provide language 
services accordingly. In response, the United States Department of Justice developed 
the “Enforcement of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 - National Origin 
Discrimination Against Persons with Limited English Proficiency” or “2002 LEP 
Guidance,” a document to aid in the enforcement of this order. This document provides 
standards for compliance by recipients of federal financial assistance, to facilitate LEP 
access without discrimination (LEP 2015). Among other things, the guidance document 
for the Department of Justice states that  
 
In addition, because there may be languages which do not have an appropriate 
direct interpretation of some courtroom or legal terms and the interpreter should 
be so aware and be able to provide the most appropriate interpretation. The 
interpreter should likely make the recipient aware of the issue and the interpreter 
and recipient can then work to develop a consistent and appropriate set of 
descriptions of these terms in that language that can be used again, when 
appropriate (emphasis added). (USDJ 2015b)  
 
This new legislation has important implications for court interpreters, whose role 
must now be revisited.  
5.3. The interpreter’s role in judicial proceedings - Revisited  
Fundamentals of Court Interpretation, by Dueñas González et al., is a comprehensive 
volume that has guided the practice of court interpreting in the United States for over 
two decades. The first edition, from 1991, stated that “the goal of court interpreting is to 
produce a legal equivalent, a linguistically true and legally appropriate interpretation of 
statements spoken or read in court, from the second language into English or vice versa” 
(emphasis in original) (p. 16). According to the second edition, from 2012, achieving 
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this legal equivalence “requires the interpreter to capture not only the content of the 
speaker’s message but also the register, style, tone, and intent of the speaker, including 
all pauses, hesitations, false starts, and other speech performance characteristics” (p. 
590). This second edition also presents an interesting development:  
 
Since the reinvigoration of Title VI, the goal of the court interpreter has been 
refined to embrace meaningful legal equivalence. It is important to note that this 
goal is not a replacement of legal equivalence but simply a refinement that takes 
into consideration the comprehension of the listener. Title VI requires interpreters 
to produce a message that abides by all accuracy standards, but also assists the 
LEP listener to achieve meaningful comprehension. This standard requires the 
interpreter to utilize terminology, paraphrasing, and definition in order to make 
the legal equivalent more meaningful to the listener. The ability to construct a 
meaningful legal equivalent in no way changes the basic performance standard 
requiring the attainment of legal equivalence. Rather, it is the most proficient 
interpreters and those with the most profound knowledge of legal processes, 
procedure, and terminology who are best suited to communicate legal concepts in 
words that are comprehensible to an LEP person who may have limited 
understanding of the U.S. justice process (emphasis in original). (2012: 14-15)  
 
These authors acknowledge that strict legal equivalence is sometimes not enough 
to assure litigants’ comprehension, and that judges often ask interpreters to provide 
clarification to non-English speakers. These, however, are “unacceptable, unethical 
practices [that] can be eliminated by allowing the court interpreter to use terminology 
that the client understands and to allow more definitions to be used when it is clear that 
the legal equivalent is not being understood” (2012: 15). What is not clear, though, is 
how all this could be achieved, starting with differentiating defining from adding. 
Standards still warn interpreters against adding language and require interpreters to 
maintain formal equivalents and not bring questions “down to the witness’s level” (see 
3.4.3. above), and many if not most of the legal terms heard in U.S. courts would 
require more than a definition to achieve comprehension by LEP persons. The authors 
also suggest that interpreters provide “no explanations and no elaborations aside from 
choosing a more accessible linguistic equivalent for an unsophisticated listener or, with 
the court’s permission, providing a definition if it is clear the listener does not 
understand” (p. 16). Although this could be useful to help improve comprehension, it 
would not be acceptable (or feasible) for interpreters to request this permission each 
time a system-bound term appears, or interrupt motions, objections, or expert witnesses’ 
testimony to do so. In addition, these authors hold that “Constructing legal equivalence 
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requires attention to preserving every conceptual unit of meaning and at the same time 
conserving the register and formal elements that contribute to speaker style” (p. 17), 
which might seem difficult to achieve if interpreters were to use terminology that LEP 
persons would understand. The authors make a further distinction between adaptation 
and conservation: while adapting a text would involve alterations, additions or 
omissions in order to simplify the message, these would be unacceptable in court 
interpreting because this practice “violates meaningful legal equivalence” and “risks 
misrepresenting legal concepts, and can insert egregious error with harmful legal 
consequences” (p. 17). Although some courts allow it and some interpreters consider it 
appropriate “to make up for the language barrier and the total ignorance of the 
individual,” other judges and attorneys oppose it. And although this practice would 
disagree with the norms described in the code, the authors state that Title VI “calls not 
only for monitoring subject comprehension, but also may mean providing the most 
accessible term, the paraphrasing of a legal concept, or a brief comprehensible 
explanation. However, this elaboration does not constitute the adding, deletion, or 
distortion of the speaker message” (p. 17) (emphasis added). Codes and standards, 
however, still warn against paraphrasing, explaining, and monitoring comprehension, 
and it is not clear how an explanation would not be interpreted as adding. The authors 
go on to say that “only in the interest of subject comprehension should there be an 
adjustment made to ensure comprehension,” but no adjustments are allowed by the 
codes, and comprehension by LEP persons should not be the interpreter’s concern 
(above). Although the authors agree that “special training is required to detect cognitive 
and linguistic factors that pertain to comprehension” (p. 419), they also state that “while 
legal equivalence continues to be the standard, interpreters are required to monitor 
comprehension to determine when it is necessary to intervene” (p. 571). It is the 
thoughtful conservation of meaning and register, as described by the authors, that 
provides the most insightful challenge:  
 
Conservation requires the preservation of meaning, register, style, and intention of 
the SL message in the TL rendition. However, the interpreter must exercise good 
judgment and avoid using conservation as a platform for exclusionary 
interpreting. Disregarding the LEP person's comprehension violates the principle 
of the interpreter as a facilitator of communication and interferes with the goal of 
meaningful comprehension and thus meaningful access. Capable interpreters 
understand that interpretation is a communicative act that requires interaction with 
the client and continuous monitoring of feedback. (2012: 18) 
UNIVERSITAT ROVIRA I VIRGILI 





Again, the codes and the literature warn against interpreters concerning 
themselves with listeners’ comprehension, which should not be a factor when selecting 
terminology (above). Codes, standards and the literature repeatedly state that 
interpreters should conserve the level of language regardless of whether the LEP person 
understands or not, and that opinions about listeners’ comprehension are beyond the 
interpreter’s role, as “A psychologist might be better suited to provide this kind of 
testimony” (CAJC 2013a: 37). Dueñas González et al. state, though, that 
 
Within the parameters of legal equivalence, thoughtful conservation of meaning 
and register in the construction of the interpretation considers audience factors, 
such as language ability and use, educational background, and experience. 
Thoughtful conservation means that within the range of possible linguistically and 
legally equivalent choices, the interpreter selects the terminology and syntactic 
arrangement that not only conserve the register, meaning, and style, but are also 
most likely to be understood by the audience. This practice does not in any way 
suggest the alteration of the original message or register, but simply means that 
the interpreter must be mindful of the unique qualities of the client and create a 
target message that may be better understood within the limits of legal 
equivalence ... This is a goal to which all great court interpreters aspire, one that 
requires exceptional linguistic and interpreting abilities to achieve. (2012: 18) 
 
How all this can be achieved, however, is not at all clear or explicit while codes 
and standards warn interpreters against acknowledging non-comprehension, 
paraphrasing, or choosing simpler terms that would be better understood by the listener. 
Legal terminology and legal concepts are extremely precise, they vary considerably 
across legal systems, and do not offer many options to convert objections and motions 
into readily comprehensible language for listeners who have never had contact with the 
United States legal system, and who might not even have in their world knowledge the 
concept of objections or motions. This is probably the most revealing statement: 
 
Under Title VI, which applies to all state courts via the Fourteenth Amendment 
due process clause, it is the legal obligation of court interpreters to provide a 
“meaningful” interpretation that the user of interpreter services can comprehend. 
For many decades arguments have raged over the use of “nonwords” in the TL, 
such as *probación (the asterisk denoting nonstandard usage) for “probation.” In 
order to produce a meaningful interpretation, interpreters are now free, under the 
LEP Guidance on Title VI ... to use the words and terms best understood by LEP 
litigants. (Dueñas González et al. 2012: 571) 
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This new freedom, however, has not yet reached the code of ethics. After 
considering the requirements of Title VI, a more target-oriented perspective on the 
interpreter’s performance in compliance with said requirements, the authors offer this 
definition of the interpreter’s role: “The proper role of the interpreter is to place the LEP 
individual, as closely as linguistically possible using the terminology most accessible to 
the defendant, in the same situation as an English speaker in a legal setting” (emphasis 
added) (2012: 411). Although the practices suggested by the authors could assist in 
improving listener’s comprehension, they seem to lie far from the narrow role currently 
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Chapter 6. Translation theoretical framework  
This research is concerned with the comprehension of legal language in judicial 
proceedings. This comprehension is studied in the context of interpreter-mediated 
encounters, that is, as a byproduct and consequence of the interpreter’s decisions. In 
skopos theory, translation is a goal-oriented action in which a purpose determines the 
strategies translators use to reach said goal. In the context that is the object of this 
research, however, these decisions and strategies are constrained and guided by 
institutional norms and purposes. Thus, the interplay between purposes and norms 
forms the base of the translation theoretical framework selected for this research. 
Borrowing terms and concepts from these two conceptual frameworks, I will attempt to 
determine whether the practices established by the skopos-determining and norm-setting 
authorities are effective in meeting the equal footing purpose defined within the system. 
These two conceptual frameworks will be described as follows. 
6.1. Skopos theory 
6.1.1. Overview 
In functionalist theories, the communicative function or skopos of the target text guides 
the strategies and methods in the translation process (Nord 1997: 27, Vermeer 1989: 
227). The word skopos comes from the Greek and means aim or purpose. It refers to the 
concept that the strategies and methods in the translation process should be guided by 
the intended communicative function of the target text. Generally speaking, in skopos 
theory the source text is an offer of information from which the translator takes 
whatever elements are relevant or adequate for the intended purpose, based on the needs 
of the target culture, in order to construct another offer of information that will become 
the target text (Nord 1997: 26). Thus, the main rule is that the skopos is the functional 
aspect that predominates and governs all translation decisions, which rest with the 
translator as the expert in the communicative situation.  
Two other rules are presented in this theory: intratextual and intertextual 
coherence (Vermeer 1989: 229, Nord 1997: 31-33). In terms of intratextual coherence, 
Pöchhacker (1992: 213) explains that the discourse “must make sense within its 
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language and culture,” and that intertextual coherence refers to the relationship of 
fidelity between source and target texts. These rules have a hierarchical sequence: the 
skopos rule takes precedence over intertextual and intratextual coherence, and 
intratextual coherence takes precedence over intertextual coherence (Nord 1997: 32-33). 
The translation process involves several agents with sometimes overlapping roles. 
The process begins when a client commissions a translation for a specific purpose and a 
specific audience. This client takes the role of initiator, the agent who needs a target text, 
and determines “its course by defining the purpose for which the target text is needed” 
(Nord 1997: 20). The commissioner is the person who contacts the translator with the 
assignment; however, the initiator and the commissioner may be the same person. The 
commissioner gives the translator a brief, which is a set of instructions regarding the 
purpose, the participants, and the intended text function that is the product of a 
negotiation between client and translator. It does not, however, contain instructions as to 
how translators should perform their job (Nord 1997: 30). The source-text producer is 
the person who actually constructs the source text. This role must be distinguished from 
the role of sender, who only transmits the source text, although it is possible for these 
two roles to be played by the same person (Nord 1998: 6). The translator is a source-text 
receiver, who as an expert makes strategic translation decisions based on the 
sociocultural constraints of the target-text receiver to produce a target text. In this sense, 
the translator is the source-text receiver and the target-text producer who “has the 
competence to decide whether the translation which the initiator asks for can actually be 
produced on the basis of the given source text and, if so, how, i.e. by which procedures 
and techniques, this should be best done” (Nord 1998: 10). The text receiver or 
addressee is the person who receives the target text, whereby the communicative 
situation is completed (p. 18). Nord also makes reference to a chance receiver who may 
read or hear the text as a secondary addressee, although he or she is not the primary 
intended addressee (p. 58).  
The propositions offered by this theory are highly relevant for the case at hand: 
the strategies and methods in the translation process are guided by the intended 
communicative function; these strategies and methods are decided by the translator 
based on the comprehension and cooperation capabilities of the audience (Nord 2006); 
and the target-culture constraints condition the communicative event (Nord 1997). This 
theory departs from previous source-oriented approaches concerned with a formal 
linguistic equivalence between source and target texts and takes a communicative and 
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target-oriented approach. These concepts will now be applied to the communicative 
situation in judicial settings. 
6.1.2. The brief 
In judicial proceedings, interpreters who work full time in criminal law do not receive 
case-specific instructions, and more often than not, they do not have access to specific 
information concerning the target-language receivers either. Although some 
sociocultural and educational traits may vary across target-language receivers, in 
general terms Spanish interpreters work with the same population: Hispanics in 
California. Interpreters who work as independent contractors may receive information 
such as the place and time of the assignment, the name of the client and the type of 
proceeding. Since court interpreters are provided for the primary purpose of enabling 
communication with a non-English speaker, this purpose is not identified in any brief 
because it is understood as common for all judicial proceedings. Thus, for the most part 
judicial interpreters work without a brief such as the one proposed by this theory and, 
also contrary to this theory, rarely receive case-specific instructions. The purpose of the 
interpretation is established in the code of ethics, as stated above, as placing “non-
English-speaking participants in legal proceedings on an equal footing with those who 
understand English to the extent reasonably possible” and ensuring that “the official 
record of the proceedings in English reflects precisely what was stated in another 
language by non-English-speaking witnesses, defendants, or other parties authorized to 
participate in the matter” (CAJC 2013a: 12). Thus, the purpose of the text is uniform 
and ongoing for all interpreting events. The code, however, also contains instructions as 
to the way interpreters must do their job, and affords no room for refusal to accept 
responsibility for the target-text function, a possibility suggested by Nord (1997), 
because interpreters can be called to give testimony about anything related to language 
in legal proceedings. In terms of skopos theory, this would imply that there is an a priori 
and nonnegotiable purpose defined by the commissioner, and that there is no room for 
the interpreter to assess the sociocultural constraints of the receiver and define a more 
appropriate skopos specifically for each case. As Vermeer points out, “A statement of 
skopos implies that it is not necessarily identical with the skopos attributed to the source 
text: there are cases where such identity is not possible” (1989: 234). In the case at hand, 
the code overtly states that register should be maintained. However, Vermeer also points 
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out that  
 
The source text does not determine the variety of the target text, nor does the text 
variety determine ipso facto the form of the target text (the text variety does not 
determine the skopos, either); rather, it is the skopos of the translation that also 
determines the appropriate text variety. A “text variety”, in the sense of a 
classificatory sign of a translatum, is thus a consequence of the skopos, and 
thereby secondary to it. In a given culture it is the skopos that determines which 
text variety a translatum should conform to. (1989: 238) 
 
The code overtly states that the purpose of the target text should be to 
communicate with non-English speakers so as to afford them the same right to due 
process and to carry out justice. The precise intention implied here is to communicate. 
However, as Vermeer points out, “‘intentionality’ does not refer to an action really 
being intentional, but to its being seen or interpreted as intentional by other participants 
or any observer” (emphasis in original) (in Nord 1997: 19). In this regard, the standard 
to conserve the legal register could indicate yet another covert intention that would be 
consistent with the ultimate aim of court discourse in action: to either free or convict 
defendants, depending on the text producers, be they the defense attorney or the 
prosecutor. This contradiction should not be ignored because this standard deprives the 
interpreter of any power to define or rework the strategy according to the sociocultural 
constraints of the receiver. This code also imposes an enduring or fixed skopos for 
every current and future translational action in all judicial proceedings as 
communicative events that do not allow a case-specific attribution of skopos according 
to each situation (Vermeer 1989: 230).  
6.1.3. The initiator – The commissioner 
The roles of initiator and commissioner may belong to different persons or institutions, 
or they may overlap. Given the diversity of judicial proceedings and situations in 
California, it would be difficult to examine every possible role assignment, so some of 
the most frequent cases will be reviewed. In compliance with the law, the Judicial 
Council is in charge of the interpreting program in California. It is thus the state that 
prescribes interpreting services in criminal courts with the aim of facilitating 
communication with non-English speakers; the state would be the initiator. However, 
each county court has an assignment office within an Interpreters’ Services Division 
that assigns interpreters daily to specific courtrooms in the county. In these cases, the 
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commissioner would be the main county court, although interpreters may receive 
specific assignment instructions from the court where they are ultimately assigned for 
the day. After a few years, interpreters may request or be assigned permanent positions 
in specific courts, in which case the assigned court will share the role of commissioner. 
In criminal cases, interpreters are employees or independent contractors of the state, 
which may also be the case in civil cases. Interpreters can also work as independent 
contractors of law firms, insurance companies, or individuals, all of whom would then 
share the roles of initiator and commissioner concurrently. In all cases, however, the 
state dictates the standards for interpreter performance and the underlying skopos that 
take the place of the brief. The purpose of the target text is defined by the initiator in 
terms of furthering the interest of justice by allowing non-English speakers the same 
opportunities afforded to English speakers by placing them on an equal footing (CAJC 
2013a).  
6.1.4. The source-text producer 
Since this research does not involve interpretation from Spanish into English, the non-
English speaker will not assume the role of source-text producer. The judge, an attorney 
or a witness may play this role. The text producer may determine a secondary purpose 
according to the exchange. For example, the prosecutor may try to lead the questioning 
with the intention of finding fault and convicting the target-language receiver, the 
defense attorney may try to lead the questioning with the intention of setting the target-
language receiver free, and the judge may decide on issues of law and subsequently 
instruct the target-language receiver, the attorneys, and the jury. The text producer may 
even be absent when attorneys and judges read or quote from documents, laws, 
precedents, and jury instructions. Both the defense and the prosecution also 
communicate with each other, with the judge, and with the jury, and all these exchanges 
may have different purposes. In all cases, however, the instructions provided by the 
commissioner in the code remain in force. Except during questioning, the language used 
by the source-text producer is the formal register of legal language, which the 
interpreter must reproduce in the target language. This may operate as a contradictory 
message when the instructions are not designed to facilitate the purpose of the 
translation. This contradiction may reflect the commissioner’s lack of awareness of the 
interpreter’s role and of the target culture (Vermeer 1989: 228); of “linguistic theory 
UNIVERSITAT ROVIRA I VIRGILI 
COMPREHENSION OF LEGAL DISCOURSE IN INTERPRETER-MEDIATED JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS 
Julia Lambertini Andreotti
104 
and interlingual message transfer”; (Mikkelson 2008: 82) and, finally, of “the linguistic 
expertise and the necessary empirical tools to make sound determinations concerning 
clarity or comprehensibility” (Charrow et al. 1979: 1307). 
6.1.5. The target-text receiver 
Although the role of the target-text receiver may be assumed by all present, this 
research focuses on the text received by the Spanish speaker. The target-language 
receiver’s knowledge of the legal system, of the source culture, and of legal language, 
as discussed previous chapters, might not be sufficient to provide for an understanding 
of the language that interpreters must use in the target discourse, as established in the 
code. This insufficiency of prior knowledge is intensified by the lack of power assigned 
to the non-English speaker in the courtroom. Furthermore, the interpreter is usually not 
allowed to assess the linguistic and sociocultural background of the receiver before the 
proceeding. The particular sociocultural background of Hispanic immigrants is 
discussed above in chapter 2. 
6.1.6. The source-text receiver – The interpreter 
The interpreter, who according to skopos theory is the expert in charge of making all 
decisions regarding the translation process based on the demands of the translation brief 
and the target culture (Nord 1997: 21, Vermeer 1989: 228), is limited to a “mechanical, 
non-participatory role” (Morris 1993: 21). These two types of demands are in conflict 
for an interpreter whose role and defined purpose are both to facilitate communication 
and preserve a fair and faithful record. Wadensjö states that the interpreter “is often 
confronted with the practical dilemma of being simultaneously seen as the lay person’s 
advocate and as the official helping hand” (1998: 50). In this particular setting, although 
interpreters are considered experts (chapter 3), established norms do not allow them 
much room for making all expert decisions as this theory proposes. These limitations 
have been detailed in chapter 3 above. 
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6.1.7. Intratextual and intertextual coherence  
The precedence of intratextual over intertextual coherence could be useful to understand 
the case at hand. In order to meet the overt purpose stated in the code, which calls for 
communication between the parties, the interpreter would have to be able to create a 
target text that would conform to the intratextual coherence standard. The rule of 
intratextual coherence states that the target-language receiver must receive a text that is 
meaningful within his or her situation, in other words, that it is coherent. In order to 
make sense of the message, the target-text receiver must be able to understand it.  
  Intertextuality refers to the dependence of the text on knowledge of prior texts. 
Intercultural intertextuality in this context is relevant as many of the terms used in court 
are in Latin, such as “You have the right to habeas corpus” or “You will be appointed 
guardian ad litem.” No translation is offered by the system, and no rule indicates that 
the interpreter must offer a translation of foreign terms, which in many cases may be 
unknown even to the interpreter, who may find a safety net in reproducing these foreign 
terms in the same foreign language. Intratextuality and intertextuality are also expressed 
continually through references to different laws or “implicit shared knowledge of the 
meanings of legal principles, concepts, and proceedings” (Frade 2008: 282).  
6.1.8. Issues of ethics and loyalty 
The interpreter is admonished to maintain accuracy by rendering verbatim translations. 
Why is being accurate equated with being ethical in the code? The first possible answer 
may be found in Nord (2006: 6), who finds a common meaning in the words loyalty and 
fidelity. She finds that being loyal is an “interpersonal category referring to a social 
relationship between people who expect not to be cheated in the process” and that 
fidelity usually refers to the rule of intertextual coherence or correspondence between 
source and target texts. Nord states that if clients, authors, and receivers did not have 
doubts about the loyalty of the translator, the translator would have more freedom to 
adapt the target text as necessary. Thus, it may be implied that the accuracy requirement 
is related to a lack of trust or a concern that the interpreter will not be loyal, and that the 
simplest way to guarantee the interpreter’s loyalty is to require his or her loyalty to the 
text.  
UNIVERSITAT ROVIRA I VIRGILI 
COMPREHENSION OF LEGAL DISCOURSE IN INTERPRETER-MEDIATED JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS 
Julia Lambertini Andreotti
106 
Clifford (2004) posed the same question with regards to community interpreting 
in healthcare settings, and followed Chesterman’s approaches to translation ethics 
(2001): representation, service, communication, and norms. In the representation model, 
the translator behaves ethically by providing a faithful representation of the other and of 
the source text without additions, omissions, or any other type of change. In the service 
model, the translator behaves ethically by being loyal to the client’s requirements. In the 
communication model, the translator behaves ethically by facilitating communication 
and understanding between the parties. In the norms model, the translator behaves 
ethically by following situational and conventional norms. Clifford concludes that the 
representation model is best suited for the conduit model, which focuses on accuracy 
and faithfulness to the source text, and which is restricted only to language forms 
(2004).  
In judicial proceedings, ethical conduct would fit: (1) the representation model, in 
that accuracy is paramount; (2) the service model, in that the client mandates such 
accuracy and loyalty demands precise compliance with such requirements; and (3) the 
norms model, in that the accepted and prescribed practice for judicial proceedings 
dictates what interpreters should do. In fact, these three models complement one another 
in that being ethical means being loyal to the client (service) by following the prescribed 
norms (norms) of accuracy (representation). The only model that could not be applied is 
the communication model, as the interpreter is precluded from taking into account the 
communicative needs of the other. In this case, being ethical from the standpoint of the 
communication model would imply behaving unethically according to the code, thus 
overpowering any other personal and professional ethical principle the interpreter might 
have. Communication is, however, part of Chesterman’s proposed oath: “I will use my 
expertise to maximize communication and minimize misunderstanding across language 
barriers,” as “understanding is the defining limit of a translator’s professional ethics, 
also of his professional responsibility, the responsibility of his practice” (2001) 
(emphasis in original). To not facilitate understanding may therefore be considered 
unethical from the interpreter’s perspective, as well as a violation of the code. 
If there were no such constraints on the interpreter’s role in judicial 
proceedings—that is, if the commissioner offered a code consistent with the 
sociocultural reality of the setting and the interpreter were allowed to use his or her own 
knowledge and training to achieve the established purpose—the interpreter could be 
loyal to the client (service) by offering a functional translation that both conveys a true 
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original meaning (representation) and promotes understanding (communication) in 
accordance with revised, adequate and accepted practice (norms). Regarding the 
communication model, Chesterman (2001) questions a situation where communication 
is adequate but in which a translation would promote unethical ends, for example, 
translating instructions for building a bomb. One could also argue that in judicial 
proceedings, interpreters who are not aware of theory and issues of role, and who are 
trained to perform according to the conduit model are, in fact, unknowingly siding with 
a system that uses language to apply the law to individuals who may not understand the 
proceeding and who may or may not be guilty. It is ultimately up to the interpreter or 
translator to refuse to perform in such circumstances. After all, translators aim to reduce 
the “communicative suffering” that actually affects all parties involved: from judicial 
authorities who cannot get their message across, to witnesses who do not understand 
what they need to understand, and to the interpreters themselves for not performing 
effectively (Chesterman 1997: 184-6, 2001). Furthermore, as Pym notes, the aim of 
translation is to promote intercultural cooperation through communication that is “the 
mutual benefit” obtained; if the translator works to promote cooperation, he or she is 
primarily loyal to the translator’s profession and to the system (in Chesterman, 1997: 
170).  
The interpreter is mandated to speak the court’s language but is very often 
perceived by English speakers as an ally to Spanish speakers, primarily because they 
share a language that may be incomprehensible to the other participants. By speaking 
both languages, interpreters exclude participants who feel “stripped of control over the 
proceedings” and “power is felt to have been ceded to the interpreter ... disempowering 
the lawyer by mediating, interceding and intervening between the examiner and the 
examinee...” (Morris 1993: 10). The use of language to influence testimony and 
questioning has been widely described as “a means of control” (Harris 1984: 6). In this 
context, when the interpreter interrupts a proceeding, thereby becoming visible—when 
seeking a clarification, for example, that intimates loyalty to the receiver or to the 
profession—the interpreter may in effect interfere with counsel’s strategy, change the 
line of questioning, break the rules of evidence (Hale 2001), or distort the legal process 
(Mikkelson 2000: 49). On the other side are the non-English speakers, who must swear 
to tell the truth, who are not allowed to ask questions, who must respond to every 
question, and who have everything they say potentially used against them (Harris 1984, 
Van Dijk 1989: 39).  
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Abril Martí also acknowledges the dilemma created for the interpreter. The 
interpreter must negotiate between speakers in different contextual situations: at one end 
is a non-English speaker who needs “a product or service that will resolve or mitigate 
some type of critical situation that affects him or her personally,” who has “limited 
control over the service provided,” and who is “in a state of need, isolated, in a foreign 
social and institutional system and surrounded by foreign language speakers.” At the 
other end is an English speaker, who is the “professional in public service who seeks to 
obtain the necessary information to decide whether or not it is appropriate to provide the 
service,” and who “speaks on behalf of an institution and not necessarily on his behalf 
and who enjoys [the] decision power” (my translation) (2004). It could be assumed, 
then, that the standard that requires conserving the register is consistent with a refusal to 
abandon the power relationship created by the tenor of this communicative context.  
6.1.9. A conflict of skopoi 
This ethical conflict elaborated in Chesterman (1997) is consistent with the interpreter’s 
conflict that arises in judicial settings. According to skopos theory, the skopos is 
primarily determined by the commissioner, and it is what guides the interpreter’s work. 
In other words, in this setting the only possibility is to be loyal and ethical to the client. 
However, as discussed above, the interpreter’s first ethical duty is or must be to 
facilitate understanding. The term skopos is used to refer to the purpose of the target text 
as indicated by the commissioner; however, the aim defined in the courtroom setting by 
the commissioner of interpreting services relates not so much to the target text as to the 
source text. The source text also has a purpose, attributed to it by the commissioner and 
also by the receiver and the interpreter. This makes it difficult for the interpreter to act 
in accordance with a clearly defined skopos: if the interpreter follows the code, which 
gives priority to the source-text function, the purpose of the translation might not be 
achieved, and the target text might not be functional for the receiver.  
Thus, the issue becomes how to make a translation functional in this context. By 
assuming that all participants have a specific purpose, it would seem possible to arrive 
at a functional translation when all these purposes converge. In other words, by 
assuming that the commissioner’s and receiver’s aim is to communicate with each 
other, that the source and target texts’ purpose is to convey a comprehensible message, 
and that the interpreter’s aim is to facilitate communication, a possible answer might be 
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that the interpreter, who is the only participant capable of satisfying all these purposes 
simultaneously, could be charged with doing so by facilitating clear and effective 
communication. In other words, the convergence of skopoi could be part of the assigned 
role of the interpreter, who would use his or her knowledge and expertise to make the 
translation functional, and even to contribute in determining what the skopos will be. 
This would be possible only when the interpreter is accepted as a professional and 
allowed to make decisions that enable participants to communicate with one another. 
But why should it be the interpreter who adapts the linguistic and discourse features of 
the utterance to facilitate listeners’ comprehension? The answer could be that it is 
inherent in his or her role as a medium of communication, as required by the code 
(CAJC 2013a). 
6.2. Translational norms 
6.2.1. Overview 
Although Toury credits the initial link between norms and translation to Levý (1969 
[1963]) and Holmes (1988), the introduction of norms to Translation Studies and the 
development of translational norms theory was first proposed by Toury (1980), who 
called for a descriptive approach over prescriptive views based on strict equivalence. He 
proposed that the concept of norms might help resolve conflicts between prescriptive 
and descriptive approaches, in the sense that it could help explain why prescription 
might not be the best or the only solution in all cases where norms prevail. Norms could 
also be considered as paths to follow without resorting to prescription. He proposed to 
observe translational behavior regularities to account for the norms that guided 
translators’ decisions, based not only on language but including the sociocultural 
components of the translation event (1998: 11). In his own words:  
 
Norms have long been regarded as the translation of general values or ideas 
shared by a group as to what is conventionally right and wrong, adequate and 
inadequate into performance instructions appropriate for and applicable to 
particular situations, specifying what is prescribed and forbidden, as well as what 
is tolerated and permitted in a certain behavioural dimension. (Toury 1998: 14) 
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Norms are standards that individuals receive from a culture, which they are to 
follow and adhere to in order to belong to that culture: “the acquisition of a set of norms 
for determining the suitability of that kind of behaviour, and for maneuvering between 
all the factors which may constrain it, is therefore a prerequisite for becoming a 
translator within a cultural environment” (Toury 1995: 53). For Hermans, norms begin 
as conventions or agreed behaviors between individuals, which materialize as effective 
and preferred courses of action and solutions to problems in certain situations. When 
conventions are successful, they become norms. Norms are also patterns of customary 
behavior that are shared, accepted, and expected among members of a community, but 
are stronger than conventions in the sense that they act as directives for people to know 
what is expected of them (Hermans 1999: 72ff.). Norms are also key factors for the 
preservation of social order, as they determine what is prescribed and forbidden, 
adequate and inadequate social behavior, and individuals can be positively or negatively 
sanctioned according to the way they comply with or deviate from them: “the notion of 
norms always implies sanctions; actual or at least potential, whether negative (to those 
who violate them) or positive (to those who abide by them)” (Toury 1998: 16). Toury 
describes norms as being in the center of a scale of constraints between rules (stronger 
norms) in one end, and idiosyncrasies (weaker norms) in the other. Norms are also 
specific and unstable: they do not necessarily apply to all cultures, and they tend to 
change with time (Toury 1995: 55).  
Since norms cannot be observed directly, Toury proposed to observe the products 
of translational norm-governed behavior. The main sources can be textual (translations, 
as primary products) or extratextual (theories, comments, etc. as by-products). This 
discovery procedure entails beginning with isolated norms that can be clearly defined, 
and then attempting to integrate the results from different areas in order to establish 
relationships between compared norms from different domains. Norms are discovered 
by observing regularities in and deviations from behaviors in different situations, with 
the aim of comparing them and establishing a connection to account for them in each 
circumstance (1995: 65). Chesterman proposes finding evidence of norms from three 
sources: belief statements from translators, critics, consumers, etc., explicit criticism 
from reviews, consumers, even other translators, and official norm statements by norm 
authorities such as trainers, clients, or institutions. However, a link must be established 
between these sources and observed regularities in order to propose that a certain norm 
exists (2006). 
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One of the main contributions from target-oriented approaches is related to the 
controversial notion of equivalence, which may include different types of relationships 
between the source text and the target text. Applied to translation, for Toury the 
equivalence between the source and the original texts is determined by the norms that 
govern the choices made by the translator (1995: 55). He believes that the equivalence 
found between source and target texts is determined by translational norms that govern 
the translator’s choices, and therefore their study is essential for getting closer to a 
better understanding of equivalence outside of historical prescriptive approaches (1995: 
65). 
Toury describes three different types of norms. The initial norm is a basic choice a 
translator has to make between adhering more to the culture or language norms of the 
source text, or to the culture or language norms of the target text. Subscribing to source 
norms will determine the adequacy of the translation, and subscribing to target norms 
will determine its acceptability. For Toury this is not a real either/or choice, as the 
translator may use a combination of these two or compromise between them. The two 
other sets of norms are the preliminary and the operational norms, which mutually 
influence and condition each other. Preliminary norms include decisions regarding the 
policy and directness of the translation, which are interrelated, and the general 
translation strategy. These norms refer to aspects considered while making decisions 
about types of texts to be translated, and the possibility of indirect or mediated 
translation. Preliminary norms precede operational norms, which include matricial 
(concerning segment manipulation, omissions, additions) and text-linguistic norms, and 
which refer to aspects considered while making decisions during the translation process. 
The non-specificity and instability properties of norms imply that there cannot be 
theoretical limits to them (1995: 56-60).  
Chesterman proposed another classification of norms: professional norms, to 
which the translator adheres to adequately meet the expectancy norms. Professional 
norms are behavioral norms followed by professional translators; they resemble 
production norms and are formulated to include three types of norms: the accountability 
norm (ethical), the communication norm (social), and the relation norm (linguistic). The 
accountability norm, whereby a translator assumes responsibility for the translation, 
states, “a translator should act in such a way that the demands of loyalty are met with 
regard to the original writer, the commissioner, and the prospective readership.” It 
relates to Nord’s loyalty concept (1991) and Harris’s true interpreter norm (1990). The 
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communication norm states that the translator should “optimize communication 
between the original writer and/or commissioner and the prospective readership” and 
specifies the social role of the translator “as a communication expert.” The relation 
norm states that “a translator should act in such a way that an appropriate relation is 
established and maintained between target text and source text,” taking into account the 
writer's intentions, the text skopos, and “the nature of the prospective readership.” 
Expectancy norms resemble product norms and are determined by what the readership 
expects a translation should be, and what the text should look like in the target language 
(1993: 8-10).  
Several scholars have applied the concept of translational norms to interpreting. 
Among them, Shlesinger discussed this possible application and identified 
methodological challenges to extrapolating interpreting norms. She found that eliciting 
said norms might prove difficult due to several obstacles that include the lack of corpora 
(as the record is only in English and proceedings are not recorded), the effect 
observation may have on interpreters, and the empirical shortcomings of simulated 
conditions (1989). In response, Harris (1990) argued that it is possible to identify norms 
in interpreting, and proposed some (mostly preliminary) normative formulations. 
Among them is the “true interpreter norm,” or the norm of the “honest spokesperson.” 
This norm states that interpreters “re-express the original speakers’ ideas and the 
manner of expressing them as accurately as possible and without significant omissions, 
and not mix them up with their own ideas and expressions.” Gile also believes that 
speech corpora are not inevitably necessary, as norms can be extrapolated by 
 
asking interpreters about norms, by reading didactic, descriptive and narrative 
texts about interpreting (what Toury, 1995: 65 calls ‘extratextual’ sources), by 
analysing user responses, and by asking interpreters and noninterpreters to assess 
target texts and to comment on their fidelity and other characteristics using small 
corpora. (1998: 100) 
 
In another study, Shlesinger found that it would be difficult for researchers to 
discern whether strategic decisions made by interpreters during the process are due to 
cognitive constraints or norm-governed behavior (1999: 13, see also Schjoldager 2002). 
She formulated one of the first norms for simultaneous interpreting: 
 
Not every element of every proposition in the source text needs to be reproduced 
as such. It is appropriate for a simultaneous interpreter to produce the underlying 
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meaning of the proposition. This is acceptable, and often even desirable, since a 
full rendering of each separate element in the proposition is liable to use up the 
cognitive resources of the interpreter and may also exceed the capacity of the 
listener to process the target-language input. (1999: 6-7) 
 
Shlesinger later responded to Harris’s “honest spokesperson” norm by showing 
that despite the oath, the standards of impartiality described in the literature and the 
codes of ethics, and the interpreters’ desire to abide by the “true interpreter” norm, 
“even the most honest and true interpreters may find their ‘own ideas’ imposing 
themselves on the ideas of the original speakers” (2010). In her response to Harris, 
Shlesinger formulated a fundamental question: when there is more than one lexical 
choice to translate a source term, should the interpreter choose the one the source 
speaker would use if he spoke the target language, or the one that would be considered 
appropriate by the target-language listener? (2010: 8). She attempted to answer the 
question by proposing that if the strategic purpose of the question were to “elicit certain 
emotional and political reactions by linguistic means,” the interpreter “would 
presumably be expected to opt for the closest ‘equivalent.’” When the purpose of the 
question is to obtain information, however, “the interpreter would presumably be 
expected to select the ‘equivalent’ that would normally be used by the addressee” 
(2010: 12). In judicial interpreting, this dilemma might prove difficult to solve. On one 
hand, the purpose of the question may be both to elicit emotional reactions and obtain 
information; on the other hand, the interpreter is not privy to this purpose. Furthermore, 
although the translation may be correct based on the language system, this does not 
imply that it will be communicative in the target culture (Schäffner 1998: 3). This 
dilemma translates into the conflict consistently formulated by so many scholars who 
acknowledge that expectancy, preliminary and production norms are not always 
compatible (Pöllabauer 2006, Jakobson 1959/2000, Tate and Turner 1997/2002, 
Anderson 1976, Fowler 1997, Mikkelson 2000, Hale 2004, Mason 1999, Gentile et al. 
1996, Morris 1995/1999, Garzone 2002), and that was clearly articulated by Shlesinger:  
 
there is no reason to doubt that, as in [the] case of written translation, so too in 
case of simultaneous interpreting target-oriented constraints of a cultural-semiotic 
nature indeed shape the cognitive processes involved in individual acts of 
translation. (Toury and Lambert 1989: 3) [Shlesinger 1995: 9].  
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Several scholars also found norms related to the simplification of target texts. 
Shlesinger found that despite the accuracy requirement, interpreters do include additions 
and shifts to facilitate comprehension or avoid the appearance of unprofessionalism, or 
to establish themselves as active participants (1991), and later proposed that court 
interpreters “have been shown to simplify institutional discourse when interpreting to 
the defendant, and to elevate the style of the defendant’s responses when addressing the 
court” (Shlesinger 1999: 3). Other scholars who found similar phenomena include 
Jansen, who concluded that “the interpreter tends to simplify the institutional discourse 
when translating to the defendant, and renders the speech of the non-professional 
participant in a standardised manner” (1995: 11). This standardization relates to Toury’s 
proposed laws, the law of growing standardization and the law of interference. The law 
of growing standardization states that source texts tend to be simplified in the target 
text, and that linguistic items chosen by the translator tend to conform to models and 
repertoires from the target culture. The law of interference states that target texts always 
show traces of the source text due to the transfer of linguistic phenomena. The first law 
also seems to focus more on the target text, and the second law on the source text. 
(1995: 279). For Marzocchi (2005), norms are significant because they evoke issues of 
ethics as related to the codes, and an example of this interaction between norms and 
ethics is illustrated in the verbatim requirement. He proposes that the verbatim 
requirement is an initial and operational norm that “seems to safeguard the different 
roles in the courtroom, protecting other actors from a potentially intrusive role of the 
interpreter as a would-be mediator or cross-cultural consultant.” He cites a study by 
Siviero (2003), who found interpreters using plain language and “denying precisely the 
operational norm of completeness” because they were interpreting for uneducated 
defendants, and a study by Roncalli (2001), who found interpreters “extending their role 
into various forms of interactions with and advocacy for defendants” without objections 
from other participants. 
6.2.2. Norms in California  
As stated in chapter 3, there are several codes of ethics, standards, and rules for judicial 
interpreters in California, not only from official authorities but also from different 
professional associations such as NAJIT, CCIA, and others. These codes are very 
similar; they usually provide the same standards and rules in somewhat similar terms 
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and in more or less equal detail. Judicial interpreters in California, however, are mainly 
guided by the Professional Standards and Ethics for California Court Interpreters 
(CAJC 2013a), which also contain California Rules of Court, sections from the 
California Evidence Code, California Standards of Judicial Administration, compliance 
requirements for certified court interpreters, and Standards for Performance and 
Professional Responsibility for Contract Court. 
The Professional Standards and Ethics for California Court Interpreters are 
provided by the Judicial Council of California, Administrative Office of the Courts. The 
beginning of the code contains a definition of ethics:  
 
The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language, Fourth Edition 
(Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 2000) defines ethics as “the study of the 
general nature of morals and of the specific moral choices to be made by a person; 
moral philosophy” and “the rules or standards governing the conduct of a person 
or the members of a profession.” (CAJC 2013a: 5) 
 
Since norms are articulated in a code of ethics equated with moral choices 
governing the profession, abiding by these standards is considered tantamount to ethical 
behavior, and interpreters learn that being ethical means following these standards. As a 
result, behavior that contradicts these standards is considered unethical, even when 
interpreters feel an inclination to behave differently in situations where abiding by the 
norms might have an unfavorable effect. Thus, the certified interpreting community 
shares a common behavioral pattern, and this behavior comes to be expected by all legal 
actors, including the interpreter. As a result, interpreters’ choices are motivated by the 
norms and constraints internalized during socialization into the interpreting community. 
By abiding by these performance instructions, they conform to norms and therefore 
“contribute themselves to the continuation and strengthening of the norms” 
(Chesterman 1998: 91).  
The preface to the Professional Standards and Ethics for California Court 
Interpreters states: “The more prepared and informed you are about professional 
practices and the purpose of established norms and principles, the more you, together 
with all officers of the court, will be able to further the interests of justice” (2013a: vi). 
From the very beginning, interpreters learn that they will participate in furthering “the 
interests of justice” by adhering to established norms. Also in the preface, the code 
states that it is largely based on cited rules of court, standards of judicial administration, 
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standards of performance, and model guides for policy and practice in the state courts. 
Although authors call it a manual, “it is here that one finds a generous sprinkling of 
‘should’s, ‘must’s and ‘ought to’s— representing what interpreters are expected to do 
under different circumstances” (Shlesinger 1999: 4). Besides this official articulation of 
norms, interpreters work in a legal setting where law is applied, in close proximity with 
a judge and a jury, and are constantly subject to being challenged by attorneys, judges, 
and even by jurors. As a result, judicial interpreting norms seem to be perceived by 
interpreters almost as legally binding, very close to rules in Toury’s continuum (1998: 
17). Although the code of ethics contains a number of norms court interpreters must 
follow in judicial proceedings, these norms seem to function altogether as one 
overarching norm when the norm is to comply with said code and everything contained 
in it.  
In judicial interpreting, performance norms can be acquired and internalized 
through different channels, from training programs to observation of colleagues, and 
predominantly from the code of ethics that must be learned from the start to prepare for 
the certification exam. Once a candidate passes the exam and becomes an official court 
interpreter, the code of ethics becomes the explicit articulation of norms to abide by at 
the risk of being sanctioned. These sanctions may take different forms, such as criticism 
from colleagues, challenges by those present, or actual sanctions by an official body. 
Although according to Dueñas González et al. no interpreter has yet been sanctioned for 
violating the code (2012), Canon 14 of the Code of Professional Responsibility of the 
Official Interpreters of the United States Courts states “Official court interpreters of the 
United States courts willingly accept and agree to be bound by this Code, and 
understand that appropriate sanctions may be imposed by the court for willful 
violations” (emphasis added) (in Dueñas González et al. 2012: 1303). Therefore, 
although there might not have been official sanctions so far, they are a real possibility in 
view of this code, or at least that is what interpreters should believe and take into 
account before deviating from the norms. The first section of the code contains a 
detailed description of the standards, which are based on Rules of Court. A few of the 
most relevant standards will be reviewed. 
6.2.2.1. Representation of qualifications  
“An interpreter must accurately and completely represent his or her certifications, 
training, and relevant experience” (CAJC 2013a: 1). Besides describing the different 
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categories of interpreters, the articulation of the norm states: “Never misrepresent your 
qualifications and credentials in order to obtain work. Your reputation and the 
reputation of the entire profession are at stake.” As stated in chapter 3, the law provides 
that non-English speakers be assisted by certified interpreters in judicial proceedings. 
The California Federation of Interpreters (CFI) and the Interpreters Guild of America 
(IGA) documented instances of fraud such as “non-interpreters stealing and using an 
interpreter’s certification number to obtain work and non certified interpreters passing 
themselves off as certified and telling judges their oath ‘is on file’” (IGA 2014). 
Certified interpreters who had to compete with non-interpreters for work perceived this 
as a threat. In order to help enforce the law regarding the use of certified interpreters, 
CFI and IGA sponsored a bill that mandates “an interpreter’s certification be stated and 
verified on the record for court proceedings and depositions, and requiring an interpreter 
to show identification to prove their certification or registration status” (IGA 2014). The 
bill was signed by Governor Brown. The new law, AB 2370, amended the code to 
include on the record the interpreter’s name, certification information, and a statement 
that the interpreter’s oath was administered or is on file with the court, for example: 
“My name is Jane Doe and I am a state certified judicial interpreter for the 
Klingon language, my certification number is 123456, I’ve been sworn in and all parties 
may examine my badge” (IGA 2014). When the original norm was threatened to be 
undermined, interpreters were able to establish a new norm to maintain and reinforce 
the original norm. As Toury explains, “some translators may then go on to take active 
part in the re-negotiations concerning translational conventions (paragraph 3.2) which 
will sometimes result in a change of norms” (1998: 28), and Chesterman states that “the 
norms are experienced by those who translate as being prescriptive, regulatory. To 
break these norms is to run the risk of criticism; but it may also, of course, lead to the 
establishment of new norms” (Chesterman 1998: 90). This development also responds 
to the norm articulation (above) in that misrepresentation of qualifications would place 
the reputation of the entire profession at stake. 
6.2.2.2. Complete and accurate interpretation 
 
An interpreter must use his or her best skills and judgment to interpret accurately 
without embellishing, omitting, or editing. When interpreting for a party, the 
interpreter must interpret everything that is said during the entire proceedings. 
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When interpreting for a witness, the interpreter must interpret everything that is 
said during the witness’s testimony. (CAJC 2013a: 3) 
 
This is the verbatim norm discussed throughout the literature as the underlying 
norm in court interpreting, as stated by Lee: “The norm in court interpreting is often 
construed as to be synonymous with the verbatim requirement in the legal sector” 
(2015: 195). The articulation of the norm in this code includes several fundamental 
elements. The main goals for providing an interpreter are stated in the beginning, to wit, 
placing the non-English speaker on an equal footing with the English speaker, and 
ensuring that the record in English reflects all that was said by all parties involved. To 
achieve these goals, many instructions are provided for interpreters who must first take 
or file an oath to “well and truly interpret” the proceeding (p. 3), although the oath 
generally taken by interpreters does include the phrase “to the best of my ability.” In 
this sense, this is an oath to uphold and abide by the norms. What follows in the section 
is a list of detailed instructions to comply with this standard, some of which will be 
reviewed next.  
 
Regarding production and comprehension 
- Interpreters should not: make the speaker sound more articulate, logical or polite in the 
target language (p. 3), add or subtract any words for the sake of clarity or expediency 
(p. 5), omit “seemingly redundant verbs” (p. 6), alter the register, or level of language, 
to make it easier to understand or more socially acceptable (p. 7), clarify ambiguities 
or double negatives (p. 12).  
- Interpreters must: “render into the target language all the filler words used by the 
speaker” (p. 6), do their best “to render a version as fragmentary as the original, 
without inserting any additional information ... to clarify the statement” (p. 9).  
- Witnesses (or an attorney) are responsible for speaking up when a question is not 
understood (p. 7).  
- Non-English speakers should hear exactly the question asked to assist counsel in their 
defense (p. 3). 
- “You, as the official interpreter, bear a very important responsibility, as other people 
are depending on you to understand what is being said. This is a relationship of trust 
that must be preserved at all costs” (p. 18). 
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- “There are two basic reasons for having an interpreter present in a court case: (1) to 
enable the defendant to understand the proceedings and (2) to enable the court to 
understand all non-English speakers who address the court” (p. 28). 
- “As an interpreter, you must be mindful at all times that communication is the primary 
objective of the interpretation process” (p. 28). 
Basically, all matters of comprehension are charged to the interpreter, who at the 
same time is prevented from making language clear and comprehensible for the target-
language receiver. The translation required during judicial interpreting is deemed a mere 
linguistic act: “the replacement of textual material in one language (SL) by equivalent 
material in another language (TL)” (Catford 1965: 20), and the translation is faithful and 
accurate as long as it replicates the exact meaning and form (and register) of the 
original. According to Lee, effective intercultural communication is not guaranteed by a 
strict verbatim requirement that often complicates achieving the prescribed accuracy 
purpose instead of facilitating it (2015: 195). The code also warns against intervening 
when suspecting non-comprehension (CAJC 2013a: 7, 37) and against being an 
advocate for the non-English speaker (p. 20) who, as described in chapters 1 and 5, will 
rarely articulate non-comprehension. This relates to the conflict of role described 
throughout the literature and above, a difficult position for the interpreter, who is 
expected to choose a translation that will be more adequate than acceptable, as target-
language listeners’ constraints must not be taken into account. Furthermore, cultural 
reasons preventing non-English speakers from speaking up in cases of non-
comprehension may rule out compliance with Chesterman’s expectancy norms (1993), 
as it minimizes the chance for non-English speakers to accept or reject the translation. It 
is also clear that there might be a conflict within each norm category proposed by 
Chesterman: the accountability norm, whereby interpreters must be loyal to the source 
speaker and the target listener; the communication norm, whereby the interpreter is an 
expert who must optimize communication between source and target speakers; and the 
relation norm, whereby the relation between source and target texts should take into 
account the skopos (articulated as communication and equal footing) and the nature of 
target-language listeners. In each of these three norm categories the interpreter is 
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Regarding the duty to third parties 
- The judge, the jury and the attorneys will draw conclusions about witnesses’ 
credibility, sophistication and intelligence based on the interpreted version of 
testimony (p. 3, 7).  
- An interpreter has the sworn duty to interpret everything that is said in court during the 
proceedings (p. 4) 
 
Regarding invisibility 
- “As a general rule, the interpreter should remain unobtrusive during courtroom 
proceedings” (p. 4). 
- “Interpreters are not actors and should not become the center of attention” (p. 10). 
- “It is imperative that you remain emotionally neutral” (p. 10). 
- “You must remember at all times that the role of the interpreter is to assist 
professionally, neutrally, and unobtrusively so that the proceedings can take place as if 
no language barrier existed. You must strive to attract as little attention to your 
presence in the courtroom as possible” (p. 12). 
- “For the most part, stepping out of the role of interpreter should be undertaken with 
great caution, as one can inadvertently take on the role of language or cultural expert.” 
(p. 4). 
 
The first-person reference proposed by Harris (1990) is not explicitly articulated 
in the main code, which contains only a statement about third-person references:  
 
It is common for persons who use interpreters to preface their statements with 
phrases like “Tell him that . . .” and “Ask him if . . .” rather than addressing each 
other directly. If they do so, you must not edit out those phrases. If someone 
repeatedly makes third-person statements, the judge will usually instruct that 
person on the proper procedure. If not, respectfully ask the judge to assist you. 
(CAJC 2013a: 5),  
 
and later: “In formal courtroom proceedings, it is common practice for 
interpreters to refer to themselves in the third person so it is clear in the written record 
that they are speaking in their own capacity and not interpreting the words of the 
witness” (p. 16). However, the first-person instruction is included in the Appendix 
section as part of California Standards of Judicial Administration, both for interpreters 
and for counsel, in Standard 2.11- Interpreted proceedings: 
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(a) Instructions to interpreters. Use the first person when interpreting statements 
made in the first person. (For example, a statement or question should not be 
introduced with the words, “He says. . .”) (p. 50) 
(b) Instructions to counsel. The court or the court's designee should give the 
following instructions to counsel, either orally or in writing: (1) When examining 
a non-English-speaking witness, direct all questions to the witness and not to the 
interpreter. (For example, do not say to the interpreter, “Ask him if. . . .” (p. 52) 
 
 
The purpose of the first-person reference is to have a clear record and know who 
is saying what, and at the same time to fuse the interpreter and the source speaker into 
one voice. Although the use of the first person is standard in judicial proceedings, non-
English speakers are usually not informed of this norm at the beginning of the 
proceeding. As a result, they may look both at the interpreter and the source speaker 
back and forth and often interrupt to ask, “who is my attorney?” This confusion could 
be avoided by simply providing instructions regarding interpreter use. The code does 
not mention the requirement to interpret in the consecutive mode during witness 
testimony either, although it is required by 28 U.S. Code § 1827 (LIIc).  
 
The code provides not only the norms but also instructions as to how to comply 
with and defend the norm when challenged. For example,  
 
Standard interpreting practice requires that you interpret for the non-English-
speaking defendant at all times during the proceedings. Any deviation from that 
may create a due process issue and constitute a violation of rule 2.890(b) (see 
California Rules of Court, rule 2.890(b); appendix A). Any time an attorney or a 
defendant requests or instructs you not to interpret, you should request counsel to 
inform the court so that the judge can make the decision and place it on the 
record, if he or she agrees with the omission. (CAJC 2013a: 35) 
 
 
Regarding professional relationships, interpreters are instructed on the forms of 
address:  
 
You should maintain professional detachment. One way to convey this is to call 
people by their last name (Mr. Jones, Ms. Smith). If there is a formal form of 
address in the target language (for example, “usted” in Spanish for “you”), use it 
at all times, regardless of the age or status of the witness or defendant. Do, 
however, observe the cultural norms of the target language in maintaining this 
formal behavior. (CAJC 2013a: 28) 
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The use of the usted form of address in Spanish is a sign of respect and courtesy 
that establishes a personal and emotional distance. It is generally used with 
professionals, people of higher authority or older age. Its use varies not only across 
countries, but geographical areas as well. In some areas, the usted is even used within 
the family to address parents and siblings, such as Colombia (Hualde et al. 2012: 259, 
Ting-Toomey 1999: 97).  
One of the norms proposed by Harris (1990) regarding team interpreting is also 
addressed in this code, in the section regarding impediments to performance:  
 
When circumstances allow, courts may provide “team interpreting” in extended 
court proceedings, such as trials and evidentiary hearings, to help prevent fatigue, 
ensure accuracy, and avoid interruptions to the flow of the proceedings. By 
alternating approximately every half hour, two or more interpreters can avoid 
fatigue—one potential cause of interpreter error—without needing to request a 
break in the proceedings. (CAJC 2013a: 33) 
6.2.2.3. Cultural or linguistic expertise  
  
Even though you have language expertise, you should make every effort to avoid 
testifying as an expert witness in a case in which you are interpreting. Doing so 
might blur your function in the courtroom and prevent you from being able to 
continue interpreting in the case. Especially avoid testifying on issues that extend 
beyond your knowledge and authority. As a court interpreter, your function is not 
that of an expert on the culture of the non-English speaking defendant or 
witnesses or on cultural practices referred to in testimony. Authorities in the 
appropriate fields should be consulted in such matters. For instance, expert 
testimony as to whether a non-English speaker has clearly understood a police 
officer’s questions as uttered in the foreign language is beyond an interpreter’s 
expertise. A psychologist might be better suited to provide this kind of testimony. 
Even if an attorney seeks to consult you on similar issues, or you feel you have 
valuable opinions and experience to offer, it is wise to refrain from commenting, 
even in an informal setting. (CAJC 2013a: 36-37) 
 
It is not clear what would constitute “testifying as an expert witness.” In 
circumstances of communication breakdowns or confusion the interpreter may be the 
only one in the proceeding to have a way to clarify comprehension issues based on the 
same interpreter’s culture or long-term contact with other Hispanic cultures.  
Interpreters also have the duty to report ethical (norm) violations:  
 
If anyone tries to induce or encourage you to violate any statute, rule, regulation, 
or policy relating to court interpreting, you are obligated to report the situation to 
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the proper authorities, such as the judge assigned to the case, the court interpreter 
coordinator, the supervising public defender or district attorney, or the presiding 
judge of the court. (CAJC 2013a: 38)  
 
The interpreter must not only comply with the norms: violations and inducement 
to violations must be reported to authorities. This might contribute in part to 
interpreters’ avoidance of discussing personal ethics concerns with colleagues, who are 
also put in the place of policing other interpreters’ behavior.  
Despite all of the should’s and must’s, the code also states “As is often the case in 
interpretation work, it comes down to using your best judgment (p. 5),” which seems to 
give interpreters certain freedom to make choices during production. This freedom is 
also implied in other sections, such as “interruptions require great tact and should be 
rare, limited to truly serious errors” (p. 14), and “in short, be very cautious about 
intervening in the process” (p. 16). Toury states that  
 
freedom of choice is exerted not only when one chooses to behave in a way which 
does not concur with the prevailing norms. It is also exercised when one seems 
simply to reaffirm one's previous commitment to these. After all, in principle, 
there is always an alternative, otherwise there would be no need for norms in the 
first place. (1998: 20)  
 
For Hermans too, in principle, choices made by translators are motivated by 
norms on which translators base their decisions (1991: 165). Although abiding by the 
norms does not imply denying free choice, when norms are so strong and are 
internalized as such, free will seems to surrender to norm-governed behavior that 
becomes the free choice. It is of course true that choosing to abide by a norm is still a 
choice, however, in this context this might be a constructive choice when the alternative 
choice would carry such dire consequences. Constructive here is used in its legal sense:  
 
That which is established by the mind of the law in its act of construing facts, 
conduct, circumstances, or instruments. That which has not the character assigned 
to it in its own essential nature, but acquires such character in consequence of the 
way in which it is regarded by a rule or policy of law; hence, inferred, implied, 
made out by legal interpretation. (Black’s Law Dictionary 1992: 312)  
 
These constructive choices may be perceived or construed as choices, but when 
perceived as the only possible choice, in this context the choice becomes being or not 
being an ethical and professional interpreter, or being or not being an interpreter at all.  
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Since norms vary across groups and subgroups, the same person may adhere to 
different norms or show more flexibility in different social contexts (Toury 1998: 17). 
For example, the same interpreter may abide by different norms according to each 
interpreting situation, such as an attorney-client interview. The same might happen in an 
out-of-court legal proceeding, where norms can also be or appear to be more flexible, 
and the privacy of the meeting might lessen the possibility of receiving sanctions. This 
and several other issues were included in the interview guide to explore the way 
interpreters actually abide (or not) by these norms, and the reasons behind their 
compliance or non-compliance.  
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Chapter 7. Research design and pilot study 
7.1. Research question 
This research concerns a particular intercultural communicative event that is at the 
intersection of several constraining and facilitating angles, in this case, Spanish speakers 
assisted by an interpreter in judicial proceedings in California. More specifically, it 
focuses on the factors that may shape Spanish speakers’ comprehension in a setting that 
has very particular characteristics. The previous chapters examined the interpreting 
scenario in California, where the law provides that non-English speakers be assisted by 
a language interpreter in order to afford them the same legal rights as English speakers. 
These guidelines seem to imply that the presence of the interpreter will guarantee them 
these same rights, an equal footing, assuming that the only difference between English 
speakers and Spanish speakers is the language, and that this difference can be overcome 
by use of an interpreter. The presence of an interpreter, however, may not be enough to 
overcome the multiple challenges faced by Hispanic immigrants who come into contact 
with the U.S. judicial system. These challenges involve cultural values that may prevent 
them from speaking up when they don’t understand, a different and unknown legal 
system, an intricate legal jargon with referents outside their sociocultural context, and a 
significantly different level of education than their English-speaking counterparts. All of 
these factors may hinder communication and comprehension, a situation that is 
exacerbated by an official code that prevents interpreters from adjusting the language 
register or intervening to alert parties in cases of non-comprehension. Based on this 
code, interpreters are mainly faithful only to the source language and are not directed to 
account for sociocultural target constraints. In brief, the main conceptual framework of 
this research is concerned with Spanish speakers’ comprehension of the language of the 
law.  
The examination of language register and comprehension issues has shown that 
registers are learned and that they are specific to speech communities, defined by Hymes 
as “sharing knowledge of rules for the conduct and interpretation of speech,” where 
“sharing of grammatical knowledge of a form of speech is not sufficient” (1974: 47-51). 
This difficulty to access the legal register was acknowledged by the government with 
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respect to (English-speaking) jurors’ lack of comprehension of jury instructions, which 
triggered a full revision of all criminal and civil jury instructions in California.  
This research seeks to bring the social, cultural, and educational constraints of 
the target-language receiver into the equation of modern-day judicial interpreting in 
California, which is still guided by principles of formal equivalence and source 
orientedness. In order to understand this intercultural communicative event it was 
necessary to account for sociocultural target constraints and, accordingly, the translation 
theoretical framework applied involved a target-oriented approach borrowing concepts 
from skopos theory and Toury’s notion of norms. Functionalist translation theory 
(skopos theory) allows giving priority precisely to the sociocultural and situational 
constraints of the target-culture receiver, and since many of these constraints are 
intimately related to institutional and professional norms, this communicative event is 
examined here by investigating the norms at play and interpreters’ attitudes toward 
them. In summary, this study attempts to determine whether the practices established by 
the skopos-determining and norm-setting authorities are effective in meeting the 
purpose defined within the system. 
In skopos theory, the translator/interpreter is the expert in charge of making 
strategic decisions, taking into account the sociocultural constraints of the receiver. 
Adjusting the register in order to facilitate and attempt to achieve the purpose of 
communication and put the non-English speaker on an equal footing may be one such 
decision. The first question this research seeks to answer is whether English speakers 
and Spanish speakers show a similar comprehension level of legal register, as implied 
by the equal footing claim. The second question this research seeks to answer is whether 
by focusing on target audience comprehension—as allowed by skopos theory—and 
hypothetically giving interpreters license to adjust the register, Spanish speakers’ 
comprehension would improve. This research thus seeks to test the following two 
hypotheses:  
1. English speakers and Spanish speakers will not show the same level of 
comprehension when presented with a spoken text reflecting the same high register of 
legal language.  
2. When the register is simplified, the comprehension level in Spanish speakers 
will increase. 
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7.2. Research design 
Since court interpreting is examined in this study as a sociocultural event involving an 
interaction among (at least) three main interlocutors, I decided to triangulate data from 
all three sources: interpreters, attorneys, and non-English speakers. To gather this data, I 
developed a research design with quantitative and qualitative components to address 
different aspects of this intercultural communication event.  
The main question in this study concerned an exploration of the equal footing 
claim in terms of comparing the comprehension achieved by English speakers and 
Spanish speakers, and exploring the possibility of enhancing Spanish speakers’ 
comprehension by simplifying the language register. This question was addressed by 
the quantitative component of the research design, aimed at comparing three different 
comprehension levels: that of English speakers hearing original legal register, that of 
Spanish speakers hearing original legal register, and that of Spanish speakers hearing 
simplified legal register. In accordance with the premise in the code and literature that 
states that providing an interpreter means placing the non-English speaker on an equal 
footing with the English speaker, I designed a listening comprehension test to examine 
the implied claim of equal access to language in terms of comprehension.  
The listening comprehension test basically consisted of having participants listen 
to sentences, each of which was followed by a question with a view to assessing 
comprehension. For this test, five sentences were selected from sample interpreter 
certification exams and California jury instructions. These five English sentences were 
then translated into Spanish with the same original register, and these Spanish 
translations—three sets in all—were then modified in a way to simplify the register. 
The Spanish translation of the five sentences for the main study was produced in a focus 
group with nine court certified interpreters, and the simplified-register version of the 
Spanish sentences for the main study was produced in a second focus group with six 
court certified interpreters. Each of these three sets of questions was used with a 
different group of ten participants each. The original English sentences were used with 
English speakers, the original-register Spanish sentences were used with one group of 
Spanish speakers, and the simplified-register Spanish sentences were used with a 
different group of Spanish speakers. All participants in this test met the required 
qualification criteria, which included an educational attainment level consistent with 
those indicated by the literature and the census, no court experience and, in the case of 
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Spanish-speaking participants, little or no English proficiency and foreign-born status. 
Based on the information obtained from the U.S. Census Bureau and the literature 
reviewed, the average educational attainment level for U.S. Whites alone in 2012 was 
13.5 years (see 2.2 above), and the average educational attainment level for foreign-
born Hispanics was between 6-8 years. In consequence, the educational attainment level 
required to participate was 13-14 years of schooling for English speakers and 6-8 years 
of schooling for Spanish speakers. 
To complete the triangulation, the qualitative component of the design involved 
gathering data through interviews with interpreters and attorneys, and focus groups with 
interpreters and Spanish speakers. The interviews with interpreters focused on gathering 
information about their views and attitudes about register and the rationale behind the 
code requirement, register variation, differences in practice across settings, and issues of 
comprehension. Interpreters’ views were also explored in the second part of the first 
focus group: after the translation task was completed, interpreters were introduced to 
some of the most relevant points of this study to invite a discussion and obtain their 
feedback. The interviews with attorneys focused on gathering information about their 
discourse practice while working with English-speaking and Spanish-speaking clients, 
issues of comprehension, and their views on interpreter interventions. Qualifying 
criteria for interpreters included a California certificate for court interpreting and at least 
five years of experience. Qualifying criteria for attorneys included at least five years of 
experience with the Hispanic population in California. 
A third focus group was conducted with monolingual lay Spanish speakers 
convened for two purposes: obtaining feedback about the terminology found in the five 
original-register Spanish sentences, and attempting to collectively produce another set 
of simplified-register Spanish sentences in order to compare them with the simplified-
register Spanish sentences produced by the interpreters in the second focus group, 
mainly in terms of vocabulary. The two sets of simplified-register sentences were then 
briefly compared to examine similarities and differences in criteria between interpreters 
and monolingual Spanish speakers on vocabulary comprehension.  
In order to evaluate the feasibility of the procedure and the instruments, I 
conducted a small-scale pilot study that will be described in the next section. 
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7.3. Pilot Study 
The pilot study was conducted in 2008 with the primary goals of testing the instruments 
that would be used later in the main study, identifying implementation problems, and 
making all necessary adjustments. Other goals were related to assessing the clarity of 
instructions, and determining whether the instruments as such would yield the 
information sought. A total of fourteen participants were invited to take part in three 
different studies: three attorneys, five court interpreters, two lay English speakers, and 
four lay Spanish speakers.  
Attorneys and interpreters were selected for interviews with the goal of inviting a 
discussion surrounding the main issues examined in this research, and to identify other 
questions to include later in the main study. Lay English speakers and Spanish speakers 
participated in a listening comprehension exercise aimed at testing and comparing their 
comprehension of legal language, and determining if Spanish speakers’ comprehension 
improved when the register was simplified. The term simplified here is used based on 
the definitions by the Oxford dictionary “Make (something) simpler or easier to do or 
understand,” and the Cambridge dictionary: “To make something less complicated and 
therefore easier to do or understand.” This simplification would entail using a more 
standard language based on O’Barr’s classification of legal registers: “standard English, 
which includes a formal lexicon and is used mainly by attorneys and most witnesses” 
(1981: 396). 
The research questions the pilot study chiefly sought to answer included:  
1. Will English speakers and Spanish speakers show the same level of 
comprehension of a spoken text presented with the same high register of legal 
language? 
2. When the register is simplified, will the comprehension level in Spanish speakers 
increase? 
3. What are interpreters’ views on register and register adjustment? 
4. What are attorneys’ views on interpreter intervention? 
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7.3.1.1. Interviews with interpreters 
Interpreters were interviewed in order to gather information regarding their awareness 
of, and views on, register, register training, and register adjustment. A second goal was 
to gather information that would help develop the final question guide that would be 
used in the main study.  
The criteria for selecting interpreter participants included their having acquired a 
certificate issued by the state for court interpreting, and at least five years of experience 
in judicial interpreting in California. Five court interpreters participated in this study. 
Participants were selected from personal contacts and referrals.  
This part of the study consisted of a semi-structured qualitative interview, and 
the list of questions used in these interviews involved mainly aspects of language 
register. Interpreters were asked to define in their own words the meaning of the term 
register as related to language, and also whether they were aware of any standard 
regarding how to handle the register during interpreting. Participants were then asked if 
they were familiar with the reasons for interpreters being expected not to adjust the 
register during interpreting, and if they had ever received any training in this regard. 
The next questions were related to participants’ actual practice, the register of legal 
language and its comprehensibility for Spanish speakers in judicial proceedings. 
Interpreters were asked if at times they perceived instances of non-comprehension by 
Spanish speakers, and the signs that helped them make this determination. The next 
question was related to Spanish speakers’ claim of comprehension when the opposite 
was found to be true. Interpreters were asked in this regard if they had witnessed this 
phenomenon during judicial proceedings. They were also invited to describe what they 
did in those circumstances, and if they ever felt comfortable enough to perhaps adjust 
the register to facilitate comprehension. Finally, interpreters were invited to add any 
comment they deemed relevant. Other materials included a digital recorder, and the 
same consent form used with all participants. 
These interviews were conducted in Los Angeles, individually and privately. 
Interviews began with participants’ confirming their consent to record the session. 
Participants were first informed of the nature and extent of the study, and received and 
signed a consent form describing the purpose and conditions of participation, which 
were explained as needed. All interviews were recorded and transcribed. 
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7.3.1.2. Interviews with attorneys 
This part of the study involved semi-structured qualitative interviews with attorneys, 
with the goal of gathering information about their discourse practice while working with 
English-speaking and Spanish-speaking clients, issues of comprehension, and their 
views on interpreter interventions.  
Three attorneys participated in this part of the study. The criteria for selecting 
attorney participants included that they had at least five years of practice with the 
Hispanic population in judicial proceedings in California. These participants were all 
monolingual English speakers. Participants were selected from personal contacts and 
referrals. 
The materials for this section of the study consisted of a question guide and a 
consent form. The list of questions used in these interviews involved mainly the 
attorneys’ communication with Spanish speakers and their views on interpreter 
interventions. Participants were asked about any difference they might find when 
communicating with English-speaking clients as opposed to Spanish-speaking clients, 
and any adjustments they might make to facilitate this communication, if needed. 
Attorneys were also asked to compare the general comprehension level of both groups 
of clients. They were also invited to describe their experiences regarding interpreter 
involvement or interruptions to alert them to potential issues of non-comprehension, and 
their views on such interventions. Attorneys were also asked if they believed they could 
communicate with clients through an interpreter the same way they could communicate 
with English-speaking clients. Finally, attorneys were invited to add any comment they 
deemed relevant. Other materials included a digital recorder, and the same consent form 
used with all participants. 
These interviews were conducted in Los Angeles, individually and privately. 
Interviews began with participants confirming their consent to record the session. 
Participants were first informed of the nature and extent of the study, and received and 
signed a consent form describing the purpose and conditions of participation, which 
were explained as needed. All interviews were recorded and transcribed.  
7.3.1.3. Listening comprehension test 
According to the codes and the literature reviewed, placing the non-English speaker on 
an equal footing with the English speaker is a primary reason for the provision of 
interpreters for non-English speakers. Accordingly, this study was designed to test this 
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implied claim of equal footing, in other words, equal access to language in terms of 
comprehension. The initial purpose of this test was to determine and compare the 
comprehension levels of English speakers and Spanish speakers using equal registers. 
As described in 5.2.1 above, studies by Charrow and Charrow, Benson, Gunnarsson and 
other scholars have already shown that register simplification leads to better 
comprehensibility for English-speaking users of legal language. Drawing on these 
studies, this test also aimed to determine if register simplification resulted in a 
significant difference in comprehension by Spanish speakers as well. The view that the 
adjustment of register, in being linked to explaining and advocating, may represent a 
lack of impartiality, necessitated a further focus on whether comprehension could be 
enhanced without providing explanations or extra information, that is, by maintaining 
impartiality according to the standards.  
A total of six participants took part in this test. This experiment involved three 
groups: one group of two English speakers and two groups of two Spanish speakers 
each. The participants selected for this experiment had, according to census data and the 
literature reviewed, the average education levels for English speakers and Spanish 
speakers in California. Since it has been shown that education does play an important 
role in comprehension and accessibility of high formal registers, this test aimed to 
determine the difference in comprehension levels between the group of English 
speakers and the group of Spanish speakers who heard the same register of legal 
language. The other group of Spanish speakers, who heard the sentences with simplified 
register, was used to determine if in fact simplifying the register led to a comprehension 
level that would resemble or come close to that of English speakers, that is, if it would 
approach the equal footing premise.  
Based on information provided by the U.S. Census Bureau and the literature 
reviewed at the time the pilot study was conducted, the approximate education level was 
13.5 years of schooling for English speakers and approximately 6-8 years of schooling 
for Spanish speakers. This value was taken from the literature because the Census 
Bureau data on Hispanics included second and third generations who were bilingual or 
spoke only English. Since U.S.-born Hispanics attend school in English and have a 
much closer and direct contact with the English language than foreign-born Hispanics, I 
decided to work with Hispanic immigrants only. In order to reduce the variables, 
Spanish-speaking participants had little or no knowledge of English, and neither English 
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nor Spanish speakers had any court experience. The experiment was very much like a 
listening comprehension exercise.  
 
7.3.1.3.1. Instrument design. Three different listening comprehension tests were 
administered, each to a different group of participants. Each test consisted of five 
sentences, each paired with a question to assess comprehension. The first idea was to 
prepare the tests with sentences from actual courtroom discourse. Seven courtrooms 
were contacted, but since none allowed recordings of proceedings, it was decided to use 
fragments from other sources. Three of the five sentences used in this test were taken 
literally from the old versions of jury instructions. The other two sentences were taken 
from a sample state court interpreter oral exam provided by Prometric on their website 
(2007).  
 1. The first set of sentences consisted of the five original English sentences as 
described above, each paired with a question to assess comprehension. These sentences 
were administered to a group of English speakers. 
2. The second set of sentences consisted of a Spanish translation of the five original 
sentences in which the original register of legal language was preserved. Each sentence 
was followed by the same question posed to English speakers, which was translated into 
Spanish. This set was administered to the first group of Spanish speakers.  
3. For the third set, the two sentences taken from Prometric were translated into Spanish 
using a simplified register. The other three sentences in the set were jury instructions, 
and the Spanish translations were made not of the original but of the newer versions of 
the instructions that were already simplified to make them more comprehensible for 
jurors. Each sentence was again followed by a question to assess comprehension. This 
set was administered to the second group of Spanish speakers.  
Following are the five sentences and translations used in the pilot study. The 
first three sentences were taken from jury instructions, and the last two sentences were 
taken from Prometric’s sample certification exams.  
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Table 1. English sentences – pilot study 
 
1 A witness who is willfully false in one material aspect of his or her testimony is to be distrusted in 
others. You may reject the whole testimony of a witness who willfully has testified falsely as to a 
material point, unless, from all the evidence, you believe the probability of truth favors his or her 
testimony in other particulars. Question: What should you do when a witness is willfully false in 
one material aspect of his or her testimony? 
 
2 Circumstantial evidence is evidence that, if found to be true, proves a fact from which an 
inference of the existence of another fact may be drawn. A factual inference is a deduction that 
may logically and reasonably be drawn from one or more facts established by the evidence. 
Question: What is circumstantial evidence? 
 
3 “Preponderance of the evidence” means evidence that has more convincing force than that 
opposed to it. If the evidence is so evenly balanced that you are unable to say that the evidence on 
either side of an issue preponderates, your finding on that issue must be against the party who had 
the burden of proving it. Question: What is preponderance of the evidence? 
 
4 The defendant further alleges that it was his perception that his attorney had disclosed privileged 
information to co-counsel, before the case was severed, that later led him to enter into a guilty 
plea. Question: What does the defendant allege? 
 
5 Since the defendant’s explanation as to the behavior of the parties is not supported by the sworn 
statement of any witnesses, it scarcely rises to the level of clear and convincing evidence. 
Question: Why does the defendant’s explanation not seem believable? 
 
 
Table 2. Spanish sentences with original register – pilot study 
 
1 Si un testigo declara voluntariamente en falso en un aspecto esencial de su testimonio, se debe 
desconfiar de él en otros. Usted puede rechazar todo el testimonio de un testigo que ha declarado 
voluntariamente en falso sobre un punto importante, a menos que al conocer todas las pruebas, 
usted considere que la probabilidad de que sea verdad favorece su testimonio en otros puntos. 
Question: ¿Qué debe hacer cuando un testigo declara voluntariamente de manera falsa en un 
aspecto esencial de su testimonio? 
 
2 Las pruebas circunstanciales son pruebas que, de determinarse que son verdaderas, prueban un 
hecho del cual puede efectuarse una inferencia de la existencia de otro hecho. Una inferencia de 
hechos es una deducción que puede efectuarse lógica y razonablemente de uno o más hechos 
establecidos por las pruebas. Question: ¿Qué son las pruebas circunstanciales? 
 
3 “Preponderancia de la prueba” significa prueba que tiene más fuerza de convicción que la que se 
le opone. Si la prueba está tan uniformemente equilibrada que usted no puede decir que la prueba 
de ninguna de las partes prepondera, su decisión sobre ese punto debe ser en contra de la parte que 
tenía la carga de probarla. Question: ¿Qué es preponderancia de la prueba? 
 
4 El acusado alega, además, que su percepción de que su abogado había divulgado información 
privilegiada al co-abogado antes de que el caso fuese separado, fue lo que luego lo llevó a darse 
culpable. Question: ¿Qué alega el acusado? 
 
5 Puesto que la explicación del acusado en cuanto al comportamiento de las partes no está apoyada 
por la declaración jurada de ningún testigo, dista mucho de alcanzar el nivel requerido para 
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Table 3. Spanish sentences with simplified register – pilot study 
1 Si usted decide que un testigo mintió a propósito sobre algo importante, usted debe considerar no 
creer nada que ese testigo diga. Por otro lado, si usted piensa que el testigo mintió sobre algunas 
cosas pero dijo la verdad sobre otras, usted puede aceptar la parte que cree que es verdad y puede 
ignorar el resto. Question: ¿Qué debe hacer usted si un testigo miente adrede sobre algo 
importante? 
 
2 Algunas pruebas demuestran algo de forma directa, como por ejemplo la declaración de un testigo 
que vio un avión volando en el cielo. Algunas pruebas demuestran algo de forma indirecta, como 
por ejemplo la declaración de un testigo que vio sólo el humo blanco que a veces dejan los 
aviones. Estas pruebas indirectas a veces se llaman “pruebas circunstanciales”. En cualquiera de 
los casos, la declaración del testigo demuestra que un avión voló por el cielo. Question: ¿Qué son 
las pruebas circunstanciales? 
 
3 Una de las partes debe convencerlo con las pruebas que presenta en el tribunal, de que es más 
probable que lo que esa parte tiene que probar sea cierto que falso. Esto se llama “obligación de 
probar”. Question: ¿De qué tiene que convencerlo una de las partes? 
 
4 El acusado también dice que se declaró culpable porque le pareció que su abogado le había 
revelado información confidencial al otro abogado antes de que se separara el caso. Question: 
¿Qué dice el acusado? 
 
5 La explicación del acusado no parece una prueba clara ni convincente porque lo que dijo sobre la 
conducta de las partes no coincide con lo que dijeron los testigos bajo juramento. Question: ¿Por 




All translations were provided by a court certified interpreter. All participants 
received a consent form describing the purpose and conditions of participation.  
 
7.3.1.3.2. Procedure. The tests were conducted in Los Angeles in 2008. Each test took 
between ten and twenty minutes to complete and was conducted in person, individually 
and privately. Participants were first informed of the nature of the study and received 
and signed the consent form describing the purpose and conditions of participation, 
which were explained as needed. Next, participants were told they would hear a 
recorded sentence followed by a question, after which they would provide an answer 
that would be recorded. No repetitions were allowed. All answers received were 
transcribed, and the Spanish answers were translated into English by a court certified 
interpreter. To measure comprehension levels, percentages were used based on the share 
of correct answers to comprehension questions.  
7.3.2. Results 
7.3.2.1. Interviews with interpreters 
The interview section did not present problems. However, the extent of unsolicited and 
relevant information volunteered by the participants led to a decision to revise the 
interview guide to include additional items. Furthermore, three of the participants 
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contacted this researcher at a later time to ask if they could add information. These 
interviews were designed to take between ten and fifteen minutes; however, all 
candidates became so deeply involved in the subject matter that the length of the 
interview was almost doubled and sometimes tripled. Most participants articulated a 
feeling of excitement to discuss issues that did not usually come up, that “never crossed 
my mind,” or that “nobody talks about.” The questions seemed to elicit thoughts that 
continued prompting ideas that apparently needed to be shared. One of the participants 
asked to turn the tape recorder on again twice after the interview was completed. 
Although most participants were somewhat apprehensive at the beginning of the 
interview and verbalized this apprehension, two of them asked to continue the 
“conversation” and three of them offered repeatedly to be contacted for more 
information if needed. It was rather evident that there was a general need to have a 
forum to discuss issues that were either considered taboo, of which there is not much 
awareness, or which interpreters were usually reluctant to discuss with colleagues in 
everyday work.  
It was decided that such interviews with interpreters would be part of the main 
study, with the addition of other questions about issues and topics volunteered by pilot 
study participants. For example, all participants made reference to formal vs. informal 
settings, and most participants made reference to definitions and boundaries of their 
roles. For example, P3 stated,  
 
If I am in an informal setting such as a deposition prep[aration], I often find 
myself telling the attorney that I believe the witness is not understanding because 
of the register being used. I wouldn’t do that in a formal setting, I would feel 
intimidated to do so because I would be scared of someone telling me you’re just 
the interpreter and your job is to interpret. (P3)  
 
All participants interviewed claimed to be familiar with the concept of language 
register, but only P5 related it to the situation, “I think it’s more related to maybe the 
setting and circumstances that the statement is made.” Three participants related the 
register to education as a condition for comprehension. For example P2, suggested that 
“high register... might possibly mean that a person needs to have had many years of 
some specialized education to fully comprehend something.” Participant 4 related it to 
levels of formality, despite calling it registry, “The registry... I can give you examples 
easier than I can define it verbally. There is if I’m [the one] talking, there is street 
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talking, there is polite, there is formal, and there is extremely formal, the level of 
formality, that's the best I can put it.” 
All but one participant claimed to be familiar with the code standard regarding 
register. The only participant who denied being aware of any standard regarding register 
referred to using her “own way” to adjust the register for clarity, 
 
Just informally from having attended workshops and listened to colleagues, but I’m 
not aware of any particular existing rule, no. Well I have my own way that I try to 
do things and I always aim for the solution that has the greatest possibility, in my 
opinion, of being understood. I use synonyms as often as I can squeeze them in 
when there may be a misunderstanding, and I seem to have a little radar that lights 
up in my brain when I think that what I’m saying can be understood in more than 
one particular way, so I’m always searching for clarity as far as when others are 
listening to me. (P2) 
 
Regarding the reasons for maintaining the register, two participants mentioned the 
way the defendant would be perceived, which is the reason provided in the code. For 
example, P2 stated,  
 
It is important for the person getting the interpretation into English, probably the 
attorney or the judge, to know what the exact register of the answer or 
conversation is, or for example if there is a person who is not very educated, it is 
important that that comes across in the interpretation. (P2)  
 
For two participants, adjusting the register would be tantamount to providing an 
explanation, “Changing the register would be the same as explaining” (P3), and 
“Basically its up to him to ask for an explanation not up to you to explain it. Without a 
translation the register will be maintained unless somebody asks for an explanation or to 
please rephrase it” (P4). Some interpreters follow the norm without knowing the reason, 
and even though they all stated that the register was sometimes too high for the Spanish 
speaker to understand, and one of them referred to register issues going both ways. 
Only one participant felt comfortable enough to adjust the register in formal 
settings without oversimplifying, and the rest of the participants stated that they would 
adjust the register, request clarifications, or speak up to warn about misunderstandings, 
but only in informal settings.  
All participants stated that they could tell when Spanish speakers did not 
understand from the their verbal and/or non-verbal cues, as described by P1: 
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Well, the person might ask me directly, they might answer something different 
and I might realize through the answer that they did not understand what was 
asked of them, they might look at me with a puzzled look on their face, or they 
might just turn to me and not say anything, because of the way they look at me I 
realize they do not understand. (P1) 
 
When that happens, some interpreters would do nothing, and others would take 
action, such as P4: 
 
I might simplify, I wouldn't use a lower register language, but I would kick the 
convoluted part if I think it's gotta be clearer. I didn't do it for years because I 
figured, like I said, I'm supposed to be invisible and I was hoping someone would 
say, what did he say? But nobody ever did. So I figure the whole point of not 
affecting the outcome is lost if the person is not gonna ask the question, they 
could be talking Chinese and it wouldn't make a difference. (P4) 
 
All participants also held that Spanish speakers claimed to understand when in 
fact they did not, and linked this behavior to fear of angering the judge, receiving a 
harsher sentence, intimidation, embarrassment, and looking dumb. For example, P2 
explained, “Yeah, it could be fear perhaps if they speak up they will make the judge 
angry and get a harsher sentence.” When this happens, interpreter behavior again 
depends mostly on the circumstances. Two interpreters stated that they would interrupt 
the proceeding to request clarification. Participant 4 also described the use of body 
language: 
 
I mean, at some point if you can make it obvious to the attorney by answering 
whatever nonsense that the person is saying and making it sound as nonsense, 
even using your body language to the attorneys, so they inquire and clear it up but 
when the attorneys are pretty dumb too and they are not getting that the person is 
not getting it no matter what your body language is, at some point you have to 
interrupt, and say... (P4) 
 
Two participants volunteered comments on the concept of invisibility. P4 stated, 
 
I think you should be [visible]. But people don't want you there. That’s the bottom 
line. Because attorneys are fairly paranoid and they assume that the moment you 
have an opinion your opinion means leaning for or against sides and it has nothing 
to do with the language... So I’m not supposed to be there. (P4)  
 
The most interesting finding in these interviews was the distinction interpreters 
made regarding their role and their room for maneuver, depending on the particular 
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judicial setting. Several reasons were offered for this distinction: it is not the 
interpreter’s job but the attorney’s; intimidation due to fear of somebody telling the 
interpreter that he or she is stepping out of their role; an ideal of invisibility; upsetting 
the proceedings; getting blamed for the words used; faithfulness to the record; avoiding 
being a “headline”; or simply because “What you can do or the possibilities of your role 
are different in an informal or a formal setting because of reality” (P4). Other 
interpreters would feel comfortable intervening only in informal settings, such as P3, 
above. The record seems to be a deciding factor in influencing interpreters’ decisions to 
either simplify the language or intervene, or do neither. 
In summary, based on the information provided by interpreters during the 
interviews, it was clear that additional questions should be included in the main study. 
The expanded interview guide will be described in detail in the next chapter, which 
presents the methodology of the main study. 
 7.3.2.2. Interviews with attorneys 
This part of the study offered no implementation problems. The interviews with 
attorneys were designed to take approximately ten minutes, but again participants 
offered enough unsolicited information to warrant adding new questions to the guide 
that would be used in the main study. There were two general sets of questions, one 
involving communication with English or Spanish speakers, and the other involving 
interpreter interventions.  
Aside from one participant’s indication that the volume used in such situations 
might be louder, all participants claimed to communicate the same way with English 
speakers and Spanish speakers. They all believe they could speak to both groups of 
clients the same way, except “when interpreters suggest I may be using difficult words 
or syntax” (P2) or when being asked to slow down (P3).  
Regarding the possibility of experiencing more instances of misunderstanding or 
miscommunication with Spanish speakers, two participants answered affirmatively, 
relating to language and education, “Yes. Lack of knowledge of the language and the 
process” (P2) and “Maybe a bit more with Spanish. Spanish speakers they often have 
less education in my experience, the average level of education is primary school” (P3).  
Although all participants welcome interpreters’ suggestions about possible 
instances of misunderstanding (as stated by P2: “I welcome it if the client is not 
understanding I want to know that, definitely”), they do not see it happen often (P3: 
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“Once in a blue moon, very, very rarely”). They do not feel threatened by the presence 
of an interpreter whom they acknowledge as visible and active, and rely on the 
interpreter’s expertise not only to facilitate communication, but also to warn them about 
any possible miscommunication.  
When switching to a simpler language, P2 describes the result as going 
 
... from a hugely blank look on the client's face to someone who was animated and 
interested in what I had to say, as opposed to a zoned out zombie who is sitting 
there, probably who feels and experiences being talked to, or talked at. The client 
has transformed into someone who is being respected and listened to and willing 
to listen back. (P2) 
 
This participant also believed that these interventions could be part of the 
interpreter’s duty.  
The responses received during these interviews and the quantity and quality of 
unsolicited information were reason enough to add a few more questions to the 
interview guide that would be used in the main study, as will be described in the next 
chapter. 
7.3.2.3. Listening comprehension test  
As described above, the purpose of this test would be to identify the comprehension 
levels of English speakers and Spanish speakers using sentences with equal registers, 
and determine whether or not simplifying the register in the Spanish sentences would 
produce an increase in comprehension, one closer to the English speakers’. In this 
small-scale pilot study, however, the main purpose was to evaluate the instrument and 
the design for further adjustment and improvement.  
The test with Spanish speakers proved to be an unexpectedly difficult task, both 
for the researcher and for this population. The first problem was related to the reaction 
of participants to the word experimento (experiment): nervous giggling, puzzled looks, 
and the question ¿me va a abrir para ver adentro? (are you going to open me up to see 
inside?). After the first two participants, it was decided to use the word investigación 
(research) instead, which yielded more favorable results.  
The second problem was related to explaining the purpose of the research. 
Puzzled looks aside, after two or three offers of explanation participants continued 
asking what the research was for. They were particularly concerned with the words 
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court and legal and with the preliminary question to find out if they had ever been to 
court, which was asked in order to determine their eligibility to participate. Although 
the explanations were getting clearer and simpler from participant to participant, none 
of them seemed to fully grasp the concept of this research or its purpose.  
The third and most difficult problem was encountered when attempting to get the 
participants to sign a consent form. An invitation to sign a document, even if it was in 
Spanish, immediately caused distrust and anxiety expressed by continuous requests for 
explanations and hesitations about participating. Three of the participants spent a few 
minutes appearing to be reading the document, and then asked what it was for and 
requested an explanation in terms of no sé leer (I can’t read), no entiendo de estas cosas 
(I do not understand about these things) or me lo lee/explica usted por favor (can you 
read/explain it to me, please). I then offered to read the document slowly and explain its 
contents line by line, to which the three participants agreed. After the slow reading and 
explanation of each line, the three participants still expressed reluctance and fear of 
meterse en problemas (getting in trouble) and that me van a venir a buscar ([They] will 
come for me). In one case, a candidate decided not to participate after listening to a 
lengthy explanation of the contents of the consent form. After the experiment was 
completed, all participants were very anxious to get their copy of the consent form. One 
solution to this problem would be to produce an even simpler and shorter translation of 
the original consent form. This may prove difficult, however, as there are official 
requirements regarding the information that must be included in the form.  
The last issue worth mentioning was related to the affective reaction of the 
participants following the completion of the experiment. When finding out that the 
research related to the comprehension of the language used in court, they were 
disappointed in their performance. This feeling was expressed in terms of si es para ver 
quién entiende y quién no, yo estoy en los que no entienden (if this is to see who 
understands and who does not, I am among the ones who do not). Other comments 
included es que no he ido a la escuela (it’s [just] that I didn’t go to school), and está 
muy enredado (it’s very confusing), where participants seemed to have felt the need to 
account for their performance. These events were consistent with the sociocultural traits 
of Hispanics found in the literature reviewed and discussed earlier in this study. 
An interesting incident took place shortly after the test. One of the participants 
approached me ten minutes after the test and asked to consult on a family matter, 
reassured by his idea that I was familiar with the law. The participant was directed to 
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seek legal advice, but he still insisted on telling the story. His niece wanted to divorce 
her husband, who had abandoned her and their son two years before, but she did not 
want to resort to the police because the family did not want to involve the police in a 
family matter. This incident was very revealing: in the first place, the family had not 
sought help for two years, and second, the family believed that divorces were granted by 
the police. This was evidence of the lack of legal knowledge non-English speaking 
Hispanics possess, their fear of authority figures, and their desire for privacy in family 
matters. 
There were no major problems with English speakers’ participation in this test. 
However, informing the participants that the research was about the comprehension of 
the language of the court seemed to have offered a challenge: most of the participants 
changed their posture, put on their glasses (although they were not required to read for 
the test), and became very serious and focused. Two of them seemed rather upset when 
they were not allowed to hear the sentences for a second time, expressed in terms of “If 
I were in court I would be able to ask for a repetition.” Added to the question of how 
many years of education they had in order to make sure they qualified to participate, 
they seemed to have felt the need to justify their performance, expressed in terms of 
“legal jargon sucks” and “I am glad I am not an attorney.”  
Following are the results of the listening comprehension test. The answers to the 
comprehension questions were scored as correct or incorrect, and results are expressed 
in percentages. The last total column shows individual levels of comprehension for each 
of the participants, and the last total line shows the levels of comprehension for each of 
the questions. 
Table 4. Pilot study - English speakers total results 
 Question 1 Question 2 Question 3 Question 4 Question 5 Total 
 
Participant 1 Correct Correct Incorrect Correct Incorrect 60% 
Participant 2 Correct Incorrect Correct Incorrect Incorrect 40% 
Total 100% 50% 50% 50% 0% 50% 
 
As shown in Table 4, the first question yielded the highest scores, and none of the 
participants received a perfect score for the entire set. The total aggregate results 
indicated that the general level of comprehension of this group of English speakers was 
50 percent. None of the Spanish-speaking participants, however, were able to answer 
any of the questions correctly, even when using a simplified register.  
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Another issue found during this test was that scoring participants’ responses as 
either “correct” or “incorrect” would not allow the results to account for intermediate 
levels of comprehension. Consequently, a new scoring system would be designed for 
the main study using a different criterion for measuring comprehension levels. Instead 
of scoring responses as “correct” or “incorrect,” a three-point system would allow to 
account for answers that might not be correct and complete but that would show some 
intermediate level of comprehension. This revised scoring system will be thoroughly 
described in chapter 8 (Methodology).  
The most noticeable difference between English speakers and Spanish speakers 
seemed to relate to the content of the answers provided. While none of the English 
speakers’ answers were irrelevant or non-responsive, most of the Spanish speakers’ 
answers were, mainly those offered by Participant 4 in the first group and Participant 6 
in the second group. For example, in question 4, Participant 4 seemed to take a few 
lexical elements from the original sentences heard and use them to compose 
explanations of new ideas. This participant understood that there was some exchange of 
information with an attorney, but was unable to make sense of these words in the 
original context, “¿Pues en este caso qué puede alegar?... si si hubo intercambio no? 
de... del abogado o sea de como quien dice se adelantó, algo así le entiendo yo” (Well in 
this case what can he allege?... if if there was an exchange, right? of... the attorney I 
mean of, you might say he acted too quickly, that’s more or less what I get out of it). 
Both groups of Spanish speakers seemed very similar in that both contained one 
participant who consistently admitted not understanding the question, and one 
participant who instead provided answers with full conviction and self-assurance, but 
that were mostly irrelevant and unintelligible.  
Sentence 3 contained word preponderance in the English set and 
preponderancia in the first Spanish set. One of the English-speaking participants 
admitted not understanding the question, and the other participant answered correctly. 
One of the Spanish speakers in the second group, however, replaced the word 
preponderancia with prepondera (preponderates), and the other participant replaced it 
with the word propone (propose) because of their similar sound, and used them in their 
answers, “Pues lo que... propone, nada más, no? Lo que yo entiendo es decir lo que... lo 
que más o menos... proponen ellos, algo así” (Well what... [pronoun] proposes, that’s 
all, right? What I understand, I mean, what... what more or less... they propose, 
something like that) (P4). 
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Another consistent phenomenon observed was participants answering the 
questions from their own point of view and not basing their answer on what was heard 
in the question. For example, Participant 6 did so in question 1, “Tratar de que diga la 
verdad, lo correcto... eh por ejemplo si dice la mitad de palabras- o sea tratar de que 
explique lo que fue sucedido, un hecho” (Try to get him to tell the truth, the right 
thing... er for example if he says half of the words- I mean try to get him to explain what 
was happened, an event), and in question 3, “Eh... pues si es falso o si no tiene la culpa 
tiene que decir pues yo no fui, pero si tiene la culpa tiene que aceptar la culpabilidad 
que haya hecho” (Er... well, if it is false or if he is not guilty he has to say well, it wasn’t 
me, but if he is guilty he has to accept the guilt he had done).  
The results were rather alarming, as Spanish speakers were not able to answer 
any of the questions correctly, even in the second group that contained the translation of 
simplified jury instructions. To improve the instrument and the chances of obtaining 
more valuable results, it was decided to shorten the sentences in order to make the 
exercise less intense and more comprehensible, and to use a simplified-register 
translation of all five sentences instead of using a translation of the simplified versions 
of the jury instructions. Other adjustments were implemented for the main study, as will 
be described in further detail below, and the final version of the material will be 
presented in chapter 8 (Methodology). 
7.3.3. Discussion 
The three components of the pilot study provided useful insight for adjusting and 
improving both the instruments and the procedure of the main study.  
The interviews with interpreters showed that although almost all interpreters 
interviewed followed the norm in formal settings, informal settings seem to give them 
the freedom to deviate from the norm to facilitate comprehension when the risk of 
criticism or challenge is not noticeably high. The interpreters’ responses indicated that 
norms are followed more rigorously when these risks are higher. In informal settings—
and mainly off the record—they feel safer and less constrained in their desire to follow 
their own norms to improve communication, almost anticipating (unarticulated) 
expectancy norms of comprehension, and definitely taking into account target 
constraints. The differences in interpreting style and strategies between formal and 
informal settings were volunteered by participants as unsolicited information in several 
UNIVERSITAT ROVIRA I VIRGILI 
COMPREHENSION OF LEGAL DISCOURSE IN INTERPRETER-MEDIATED JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS 
Julia Lambertini Andreotti
145 
questions and also after the completion of the interview. This data is of great value for 
this research, and warranted the inclusion of a question in this regard in the interview 
guide of the main study.  
The interviews also included a question regarding the reasons for maintaining 
the original language register in the target text, but this question proved to be 
ambiguous in the sense that it failed to identify the language direction. As a 
consequence, participants offered reasons for either direction without a clear distinction. 
Given that this is such a relevant aspect of this research, the question was modified to 
include both language directions and receive a more comprehensive list of reasons for 
not adjusting the register in each case. 
The attorneys interviewed also provided information that showed behavior that 
deviates from the norm, as interpreter expertise is valued and taken into account 
particularly to advise them when communication might not be achieved. Therefore, the 
interview guide was expanded to include a question regarding the qualities attorneys 
would expect to find in the interpreters that would assist them in communicating with 
Spanish speakers. The interview guide for attorneys was also extended to include some 
of the questions posed to interpreters regarding the aspects of non-comprehension 
behavior observed in Spanish speakers, such as not asking for clarification or stating 
they understand when in fact they do not. Furthermore, given the willingness to discuss 
these topics and the amount of unsolicited information, the time allowed for all the 
interviews was also extended. 
As described in the implementation problems detailed above, the presentation 
and the consent form were problematic for Spanish speakers. It was therefore decided to 
modify the consent form in a way that would be easier to read and understand for all 
participants.  
The results of the listening comprehension test seemed to imply that in order to 
achieve some level of comprehension, the register should be simplified even more or 
some explanation should be provided. English speakers were able to answer some 
questions correctly but none of the Spanish speakers were, and obtaining data averaging 
0% would not yield useful results for this study. In consequence, it was decided to 
shorten the sentences and use only the first part of each to make the exercise less intense 
and more accessible in terms of comprehension. It was also decided not to use a 
translation of the simplified version of the jury instructions, and instead use a 
simplified-register version of all five sentences. This decision was made because the 
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new jury instructions contain revisions that go beyond what a court interpreter could or 
would be able to do during simultaneous interpretation. These changes will be described 
in more detail in chapter 8. 
7.3.4. Conclusion 
This section described the methodology, procedure and results of the pilot study, which 
provided valuable information for adjusting and improving on the instruments to be 
used in both the qualitative and quantitative components of the main study. The 
outcome of the pilot study demonstrated the feasibility of the research design presented 
in section 7.2., but also pointed to the need for adjustments to the methodology, which 
will be detailed in the next chapter. 
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Chapter 8. Methodology  
 
This chapter will describe the methods used for the three components of the main study: 
the listening comprehension test with English speakers and Spanish speakers, the 
interviews with attorneys and interpreters, and the focus group with Spanish speakers. 
The section describing the process used to obtain the sentences for the listening 
comprehension tests will also include the two interpreter focus groups conducted to 
translate and simplify the register of the five original sentences.  
8.1. Listening comprehension test  
As explained in section 7.2., the rationale behind this component was to test the equal 
footing claim from the code and the literature in terms of equal access to language, that 
is, equal comprehension by English speakers and Spanish speakers, which purportedly 
would be achieved by providing an interpreter. The first purpose of this test was to 
determine and compare the comprehension levels of English speakers and Spanish 
speakers using sentences with equal registers. Drawing on earlier studies that had 
already shown that register simplification leads to better comprehensibility for English-
speaking users of legal language (see 5.2.1 above), the second purpose was to determine 
if register simplification resulted in an increased comprehension level by Spanish 
speakers as well, or if the comprehension gap between English speakers and Spanish 
speakers, if any, would narrow. In consonance with the institutional view that register 
simplification may be perceived as lack of impartiality, the study also aimed to test if 
comprehension could be enhanced without providing explanations or extra information, 
in other words, maintaining impartiality according to the standards. This test eventually 
consisted of the listening comprehension exercise applied in the pilot study, with a few 
adjustments that will be described in more detail in the sections that follow.  
8.1.1. Participants 
A total of thirty participants were invited to take part in this experiment: ten lay English 
speakers and twenty lay Spanish speakers. The test was conducted with ten participants 
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in each of three groups, in line with the recommendation of examiners of the minor 
dissertation (Lambertini Andreotti 2008). Ten English-speaking participants made up 
one group, and the twenty Spanish-speaking participants were randomly assigned to two 
groups of ten participants each. A few participants were selected from personal contacts 
and networking, but most of the participants were provided by a community center and 
a music therapy center that provide services for Hispanic children and their families. 
Participant selection criteria were the same as in the pilot study: for the lay English 
speakers, the same approximate education level of 13-14 years and no court experience; 
and for the lay Spanish speakers, the same approximate education level of 6-8 years of 
schooling, no court experience, foreign-born status, and little or no knowledge of 
English. The average education levels found for the pilot study were checked against 
updated census data and found to be unchanged. 
8.1.2. Materials and instruments (sentences) 
Although the sentences remained the same as in the pilot study, the three jury 
instructions were shortened to include only the first sentence in each instruction, thus 
lessening the intensity of the exercise. Three sets of five sentences were used for the 
three different groups of participants. 
1. The first set of sentences consisted of the (shortened) original English sentences used 
in the pilot study. As stated above, three of the five sentences were taken literally from 
the old versions of jury instructions, and the other two were taken from a sample state 
court interpreter oral exam provided by Prometric on their website (2007). Each of the 
sentences was paired with a question to assess comprehension. These sentences were 
used with the group of English speakers. 
2. The second set of sentences consisted of the Spanish translations that were produced 
in the first focus group with certified interpreters, with conservation of the original 
register of legal language. Each sentence was also followed by a question to assess 
comprehension. These sentences were used with the first group of Spanish speakers. 
3. The third set of sentences was obtained in the second focus group, which met to 
simplify the register of the five sentences translated by participants in the first focus 
group. Each sentence was paired with a question to assess comprehension. These 
sentences were used with the second group of Spanish speakers. 
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The three sets of sentences and questions were recorded so that each member of 
a given group of participants would hear the same version of the test. The simplified-
register sentences used for the second group of lay Spanish speakers were recorded at a 
lower speed, with pauses and marked intonation, as suggested by interpreters in focus 
group 2. The voice in the recording of the English sentences belonged to a male native 
English speaker from the U.S., and the voice in the recording of the Spanish sentences 
belonged to a male native Spanish speaker from Mexico. A laptop computer was used to 
reproduce the sentences and questions, headphones were used for the participants, and a 
digital voice recorder was used to record their answers. A consent form, based on a 
sample provided by URV, was adapted to conform to the particulars of this study. The 
English original consent form was translated into Spanish for Spanish-speaking 
participants (see Appendix 1 and 2). 
8.1.2.1. Focus group 1 (for translation of sentences) 
The purpose of this first focus group was twofold: to produce a Spanish translation of 
the five original English sentences with register conservation, and to present some of 
the most relevant points of this study to the participants to invite a discussion and obtain 
their feedback. It was also hoped that the feedback received during the meeting would 
provide ideas for new questions to be incorporated into the individual interviews, and 
that it would complement the comments received during said interviews. The 
translations produced by this group would later be 1) examined by five other certified 
interpreters to confirm the conservation of source register in the target text, and 2) used 
in the listening comprehension test with the first group of Spanish speakers.  
 
8.1.2.1.1. Participants. Participants in this focus group met the same selection criteria as 
used for all interpreters participating in the study: a state certificate for court 
interpreting, and at least five years of experience in judicial interpreting in California. A 
total of nine court interpreters participated in the meeting, and five other interpreters 
participated in the subsequent examination of the sentences produced in this first focus 
group. Participants were selected from personal contacts, networking, and invitations 
posted in a private Internet group for interpreters.  
 
8.1.2.1.2. Materials and instruments. Participants in this focus group received several 
handouts that included: 
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1. The consent form; 
2. A definition of a focus group for those participants who were not familiar with the 
procedure: “A focus group is a data collection procedure in the form of a carefully 
planned group discussion among about ten people plus a moderator and observer, in 
order to obtain diverse ideas and perceptions on a topic of interest in a relaxed, 
permissive environment that fosters the expression of different points of view, with no 
pressure for consensus” (Omni 2013); 
3. The five original English sentences: as described above, three of the five sentences 
used in this test were taken literally from the old versions of jury instructions, and the 
other two sentences were taken from a sample state court interpreter oral exam provided 
by Prometric on their website (2007). Also as stated above, the three jury instructions 
were shortened to include only one of the two sentences that made up each instruction;  
4. A selection of statements gleaned from the literature review for this research and 
included in the summary focus group transcript (see Appendix 6). 
Two digital voice recorders were used to record the session. 
 
8.1.2.1.3. Procedure. The focus group session took place in Los Angeles, in November 
2013. Nine court interpreters met in person for three hours. Also present were myself as 
an observer and moderator, and another court interpreter who assisted with technical 
aspects of the meeting, including the recording of the session. Participants first received 
and signed the consent form describing the purpose and conditions of participation, 
which were explained as needed. Participants were then informed of the general nature 
of the study and discussed the definition of a focus group that was provided in the 
handouts. Following the introduction, participants were asked to produce a group 
translation of the five original English sentences, and arrive at a Spanish version that 
would resemble the way they would normally interpret in court. Participants were also 
informed that the sentences were taken from actual jury instructions and sample 
certification exams.  
In the second part of the meeting, participants were presented with quotes from 
the literature reviewed in this research, each of which was discussed among the group. 
This part of the session lasted about two hours, and participants discussed the items 
submitted with great interest. All parts of the session were recorded and transcribed.  
The group worked in harmony and showed enthusiasm. The session presented 
no problems, except that since these topics are not frequently discussed openly, 
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participants offered many comments and the time allotted proved rather short for the 
material provided. Since there were nine participants, it took longer to arrive at agreed 
versions because of the number and variety of proposed translations and points of view. 
In the months that followed, five other certified interpreters were invited to examine the 
translations produced by participants in the focus group. They too received and signed a 
consent form, and were provided with the original sentences and the Spanish 
translations.  
 
8.1.2.1.4. Final Spanish translation of sentences. Interpreters in this focus group worked 
for approximately one hour to produce the following English-into-Spanish translations: 
 
Sentence 1. 
ST: A witness who is willfully false in one material aspect of his or her testimony is 
to be distrusted in others. 
TT: Si un testigo declara intencionalmente en falso en un aspecto importante de su 
testimonio, se debe desconfiar del resto de su declaración.  
Sentence 2. 
ST: Circumstantial evidence is evidence that, if found to be true, proves a fact from 
which an inference of the existence of another fact may be drawn. 
TT: Las pruebas indirectas son pruebas que, de determinarse que son verdaderas, 
prueban un hecho del cual se puede inferir la existencia de otro hecho. 
Sentence 3. 
ST: “Preponderance of the evidence” means evidence that has more convincing force 
than that opposed to it. 
TT: “Preponderancia de la prueba” se refiere a la prueba que tiene más fuerza de 
convicción que la prueba contraria. 
Sentence 4. 
ST: The defendant further alleges that it was his perception that his attorney had 
disclosed privileged information to co-counsel, before the case was severed, that 
later led him to enter into a guilty plea. 
TT: El acusado además alega que a él le pareció que su abogado le había divulgado 
información confidencial a su colega en el caso antes de que se separara el caso, 
y eso lo llevó a declararse culpable. 
Sentence 5. 
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ST: Since the defendant’s explanation as to the behavior of the parties is not 
supported by the sworn statement of any witnesses, it scarcely rises to the level 
of clear and convincing evidence. 
TT: Ya que la explicación del acusado en cuanto al comportamiento de las partes no 
está corroborada por la declaración jurada de ningún testigo, no alcanza a ser 
una prueba clara y convincente. 
8.1.2.2. Focus group 2 (for register simplification) 
This second focus group with court certified interpreters was convened with the single 
purpose of collectively producing the new simplified-register versions of the five 
Spanish sentences that were translated by the interpreters in the first focus group. These 
new versions would later be used in the listening comprehension test with the second 
group of Spanish speakers.  
 
8.1.2.2.1. Participants. Participants met the same selection criteria used for interpreters 
who participated in the first focus group and in the interviews: court interpreting 
certification and at least five years of experience in the field. Six court interpreters 
participated in this session, assisted again by another court interpreter in charge of 
recording, and myself as moderator. Participants were selected from personal contacts, 
networking, and invitations posted in a private Internet group for interpreters. 
 
8.1.2.2.2. Materials and instruments. Since the sole purpose of conducting this meeting 
was to produce new simplified versions of the original Spanish translations, the only 
materials needed, aside from the consent form, were the five Spanish translations 
produced by the first focus group. 
 
8.1.2.2.3. Procedure. This focus group was conducted in April, 2014 as a telephone 
conference with six participants, one moderator, and one research assistant. The consent 
form and the five Spanish sentences were emailed to the participants before the meeting. 
Discussion started with a brief presentation about the research topic and the exercise 
that would follow. Participants were asked to pretend they had the freedom to adjust the 
register and to try to simplify it in the five sentences provided, without explaining, 
adding, omitting, or advocating, and thinking not only in terms of isolated vocabulary 
items but also in terms of syntax. The old and new versions of the jury instruction 
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concerning failure of recollection (see 5.2.3. above) were provided as an example of 
possible modifications. Participants were informed that the five sentences had been 
translated from English into Spanish by court interpreters in a previous focus group, and 
that the five original English sentences were taken from actual jury instructions and 
sample certification exams. Members participated actively and exchanged justified 
opinions to arrive at the five final versions. The session was recorded and transcribed.  
The only challenge observed during this meeting concerned the setting, as at 
times it proved difficult to get ideas across during a phone conversation with six 
interpreters. It was probably not the most ideal of settings. However, it was the only 
possibility due to family, work, and distance constraints. Participants were still satisfied 
with the results and articulated this in terms such as “we behaved well” and “this was 
very interesting.”  
 
8.1.2.2.4. Final Spanish sentences – simplified register. Interpreters in this focus group 
worked for approximately one hour to produce the following simplified-register Spanish 




OR: Si un testigo declara intencionalmente en falso en un aspecto importante de su 
testimonio, se debe desconfiar del resto de su declaración. 
SR: Si un testigo miente en una parte importante de su testimonio, no tienen por qué 
creer el resto de su declaración.  
Sentence 2. 
OR: Las pruebas indirectas son pruebas que, de determinarse que son verdaderas, 
prueban un hecho del cual se puede inferir la existencia de otro hecho. 
SR: Las pruebas indirectas son pruebas que, si se decide que son verdaderas, 
demuestran un hecho del cual se puede deducir la existencia de otro hecho. 
Sentence 3. 
OR: “Preponderancia de la prueba” se refiere a la prueba que tiene más fuerza de 
convicción que la prueba contraria. 
SR: La prueba que tiene más peso es la prueba que es más convincente que la prueba 
que demuestra lo contrario. 
UNIVERSITAT ROVIRA I VIRGILI 




OR: El acusado además alega que a él le pareció que su abogado le había divulgado 
información confidencial a su colega en el caso antes de que se separara el caso, 
y eso lo llevó a declararse culpable. 
SR: El acusado además dice que a él le pareció que su abogado le había dado 
información confidencial a su colega en el caso antes de que se separaran las 
causas, y por eso se declaró culpable. 
Sentence 5. 
OR: Ya que la explicación del acusado en cuanto al comportamiento de las partes no 
está corroborada por la declaración jurada de ningún testigo, no alcanza a ser 
una prueba clara y convincente. 
SR: La explicación del acusado sobre el comportamiento de las partes no llega a ser 
una prueba clara y convincente porque no está corroborada por la declaración 
jurada de ningún testigo. 
8.1.3. Procedure  
The listening comprehension test was conducted in Los Angeles, California. Each 
exercise took between ten and twenty minutes to complete and was conducted 
individually and privately. Participants were first informed of the nature of the study 
and received and signed the consent form describing the purpose and conditions of 
participation, which were explained as needed. Following the signing of the consent 
form, participants were informed that they would hear a recorded sentence followed by 
a question, after which they would provide an answer that would be recorded. No 
repetitions were allowed. All answers received were recorded and transcribed. The 
Spanish answers were translated into English for clarity by court certified interpreters. 
The group of English speakers worked with the original English sentences, the first 
group of Spanish speakers worked with the (original-register) Spanish translations 
produced during the first focus group with court interpreters, and the second group of 
Spanish speakers worked with the (simplified-register) second set of Spanish 
translations produced in the second focus group with court interpreters. 
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8.1.4. Data analysis  
The pilot study had shown that the sentences used in the test contained information and 
terminology that was rather unfamiliar to most participants, and scoring the responses as 
either “correct” or “incorrect” did not account for intermediate levels of comprehension 
that were observed. For the design of a different scoring system that would include the 
borderline responses, the initial system was shared with three psychologists, one of 
them also an attorney, all bilingual in Spanish, and all working in California with this 
same population. These consultations resulted in the adjustment of the scoring criteria. 
For this main test, a three-point system was developed: 0 points were assigned for 
answers that showed no comprehension, 1 point for answers that showed an 
intermediate level of comprehension, and 2 points for answers that showed full 
comprehension. Since this test was designed to measure only an approximate level of 
comprehension, it is implicit that if the answer is entirely incorrect the participant will 
receive 0 points, if the answer is correct and complete the participant will receive 2 
points, and the rest will receive 1 point. In consequence, the comprehension level of 
participants who receive 1 point will range between 1 percent and 99 percent and will 
denote “some” level of comprehension. This will include answers that have correct 
elements but are incomplete, and answers that have a combination of correct and 
incorrect elements as long as the incorrect element does not change and therefore 
invalidate the meaning of the correct element. It was decided that answers that 
contained both correct and incorrect elements in a way that the incorrect element 
invalidated the correct one would receive 0 points. For the assignment of points in 
borderline cases, the results were shared with two of the psychologists mentioned 
above, one of whom is also an attorney. The average points obtained per group are 
expressed as a percentage of the total possible score.  
8.1.5. Implementation problems  
Obtaining consent from participants for the listening comprehension test was not as 
difficult as in the pilot study, for two reasons. First, the language in the form was 
simplified, making comprehension easier; however, almost none of the participants 
attempted to read the form in detail. The form was read to those participants who had 
not taken the initiative to read it before their signature was requested. Second, since 
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most of the participants were provided by institutions, the legitimacy of the test was not 
questioned and there were virtually no issues of fear or distrust. In the test with Spanish 
speakers, as will be described later in greater detail in the next chapter, it was very 
difficult for participants to understand what they were supposed to do in terms of 
answering a question not related to them. Many of them would respond to the 
comprehension questions based on their own opinion or experience. This did not happen 
with the English speakers. 
8.2. Interviews 
8.2.1. Interviews with interpreters 
This part of the study consisted of a semi-structured qualitative interview aimed at 
gathering information regarding interpreters’ awareness of and views on register and 
register adjustment, and role limitations in matters of facilitating comprehension. 
Furthermore, and based on the pilot study results, the purpose was also to explore in 
greater detail interpreters’ attitudes toward established institutional norms. This 
information was used to complement the results of the other tests and develop a better 
understanding of the intercultural communicative event, taking into account all parties 
involved. After analyzing the results of interpreters’ interviews in the pilot study, the list 
of questions was adjusted to include several other areas that will be described below.  
8.2.1.1. Participants 
Ten certified court interpreters participated in this part of the study. Participants met the 
same selection criteria as those applied to all interpreters: a state certificate for court 
interpreting and at least five years of experience in judicial interpreting in California. 
The interpreters who participated in this part of the study were selected from personal 
contacts, networking, and invitations posted in a private Internet group for interpreters.  
8.2.1.2. Materials and instruments  
The list of questions used in these interviews was based on the original guides used in 
the pilot study, which was expanded to include other relevant questions that arose 
during the pilot study and the first focus group. Interviews started with a brief 
description of the purpose of the interview, reminding participants of the confidentiality 
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aspects, and making sure there were no unanswered questions about the process. The 
first questions mostly concerned demographics: national origin, upbringing, English and 
Spanish learning and/or acquisition, and length of stay in the United States. Interpreters 
were then invited to discuss the training received, certifications held, and the number of 
times they took the certification exam before passing it. These first questions were 
designed to make participants feel comfortable discussing themselves and their 
background from the outset, and also to confirm that they met the requirements for 
participating in the study. Another reason for gathering this information was to compare 
their background to the general characteristics of heritage speakers to determine 
whether or not there was any relation between their upbringing and the number of 
attempts at the exams.  
The next set of questions was related to language register. The purpose of these 
questions was to gather information regarding register awareness and adjustment as 
related to established norms. Following a brief introduction to the topic, participants 
were invited to define the notion of language register in their own words. Questions in 
this group also dealt with the code standard regarding register, participants’ familiarity 
with the code and said standard, and any training and/or practice received in the area of 
register, register adjustment, and features of legal language. The next two questions 
invited participants to describe the reasons, either personal or learned, for maintaining 
the register both from English into Spanish and from Spanish into English.  
The next set of questions focused on the Spanish-speaking population that 
interpreters work with in California. The first question in this set was related to the 
average level of education interpreters find among the Spanish-speaking witnesses or 
defendants they usually work with, based not on assumptions but on personal 
knowledge, as the educational attainment level is usually one of the first questions 
attorneys ask their clients. This information was also important to compare with and 
complement the data from the census and the literature. The questions that followed 
related to the comprehension of legal register by Spanish speakers. Interpreters were 
invited to discuss their views on the suitability of legal register for this particular 
population in terms of comprehension. With reference to the assertion in the code that 
only a psychologist would be able to determine if a witness has understood a question 
(CAJC 2013a: 37), interpreters were invited to discuss their views on Spanish-speaking 
witnesses’ comprehension as they perceived it, and the signs that helped them determine 
whether comprehension had been achieved or not. Interpreters were also asked whether 
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the non-comprehension they perceived could be related to the language register; in other 
words, did they believe the legal language register might sometimes not be the most 
suitable for the population in question. Interpreters were also asked to discuss their 
experience regarding another comprehension issue reviewed in the literature, one 
related to Spanish speakers not asking for clarification or claiming to understand when 
they do not. It seemed relevant, based on the pilot study responses, to add a question 
about the (potential) difference in interpreting style between formal and informal 
settings, mainly in terms of interventions and/or register adjustment. To conclude the 
register section, interpreters were asked if there were situations or settings in which they 
would consider adjusting the register and/or interrupting the proceeding for clarification 
purposes or to draw attention to possible non-comprehension issues. 
 The next set of questions related to the hand/arm and foot/leg issue discussed in 
detail in the first focus group and described in 3.4.2. above. Given the diversity of views 
observed in the focus group, a set of four different scenarios was presented to the 
participants interviewed, who were asked their opinion on the best course of action in 
each situation. All these scenarios involved a witness using the word mano (hand) to 
refer to the arm in four different situations: while pointing to the arm in plain view; 
while pointing to the arm in hidden view; when it was known by all present that the case 
involved only an arm; and in an everyday situation with no other indicators as to the 
possible double meaning of the term. A similar question about the waist dilemma was 
also incorporated. This last set of questions was designed to compare and contrast 
interpreters’ views regarding this common issue. At the end of the interview, 
participants were invited to share any relevant comment they wished to add. 
Other materials used in the interviews included a digital recorder and an external 
in-ear microphone, and the consent form, which was the same for all English-speaking 
participants throughout the study (see section 8.1.).  
8.2.1.3. Procedure 
The interviews with interpreters were conducted between November 2014 and February 
2015, individually and by telephone. Interviews lasted between thirty and sixty minutes, 
although some participants requested to add information after the interview was 
completed. Consent forms were emailed to participants before the interview.  
All interviews began by confirming participants’ consent for recording the 
session. Following consent, participants were informed of the general nature and extent 
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of the study, although with little detail in order not to influence participants’ answers. 
At the beginning of the interview, interpreters were also informed that there were no 
correct or incorrect answers, and that the questions were designed to explore their views 
on certain aspects of the practice of the profession. In most cases the questions followed 
the order established in the interview guide; however, in some cases this order was not 
followed when participants would volunteer information that would answer subsequent 
questions. After all questions were answered, participants were asked to add any other 
information they deemed relevant. All interviews were recorded and transcribed.  
As in the pilot study, a common issue in these interviews was the amount of 
information participants offered and the number of topics that were derived from the 
questions. Since these issues are not frequently discussed openly among interpreters, the 
interviews provided a favorable forum for participants to share their views and 
experience. Some participants asked to turn on the tape recorder again after the 
interview was completed, and a few also contacted me days later to add information that 
came to mind while rethinking the issues discussed.  
8.2.2. Interviews with attorneys 
This part of the study consisted of individual semi-structured qualitative interviews with 
ten attorneys. As with interpreters’ interviews, gathering information about attorneys’ 
views on interpreter interventions and role limitations was necessary to complement the 
results of previous tests and provide a better understanding of this triangular 
intercultural communicative event. After analyzing the results of attorneys’ interviews 
during the pilot study, the list of questions was adjusted to include several other areas 
that will be described below.  
8.2.2.1. Participants 
The ten attorneys participating in this part of the study met the same selection criteria as 
those used in the pilot study: at least five years of legal practice with the Hispanic 
population in California. These interviews also aimed to explore whether attorneys who 
were familiar with the Spanish language would have different views than those who 
were not. To achieve this, the ten attorneys who were selected to participate included 
five monolingual English-speaking and five English-Spanish bilingual participants, 
recruited through personal contacts and networking.  
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8.2.2.2. Materials and instruments  
The list of questions used in these interviews was based on the guide used in the pilot 
study, and was extended to include other relevant questions that had arisen during the 
pilot phase. As with the interpreters, these interviews started by briefly describing the 
purpose of the discussion, reminding participants of the confidentiality aspects, and 
making sure there were no unanswered questions about the process. The first set of 
questions was partly designed to confirm that participants met the qualifying criteria: 
five years of legal practice in California working with the Spanish-speaking population. 
They were also asked about the percentage of English speaking and Spanish-speaking 
clients that made up their practice. Additionally, participants were asked if they were 
proficient in the Spanish language in order to confirm the group had five monolingual 
and five bilingual attorneys.  
The following set of questions was related specifically to aspects of 
communication, starting with the average educational attainment levels of English-
speaking and Spanish-speaking clients. This was intended to complement the data from 
the census and literature reviewed on the subject, as well as compare it with the 
information obtained in the interviews with interpreters. Participants were invited to 
discuss the key differences between their communication with English-speaking clients 
and Spanish-speaking clients, if any, mainly in terms of emphasizing different points, 
the content of the communication, or the instructions provided to clients before a 
proceeding. These differences between the groups were also discussed in terms of client 
awareness, participation, comprehension of the issues at hand and familiarity with the 
legal system. Participants were also asked to compare the comprehension levels of both 
groups of clients, in terms of experiencing instances of misunderstanding or 
miscommunication with either group. 
The next set of questions was also based on the literature reviewed and aimed at 
comparing this information with results from the interpreters’ interviews. These 
questions included inviting attorneys to describe and compare the attitude and/or 
reaction of both groups of clients in cases of non-comprehension, in terms of asking for 
repetition or clarification spontaneously. They were also asked to share their experience 
regarding Spanish speakers claim of comprehension when comprehension has not, in 
fact, taken place.  
The next set of questions focused on interpreter intervention. Participants were 
invited to discuss whether interpreters may interrupt the proceeding to advise on a 
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possible language or cultural issue, or to suggest that the non-English speaker may not 
be understanding the language used. To conclude this set, participants were asked to 
share their views on these possible interventions. Finally, based on the results of the 
pilot study, the attorneys were asked about the expectations they brought to their work 
with interpreters, in terms of the qualities they would hope to find in an effective 
interpreter when communicating with Spanish-speaking clients. After the interview was 
completed, participants were invited to share any relevant comment they might wish to 
add. 
Other materials used in these interviews included a digital voice recorder with an 
external in-ear microphone, and the consent form.  
8.2.2.3. Procedure 
Interviews were conducted individually, two of them in person and eight of them by 
telephone due to work, family, and distance limitations. Interviews lasted between 
twenty and thirty minutes. Consent forms were either handed or emailed to participants 
before the interview. All interviews began by confirming participants’ consent for 
recording the session. Following consent, participants were informed of the general 
nature and extent of the study. At the beginning of each interview, attorneys were also 
informed that the questions were designed to explore their views on their 
communication with both English and Spanish-speaking clients, when the latter took 
place through an interpreter. In most cases the questions followed the order established 
in the interview guide; however, in some cases this order was not followed when 
participants would volunteer information that would answer subsequent questions. After 
all questions were answered, participants were asked to add any other information they 
deemed relevant. All interviews were recorded and transcribed.  
8.3. Focus group 3 (with Spanish speakers) 
This focus group was convened with the main purpose of soliciting feedback from lay 
Spanish speakers about the five original-register Spanish sentences translated by the 
first focus group. Another goal was to attempt to produce, in a group, another set of 
simplified-register Spanish sentences in order to compare them with the simplified-
register Spanish sentences produced by the interpreters in the second focus group, 
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mainly in terms of vocabulary. Lastly, it was hoped that the group discussion and 
comments offered by participants would provide insight into their reasoning and general 
comprehension of the sentences. 
8.3.1. Participants 
Participants met the same selection criteria established for lay Spanish speakers in the 
listening comprehension test: no court experience, an approximate educational 
attainment level of 6-8 years of schooling, foreign-born status, and little or no 
knowledge of English. This group of six lay Spanish speakers was provided by a local 
community center, where the meeting took place. Again, in addition to myself as 
moderator, another court interpreter was present to assist with the recording. 
8.3.2. Materials and instruments  
The only materials needed for this meeting were the five Spanish sentences translated 
by the interpreters in the first focus group. Participants received the Spanish version of 
the consent form. Two digital voice recorders were used to record the session. 
8.3.3. Procedure 
The meeting took place in a regional community center in Los Angeles, and it lasted 
about one hour. My assistant and I introduced ourselves as court interpreters doing 
research on the language used in court, specifically the Spanish language, and explained 
the task ahead: a group discussion of the vocabulary found in five Spanish sentences in 
terms of difficulty, comprehension, and their familiarity with said vocabulary. 
Participants were also invited to comment on all the changes they considered should be 
made to make the sentences more understandable, if necessary. The task was conducted 
as follows: 
1. Each sentence was presented in oral form, read by the moderator and repeated as 
necessary. 
2. After each sentence was presented, participants were invited to discuss any 
comprehension issues.  
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3. When participants claimed to understand the sentence, they were invited to try to 
reformulate or explain it in their own words to verify comprehension. 
4. The group was then invited again to state if there were any unfamiliar words in the 
sentence. 
5. Unfamiliar words were explained and replaced with the terms proposed by the 
participants. 
6. After each change was incorporated, the sentence was read again to the group to 
determine whether or not comprehension had improved. 
7. After all changes proposed by participants were incorporated, the final agreed-upon 
version was read again to the group to verify comprehension. 
8. After the reading of the last version, participants were again invited to try to 
reformulate it or explain the meaning in their own words in order to verify 
comprehension. 
This process continued for all sentences, with repetition of each step as necessary. 
The session was recorded and transcribed.  
Several challenges arose in the implementation of this part of the study. The first 
was observed at the beginning of the session, as participants needed some time to feel 
comfortable and discuss their views openly. The second was the presence of two 
children in the room (a baby and a toddler), which at times made it difficult for their 
parents and the group to focus on the task at hand. Lastly, the nature of this task and the 
language involved made it necessary for me to intervene frequently and discuss several 
terms individually. Although most of the sentences were somehow simplified, it was not 
really clear whether comprehension was achieved, for several reasons. First, time 
constraints did not allow to spend enough time with each sentence to arrive at a truly 
simplified way to express the basic idea, particularly when not even the analogy of the 
plane in the sky from jury instructions was really helpful or clear enough for 
participants to restate it comfortably. Second, although participants seemed comfortable 
and open, they were at times embarrassed to acknowledge and state they did not 
understand. Evidence of this were the silence that ensued when participants were invited 
to repeat or rephrase the sentences after they had confirmed that the meaning was clear 
and understood, and the several terms I asked about that turned out to be unknown to 
participants, again, after comprehension had been confirmed. All these results will be 
discussed in the next chapter. 
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Chapter 9. Results 
 
Given that this research focuses on an intercultural communicative interaction among 
(at least) three main interlocutors, this study triangulates data from all three sources: 
interpreters, attorneys, and non-English speakers. It explores the equal footing claim 
through a comparison of the comprehension achieved by English speakers and Spanish 
speakers, and by exploring the possibility of enhancing Spanish speakers’ 
comprehension by adjusting the language register. This latter point was addressed 
through the listening comprehension test described in the methodology chapter, which 
constitutes the quantitative component of this research. To obtain a more detailed and 
balanced perspective on this research issue, this data was triangulated with information 
obtained in interviews with attorneys and interpreters and in a focus group with lay 
Spanish speakers, all of which constitutes the qualitative component of this research. 
This chapter reports the results obtained in each of these three components: the 
interviews with interpreters and attorneys, the focus group with lay Spanish speakers, 
and the listening comprehension test.  
9.1. Interviews  
9.1.1. Interviews with interpreters 
As described in the methodology chapter, the purpose of these interviews was to gather 
information mainly regarding interpreters’ awareness of and views on register and 
register adjustment, and role limitations in matters of facilitating comprehension. 
Furthermore, the pilot study results suggested that a more detailed exploration of 
interpreters’ attitudes toward institutional established norms was necessary to 
complement the results of the other tests and develop a better understanding of the 
intercultural communicative event, taking into account all parties involved.  
Demographics (Question 1) 
The interviews started by obtaining information regarding participants’ place of birth, 
upbringing, education, and language (English and Spanish) learning and/or acquisition. 
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The ten interpreters interviewed included four born in a Spanish-speaking country and 
six born in the United States, two of whom migrated to a Spanish-speaking country in 
their early years. Of the ten participants, four completed their schooling in a Spanish-
speaking country, four in the United States, and two completed their schooling in 
different countries due to migration. As a consequence of frequent relocation and 
traveling, six participants learned or acquired Spanish in a Spanish-speaking country, 
two in the United States, and two in both. English, on the other hand, was learned or 
acquired by five participants in the United States, in a Spanish-speaking country by only 
one participant, and in both by four.  
Certifications and attempts at examinations before passing (Question 2) 
As described in chapter 3, court interpreters may get certified to work in state courts 
and/or federal courts. Regarding the state exam, seven participants passed the written 
exam after one attempt, one participant needed two attempts, and two participants took 
the written portion five times before they passed. As for the oral portion of the exam, 
three participants took the exam once, three took the exam twice, two took the exam 
four times, and one participant took it five times. Regarding the federal exam, five 
participants took the written portion only once, one participant took it twice, another 
one three times, and one participant has not attempted this exam yet. As for the oral 
portion of this exam, four participants took it once, four participants took it twice, and 
two participants have not attempted it yet. In summary, the ten participants hold the 
state certification, and eight also hold the federal certification for court interpreting.  
This data was obtained not only to confirm that interpreters met the selection 
criteria for participating in this study, but also to consider the possible relationship 
between formal schooling, language learning, and the number of attempts at the state 
and federal certification exams. While Participant 6 was born in a Spanish-speaking 
country, migrated to the United States as a child, and was raised in a Spanish-speaking 
home, Participant 7 was born and raised in the United States in a Spanish-speaking 
home. Both would fit the description of heritage learners (see 3.2.1. above), since they 
had little or no formal education in a Spanish-speaking country, and each had made five 
attempts at the written exam, which at that time included a Spanish component. Their 
number of attempts at the oral exam is also among the highest (four and five, 
respectively), and these two participants made comments in this regard, “Because I was 
UNIVERSITAT ROVIRA I VIRGILI 
COMPREHENSION OF LEGAL DISCOURSE IN INTERPRETER-MEDIATED JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS 
Julia Lambertini Andreotti
167 
failing the Spanish by a few points each time” (P6) and “Because I didn’t have any 
formal training in Spanish and that’s what got me on the written” (P7).  
Training (Question 3) 
Seven of the participants received training in an interpreting program, and two of them 
complemented it with further private instruction. While two participants received only 
private instruction, only one of the participants received no training from any 
interpreting program or privately.  
“Language register” defined, code standards (Questions 4) 
Participants were asked to define “language register” in their own words. Most 
remarkably, seven of them defined the register as a factor of education, such as P5: “A 
lower register word is more commonly used within people of lower education” and P9: 
“... language register is really a factor of formal education.” It is also worth noting that 
four participants defined the register as something interpreters must not modify, such as 
P7: “you have to maintain the register,” and P1, who stated, “... I’m not going to start 
distorting the English version,” and who also believes it is more important “to keep the 
exact same register when you’re interpreting from Spanish into English.” Other factors 
included the level of sophistication, difficulty, correctness, or politeness, and 
characterizations in terms of descriptors such as high or low, or formal or informal. 
Only one participant made reference to legal language and qualified it as being of high 
register, “... if we are in a courtroom setting, the legalese would be a high register” (P6), 
and only one participant related it to the formality of the situation: “... register can also 
have to do with the words you select and depending on the formality or informality of 
the situation you are in” (P9). Only one participant (P8) related it to the source context: 
“I mean, it means that you are trying to put whatever you hear in the same context as 
used in the original language.” Two participants also related language register to 
comprehension, such as P1: “The level at which a person will understand,” and P6: “So 
somebody with a little more education may be able to understand it better.” All 
participants claimed to be aware of the code standard for handling the register.  
Training in register, register manipulation, or features of legal language (Question 5) 
Except for the six-hour ethics seminar described in chapter 3, which is mandatory for all 
newly-certified interpreters, none of the participants received any training or practice in 
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register or register adjustment before they started working, or before they became 
familiar with the code and the register standard.  
Reasons for maintaining the register from Spanish into English (Question 6) 
All participants related the conservation of register from Spanish into English to 
allowing the jury and others in the proceeding to get the most faithful possible 
representation of the defendant or witness, the rendering of whose testimony into 
English must reflect his or her same level of language, mostly in terms of origin, 
education and sophistication. For example, P1 stated that the register should not be 
modified because “the judge, the jurors, the attorneys, they got to hear not only the 
meaning that the person is conveying through his testimony, but also the level of 
sophistication, the level of education, the level of how well-rounded the person may be 
or not,” and P6 stated that register is maintained “for the Court to ascertain the speaker's 
education and sophistication.” One participant qualified register adjustment as changing 
the real meaning or embellishing a word. According to P5, by adjusting the register  
 
... you would convey a different meaning, you would not convey the level of 
education of the person, you would not convey maybe the area where the person 
comes from. I’m talking about embellishing and changing the word so the person 
doesn’t sound so uneducated. (P5)  
 
It is interesting to note that two participants also stated that interpreters should 
maintain the register from Spanish into English because it is the language of the record, 
such as P9: “English is the language of the record. And to not maintain the register is to 
present something that doesn’t exist,” and P10: “Because that’s the register used by the 
court, the attorneys, the people, and that’s the one that they understand and feel more 
comfortable with.” Again, the requirement to maintain the register was mentioned by 
P9: “You have to, to the best of your abilities, maintain the register.” 
Reasons for maintaining the language register from English into Spanish (Question 7) 
Six of the ten respondents believe interpreters should not adjust the register when 
interpreting from English into Spanish so that Spanish speakers would hear the same as 
an English speaker would, also stated in terms of equal footing, same level, or fairness. 
This was mentioned by several participants, such as P1:  
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I think it is so that it’s at the same playing field, footing, as a person who, in the 
same exact situation, lack of education, lack of sophistication, lack of training, lack 
of being exposed to judicial terminology, does not need an interpreter, speaks 
perfect English, but has to listen to this jargon which they are not accustomed to 
listening to. So then both of them, the Spanish speaker and the English speaking 
person are at the same level. (P1) 
 
Other examples include P3, who stated, “So that the party’s witness, or defendant, 
can have the same experience as an English-speaking person would have,” P6: “If the 
Court were to speak to an English speaker, that English speaker doesn’t have the luxury 
of somebody explaining to him or telling him what the Court’s meaning,” and P10: “If a 
guy who is American, born and raised here, he listens to those words and that’s what he 
hears. Even if he doesn’t understand the high register, that’s what it is.” 
Again, the requirement to keep the register unchanged was mentioned by six 
participants. For example, P7 stated that the register should remain unmodified “just 
because you have to maintain the register,” and P8: “You have to maintain the register 
to the best of your abilities... it’s the only way around.” Adjusting the register was 
characterized by participants in many significant and revealing terms: P5 stated, “You 
would be violating your code of ethics by basically explaining or dumbing down the 
language to the person that doesn’t understand legalese... because you could change 
meaning, the person could see you maybe as an advocate,” and P9 explained, “because 
then you are interceding.”  
The connection between high register, register adjustment and comprehension 
was also made explicit in participants’ responses. For example, P6 explained, “If we 
change it to make it easier to understand to the other speaker, in my case the Spanish 
speaker, then we’re assisting in their understanding”; P7 stated, “I know a lot of times 
they don’t understand, but it’s really not my job”; P8: “But if he doesn’t understand 
something, he has lost. I am not there to explain what they are trying to tell him”; and 
P9: “More than likely he’s not gonna understand half the crap you’re saying if you 
maintain the register.” Interfering with legal strategy was only mentioned by P7, who 
stated, “A lot of times there’s a strategy that they use with certain vocabulary. There’s 
always a strategy, especially by the person asking the question. And you can’t interrupt 
that, you know, basically we’re transparent, we don’t exist.” The possibility of third 
parties listening and realizing the register was changed was mentioned by P5: “... the 
district attorney may be bilingual and can figure out that you are not saying what you’re 
supposed to say, part of the jurors may be bilingual and understand.” Last but not least, 
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six participants showed awareness of Spanish speakers’ lack of understanding of a high 
or legal register, one of them (P1) admitting (to) feeling “guilt” for looking for “the 
easiest.”  
In summary, although most participants expressed awareness of the difficulty to 
understand the high register of legal language, they believe the interpreter’s role does 
not include explaining or facilitating comprehension. The main reasons reported for not 
adjusting the register while interpreting from English into Spanish included keeping 
English speakers and Spanish speakers on a level playing field, not being perceived as 
an advocate, and not interceding to make the source-language utterance easier to 
understand.  
Interpreting style variation according to setting (Question 8) 
The results from the pilot study had suggested that interpreters used different styles 
according to the setting, and consequently participants were specifically asked about 
this variation. All respondents indicated that the setting affected their interpreting style, 
mostly in terms of being able to interrupt or make suggestions to the attorney about 
lowering the register or stating the client is not understanding, non-comprehension 
being again a common element in interpreters’ answers. The reasons for not changing 
the interpreting style in court or more formal settings again included being on or off the 
record as a determining factor, in terms of being invisible while on the record, as 
explained by P4: “The record is a decisive factor,” and P2: “On the record or in court... I 
want to be as invisible as possible and just there as a communicator, and I don’t want 
my feelings or my opinions to be recorded or to become part of the record.” The 
presence of the judge and the decorum of the setting are also factors in respondents’ 
views, as stated by P10:  
 
In court there’s more decorum. I think there’s a little bit more fear because there’s 
a judge sitting there... fear that they’re going to think that you are an 
argumentative, difficult interpreter. Especially in federal court. In state court no 
but in federal court yeah, it’s like oh my gosh. (P10) 
 
Other reasons included the possibility of bilingual jurors or colleagues who may be 
listening, as explained by P5:  
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Ok, so there’s- not only I wouldn’t do it on the record because the judge is 
listening, there might be bilingual jurors that are highly educated and they might 
feel like I’m dumbing down the language and using a lower register... I would also 
not do it in front of a colleague, especially if I do not know the person. You are 
subject to criticism and opinions and people saying that you may not even know the 
word and that’s why you’re using a lower register word, which may be the case for 
some individuals but not for everyone. (P5) 
 
Half of the respondents explained that informal settings give them the freedom to 
either ask the attorney to simplify the register or suggest that the client is not 
understanding, or simplify the register when attorneys ask them to do so. P1, for 
example, stated, “I’m more likely to tell the attorney, ‘I’m sorry but you know what? I 
don’t think he got what you said’” and P2: “When I’m off the record... if the witness is 
not understanding what I am saying, and it is obvious to me that he or she is not 
understanding, I feel the liberty, the freedom of interrupting and telling the attorney that 
I believe the witness is not understanding me.” Other strategies used by some 
respondents in informal settings include following the same register and then adding a 
few words for clarification or switching to a lower register. For example, P5 stated,  
 
If I am just having an attorney-client conference in a hallway or a private room and 
there is no one else listening to me, and... that person was giving testimony and said 
something that could compromise the case, and the attorney tells me, ‘Interpreter 
please do this quickly, he needs to understand right away what are the 
consequences of his plea.’ And I start by using... the same register the attorney is 
using, the person is not understanding, I switch... to a lower register so the person 
has the right to understand what is really going on... and what he should say 
according to what’s informed to him by his counsel. (P3) 
 
One way or another, most respondents seem to find strategies to address the gap 
between the legal register and non-English speakers’ comprehension level; however, the 
most remarkable finding seems to be the diversity of answers and strategies among 
participants. 
Settings in which interpreters may adjust the language register (Question 9) 
Based on some responses to the previous question, participants were asked to describe 
the settings in which they might feel free to make register adjustments to facilitate 
comprehension. Once again, strategies for adjusting the language register vary 
considerably across respondents, ranging from never to only in informal settings to even 
in formal settings. For example, P2 stated, “I never do,” while P6 referred to a more 
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intuitive “common sense” approach to interpreting to enhance comprehension, not 
equating it to changing the register or the meaning: 
 
I do change the register for the sake of making sure my listener understands. I do it 
for the defendant, in private settings, and even at the witness stand. My choice of 
words does not necessarily change the meaning, nor do I consider it changing the 
register when I simply use more common terms or a different word to make myself 
understood. That's the difference between a new interpreter and a seasoned one, 
you develop a common sense approach to interpreting, it becomes more intuitive. 
(P6) 
 
Although in different settings and circumstances, six interpreters take the initiative 
to simplify or adjust the register to facilitate comprehension: by making it easier, only in 
informal settings, in both formal and informal settings, during the whispered part of the 
trial, by adding a few words, or only after using the original register. For example, P1 
explained, “If I think that a statement, while expressed well by an attorney, is confusing 
or difficult, I do my best to make it easier to understand, yes... I may add a couple of 
words to clarify or I may use an easier word,” and P3 stated, 
  
During the whispered part of the trial I do not keep the same register, because it's 
impractical, because I can’t speak that many words by so many people so quickly at 
that level, because they’re not doing it for our benefit. They’re not trying to help the 
interpretation. And also I find the defendant or the witness is very confused by all 
of the speaking, so I lower the register and I tend to summarize in order to make 
sure they understand what’s happening. (P3) 
 
Other respondents would warn the attorney that the client may not be 
understanding, or they may adjust the register only after asking the attorney for 
permission to do so, as P10 explained, “I tell them ‘You know what, I think that your 
client is having a really hard time understanding, harder than normal, and if it’s ok I’m 
going to lower the register.’” 
The reasons for not adjusting the register in court or more formal settings again 
included having to say exactly what witnesses and attorneys say, avoiding repercussions 
because of colleagues who may be listening and may report the interpreter, or fearing 
that attorneys might report the interpreter because non-comprehension was intended. 
For example, P5 explained, 
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In any of the other more formal settings I don’t feel comfortable because I know if 
there is... not because I don’t think it shouldn’t be done, but because of the 
repercussions. The repercussions could be that if another fellow interpreter hears 
me or sees me doing that, that person is going to tell the world that I’m not 
following the code of ethics, or if there is a bilingual attorney that may want to do 
some harm may report me to a supervisor, if maybe because of that explanation 
there was an answer that his client was not supposed to understand, or complex, 
and there could be a lot of repercussions. (P5) 
 
Strategies used by two respondents include warning the Spanish speaker before or 
after the proceeding to state when they don’t understand, such as P1: “Sometimes, at the 
end of a hearing, I say to the defendant ‘Sir, if you are not clear on some of the things he 
discussed during this hearing, let your attorney know.’” It is also relevant that two 
participants stated that attorneys or judges would not know how to make it easier for the 
client to understand, being limited to the vocabulary they learned in law school. This 
was explained by P9:  
 
So you’ve got a judge or a lawyer with 21 years of formal higher education trying 
to explain to a third grader what’s going on, and they just don’t see it. They just 
don’t see how to make it understandable, other than using the register and 
vocabulary that they learned in law school or university. (P9) 
 
While awareness of non-comprehension is again a consistent element in 
respondents’ answers, the most remarkable finding seems to be the diversity of answers 
and strategies among participants, who share and follow the same code and institutional 
norms and work with the same population and the same language combination. 
General educational attainment level of Spanish speakers (Question 10) 
The average educational attainment level of Spanish speakers reported by interpreters is 
6.1 years, which is consistent both with the literature reviewed and the data provided in 
the attorneys’ interviews (see Section 9.1.2.). 
Register used may not be the most suitable for CA Spanish speakers (Question 11) 
Participants were asked if they ever considered that the register used in judicial 
proceedings might not be the most suitable for the Spanish speakers they work with, and 
implicitly, if they believed that the language used in court may hinder comprehension 
for this particular population. Remarkably, all respondents found that at times the 
register may not be the most appropriate for the Spanish speaker, and coping strategies 
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are again diverse. Among them, for example, interpreters may warn the defendant or 
witness about the limitations of the interpreter’s role and prompt them to say when they 
do not understand, such as P1:  
 
What I have done is kept the register but before we started I have told the person, 
“Sir, I am here to interpret for you. If there’s something you cannot understand, 
even if I can tell you did not understand, there’s nothing I can do. So if you do not 
understand, when the judge says did you understand? You need to say yes when 
you do, and no when you don’t, and then you might want to say, I need to talk to 
my attorney. Because once the question comes to you, and I have to interpret what 
the judge is saying...” (P1) 
 
Interpreters may also simplify the language to facilitate comprehension, let 
attorneys know that the register may be too high, or use eye contact and a slow and 
louder rendition to convey to the attorney that the register is too high. This last strategy 
was explained by P4: 
 
The only way I have ever found to dispassionately and harmlessly convey to an 
attorney that the register is too high is by keeping my eyes on the attorney for the 
first several words of my interpretation of his question and, additionally, rendering 
my interpretation somewhat slowly and deliberately and perhaps in a slightly louder 
and more emphatic voice than I really need. This conveys a bit of doubt or 
incredulity on my part without compromising communication with the witness, or 
the jury, in the least. It's just a way to convey to the attorney that, somewhat to my 
surprise, I am being asked to formulate high-register language. (P4) 
 
Again, two respondents included comments about role limitations: “that’s not for 
me to do anything about” (P8), and “that is not your job to make judgment about that” 
(P4). One participant (P5) provided an example of non-comprehension: 
 
[When] you need to read the advisement of rights... at a speed that you run out of 
saliva... they have no clue whatsoever. And not only that, when they go before the 
judge, the judge says, “Ok, would you like me to read you your indicated 
sentence?” And then you interpret. They don’t understand the interpretation for 
indicated sentence. And they look at me like, “¿Y qué quiere decir eso?” (And what 
does that mean?) So I look at the judge and say “What does that mean?” blah blah 
blah. “Oh no, but I wanna plead guilty.” Ok, so you need to go back into the 
audience, sit down, and read all the advisement of rights again, which is a two-page 
sight translation... [Do they ever ask what it means, or ask for a repetition?] No. 
There’s a mix of embarrassment, self consciousness, and I don’t know, there’s a big 
temptation to tell them “Do you really understand what’s going on here?” but it’s 
like opening a can of worms. (P5) 
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In summary, respondents showed awareness of non-comprehension issues as a 
consequence of the high register of legal language, and provided a wide variety of 
bridging strategies to help facilitate communication.  
 
Interpreters’ awareness of Spanish speakers’ non-comprehension - Signs (Question 12) 
All respondents claimed to be able to tell when the Spanish speaker does not 
understand, and all respondents included among the signs: the look or expression in the 
non-English speakers’ face in terms of confusion, despair, looking down or away, a 
blank expression, staring, and frowning. The manner in which defendants and witnesses 
answer was also a sign of non-comprehension for eight of the respondents, expressed in 
terms of non-responsive answers, stammering, hesitation, false starts, pauses, longer 
answers, mumbling, asking more questions, saying “yes” too many times, talking 
directly to the interpreter, remaining silent, or using a higher register than they can 
handle. For example, P4 stated,  
 
Another sign is when the person tries to speak at a higher register than they’re 
really capable of handling well to conceal the fact, and this is often a matter of 
dignity and pride, to conceal the fact that they’re embarrassed that they don’t have 
the language skills to cope with the situation. (P4)  
 
Body language was also a sign of non-comprehension for half the participants, 
expressed in terms of palpitations, sweating, rubbing hands, yawning, hanging the head, 
and nodding. Only two respondents stated that the non-English speaker would ask for 
clarification, and P5 provided an example: 
 
For example, ok “objection your honor,” if they were not prepped, they don’t even 
know what an objection is, and it has happened to me, they interrupt, and I’m 
interpreting and they stop me in the middle of interpreting the objection, and they 
start talking to me asking me what an objection means, that they don’t understand. 
The judge stops to tell me “Interpreter, tell the witness to stop talking because there 
is an objection,” so it’s like I would need to go back again explain what an 
objection is, and then the judge may perfectly say “Ok interpreter, interpret the 
question,” and by that time I forgot the question. (P5) 
 
One participant described a strategy to confirm comprehension: “I always, I say 
‘Do you understand?’ at the beginning, and I say ‘¿Entiende? ¿Comprende?’ (Do you 
understand?) Because that opens the door for the person to say ‘Yes, I do’ or ‘No, I 
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don’t’” (P1). Lastly, one respondent included an interpreters’ norm in terms of “it’s not 
my job to tell the attorney” (P8). 
Spanish speakers claim they understand when in fact they do not (Question 13) 
All respondents reported witnessing situations in which a non-English speaker would 
claim to understand when in fact the opposite was true, in one case even when the 
defendant did not speak Spanish but another indigenous language. Interestingly, three 
respondents offered cultural reasons as an explanation: according to P6, “They may say 
‘yes’ too many times, because they’re too embarrassed to say ‘I don’t understand’ so 
they may just agree, because it’s part of the culture,” and P7: “And a lot of times they’ll 
answer a question without understanding it because they simply feel like they have to 
answer the question.” A most revealing explanation and example was provided by P9: 
 
You do this whole thing with them and they go “Sí, sí, sí,” and then you find out 
they speak Zapotec or some other language, some other indigenous language, from 
Mexico or... [But they still say they understand?] Oh yeah, they’ll say that, because 
they don’t wanna get beaten, you know? Where they come from, up in Antigua or 
Guatemala, [if] you don’t say yes, you get slapped around. So their concept is yes, 
of course, whatever you want. They do not order their world the way we do. 
They’ll still say yes even if they don’t understand because that’s just what you do in 
front of authority. There’s not just a language element to look at, there’s a cultural 
element to look at. Yeah, I took an entire plea, a guilty plea and sentencing, before 
we realized that the guy was just saying yes yes yes and he didn’t really know what 
the hell else to say. (P9) 
 
While Participant 9 characterized the phenomenon as linguistic and cultural, 
another participant explained that while the language may be understood, the concept 
may not be (P6). Three respondents stated they would feel comfortable intervening and 
communicating to the attorney that the non-English speaker is not understanding, but 
only in informal settings and not in the courtroom (P1), after weighing the 
“consequences of the misunderstanding and the repercussions” (P5), or outside the 
courtroom, if they know the attorney, or if the non-English speaker claimed not to 
understand and the attorney asked the interpreter for an opinion (P8). Participants’ 
answers were largely consistent with the literature on cultural traits reviewed in chapter 
2. 
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Interpreter interventions (Question 14) 
Interpreters were asked if they ever felt comfortable enough to interrupt a proceeding, 
either to clarify a term, to advise on a possible language or cultural issue, or because 
they believed the witness or defendant might not be understanding. While more so in 
private or informal settings and to different degrees, nine respondents stated that they 
may interrupt the proceeding or interview for different reasons: to seek clarification for 
either the non-English speaker or the interpreter, to warn about non-English speakers’ 
lack of comprehension, or when a non-English speaker speaks a language other than 
Spanish. Once again, responses ranged from interpreters who would not interrupt the 
proceeding, such as P6: “I don’t interrupt the proceeding, I don’t feel free to do so... if it 
was acceptable, if it was expected, I would,” to interpreters who would interrupt any 
proceeding: “Yes. I would say in any setting” (P3). Reasons for not interrupting 
included, for example, an uncertainty about when to do so. As P10 explained, 
“Sometimes I find it difficult to discern whether I need to bring something up that is 
culturally important, or not. Because I don’t want anybody to think that I’m leading the 
witness.” Other respondents mentioned judges who do not care (P1), or having had a 
bad experience doing so, such as P2:  
 
I told the attorney, “I don’t think the witness is understanding you,” and he told me, 
“Well, let the witness tell me.” So it kind of threw me off, because I was only 
trying to help. And I thought, ok he’s putting me in my place and maybe I shouldn’t 
be saying anything. I think my instinct in that moment, and I remember that case in 
particular, that the attorney was making it seem as if the witness was just dumb. 
And he wasn’t dumb, maybe he was uneducated, but he wasn’t dumb. It’s just that 
he was unable to understand the words that this attorney was using. (P2) 
 
Two respondents provided revealing examples of cultural issues: asking defendants 
or witnesses to spell their name, and testing a Spanish speaker on U.S. judicial officers’ 
roles. These examples were provided by P2 and P5: 
 
“State and spell your name for the record.” And the person will state their name and 
start spelling it, let’s say Mario, and they’ll say “M-r-i-o,” and I don’t care how 
educated or uneducated the person is, we in Spanish do not spell out loud. We 
don’t, we separate in syllables. I never in my native country have had to spell 
[Participant’s name] out loud, x-x-x-x in Spanish, or spell words. And they’ll look 
at the person like, what? And I don’t know if you’ve ever encountered that, but 
sometimes they roll their eyes, I’ve been in settings where everybody in the room 
rolls their eyes like “Oh my God give me a break, they don’t know how to spell 
their name.” (P2) 
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This specific person was being interviewed for competency in terms of mental 
health. It turned out that this psychologist, after we left, she told me, “What do you 
think?” And this is where there’s a really thin line for me, the interpreter, to 
determine where is the right to culture present, and where is my opinion, as 
something not being called for taking place? So I thought in this particular case I 
had to speak up, because they started asking the defendant, “Are you ready to stand 
trial?” and then I interpreted. And he said, “Well, I don’t know.” “Do you know 
what a public defender is?” “Is that my attorney?” “Yeah yeah yeah.” “Do you 
know who the prosecutor is?” “No.” “What does the prosecutor do?” “I don’t 
know.” “Do you know what the judge does?” “No.” “Do you know how many 
members of the jury are in the jury box?” “Uhh... ” He didn’t know anything. So I 
thought that my input was necessary to let this psychologist know that in the 
country of origin where this person comes from there are no oral trials, so this 
person doesn’t have any idea about how the judicial process, how the system works 
here, so if someone is found guilty of a crime, it’s because the judge ruled and that 
was it. Yeah, you go to jail for so and so months, go to a rehab center, whatever. 
None of this show happens. So in that specific instance, yes, I did think that this 
person had the right to culture, because of lack of competence, cultural competence. 
(P5) 
 
Once again, role limitations regarding mutual comprehension and interpreter 
interventions were made explicit in responses by several participants: “‘Cause it’s like I 
said, it’s not my responsibility to make sure they understand each other. If I’m using the 
register that the attorney’s using and the witness is not understanding it, then that’s that” 
(P7), “And there’s a legal concept that, you’re not a party to the action, whether it’s the 
prosecutorial side, whatever it may be, you don’t have legal standing to sit there and 
stop things, interrupt things” (P9), and “So ethically, this happens to me all the time, 
that I think ok, I have to say something, but I don’t. I don’t because I know that I 
shouldn’t, because I have been trained not to” (P2). 
Hand/arm scenarios (Questions 15-18) 
Participants were given four different scenarios in which a witness would use the term 
mano (hand) to refer to the arm, but in different circumstances. In each situation, 
participants were asked what, in their opinion, would be the most appropriate course of 
action for the interpreter.  
 
Scenario 1 (Question 15): The witness says mano (hand) but points at the arm in plain 
view. In this first scenario in which a Spanish speaker says mano (hand) and points at 
the arm in a way that everyone can see, only one participant would translate the term 
mano as arm, but only in a medical setting and not in court. The literal translation hand 
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would be the preferred choice for eight participants: P3 would make a comment about 
the pointing, “Interpreter note: witness is indicating his arm,” P2 would like to offer a 
cultural account of the apparent error but does not, and two participants may ask for 
clarification, one of them only if the attorney does not clarify first: “Sometimes the 
attorney says, ‘I’d like the record to say that he’s pointing at his arm, do you mean your 
arm?’ So if that doesn’t happen, I would just ask the attorney ‘May I clarify, because in 
Mexican [Spanish] they use hand and arm for both, so may I clarify?’” (P10). Only two 
respondents would clarify before translating: P8 would comment on the pointing: “I go 
to the judge and say ‘Your honor, the witness used the word for hand but he pointed at 
his arm,’” and P7 would alert the court to the double meaning of the term mano: “I say 
‘This is the interpreter speaking. The witness is using a term that can mean hand or 
arm.’” Three participants acknowledged this double meaning as a cultural issue, while 
three other participants would expect the judge or attorneys to see the witness point at a 
body part and name another. The miscommunication and role limitations were clearly 
expressed by P2: 
 
What I will do is interpret the word hand. What I would like to do is make an 
interpreter comment on the record. Not a comment as to the pointing, I would just 
like to state on the record that in several areas of different countries, I believe that 
happens a lot with Mexican nationals but I cannot guarantee that it is only with 
Mexican nationals... And I would like to be able to state that, as an interpreter, to 
put that on the record, that that exists, that it’s not just this witness was doing that, 
but it is common. But again, that’s not what I would do. (P2) 
 
Scenario 2 (Question 16): The witness says mano (hand) but points at the arm in a way 
that only the interpreter can see. In this second scenario, six participants would translate 
the term mano literally as hand, and three of them would also add a comment to let the 
judge and attorneys know that the witness is indicating the arm. The other three 
participants who would translate the term as hand would make no comment; however, 
P2 relates the situation to a moral conflict: 
 
What I will do once again is interpret hand, but this is the main reason why I would 
like to be able to make an interpreter comment. And the reason I don’t do it is out 
of fear... I don’t wanna find myself in the situation of being told, “Well that’s not 
your job.” It’s really not my job to be looking at the witness, but ethically, and now 
I’m not talking about the Judicial Council ethics, I’m talking about my moral 
ethics... I really feel horrible because I know what he is saying, I know that I’m the 
only one looking at him, ‘cause it has happened and I know nobody saw him. So 
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they’re not going to clarify it, and it may be a very important part of the case that 
he’s pointing at the arm and saying hand, and I have to say hand, and I leave with 
that bad taste in my mouth. (P2) 
 
The other four participants would either ask for clarification before translating the 
term or make a comment about the pointing or the double meaning. One of them (P1) 
assumes responsibility for making the court aware of the pointing:  
 
I probably ask for permission to clarify or I might, in a situation like that, say 
“Your honor, the witness pointed at an area in his body and I think I was the only 
one that could see that.” So then it becomes my responsibility. (P1)  
 
Five participants would make a comment about the witness pointing at the arm. 
 
Scenario 3 (Question 17): The witness says mano (hand) without pointing, but everyone 
(including the interpreter) knows that the case only concerns an injured arm. The third 
scenario presents the first case of an interpreter who would translate mano as arm based 
on familiarity with the case and the possibility of offering an argument about the 
“cultural implication of the term” to justify the choice. This was explained by P6:  
 
If I’m familiar with the case, I’ll probably use arm rather than hand. And I can, 
one of the things about using the different words is being able to argue in favor of 
your choice. So if somebody from a juror says, the witness says hand but the 
interpreter says arm, I can argue, I can give a good argument as to the cultural 
implication of the term. I can justify my choice. (P6) 
 
This time, half of the participants would translate mano as hand without adding 
any comment or asking for clarification, four of them leaving it in the hands of 
authorities to make the determination, and one of them (P9) referring to other Spanish 
speakers present who would understand the original term mano, “Any Spanish speaker 
knows that he’s saying the word hand, I’m not gonna sit there and say arm.” Four 
participants would ask for clarification or make a comment about the double meaning of 
the term before attempting a translation. 
 
Scenario 4 (Question 18). The witness says mano (hand) without pointing, and 
interpreters have no previous knowledge about the case, only a possible suspicion, 
based on experience, that the witness may mean the arm. Results indicated that half of 
the participants would translate mano (hand) as hand in court without adding any 
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comment. In a more informal setting, however, one of these participants (P9) would still 
translate mano as hand but maybe ask for clarification:  
 
I would do it in an interview outside of a judicial hearing because in a judicial 
hearing the most important thing is to not become a proactive person in the 
proceeding. And if I were to sit there and start throwing out, well I think this may 
be this or that, I’ve become proactive. That’s not the role of the interpreter in a 
judicial proceeding. But in an interview process, that’s completely different, 
what’s most important is meaningful communication, accuracy, and the meaning. 
(P9) 
 
Other participants would ask for clarification, and Participant 7, who would in all 
cases comment about the dual meaning before attempting a translation, explains, “You 
can’t assume facts not in evidence.” 
The following table shows a summary of the results of these four scenarios: 
 
Table 5. Summary results – hand/arm scenarios  
 S 1 S 2 S 3 S 4 
Interpret mano as hand with no comment 45% 25% 50% 50% 
Interpret mano as hand with comment about pointing 10% 20%   
Interpret mano as hand with comment about dual meaning   10% 20% 
Interpret mano as arm 5% 5% 10%  
Request to clarify the term before attempting a translation 20% 10% 20% 20% 
Comment about pointing before attempting a translation 10% 30%   
Comment about dual meaning before attempting a translation 10% 10% 10% 10% 
 
Of these forty possibilities (ten participants, four scenarios), only in sixteen 
cases would interpreters translate mano as hand with no comment whatsoever, and one 
of these respondents would sometimes translate it as arm. Only one respondent would, 
in all scenarios, make a comment about the dual meaning of the term before attempting 
a translation. Another one would, in all scenarios, request to clarify the term before 
attempting a translation. Out of the ten interpreters, only one would translate mano 
(hand) as arm, and then only in the third scenario, when everyone knows that the case 
involves only an injured arm and the choice can be justified. This same respondent 
would translate mano sometimes as hand and sometimes as arm in the first two 
scenarios. 
Five of the interpreters interviewed would make a comment about the pointing: 
two after interpreting mano as hand, and three before attempting a translation. Of these 
five respondents, two would make this comment in the first scenario, when the pointing 
is done in plain view, and all five of them would make the comment when the pointing 
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is not visible to the court or attorneys. In summary, five interpreters believe that making 
a comment to alert the court about the pointing is vital to the testimony. Although the 
others may agree that the pointing is vital to the testimony, they refrain from 
commenting, either because they believe it is not the interpreter’s duty to do so, because 
other Spanish speakers in the room could hear and challenge the interpretation, because 
they believe the court and attorneys can see it, or because of fear.  
The case of cintura (waist/low back) (Question 19) 
In this last scenario a Spanish-speaking witness refers to his lower back as cintura 
(waist). Half of the respondents would translate this term as low back or lower back, 
two would translate it either as waist or low back, another two would translate it as 
waist, and one would make a comment about the double meaning of the term before 
attempting a translation—the same participant who would make a comment before 
translating mano as hand. A clear explanation for translating cintura as low back was 
provided by P4, a native English speaker: 
 
The reason I say lower back directly and immediately for cintura (waist) is because 
it would be highly unlikely for any actual English speaker to say “My waist hurts.” 
It’s not a part of the body, really. A waist is an abstraction; a waist is a description 
rather than an anatomical part, strictly speaking. And so I have no problem because 
I know, as I think all of us interpreters know, that when a Spanish speaker says la 
cintura and especially our Spanish speakers say cintura, they mean lower back, 
precisely. Let me add something to that. For the first number of years as an 
interpreter, whenever I had that problem I would stop and ask counsel, usually in 
depositions, I would ask if I could please clarify. And in clarifying, I would add an 
additional unnecessary three minutes of exchange with the applicant, witness, 
whatever, talking about la espalda, (the back) la parte inferior de la espalda, la 
parte baja de la espalda, (lower back) “¿No es eso lo que quiere decir?” (Isn’t that 
what you mean?) and the net gain in doing this would be absolutely zero. Because I 
could have just simply... I knew, at the beginning I knew, but after a thousand times 
you know so much more, so much better, that all along the person has meant lower 
back and nothing but lower back, and so I simply dropped that whole little 
interference because it wasn’t gaining anybody anything. (P4) 
 
The last comment offered by one of the participants summarizes most of the issues 
addressed in this research and these interviews. According to this respondent, although 
interpreters may do what they are supposed to do to comply with the codes, they may 
not be able to communicate meaning to a Spanish speaker with less education and less 
exposure to the legal system, and being able to communicate is “what interpreting is all 
about”: 
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There might be instances where you are doing what your “formal education” in 
California, and your code of ethics, or the Canons of the profession, as they call 
them, they tell you you’re supposed to do a, b, c in this order and this way. But if 
the person that you are interpreting for is not understanding, you’re not getting the 
concept through to the person that you’re interpreting for, I mean, you might be 
doing what they told you to do; however, that doesn’t mean that you’re doing what 
an interpreter is supposed to be doing... the point is to be able to communicate. 
That’s what interpreting is all about. (P8) 
 
In all these scenarios, participants show awareness of the different terms used by 
some Spanish speakers to denote the arm and the low back; however, even though 
interpreters are aware of this common issue and of its legal consequences, very few ask 
for clarification before attempting a translation. Again, not only in these scenarios but 
throughout the interviews, the most remarkable finding seems to be the wide diversity 
of answers and strategies among participants who follow the same code and comply 
with the same norms while working with the same population and the same language 
combination.  
9.1.2. Interviews with attorneys 
As with interpreters’ interviews, gathering information about attorneys’ views on 
interpreter interventions and role limitations was necessary to complement the 
comprehension test results and achieve a better understanding of this triangular 
intercultural communicative event. 
Spanish-speaking clients (Question 1) 
The interviews started by confirming that respondents indeed worked with Spanish-
speaking clients with enough frequency to enable them to provide informed responses. 
The average share of Spanish speakers in the respondents’ clientele was 77 percent. As 
described in the methodology chapter, half of the attorneys interviewed were bilingual 
English-Spanish, and the other half spoke only English.  
Communication with Spanish speakers vs. English speakers (Question 2) 
Attorneys were asked if they believed they could communicate with English-speaking 
clients and Spanish-speaking clients in the same way, or if there were any differences. 
The question was also designed to learn if there were any differences between the two 
UNIVERSITAT ROVIRA I VIRGILI 
COMPREHENSION OF LEGAL DISCOURSE IN INTERPRETER-MEDIATED JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS 
Julia Lambertini Andreotti
184 
groups of attorneys in terms of this communication. The answers provided to this 
question indicated a marked difference between the respondents who spoke Spanish and 
those who did not. All bilingual English-Spanish respondents overwhelmingly 
mentioned simplifying the legal language, using simpler terms and cultural examples 
and vocabulary, and most showed concern about the client’s comprehension. Four of 
these five participants also mentioned Spanish-speaking clients having less education 
than English-speaking clients, mostly as the main reason for keeping the language 
simple to facilitate comprehension. For example, P1 stated, “Spanish speakers are less 
educated and I will consciously try and keep things even more simple. Like, I don’t 
want to overwhelm them with details so I will try to just keep in mind that the 
comprehension is going to probably be lower so I’ll use the simpler language.” Cultural 
issues were also mentioned: “When I speak to the Spanish-speaking clients, I give them 
more examples than I do with my English speaking clients. I use more cultural 
examples and words as well, that I think that they’ll be more familiar” (P3). Lastly, P5 
described resorting to Spanish to speak in a way the client would understand:  
 
I just find that the Spanish language is a lot more rich. There’s so many different 
words to explain something, I can actually lower the legal terms to a level that... 
in English I find it harder to do that when I’m using an interpreter, especially 
because the interpreter is limited to only interpreting what I am saying so it’s all 
up to me. (P5) 
 
The non-Spanish-speaking group, on the other hand, made reference to giving 
other instructions when working with interpreters. P8 stated,  
 
Sometimes I may add an additional instruction that deals with the language of the 
process, so I instruct the client that they must only depend on the words of the 
interpreter, and then I instruct them that I’m going to sit them in a way that 
they’re not distracted by English speakers so they’re not facing English speakers, 
they face the interpreter. (P8) 
 
Only one respondent mentioned a difference regarding the language used, “I try to 
avoid using slang or colloquialisms that might get lost in translation” (P9). It is also 
important to note that three of the five monolingual English-speaking respondents 
believe that the difference in communication is not due to language issues but to the 
education level of the clients, and four of them stated that they communicate the same 
way with English speakers and Spanish speakers.  
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Comprehension, participation, familiarity with the legal system (Question 3) 
Again comparing English-speaking and Spanish-speaking clients, this question was 
designed to elucidate their differences in comprehension, participation, and familiarity 
with the legal system and the proceeding at hand. The most relevant results showed that 
seven of the ten participants indicated that English-speaking clients are more assertive, 
ask more questions, and show more involvement. P3 explained, “I feel that the English-
speaking clients, I get more feedback from them, they’re more into the conversation,” 
and “Whereas with my Spanish-speaking clients, I feel like they’re looking at me, but 
their mind is wandering somewhere else.”  
Regarding familiarity with the legal system, half of the respondents indicated 
that English-speaking clients are more familiar with the legal system, and it is also 
significant that three participants referred to issues of exposure. For example, P6 stated, 
“They’re basically clueless. They don’t understand even though it’s been explained, the 
fundamental concept of a [legal] system,” and P8 explained, “Almost zero percentage 
familiarity with the system for the Spanish speaker, because culturally they’re not 
affiliated with it, they don’t grow up watching TV, they don’t understand what English 
speakers take for granted.”  
Regarding comprehension, nine participants indicated that Spanish-speaking 
clients had more difficulty understanding the case and the system. P1, for example, 
stated, “I have to make a lot of effort to make sure that they understand what I’m 
saying,” and P2 stated, “I have to explain things over and over to Spanish speakers to 
make sure that they understand.” Two participants referred to issues of lower education 
among Spanish-speaking clients, and P9 mentioned a deferential attitude toward 
authority, consistent with the literature reviewed regarding cultural traits of Hispanics 
(see chapter 2), “The problem becomes more about being overly deferential to me. They 
don’t tell me something unless I ask specifically. They don’t necessarily appreciate or 
don’t understand what I’m telling them about what is important and not important in the 
case.” The same respondent later added, “They seem to think that if they just cooperate 
with everybody that everything will be alright, and that oftentimes leads to them 
waiving important rights before I even see them.” Lastly, P6 explained,  
 
Especially with the less educated, they lack... their ability to do critical thinking or 
independent thinking or abstract thinking is very very limited, and you’ve gotta 
basically feed them questions. In many cases, because of their education level or 
their background, they cannot give a clear narrative... For example, I had one, ‘Do 
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you have any pets?’ and the answer is ‘No, only one dog,’ rather than in English 
or more sophisticated education, ‘Yes, I have a dog.’ (P6) 
 
It is interesting to note that all monolingual English-speaking attorneys indicated 
that Spanish-speaking clients have less understanding of the legal system; however, 
except for one participant’s avoidance of slang or colloquialisms, they all stated, in 
response to the previous question, that they communicate with English speakers and 
Spanish speakers in the same way.  
Non-comprehension: requests for repetitions or clarifications (Question 4) 
Participants were asked, on the one hand, about the way they would characterize the 
difference in attitude of English-speaking clients vs. Spanish-speaking clients in cases 
of non-comprehension; and on the other, if they found Spanish speakers tending to ask 
for repetition or clarification spontaneously. Overwhelmingly, all participants found that 
Spanish speakers failed to ask or say when they did not understand, which is also 
consistent with the literature on cultural traits of Hispanics reviewed in chapter 2. For 
example, P1 stated, “Spanish speakers do not generally volunteer the fact that they do 
not understand what’s going on, and they don’t always show it in their faces,” and P7: 
“I believe Spanish-speaking deponents rarely ask for clarification even when they really 
don’t seem to grasp the question.” Three respondents believed that this was due to 
feelings of embarrassment, such as P6: “They’re just clueless to what’s going on and 
they’re too embarrassed to say that they don’t understand, and it’s all over their head 
and they don’t understand,” and two respondents referred to Spanish speakers feeling 
intimidated. For example, P8 stated,  
 
Spanish speakers, the clients that I’ve been dealing with, they’re much more 
intimidated by the process, much more hesitant to speak up and ask for 
clarification even when it’s apparent that I would not expect them to understand. 
English speakers tend to just say, “I don’t understand, I’m really confused.” (P8) 
 
This lack of comprehension may be evident by the answer received, as explained 
by P6: “Or many times... they will answer a question, but not the one asked. So they’ll 
give information, but they don’t ask, for example, ‘Did you see Dr. Jones last month?’ 
it’s a yes or no question, and the answer is ‘I saw him for pain in my back.’” P9 
similarly explained, “When the lawyer tells him, these are the consequences for the 
conviction of this charge, and they’re just like, ‘Oh, ok,’ it tends to be a sign that they 
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didn’t quite understand.” Attorneys also mentioned how they cope with the situation: “I 
go to great lengths to make sure they understand” (P2), “constantly I’m asking, ‘Ok did 
you understand that? Does it make sense?’” (P3), and “you have to ask them if you feel 
that they’re not understanding, and you have to help them” (P4). These three 
participants belong to the bilingual English-Spanish group. 
Claim of comprehension when the opposite is true (Question 5) 
As discussed above, some Spanish speakers tend to claim they understand what they 
hear when in fact they do not. This claim was also mentioned by some respondents in 
previous questions and now confirmed by all participants, who found that Spanish-
speaking clients will often claim to understand when they actually do not, and will also 
answer the question asked without understanding it. For example, as P8 explained, 
“Yes, they just won’t make any sense. I know many times when someone answers a 
question, they believe, they say that they understood it, and they may answer something 
completely different, off topic”; P2 stated, “They’re kind of glazed over but they say 
they understand”; and P5 explained, “So they’ll say ‘Yes, I understand,’ or they’ll 
answer the question even though they don’t understand what they’re answering.” 
In alignment with the cultural features of Hispanics described in chapter 2, 
respondents referred to feelings of embarrassment and politeness among Spanish-
speaking clients. For example, P4 explained, “Yes, sometimes they don’t understand, 
they’re more polite, no doubt about it. I think it’s an aspect of being polite. They just, 
they don’t wanna be a bother,” and P6 stated, “I think a lot of them get, they’re very 
nervous, they’re very embarrassed.” Other participants also made reference to issues of 
pride. For example, P5 stated, “I find especially within the male community they don’t 
wanna look or feel that they’re dumb or that they don’t understand. I think that they feel 
that that’s a sign of weakness.” 
Once again, attorneys mentioned their coping strategies, such as “you should go 
over certain things more than once” (P4) and “I’ll try to emphasize, it’s okay to say I 
don’t know, it’s ok to say I don’t understand” (P6). P9 elaborated,  
 
If they have me for their lawyer, they’re... and they get convicted, they are very 
likely going to federal prison, and oftentimes for a very long period of time. And 
so I have to... it’s a constant battle to make sure that they understand the 
seriousness of what’s going on, while, at the same time, maintain their trust and 
confidence. (P9) 
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Educational attainment levels of Spanish speakers and English speakers (Question 6) 
All but one respondent found English speakers to have at least a high school education 
up to two years of college, yielding an average of 13.5 years of education, while the 
average educational attainment level indicated for Spanish speakers was 6.2 years. P1 
added, “Spanish speakers will have about a sixth grade education, as that is what I 
understand is customary in Latin American countries.” These numbers are consistent 
with the literature reviewed and with interpreters’ responses. 
Interpreter interventions (Question 7) 
Participants were asked if, in their experience, interpreters may interrupt the proceeding 
to advise on a possible language or cultural issue, or to suggest that a Spanish-speaking 
client may not be understanding. Attorneys were also asked if they would welcome such 
interruptions, if any. All respondents indicated that interpreters may interrupt the 
proceedings for clarification purposes, and six found it happening more often while off 
the record and in more informal settings, which is consistent with interpreters’ 
responses. P1, for example, explained, “sometimes the interpreter is a little bit more 
sensitive to my client and can tell which words or which concepts are tripping them up. 
And they say, ‘I think I understand where they’re confused, do you mind if I try to 
straighten this out?’”, and P2 made reference to the setting: “Before we get to trial, the 
interpreters are more likely to say ‘Let me help you.’ When we’re actually on the 
record, it doesn’t always happen.” When interpreters do not take the initiative to clarify, 
sometimes attorneys invite them to do so: “Sometimes I’ll try in several ways, and I’ll 
ask the interpreter, ‘Can you help me on this, and try to explain it maybe in a different 
way or ask it in a different way?’” (P6). 
All respondents indicated they welcome interpreter interventions and find them 
helpful to promote understanding and communication. For example, P3 stated, “And so 
I do appreciate when the interpreters interrupt and say, ‘Oh, I don’t think he understood 
that’ or ‘I don’t think we’re getting through to him,’” and P9 added, “because more 
often than not it’s what’s needed to give it clarity, and the failure to do that would 
actually lead to miscommunication.” Respondents characterized these interventions as 
positive, viewing them as a sign of a good interpreter. For example, P1: “It’s 
tremendously helpful, and that’s what good interpreters have done for me, is that they 
help me get on the same page, get on the same understanding, help me understand when 
my client is not understanding me, when I am not able to discern that for myself,” P5: 
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“Actually those are the good interpreters for me. The ones that are able to stop me and 
say, ‘Listen, I don’t think your client is getting it, or may I explain it in a different 
way?,’” and P8: “And at that point they will say, ‘Interpreter clarification, I need to 
inquire as to the client’s understanding, if I may, may ask permission.’ Those are the 
better interpreters.” 
Other respondents referred to these interventions as a source of learning. P5, for 
example, explained, “I usually appreciate that, I’ve learned so much that way. I’ve 
learned so much from the interpreters, because sometimes I get caught up in my 
legalese so I don’t know how to bring it down to my client’s level, and a good 
interpreter is able to do that.”  
Three respondents characterized the interpreters’ role limitations as unfortunate 
and unhelpful for understanding: 
 
So I wish they would say it more, and I understand that they’re not supposed to be 
advocates of the people that they’re interpreting for, but if they’re trying their best 
to interpret what this client is saying and what the attorney asking the question is 
understanding, then I think that they should speak up and say, I think there’s a 
cultural difference in using that word, or I should seek further clarification to 
make sure that I really understand. (P1) 
 
Similarly, P5 conceded, “I know they’re not supposed to, unfortunately, but it 
usually helps me a lot and I’ve learned a lot from interpreters that do that,” and P10 
stated, “To say that the client is not understanding it doesn’t happen very often, not 
enough. I wish they would do it more.” 
Preferred interpreter qualities (Question 8) 
To conclude the interview, attorneys were asked about the main qualities they would 
hope to find in an interpreter who would assist them in a proceeding. In alignment with 
with previous answers, all respondents indicated that they hoped to find an interpreter 
who would alert them when there were comprehension or communication problems. For 
example, P4 stated, “I think that it’s better that there’s an interruption and a clarification 
so that the record is clear,” and P5 explained,  
 
And also someone that is not gonna be afraid to stop me and say, you know what, 
I’m sorry [Participant’s name], but you’re not explaining this correctly, he or she 
is not understanding what you’re saying. Then I appreciate that, because it 
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challenges me. Or if they know how to explain it then go ahead, do it, let me learn 
from you. Those are the qualities that I like in an interpreter. (P5) 
 
Several respondents also hoped to find an interpreter who is familiar with 
different dialects and immigrant communities, as explained by P1: “I like when the 
interpreters ask my clients at the beginning of a deposition, ‘Where are you from?’ 
Because then it makes them culturally sensitive to the language or to the dialect that the 
person speaks,” and P3: “and that they’re sensitive to the different dialects that are 
around”. References were also made to the interpreter’s role in different settings, as 
explained by P6: “you have to distinguish between the interpreter during the deposition 
and the interpreters during the preparation, ‘cause I think their roles are somewhat 
different.” 
The client’s comprehension was again presented as a main concern, as stated, for 
example, by P1: “The priority has to be our clients understanding what we’re trying to 
say and feeling connected to their attorney. They don’t feel connected, they don’t feel 
understood, they don’t feel like they have an advocate, then that puts me at a handicap.” 
Issues of language and the interpreter’s role were again mentioned, as stated by P6:  
 
And sometimes the attorneys make it difficult because they think they’re talking 
to some other lawyer or a graduate student, not someone who’s barely literate. 
And the poor interpreter, all they can do is translate these great big words, that, 
the client has no clue what they mean in Spanish. (P6) 
 
Regarding the qualities attorneys would hope not to find in an interpreter, P2, for 
example, stated, “Not [someone] just sitting there like a robot, interpreting what I say, 
but actually engaging the client so that they understand, and telling me if they think that 
the client doesn’t understand, that really helps me.” Similarly, P8 spoke in favor of 
“someone who just doesn’t turn their brain off and automatically have language going 
in their ear and words come out without being aware of the clients’ responses.” Lastly, 
P10 summarized most of the comments made in response to this last question, including 
a reference to the hand/arm issue:  
 
... if the client is not responding for cultural reasons or whatever, they’re pointing to 
the body part and saying the wrong body part for cultural reasons, I would like... I 
don’t want the interpreter to translate perfectly literally. I don’t think that’s 
necessarily a fair interpretation. I think it should be, give some sense of what she’s 
saying rather than literally, what comes out of a textbook or something. So I want 
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them to volunteer what’s going on, let’s put it that way... I think that’s really good 
if the interpreter is a little proactive and isn’t just there to translate literally 
everything regardless of whether I’ve said everything clearly or not. A little help. 
(P10) 
 
After participants had answered all the questions, they were invited to comment on 
any of the issues that were discussed during the interview. Respondents offered many 
comments that were consistent with the literature reviewed on cultural traits of 
Hispanics.  
Regarding assumptions and communication patterns, P6 explained the difficulties 
encountered when the questions asked call for specific answers: “You ask someone, 
well, what do you clean? I clean everything. What do you mean by everything? I do 
everything. Well, I don’t know what that means.” This respondent also gave several 
examples of these assumptions:  
 
For example, the women, you’ll ask them, “Have you ever been overnight in the 
hospital for any reason in your life whether it has to do with this case or not?” 
They say no. Then I’ll ask, “Where were your children born?” They’ll say “Oh, in 
the hospital.” I’ll say “Why didn’t you say that?” They say, “Oh, I thought you 
were only talking about the case.” So their ability to concentrate and focus, that if 
you give them a question or statement like that, it’s too long. They just don’t 
follow it... (P6) 
  
Four participants mentioned a frequent issue regarding Spanish speakers 
volunteering more information than requested. For example, P5 explained, “They feel 
the need to start from the beginning and not answer the questions, and they wanna 
explain everything instead of just listening to my simple instructions”; P9 stated, “And 
there is a tendency, I think, to want to explain everything, want to tell you the whole 
story, when you’re trying to simply take it step by step,” and P10 added, “When they 
have no idea what I was asking at all, and just give a story which is partially irrelevant, I 
don’t... well, it’s frustrating sometimes.” 
Four participants also mentioned issues regarding Spanish-speaking clients’ 
concept of time, dates, and numbers. For example, P6 explained, “So you have to make 
the questions real real simple because many of them, if you ask how old their children 
are, they don’t know... Many of them have no concept of time or time differences.” 
Regarding the notion of time, P8 explained, “So if you were to ask someone who may 
have developed... profound migraines ‘When was the first time you experienced this?,’ 
in addition to the sense of tenses being completely messed up, they understand it as 
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‘When did you experience this problem as you experience it now?,’” and P9 added, 
“And it does lead to miscommunication if you’re not conscious of it, because they’re 
telling you information that they now have when what you’re really asking them is what 
information did you have at this point in the past.” 
Participants also added comments regarding Spanish-speaking clients’ use and 
knowledge of terminology to denote the parts of the body. For example, P6 explained,  
 
They don’t know basic body parts, they don’t know the names in Spanish, they 
have trouble describing, for example, the word for wrist, rather than saying “I 
don’t know the name, it’s the part of the body between my hand and my elbow,” 
but that kind of sophistication is just beyond many of them. (P6)  
 
Regarding the arm/hand and the waist/low back scenarios described above, this 
participant added,  
 
But here I’ve learned over time that when anybody talks about their arm or their 
hand, or their leg, that it can have many many different meanings... And I have all 
my clients fill out a diagram showing the parts of the body, but many times they’ll 
say one word and they’ve marked a different word. For example, they’ve marked 
the hip but maybe they’re using waist or buttocks or something like that, or vice 
versa. (P6) 
 
In this regard, P6 offered the following experience: 
 
I’ll say, “Ok, what do you mean by your arm?” “I mean the whole arm.” I say “No, 
what do you mean, are you talking about the shoulder, yes or no? Upper arm?” I’m 
literally pointing to them so I say “When you explain you have to go through all 
these parts [of the arm].” They’ll say “Yeah, my arm... I’ve had people say back, 
which is espalda in Spanish, but I’ve said upper back, middle back, and lower back, 
and sometimes they have no idea what I’m talking about, then I’m using layman’s 
terms, not medical terms... And then people mix up the left side and right side, they 
say “I’m all confused.” “What are you confused about?” And then I don’t get an 
answer, something, so I can help them out. (P6) 
 
Regarding Spanish-speaking clients’ trust in the legal system, some of the 
comments received were contradictory. For example, while P4 stated, “They believe in 
you more and they trust you more than the American clients,” P5 explained, “they don’t 
trust the system as much, they don’t understand it, they don’t understand the process, 
they don’t understand why they’re there, they get very intimidated, they’re afraid. I’ve... 
sometimes they don’t even trust me and I’m the attorney.” The way Spanish-speaking 
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clients deal with the legal process was explained by P6, who also offered some 
examples:  
 
I don’t think most lawyers realize what they’re going through and especially for the 
women, when there’s psychological problems, I’ll say, “What was more difficult, 
going through this or having your baby?” and it’s amazing how many of them say 
that the deposition process was far worse than the pregnancy and the birth, which I 
wouldn’t think at all. Or, I hear again, only with the older women, I’ll say... 
“What’s more embarrassing, having to go through these women’s checkups or 
having to go through the deposition process?” and it’s amazing how many women 
will say the deposition process... I think they have trouble concentrating, they get 
flustered, they’re embarrassed, they’re worried they’re gonna say the right name, 
right thing or not. (P6) 
 
On the same subject, P8 added, “Clients who are intimidated by the process break 
down and get extremely nervous, and that locks their ability to think. It’s almost as if 
someone is going through a traumatic experience, which causes them to not be able to 
understand, or say when they don’t.” Willingness to cooperate and its legal 
consequences were mentioned earlier and now explained by P9 with a clear example:  
 
They tend to essentially give statements to the police... thinking that’s going to help 
them without appreciating that the police are really gonna use it in a way to make 
them appear guilty... even if they’ve all been advised to their Miranda rights and 
told that their statement can be used against them in a criminal proceeding... for 
instance in a drug case, “It wasn’t my drugs it was the other guy in the car’s drugs,” 
and they think if they tell the police that, the police is just gonna let them go, but 
how the police view that statement is that you just admitted that you knew there 
were drugs in the car, right? Which is now an element of the crime we have to 
prove and therefore we’re gonna use that against you. So that’s actually a fairly 
common scenario. (P9) 
 
Lastly, P8 summarized the most relevant points discussed throughout the interview 
and related them to the legal system: 
 
I feel strongly that the system that’s imposed doesn’t work. The system imposed is 
a formalized interaction with a non-native speaker. They’re being asked questions 
that we as attorneys take for granted, it is our language, and we take for granted that 
the deponent understands that language. But there are cultural nuances that shift 
between cultures of different countries. So somebody from El Salvador and Mexico 
or Argentina or France or wherever, they have a different life experience and 
educational background. And words have more formalized meanings to them, and 
they perceive it as a conversation. The consequences of a misunderstanding to the 
deponent can sometimes cost that client the case and cost them their credibility, 
because their entire believability is called into question. And the system that I work 
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in or have worked in for the last 14 years doesn’t work for non-native speakers 
without a high educational level. (P8) 
 
 
The above characterizations seem to involve some of the most frequent reasons for 
intercultural misunderstandings between attorneys and Spanish-speaking clients. Most 
of the participants attribute these problems to lack of education, and lack of familiarity 
with the legal system. Attorneys acknowledge Spanish speakers’ difficulty in 
understanding the language and the process, and they count on interpreters to help them 
work as a team, and to alert them when there are comprehension problems.  
9.2. Focus group 3  
As described in the methodology chapter, this focus group was convened with the 
purpose of soliciting feedback from lay Spanish speakers about their comprehension of 
the five Spanish sentences with original register produced by the first focus group. The 
goal was also to attempt to produce, in a group, another set of simplified-register 
Spanish sentences in order to compare them with the simplified-register Spanish 
sentences produced by the interpreters in the second focus group, mainly in terms of 
vocabulary. This section will first describe the feedback received from the group, and 
then present the comparison of both sets of sentences. 
9.2.1. Focus group 3 feedback  
Each of the five sentences was presented to the group and discussed among participants. 
They made comments regarding the terms that were unfamiliar or confusing to them, 
and made some replacements to arrive at sentences that, in their view, were easier to 
understand. 
 
Sentence 1. Si un testigo declara intencionalmente en falso en un aspecto importante de 
su testimonio, se debe desconfiar del resto de su declaración  
[A witness who is willfully false in one material aspect of his or her 
testimony is to be distrusted in others] 
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After hearing this sentence twice, participants stated that there were no 
vocabulary problems. When invited to state the meaning of the sentence in their own 
words, P2 offered the following, “Dice que, por ejemplo, si yo digo en mi declaración, 
lo que estoy diciendo... alguna palabra... estoy diciendo algo falso, toda mi declaración 
que he dado se va a tomar como completamente todo falso” (It says that, for example, if 
I state in my testimony... what I am saying... some word... I am saying something false, 
all my testimony that was given will be taken as completely everything false). It should 
be noted that the explanation offered was given from personal opinion and not based on 
the contents of the sentence, a phenomenon that would be recurring among Spanish 
speakers also in the listening comprehension test. The original version of this sentence 
was not modified. After confirming that everyone agreed on the meaning of the 
sentence and the absence of issues with the vocabulary, participants moved on to the 
next sentence.  
 
Sentence 2. Las pruebas indirectas son pruebas que, de determinarse que son 
verdaderas, prueban un hecho del cual se puede inferir la existencia de otro 
hecho  
[Circumstantial evidence is evidence that, if found to be true, proves a fact 
from which an inference of the existence of another fact may be drawn] 
 
After hearing this sentence, participants asked for a repetition. The first word 
brought up by the group was inferir (to infer, to draw from). An explanation was 
provided about the meaning, using the example from the newer version of the jury 
instructions: “For example, if there is smoke in the sky, we may think an airplane just 
flew by even if we do not see it, that is to infer.” Participants compared the term to 
deducir (to deduce) and interpretación (interpretation), and decided that deducir was 
more common and understandable. Some participants stated they had never heard the 
term inferir (infer) before, and some gave their own interpretations:  
 
Yo pensé que inferir por ejemplo, algo que fue pasado, algo que fue primero... y 
después... o sea primero esto y después esto, más o menos?... Por ejemplo, como 
dice usted esto de las pruebas que hicieron, no me acuerdo la pregunta, infiero que 
estas pruebas son verdaderas, más o menos así dijo usted, verdad? No todas las 
palabras verdad, pero yo pensé que inferir era primero las pruebas que puso y 
después estas pruebas, o sea algo que algo que pasó antes (I thought that to infer, 
for example, something that was past, something that was first... and then... I 
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mean first this and then this, more or less... For example, like you say this about 
the evidence they made, I don’t remember the question, I infer this evidence is 
true, more or less that’s what you said, right? Not all the words, right, but I 
thought that to infer was first the evidence he presented and then this evidence, I 
mean something that happened before). (P3) 
 
After the group agreed to change inferir to deducir, the new sentence was read. 
Participants then discussed the meaning of pruebas indirectas (circumstantial evidence), 
and offered, “Las pruebas indirectas... indirectas no es algo... o sea una indirecta es 
algo... estoy diciendo como una mentira...” (Circumstantial evidence... indirectas isn’t 
something... I mean an indirecta is something... like I’m telling a lie). After asking the 
group what the word indirectas meant to them, the general answer was, “Que no es 
directamente a la persona” (That is not directly to the person). It was clear that 
participants were applying the meaning of the Spanish noun indirecta known to them. 
In Spanish, the noun indirecta means a “statement or means used to not represent 
something explicitly or clearly and, nevertheless, imply it” (DRAE, my translation), 
similar to an insinuation, or a hint. The difference in meanings between an indirecta and 
circumstantial (indirect) evidence was clarified, together with the different kinds of 
evidence in court, direct and circumstantial (indirect) evidence, and the example of the 
smoke and the airplane was repeated. This explanation produced the following 
feedback:  
 
Suena como si pasó un accidente, nadie supo, encontraron una persona, vienen los 
detectives, deducen qué es lo que pasó, no sé qué palabra usó, y van y dicen, pasó 
esto y esto y esto entonces ellos de ahí... ¿cuál era la otra palabra? Deducen qué 
fue lo que pasó Indirecto, porque no lo vieron lo que pasó no vieron exactamente 
pero deducen oh pasó esto, y de ahí toman la decisión si fue el hecho como 
dijeron, o no, ya me confundí (It sounds like there was an accident, nobody knew, 
they found a person, the detectives come, deduce what happened, I don’t know 
what word you used, and they go and say, this and this and this happened, and 
then from there they.. what was the other word? They deduce what happened, 
because they didn’t see what happened exactly but they deduce oh this happened, 
and there they make the decision if it was the fact like they said, or not, I am 
already confused). (P4) 
 
Participant 5 agreed: “O sea que como dice ella, si hay un accidente y llega la 
policía ellos deducen lo que pasó por lo que miran* pero no vieron la... no tienen la 
prueba” (I mean, like she says, if there is an accident and the police come they deduce 
what happened based on what they look* [see] but they did not see the... they don’t 
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have the evidence). This participant is using the verb mirar (to look) instead of the verb 
ver (to see), which is consistent with the literature reviewed in Chapter 2 regarding the 
Spanish language use in California. Participants were then asked how the sentence 
could be made easier to understand, and the group agreed with P3: 
 
Lo indirecto no está claro, porque las personas se quedan pensando cuál es la 
prueba indirecta y cuál es la directa, entonces así como nosotros estamos aquí 
también hay personas que no van a saber qué es lo que quiere decir, entonces 
tendrían que usar otra palabra para explicarle a las personas (The “indirecto” is 
not clear, because people keep thinking which is the circumstantial and which is 
the direct evidence, so the same way we are here there are people who will not 
know what it means, so they should use another word to explain it to people). (P3) 
 
The group then asked to hear the sentence again in sections to address each 
unfamiliar term or expression individually. When asked why the sentence was so 
difficult to understand, P3 replied, “Para mí [es claro] porque lo explicó pero no por la 
oración” (To me [it’s clear] because you explained it but not from the sentence), and 
“Porque hay frases que no escuchamos muy a menudo, por ejemplo inferir y la 
palabra... de un hecho a otro hecho... esa parte es complicada” (Because there are 
expressions we do not hear very often, for example inferir and the word... from a fact to 
another fact... that part is complicated).  
After reading the new sentence and asking the group to try to explain the meaning 
of circumstantial evidence, P2 explained, “La prueba indirecta es como se deduce que 
pasó eso por la prueba que estamos viendo” (Circumstantial evidence is how we deduce 
that that happened because of the evidence we are seeing), and P4 offered, 
 
Que si se resuelve el caso, si se resuelve el hecho que hubo, entonces ya... o sea 
ya es directa, se convertiría en directa, porque nomás se hablaba de vamos a decir 
una suposición, se suponía que era así, tratando yo de explicarlo es como más o 
menos como lo vi, pero no va a ser hasta que se compruebe de que así fue” (That 
if the case is resolved, if the fact that was is resolved, then... I mean it’s already 
direct, it will become direct, because we were only talking about let’s say a 
supposition, we supposed it was so, I am trying to explain it it’s more or less how 
I saw it, but it will not be until it is proven that it was so). (P4) 
 
In a similar sense, P1 explained, “Se imagina que eso pasó porque la prueba 
directa lo está como señalando” (You imagine that happened because the direct 
evidence is like indicating/pointing it out). The group then discussed the difficulty of the 
sentence, with comments such as the following: “Porque es una pregunta muy larga, por 
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eso es que le dije que me leyera renglón por renglón. Si hicieran una pregunta más corta 
con las palabras usuales o comunes, sí se entendería, como la primera pregunta que 
usted que nos hizo” (Because it is a very long question, that is why I told you to read me 
line by line. If they asked a shorter question with the usual or common words, it would 
be understood, like the first question you asked us) (P2), “Están usando como 
vocabulario que no lo usamos diariamente, más común” (They are using vocabulary we 
do not use daily, more common) (P1), and “Así como está, no [se entiende]. La primera 
sí, esta no” (The way it is, it is not [understandable]. The first one is, this one’s not) 
(P4). 
The group agreed to change de determinarse (if found) to si se determina (if it is 
found) and la existencia (the existence) to que existe (that there exists). Discussion 
about this sentence concluded when the participants determined that without finding 
another word to replace indirectas (circumstantial), comprehension would not be 
achieved.  
 
Last version: Las pruebas indirectas son pruebas que, si se determina que son 
verdaderas, prueban un hecho del cual se puede deducir que existe otro 
hecho  
[Circumstantial evidence is evidence that, if it is found to be true, proves 
a fact from which it can be deduced that another fact exists] 
 
Sentence 3. “Preponderancia de la prueba” se refiere a la prueba que tiene más fuerza de 
convicción que la prueba contraria  
[“Preponderance of the evidence” means evidence that has more 
convincing force than that opposed to it] 
 
The first word that was unknown to the group was preponderancia. An 
explanation of the meaning was offered, and the following comments ensued: “¿Tiene 
más peso?” (It has more weight?) (P3), “La que gana” (The one that wins) (P1), “Que 
pesa más que otra” (That weighs more than another) (P2), and “Es más poderosa” (It’s 
more powerful) (P5).  
The next term discussed by the group was convicción (conviction), and 
participants expressed their understanding of the term, as formulated by P2: “Como yo 
lo entiendo convicción es algo que yo hice, por ejemplo, algo que quiero hacer con 
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convicción, o sea, cómo le explico... ” (As I understand it convicción is something that I 
did, for example, something I want to do with conviction, I mean, how can I explain 
it...). After I provided an explanation, the meaning was expressed in the following 
terms: “Porque la segunda persona que llega y trae algo que demuestra que él no lo hizo 
entonces la otra persona está... la balanza se va en contra” (Because the second person 
who comes and brings something that shows he didn’t do it then the other person is... 
the scale tips the other way) (P4), and “Estoy buscándole otra palabra más fácil en lugar 
de peso porque como dice él, porque peso está bien, pero como dice.. la prueba más 
fuerte es la que tiene fuerza de convicción sobre la otra” (I am looking for another 
easier word instead of weight because like he says, because weight is fine, but like he 
says... the stronger evidence is the one that has convincing force over the other) (P1). 
After another explanation and further discussion, the group agreed that fuerza de 
convicción (convincing force) meant “Que convence más que la otra” (That [it] 
convinces more than the other) (P3), “O sea que esta prueba es más fuerte que esta” 
(That means this evidence is stronger than this one) (P5), and “Esta prueba es más... 
convence... más creíble que la otra” (This evidence is more... convinces... more 
believable than the other) (P1). After this discussion, the group agreed to change the 
word preponderancia to peso (weight) and que tiene más fuerza de convicción (that has 
more convincing force) to que es más creíble (that is more believable).  
 
Final version: La fuerza de la prueba se refiere a la prueba que es más creíble que la 
prueba contraria  
[The strength of the evidence refers to evidence that is more believable 
than that opposed to it] 
 
Sentence 4. El acusado además alega que a él le pareció que su abogado le había 
divulgado información confidencial a su colega en el caso antes de que se 
separara el caso, y eso lo llevó a declararse culpable  
[The defendant further alleges that it was his perception that his attorney 
had disclosed privileged information to co-counsel, before the case was 
severed, that later led him to enter into a guilty plea] 
 
After reading the sentence and inquiring about comprehension or vocabulary 
issues, participants claimed to understand and explained parts of the sentence, “Le dio 
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información confidencial antes de que se llevara el caso” (He gave confidential 
information before taking the case) (P2), and “De un abogado a otro abogado se dieron 
información confidencial y es por eso que este se declaró culpable, porque el abogado le 
dio información al otro antes que se separara el caso” (From one attorney to another 
attorney they exchanged confidential information and that is why this one pled guilty, 
because the attorney gave information to the other one before the case was severed) 
(P4). Participants were then asked if they were familiar with the term alega (alleges), 
and the following comments were offered: “¿Como que está en discusión, están 
discutiendo más o menos?” (Like it’s being argued about, they are arguing more or 
less?) (P1), “Posiblemente es como defensa, buscando defensa” (Possibly it’s like 
defense, looking for defense) (P3), “Como pelear” (Like fighting) (P4), and “Para 
nosotros alegar es como discutir” (For us allege is like arguing) (P5). The term was 
explained and the meaning was clarified. 
After reading the sentence again and receiving confirmation from the group that 
everyone had understood it, participants were asked about the meaning of divulgar 
(disclose) and the following comments were offered: “Yo soy de El Salvador, en El 
Salvador divulgar es que uno ande difamando a otro, que ande hablando mal de otra 
persona, eso es divulgar en mi país” (I am from El Salvador, in El Salvador to disclose 
means that one is slandering someone else, that one is badmouthing someone else, that 
is to disclose in my country) (P2), “En México igual, poner los trapitos al sol” (In 
Mexico it’s the same, to wash dirty linen in public) (P3), “Que ella robó, que ella esto, 
que está casada, esto y lo otro... anda divulgando en el vecindario anda divulgando a las 
personas” (That she stole, that she this, that she is married, this and that... she is 
badmouthing in the neighborhood, is badmouthing people) (P4), and “Porque está 
hablando de esa persona, como chismes” (Because [pronoun] is talking about that 
person, like gossip) (P5). The term was then discussed and the meaning clarified. The 
group agreed to change alega (alleges) to dice (says) and divulgado (disclosed) to dio 
(gave).  
 
Last version: El acusado además dice que a él le pareció que su abogado le dio 
información confidencial a su colega en el caso antes de que se separara 
el caso, y eso lo llevó a declararse culpable  
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[The defendant further says that it was his perception that his attorney 
gave privileged information to co-counsel, before the case was severed, 
that later led him to enter into a guilty plea] 
 
Sentence 5. Ya que la explicación del acusado en cuanto al comportamiento de las 
partes no está corroborada por la declaración jurada de ningún testigo, no 
alcanza a ser una prueba clara y convincente  
[Since the defendant’s explanation as to the behavior of the parties is not 
supported by the sworn statement of any witnesses, it scarcely rises to the 
level of clear and convincing evidence]  
 
After reading the sentence and inviting comments, the first word the group did not 
understand was corroborar (to corroborate), and the next term discussed by the group 
was convincente (convincing). Participants offered the following comments, “Es como 
convencer a esa persona que no cree muy fácil” (It’s like convincing that person who 
does not believe very easily) (P3), and “No parece estar muy seguro de lo que está 
diciendo, entonces no me convence” ([Pronoun] doesn’t seem to be very sure of what 
he is saying, so [pronoun] doesn’t convince me) (P6). The group agreed to change 
corroborar (corroborate) to confirmar (confirm) and convincente (convincing) to que 
convenza (that convinces). The new sentence was read, and participants were asked if it 
was now comprehensible and were invited to try to explain the meaning. The following 
comment was offered, “Quiere decir que las partes no están corroboradas” (It means 
that the parties are not corroborated). Participants were then asked who they believed 
the parties were, and Participant 5 responded, 
 
 Las partes es por ejemplo una pregunta antes dijimos un abogado le dijo a otro 
abogado información confidencial del caso del acusado, entonces esta pregunta 
viene a ser el seguimiento de eso digamos, por ejemplo los testigos no supieron si 
este abogado le pasó información al otro abogado, si es cierto o no es cierto, yo 
así es como lo tomé (The parties is for example a question earlier we said an 
attorney told the other attorney confidential information about the defendant’s 
case, then this question is like the follow-up of that, say, for example the witnesses 
didn’t know if this attorney gave information to the other attorney, if it’s true or 
not true, that is the way I took it). (P5) 
 
After explaining that there was no connection among the five sentences, 
participants stated that the parties were then “El acusado y la otra persona” (The 
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defendant and the other person) (P1), “¿Las personas involucradas en el caso?” (The 
people involved in the case?) (P3), and “Está hablando de todas las partes, la que acusa 
y la acusada” (He is talking about all the parties, the accuser and the accused) (P4). 
Participants then agreed that adding involved in the case made the sentence easier to 
understand, but P3 replied, “Las partes involucradas, las partes del caso, pero si no 
sabemos lo que son... ” (The parties involved, the parties in the case, but if we don’t 
know what they are...), and P5 offered, “Dice las partes involucradas, cuando dice el 
nombre, por ejemplo Juan y Pedro son las partes acusadas, o Pedro está acusando a 
Juan, esas son dos partes, la negativa y la positiva” (It says the parties involved, when it 
says the name, for example John and Peter are the accused parties, or Peter is accusing 
John, those are the two parties, the negative and the positive).  
Participants agreed to change las partes (the parties) to las partes involucradas 
en el caso (the parties involved in the case). The new sentence was read, and after 
confirming that the meaning was clear to participants and asking if anyone could repeat 
the sentence in their own words, P3 commented, “- Eh... como no estuvieron los testigos 
no lo puede acusar al... que no pudieron convencer así que no hay pruebas” (Er... as the 
witnesses were not there he cannot accuse... that they couldn’t convince so there is no 
evidence). Since it was clear that the sentence had not been entirely understood, the 
meaning was explained again, taking each vocabulary item individually to try to find 
out if there were other confusing terms. Participants were asked about the meaning of en 
cuanto a (regarding), and responses varied, “¿Cómo se comportó?” (How he behaved?) 
(P6) and “¿A causa de?” (because of?) (P1). Following an explanation of the term, P2 
offered, “La acusación del comportamiento del acusado no es convincente para ellos, no 
los convence de que así fue el caso, tal vez titubea o está nervioso, o algo así, que 
demuestra que no se le puede creer, no es convincente” (The accusation of the 
defendant’s behavior is not convincing to them, it doesn’t convince them that that was 
the case, maybe he hesitates or is nervous, or something like that, that shows he cannot 
be believed, he is not convincing), to which P5 replied, “No, está hablando de que a 
causa del comportamiento de los abogados” (No, it’s talking about, that because of the 
attorneys’ behavior). Participants were then asked whose behavior the sentence was 
discussing, to which P1 replied, “Del acusado” (The defendant’s), and P4 answered, 
“De las partes” (The parties’). The sentence was explained again, making sure all terms 
were clear to the participants, who agreed to change en cuanto a (regarding) to sobre 
(about). The new sentence was read twice at participants’ request, and after confirming 
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that the meaning was clear and asking if anyone could repeat the sentence in their own 
words, silence ensued. Although the sentence had been rephrased using the new terms 
offered by the group, participants were not able to reproduce the sentence in their own 
words or in the original words. The exercise ended with comments by P2: “Lo podrían 
hacer más pequeño” (They could make it smaller [shorter]). After I pointed out that 
attorneys and judges used these words to talk, P5 remarked, “... para confundir al 
acusado” (To confuse the defendant). 
 
Last version: Ya que la explicación del acusado sobre el comportamiento de las partes 
involucradas en el caso no está confirmada por la declaración jurada de 
ningún testigo, no alcanza a ser una prueba clara que convenza  
[Since the defendant’s explanation about the behavior of the parties 
involved in the case is not confirmed by the sworn statement of any 
witnesses, it scarcely rises to the level of clear evidence that convinces]  
 
Although participants were rather reluctant to comment at first, they soon felt 
more comfortable and started offering comments with openness, cordiality, and humor, 
and the final comment was “we are learning.” While everyone participated and felt at 
ease, the group would again fall silent each time they were asked to repeat or explain 
the simplified sentences. Even though at the end of the simplification process for each 
sentence the group would claim to understand, on very few occasions were participants 
able to express the main idea, albeit in a very different way than it was originally 
expressed. Also, despite the general claim of comprehension after the simplification 
process, new questions to the group, for instance regarding the meaning of en cuanto a 
(regarding), alegar (allege), or divulgar (disclose), which were terms not flagged by 
participants as unfamiliar, would show that, contrary to what participants claimed, 
comprehension was in fact not achieved. This claim of comprehension in cases where 
the opposite was true had also been a prominent issue in the interpreters’ and attorneys’ 
interviews. Moreover, despite the general comprehension claim, some of the versions 
offered by the group when invited to repeat or explain the sentences, were outright 
nonsensical, issuing instead in unrelated additions, sentences connected with previous 
ones, or words mixed from previous sentences. As will be seen, most of these deviations 
were also observed in the listening comprehension test (see Section 9.3.). There, as in 
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this focus group, participants were apologetic and embarrassed to admit when they did 
not understand or know the meaning of a word.  
9.2.2. Comparison of sentences produced by focus group 2 and focus group 3 
The following is a comparison between the simplified-register sentences produced by 
focus group 2 (FG 2) and the sentences produced by focus group 3 (FG 3). Each of the 
following tables shows four versions of each sentence: the original English version for 
reference, the Spanish sentence produced by focus group 1 (FG 1) with original register, 
the Spanish version produced by FG 2 with simplified register, and the Spanish 
sentence produced by FG 3, also with simplified register. All changes made by focus 
group 2 and focus group 3 are underlined for comparison purposes. 
  




Original A witness who is willfully false in one material aspect of his or her testimony is to be 
distrusted in others 
FG 1 Si un testigo declara intencionalmente en falso en un aspecto importante de su testimonio, se 
debe desconfiar del resto de su declaración.  
FG 2 Si un testigo miente en una parte importante de su testimonio, no tienen por qué creer el resto 
de su declaración (If a witness lies in one material aspect of his or her testimony, there is no 
reason for you to believe the rest of his or her statement/testimony) 
FG 3 Unmodified 
 
This first exercise was the hardest for FG 3 as participants were rather reluctant 
to be heard or admit openly that they did not understand. Also, this is not a very difficult 
sentence and the terminology is not very technical. If Spanish speakers hear and 
understand a series of four terms, they will get the basic meaning: declara (declares), 
falso (false), aspecto importante (material aspect), debe desconfiar (is to be distrusted). 
This sentence was not modified by FG 3. 
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Original Circumstantial evidence is evidence that, if found to be true, proves a fact from which an 
inference of the existence of another fact may be drawn 
FG 1 Las pruebas indirectas son pruebas que, de determinarse que son verdaderas, prueban un 
hecho del cual se puede inferir la existencia de otro hecho 
FG 2 Las pruebas indirectas son pruebas que, si se decide que son verdaderas, demuestran un hecho 
del cual se puede deducir la existencia de otro hecho (Circumstantial evidence is evidence 
that, if it is decided they are true, they prove a fact from which the existence of another fact 
can be deduced) 
FG 3 Las pruebas indirectas son pruebas que, si se determina que son verdaderas, prueban un hecho 
del cual se puede deducir que existe otro hecho (Circumstantial evidence is evidence that, if it 
is found to be true, proves a fact from which it can be deduced that another fact exists) 
 
Although FG 2 and FG 3 used different terms (decide and determina), both 
made the same change in the verb phrase: de determinarse (if found/determined) to si se 
decide (if it is found/decided) and si se determina (if it is found/determined). Both 
groups changed inferir (infer) to deducir (deduce). FG 3 made an additional 
transposition: la existencia (the existence) to que existe (that there exists). 
 




Original “Preponderance of the evidence” means evidence that has more convincing force than that 
opposed to it 
FG 1 “Preponderancia de la prueba” se refiere a la prueba que tiene más fuerza de convicción que 
la prueba contraria 
FG 2 La prueba que tiene más peso es la prueba que es más convincente que la prueba que 
demuestra lo contrario (The evidence that has more weight is the evidence that is more 
convincing than the evidence that proves the opposite) 
FG 3 La fuerza de la prueba se refiere a la prueba que es más creíble que la prueba contraria (The 
strength of the evidence refers to evidence that is more believable than that opposed to it) 
 
Even though FG 2 and FG 3 made very different choices, both groups made 
changes to the same two items: preponderancia (preponderance) and fuerza de 
convicción (convincing force). The term preponderancia was replaced by la prueba que 
tiene más peso (the evidence that has more weight) by FG 2 and by la fuerza de la 
prueba (the strength of the evidence) by FG 3. The phrase que tiene más fuerza de 
convicción (that has more convincing force) was replaced by que es más convincente 
(that is more convincing) by FG 2 and by que es más creíble (that is more believable) 
by FG 3. FG 2 made an additional change: que la prueba contraria (than that opposed 
to it) was replaced by la prueba que demuestra lo contrario (evidence that proves the 
opposite). Although interpreters in FG 2 were able to identify the most difficult areas, 
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they used the term convincente (convincing), which was identified by FG 3 as a difficult 
term and replaced. 
 




Original The defendant further alleges that it was his perception that his attorney had disclosed 
privileged information to co-counsel, before the case was severed, that later led him to enter 
into a guilty plea 
FG 1 El acusado además alega que a él le pareció que su abogado le había divulgado información 
confidencial a su colega en el caso antes de que se separara el caso, y eso lo llevó a declararse 
culpable 
FG 2 El acusado además dice que a él le pareció que su abogado le había dado información 
confidencial a su colega en el caso antes de que se separaran las causas, y por eso se declaró 
culpable (The defendant also says that he believed his attorney had given confidential 
information to his colleague in the case before the cases were severed, and that is why he 
pled guilty) 
FG 3 El acusado además dice que a él le pareció que su abogado le dio información confidencial a 
su colega en el caso antes de que se separara el caso, y eso lo llevó a declararse culpable (The 
defendant further says that it was his perception that his attorney gave privileged information 
to co-counsel, before the case was severed, that later led him to enter into a guilty plea) 
 
In this sentence, both FG 2 and FG 3 replaced the verb alegar (allege) by decir 
(say), and the verb divulgar (disclose) by dar (give), although with a different verb 
tense in the latter: past perfect for FG 2 and simple past for FG 3. FG 2 proposed 
another change, replacing y eso lo llevó (that later led him to) with y por eso (and that is 
why) to lower the register. 
 
Table 10. FG 2 & FG 3 Comparison - Sentence 5 
 
 
Original  Since the defendant’s explanation as to the behavior of the parties is not supported by the 
sworn statement of any witnesses, it scarcely rises to the level of clear and convincing 
evidence 
FG 1 Ya que la explicación del acusado en cuanto al comportamiento de las partes no está 
corroborada por la declaración jurada de ningún testigo, no alcanza a ser una prueba clara y 
convincente 
FG 2 La explicación del acusado sobre el comportamiento de las partes no llega a ser una prueba 
clara y convincente porque no está corroborada por la declaración jurada de ningún testigo 
(The defendant’s explanation about the behavior of the parties scarcely rises to the level of 
clear and convincing evidence because it is not supported by the sworn statement of any 
witness. Sentence inversion) 
FG 3 Ya que la explicación del acusado sobre el comportamiento de las partes involucradas en el 
caso no está confirmada por la declaración jurada de ningún testigo, no alcanza a ser una 
prueba clara que convenza (Since the defendant’s explanation about the behavior of the 
parties involved in the case is not confirmed by the sworn statement of any witnesses, it 
scarcely rises to the level of clear evidence that convinces)  
 
In this sentence, FG 2 successfully inverted the order of the clauses to facilitate 
comprehension. This change was thought out and well executed by professional 
interpreters, while it would seem to be a harder task for the Spanish speakers in FG 3. 
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Both groups changed en cuanto a (regarding) to sobre (about), and each offered one 
additional change. FG 2 replaced no alcanza a ser (scarcely rises) to no llega a ser 
(scarcely rises), and FG 3 considered it was necessary to change las partes (the parties) 
to las partes involucradas en el caso (the parties involved in the case) for clarification. 
Lastly, FG 3 changed corroborada (corroborated) to confirmada (confirmed), and 
transposed convincente (convincing) to que convenza (that convinces). Both of these 
last terms were discussed in FG 2, but participants believed they would be understood 
by lay Spanish speakers. FG 3, however, believed differently.  
In summary, except for one register simplification and the sentence inversion 
made only by FG 2, Spanish speakers in FG 3 made several other changes to terms and 
expressions that interpreters in FG 2 did not consider problematic in terms of 
comprehension.  
9.3. Listening comprehension test  
As explained in the methodology chapter, this experiment aimed to test the equal 
footing claim from the code and the literature in terms of equal access to language, in 
other words, equal comprehension by English speakers and Spanish speakers. The first 
purpose of this test was to determine and compare the comprehension levels of English 
speakers and Spanish speakers using sentences with equal registers and, drawing on 
previous studies that had already shown that register simplification leads to better 
comprehensibility for English-speaking users of legal language (see 5.2.1 above), to 
determine if register simplification would result in a significant difference in 
comprehension by Spanish speakers as well. In alignment with the view that register 
simplification may be perceived as lack of impartiality, the study also aimed to test 
whether or not comprehension could be enhanced without providing explanations or 
extra information, in other words, by maintaining impartiality according to the 
standards. This test is based on the listening comprehension exercise done in the pilot 
study with a few adjustments as detailed in the methodology section, mostly in terms of 
shortening the sentences to reduce the intensity of the test.  
The following tables depict the points assigned to each participant for each 
response. As explained in the methodology section, the borderline cases were discussed 
with two psychologists, one of whom is also an attorney, to assign the final scores. The 
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last total column shows individual levels of comprehension for each of the participants, 
and the last total line shows the levels of comprehension for each of the questions. 
 
Table 11. Main study - English speakers total results 
 Question 1 Question 2 Question 3 Question 4 Question 5 Total 
Participant 1 2 2 1 1 0 60% 
Participant 2 2 2 2 2 2 100% 
Participant 3 2 2 0 1 2 70% 
Participant 4 2 1 0 1 2 60% 
Participant 5 2 1 1 0 0 40% 
Participant 6 2 0 1 2 2 70% 
Participant 7 2 0 0 0 2 40% 
Participant 8 2 2 2 0 1 70% 
Participant 9 2 0 0 0 1 30% 
Participant 10 1 2 1 1 0 50% 
Total 19 = 95% 12 = 60% 8 = 40% 8 = 40% 12 = 60 % 59% 
 
The first question seems to have yielded the highest scores, and one of the 
participants received a perfect score. While the lowest comprehension level achieved by 
a participant was 30 percent, none of the participants scored 0 percent. The total 
aggregate results indicated that the general level of comprehension of the whole group 
of English speakers was 59 percent.  
 
Table 12. Main study - Spanish speakers group 1 (original register) total results 
 Question 1 Question 2 Question 3 Question 4 Question 5 Total 
Participant 11 0 0 0 1 0 10% 
Participant 12 0 0 0 0 0 0% 
Participant 13 0 0 0 0 0 0% 
Participant 14 0 0 0 0 0 0% 
Participant 15 0 0 0 0 0 0% 
Participant 16 2 0 0 0 0 20% 
Participant 17 0 0 0 0 0 0% 
Participant 18 0 0 0 0 0 0% 
Participant 19 0 0 0 0 0 0% 
Participant 20 0 0 0 0 0 0% 
Total 10% 0% 0% 5% 0% 3% 
 
As evident from Table 12, the scores are extremely low, with only two 
participants showing some comprehension level in only two of the questions, and most 
of the participants scoring 0 percent. The total aggregate results indicate that the average 
level of comprehension of this whole group of Spanish speakers was 3 percent.  
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Table 13. Main study - Spanish speakers group 2 (simplified register) total results 
 
 Question 1 Question 2 Question 3 Question 4 Question 5 Total 
Participant 21 1 1 0 0 0 20% 
Participant 22 2 0 0 1 0 30% 
Participant 23 2 1 0 0 2 50% 
Participant 24 2 1 0 0 2 50% 
Participant 25 2 0 0 0 0 20% 
Participant 26 2 1 1 0 0 40% 
Participant 27 2 1 0 0 0 30% 
Participant 28 2 1 0 1 0 40% 
Participant 29 2 1 0 1 1 50% 
Participant 30 2 1 0 1 0 40% 
Total 19 = 95% 8 = 40% 1 = 5% 4 = 20% 5 = 25% 37% 
 
As seen in Table 13, the first question yielded the highest scores, though none of 
the participants received a perfect score. While the lowest comprehension level 
achieved by an individual participant was 20 percent, none of the participants scored 0 
percent. The total aggregate results indicate that the average level of comprehension of 
this whole group of Spanish speakers was 37 percent.  
 
Table 14. Main study - Listening comprehension test - Total results combined 
  
  
Group 1 - English speakers - original register 
 
59 % 
Group 2 - Spanish speakers - original register 
 
3 % 




The test results indicate that while the average level of comprehension of 
English speakers was 59 percent—coincidentally, the same value found by Charrow and 
Charrow (1979)—the first group of Spanish speakers scored only 3 percent, and the 
second group of Spanish speakers scored 37 percent. While the English speakers’ scores 
were not ideal, they were nearly twenty times as high as the scores of the first group of 
Spanish speakers (equal register), and much higher than those of the second group of 
Spanish speakers (simplified register). Although this test was designed to measure only 
approximate levels of comprehension, the responses offered by participants reveal other 
elements that deserve attention since they complement the literature reviewed on the 
educational and cultural aspects of Hispanics in California, and show significant 
differences with the English speakers. 
A common phenomenon observed in all tests was participants constructing non-
responsive answers by incorporating some of the terms heard in the sentence. Although 
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this happened in all groups, there were some important differences among them. In the 
case of English speakers, although some of the answers were incorrect, none of them 
were irrelevant or nonsensical. For example, P4 in Q3 responded, “Circumstantial 
evidence proves that there is an inference to be drawn,” and P9 in Q2 answered, 
“Something that is proven evidence that is shown to the court.” In other cases, some 
words from the original sentence were replaced by other words that sounded similar, for 
example P6 in Q2, “It’s the one that has... I would say more convincing form,” 
replacing the original force by form, and P5 in Q4, “The defendant alleges that his 
lawyer talked to other counsel because the -the case was dismissed,” when in fact 
counsel disclosed information before the case was severed, and not because.  
Spanish speakers also constructed answers with some of the words heard in the 
sentence, such as P21 in Q4, “El acusado dice que le dio información er confidencial 
antes que -antes que separara de su colega” (The defendant says that [Pronoun] gave, 
uh, confidential information before -before separating from his colleague), when the 
question stated that counsel had disclosed information before the case was severed. In a 
few cases, Spanish speakers also replaced the original words by other actual words that 
sounded similar, such as P27 in Q5, “Porque no está bien eh... elaborada” (Because it is 
not well, er... elaborated) replacing corroborada (corroborated) by elaborada 
(elaborated). However, unlike English speakers, many Spanish speakers offered answers 
with utmost conviction in nonsensical sentences or fragments, even using non-words 
that sounded similar to the words heard. The term preponderancia (preponderance), for 
example, appeared in question 2 of the first group of Spanish speakers (original 
register), and this question received four answers with non-words to replace the term: 
prepolderancia*, prepodancia*, proderancia*, and pronderancia*. For example, 
Participant 18 in Q2 attempted a full (incorrect) definition of the non-word 
prepolderancia*: 
 
Ah pues la palabra prepolderancia* para mí viene siendo como -como que -o sea 
que me están -cómo le dijera la palabra... que me están acusando o sea me están 
haciendo algo... que no es correcto con este... más... cómo le dijera usted... no se 
me viene a la mente cómo es la palabra que usamos nosotros... Algo como como 
que están -como que me quieren como - cómo es la palabra -decirle que me están 
poniendo en el mismo lugar, con -con -cómo le dicen la palabra... alevosía (Ah 
well the word prepolderance* for me would be like -like -I mean, they’re -what’s 
the word I could use here... that they are accusing me I mean they are doing 
something to me... that is not correct with er... now how can I say this... it doesn’t 
come to mind what the word is that we use... Something like, like they are -like 
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they want me to, like -what is the word -tell you that they are putting me in the 
same place, with -with -what is the word... malice aforethought).(P18) 
 
Another example of non-words used in place of the original term was related to the 
word corroborada (corroborated), which appeared in question 5 of both groups, and 
received responses including the words coloborando* and corraborada*. For example, 
P21 responded, “Porque no está coloborando* y no este... no está coloborando* y no es 
convincente” (Because [Pronoun] is not colloborating* and not er... is not 
colloborating* and it is not convincing). In this regard, it is worth mentioning that most 
English speakers asked for repetitions and many complained about not getting them, but 
almost none of the Spanish speakers did.  
Lexical items and meanings used to construct answers were also taken from 
previous sentences. For example, in question 3 regarding circumstantial evidence, P28 
responded, “La que tiene más peso?” (The one that has more weight?), which is the 
answer corresponding to preponderance. Also in question 3, P19 responded, “Este... 
pues es como juzgar mal y también quedar callado” (Er... well it’s like misjudging and 
also remaining silent), repeating “remaining silent” from the answer offered in response 
to question 1.  
As in FG 3 with lay Spanish speakers, in question 3 several participants 
attempted to give a definition of circumstantial evidence (pruebas indirectas) by 
defining what is known in Spanish as an indirecta, as described above. For example, 
Participant 18 stated, “Las indirectas para mí son las que le hacen a uno, que le están 
poniendo pruebas que no son correctas, verdad? O sea, es es indirecto, que no es algo 
que es falso” (The circumstantial ones [indirect] to me is the kind that is done to one, 
like when they are showing evidence that is not correct, right? That is, it’s, it’s 
circumstantial [indirect], that it’s not something that is false), and Participant 22 
proposed, “Las pruebas indirectas es que le están preguntando como... con otra persona, 
no están preguntándole al... no están agarrando pruebas suficientes para ver si no hay 
otro medio, otra manera u otra persona que está juntando pruebas” (Circumstantial 
evidence is that they are asking him like -with another person, they are not asking... 
they are not getting enough evidence to see if there might be other means, another way 
or another person who is gathering evidence). 
 As explained in the methodology section, it proved very difficult for Spanish 
speakers to understand that the response that was expected had to be related to the 
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sentence and not to their personal opinion or experience. No English speaker answered 
questions from personal opinion or involved their feelings in the answers. Spanish 
speakers’ answers, on the contrary, contained both. The first question for the first group 
of Spanish speakers seemed to have elicited the most personal responses because it 
asked what they (as jurors) should do in a specific situation, that is, if a witness was 
willfully false in a material aspect of the testimony. Although the instructions stated that 
the question was addressed to jurors, Spanish speakers’ lack of familiarity with the 
process prevented them from stepping into that role. The correct answer should have 
made reference to the action provided in the sentence: the witness is to be distrusted in 
other aspects of his testimony. Instead of relating the answer to the sentence presented, 
several Spanish speakers responded by saying what they believed should be done, such 
as P18: “Entonces lo que tendría yo que hacer es este que... pedir más explicación, por 
qué razón me está -está haciendo eso” (Then what I would have to do is, er, to... to ask 
for more explanation, why is -is [Pronoun] doing that to me); P11: “Pues si yo sé la 
verdad, eh... la digo, eh... y también -también le digo a la corte que él está diciendo -que 
está diciendo información falsa” (Well if I know the truth, er... I say it, er... and also -I 
also tell the court that he is saying -that he is saying false information), and P13: “Pues 
si yo fuera el testigo, pues decir la verdad. Sea buena o sea mala pero siempre con la 
verdad enfrente” (Well if I were the witness, well, tell the truth. Whether good or bad 
but always with the truth up front).  
 Spanish speakers’ answers also contained value judgments and personal beliefs, 
such as P20 in Q1: “Es malo dar una una información falsa y yo pienso que... que esa 
persona no merece estar ahí en la corte” (It is bad to give false information and I think 
that... that person does not deserve to be there in court), and P11 in Q4: “Que este... 
eh... su abogado no lo defendió como debió de haber hecho, porque eh... porque le dio 
información al otro -al abogado, al otro abogado que no debía de haber hecho” (That 
er... er... his attorney didn’t defend him as he should have done, because er... because 
he gave information to the other -to the attorney, to the other attorney that he should 
not have done).  
Similar to the pilot study, English-speaking participants’ reactions were very 
different from the reactions exhibited by Spanish speakers. English speakers were 
noticeably displeased and even irritated when they were not able to produce a correct 
answer, again expressed in terms of “This sentence is not correct” or “Nobody could 
understand this.” On the contrary, Spanish speakers who did not understand in general 
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showed two distinct reactions: while some expressed embarrassment and apologized, 
such as P12 in Q2: “Esa no la entendí nada. Perdón” (That one I didn’t understand 
anything. I’m sorry), others offered responses with full conviction and self-assurance 
but lacking meaning, relevance, or sometimes grammar. For example, in question 2 
about preponderance of the evidence, P25 responded, “Sí es la misma, sí es la misma, 
porque es la... eh es -es- él no se basa a una -a una, [daughter’s interruption] pérame 
m’ija, a una... es que no -no se interroga algo más específico, es la misma prueba, es la 
misma prueba porque él no dice otra” (Yes it’s the same, yes it’s the same, because it’s 
the... er it’s -it’s - he doesn’t rely to a -on a [daughter’s interruption] hold on 
sweetheart, to a... it’s that no -nothing more specific is questioned, it’s the same 
evidence, it’s the same evidence because he does not say any other). Also, in question 3 
about circumstantial evidence, the same P25 responded, “Ok, aquí dice que... haz de 
cuenta como la prueba no ocupa al... como traer a alguien, no? O sea eh -si ya tiene una 
prueba grande ahí ya se va a quedar, no ocupa más hechos” (Ok, here it says that... let’s 
say as the evidence does not need the... like bringing somebody in, right? That is er -if 
[Pronoun] has major evidence there, it’s going to stay,[Pronoun] does not need any 
more facts). In the same question, P27 responded, “Preguntas son respuestas 
verdaderas” (Questions are true answers), and P29 responded, “No, no sé [giggle]... 
Que salen de lo indirecto y que entonces qué son -qué realmente -cuales son las pruebas 
realmente valoradas, no? o verdaderas... ahí es donde un juego de palabras que complica 
la situación, verdad?” (No, I don’t know [giggle]... That they are drawn from 
circumstance and then what are they -what really -which is the truly valued evidence, 
right? Or true ... that is where a play on words that complicates the situation, right?). 
 Another important example of bringing the personal into the answers was offered 
by Participant 14, who gave non-responsive answers related to the consequences of 
being undocumented. In Q4, this participant answered, “Pues que a veces no es verdad 
lo que ellos nos dicen pero es por no tener papeles nos echamos nosotros la culpa” 
(Well, it’s that sometimes what they tell us is not true but it’s because of not having 
papers that we blame ourselves) and in Q5, “Porque a veces decimos y a veces no -no 
creen lo que uno haga y a veces por medio de no tener documentos nos echamos la 
culpa aunque no sea verdad” (Because sometimes we say and sometimes they don’t -
don’t believe what one does and sometimes through not having documents we blame 
ourselves even if it’s not true). 
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In conclusion, this chapter has reported on the results obtained in the three 
components of this study from three different sources: interpreters, attorneys, and lay 
Spanish speakers. Interpreters mediate between a Spanish speaker with limited 
cognitive access to the high-register, system-bound language used by attorneys in 
judicial proceedings. Interpreters are also instructed to follow an ethics code and 
institutional norms that limit the range of possible strategies they might use to bridge 
the comprehension gap. Attorneys welcome and expect interpreter interventions to alert 
them when comprehension is not achieved, or when a simpler language would be more 
effective to achieve it. The results also showed that despite the register simplification in 
the listening comprehension test, and despite the explanations provided in FG 3, 
Spanish speakers did not achieve full comprehension of the legal language. This also 
indicates that the reason for non-comprehension is not limited to the vocabulary, but 
also to the lack of referents and prior domain knowledge. The results show that 
notwithstanding the code and the norms, both interpreters and attorneys acknowledge 
this comprehension gap and are inclined or willing to favor interpreter interventions in 
order to facilitate comprehension and enhance the intercultural communication between 
the interlocutors.  
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Chapter 10. Discussion 
 
This research set out to examine Spanish speakers’ comprehension of legal language 
when assisted by a court interpreter in judicial proceedings. The design involved two 
major areas: testing the institutional equal-footing claim by comparing comprehension 
levels of English speakers and Spanish speakers with and without register 
simplification, and collecting data from Spanish speakers, interpreters, and attorneys to 
better understand how each one contributes to the construction of meaning in this 
intercultural communicative event. The first hypothesis was that English speakers and 
Spanish speakers would not show the same comprehension levels when presented with 
the same original register of legal language, and the results supported the hypothesis. 
The second hypothesis was that Spanish speakers’ comprehension would improve by 
simplifying the legal register, and the results supported this hypothesis as well. The 
results showed that providing an interpreter for the proceeding does not necessarily 
place the non-English speaker on an equal footing with the English speaker, because 
non-English speakers in this particular context for the most part lack important tools to 
access the high legal register that characterizes judicial proceedings, and that court 
interpreters are required to maintain. The tools required to access and be able to 
understand and communicate using a legal register include a certain educational 
attainment level, specialized domain education, socialization into a specific speech 
community, exposure to and knowledge of the U.S. legal system, and assertiveness to 
express non-comprehension. Other questions this research study set to answer included 
interpreters’ views on register, register adjustment and intervention; and attorneys’ 
views on issues of comprehension and interpreter interventions. The results of the 
interviews showed that notwithstanding the code and institutional norms, both 
interpreters and attorneys acknowledge a communication gap between English speakers 
and Spanish speakers, and are inclined or willing to favor interpreter interventions and 
adjustments of register in order to facilitate and enhance comprehension between 
speakers. This chapter will organize the discussion of the results in three areas: findings 
about factors that might hinder comprehension, findings about observed non-
comprehension, and findings about factors that might enhance comprehension. 
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10.1. Findings about factors that might hinder comprehension 
Communication in judicial proceedings is conducted in a particular language variety 
that bears little syntactic, semantic, and referential resemblance to everyday language. 
Although the level of formality might vary in different stages of judicial proceedings 
(O’Barr 1981: 396), this formality level varies within the same register of legal 
language—a register that cannot be accessed without formal and domain-specialized 
education. All interpreters interviewed in both the pilot and the main study as well as 
interpreters from focus group 1 reported that, except for the six-hour mandatory ethics 
workshop, they never received any instruction on the fundamental notion or features of 
legal register or register adjustment, which is probably due to the fact that this 
adjustment would not be officially required in their work. This lack of instruction might 
explain the descriptive narrowness in the definitions of register provided by 
participants, who for the most part related it to the level of language—indeed, the only 
definition provided in the code of ethics. This 215-word section on register would seem 
to contain, based on the results obtained in this study, the main reasons for non-
comprehension of legal language by Spanish speakers, and the main issues explored in 
this research study: 
 
Register  
When rendering the source-language message into the target language, you must 
never alter the register, or level of language, to make it easier to understand or 
more socially acceptable. For instance, if the attorney asks, “What did you 
observe the subject to do subsequently?” you should not say in the target 
language, “What did you see him do next?” if more formal synonyms exist. You 
should not try to bring the question down to the witness’s level. You also should 
not intervene and say that you do not think the question is understandable to the 
witness. If the witness does not understand the question, it is his responsibility, or 
that of the attorney who has called him to the stand, to say so. It is not the 
interpreter’s job to evaluate and give an opinion on the witness’s ability to 
understand. (See “California Standards of Judicial Administration, Standard 
2.11,” in appendix C.)  
It is important to remember that when interpreting a witness’s testimony before a 
jury, the jury will draw certain conclusions about the witness’s sophistication, 
intelligence, and credibility based on word choice, style, and tone, among other 
things. It is your job to faithfully convey all of these factors so jurors get the same 
impression they would if they could understand the witness directly. (CAJC 
2013a: 7) 
 
This brief section from the code of ethics contains a series of norms that 
interpreters have internalized and strive (or struggle) to comply with, as was found in 
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the interviews. These norms, however, conflict directly with other sections in the code 
that state that interpreters are provided so that parties can understand each other (2013a: 
28) and that the interpreter is the medium of communication (2013a: 26). Court 
interpreters may be hired to work in a variety of judicial proceedings in and out of court, 
but regardless of the setting, the court interpreter’s duty, role, instructions, and purpose 
do not change: the interpreter in a judicial setting always abides by the same code of 
ethics and is there with the same purpose of placing the non-English speaker on an 
equal footing with the English speaker. The code of ethics contains the instructions 
court interpreters must follow as well as the purpose for their presence and, in this 
sense, the equal footing purpose could be thought of as a hyper-skopos that covers every 
judicial proceeding, while the code of ethics could be thought of as a hyper-brief with 
instructions to follow in every judicial proceeding. These instructions, however, seem to 
be contradictory: 1) interpreters place the non-English speaker on an equal footing with 
the English speaker, 2) interpreters are there so non-English speakers will understand 
the proceeding, and 3) this is achieved by conserving the original legal register in 
interpreters’ renditions. In the same way, the code equates ethics with accuracy, and 
loyalty with fidelity. Loyalty, however, refers to a relationship between people, while 
fidelity refers to a relationship between texts (Nord 2006: 6) (see chapter 6). Following 
Chesterman’s (2001) four (incompatible) models for translation ethics—representation, 
service, communication, and norms—judicial proceedings would make use only of 
three of them: ethical conduct would fit the representation model by giving priority to 
accuracy, the service model by giving priority to the client’s mandate of accuracy and 
loyalty, and the norms model by giving priority to compliance with the code. As 
mentioned in chapter 6, these three models would complement one another in that being 
ethical would mean being loyal to the client (service) by following the prescribed norms 
(norms) of accuracy (representation). The only model that could not be applied to this 
context is the communication model, because the interpreter is precluded from taking 
into account the communicative needs of the other. This represents a conflict for the 
interpreter, as facilitating communication is also part of the hyper-brief and, in this 
sense, not facilitating understanding may be considered unethical from the interpreter’s 
perspective. This ethical conflict has been described in the literature (Angelelli 2004, 
Morris 1993, Berk-Seligson 1990, Mikkelson 1998, Rudvin 2007, among others), and 
was mentioned by all interpreters interviewed: either comply with the norms or facilitate 
understanding. The purpose of having an interpreter present is defined by the code as 
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that of facilitating communication among the parties; however, understanding, as it has 
been shown, is considered a prerequisite to effective communication (see chapter 5). At 
least in this context, it does not seem possible to comply simultaneously with both the 
individual and prescribed goal of facilitating communication and the norms requiring a 
verbatim translation. This is the professional and human conflict for the interpreter, who 
is precluded from (a) “identifying cultural or linguistic factors that are generating 
miscommunication”; (b) requesting or providing clarifications “when speakers’ 
referents are based on different worlds of knowledge”; and (c) performing anything 
beyond a “mechanical, non-participatory role” (Morris 1993: 21). This view is 
supported by Moeketsi (1999), who states that “in their bid to behave professionally, 
court interpreters are often compelled to inhibit their human quality that dictates caring 
for those in distress,” and Altano, who states that “under the mantle of professional 
conduct ... court interpreters must ... deny the urge to help, at precisely the moment 
when the witness is turning to them” (1990: 99). It is also supported by Anderson, who 
states that the interpreter is “the man in the middle” who has certain obligations to serve 
two clients at once, and that these duties “may not be compatible” (1976: 211). The 
norms contained in the Register section above could be summarized as follows: 
 
1. Register must never be altered. 
2. Register is defined (only) as the “level of language” (only “formal” is mentioned). 
3. Register should not be altered to make language “easier to understand” or to bring it 
“down to the witness’s level.” Examples include not changing “observe” to “see,” or 
“subsequently” to “next.” 
4. Register should not be altered to make it more “socially acceptable.” 
5. Interpreters should not intervene to say that the witness will not understand the 
question or evaluate or give opinions on witnesses’ comprehension abilities. When a 
witness does not understand, that witness (or an attorney) is responsible for saying so.  
6. Register is maintained so that jurors can evaluate witnesses’ sophistication, 
intelligence, and credibility based on the interpreter’s choice of words, style, and tone, 
the same way they would if there were no interpreter present. 
 
Each of these norms represents an area explored in this study, and each of these 
norms showed potential for hindering comprehension. They will be addressed 
separately as follows. 
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1. Register must never be altered 
It would have been ideal to observe and record interpreters in action to determine 
whether register is maintained, for example, during non-testimony stages of 
proceedings, when the only one listening is the non-English speaker. However, since the 
courts still do not allow the recording of proceedings, the only available data was 
gathered through observation of interpreters in both focus groups: the first group (FG 1) 
translated the five sentences used in the test, and the second group (FG 2) simplified the 
register of those translations for the second group in the test.  
Interpreters in FG 1 were in charge of producing the translation of the five 
sentences for the listening comprehension test with register conservation. At times, 
participants would discuss terminology and the possibility of restructuring the sentence 
in Spanish to make it simpler or more grammatical. However, they would soon remind 
themselves and each other that the task was to produce a version that would resemble 
what they would normally use in court on the spur of the moment without much time to 
think, almost like a sight translation. Although at times participants were inclined to use 
simpler terminology, for example in the case of preponderancia (preponderance) vs. el 
peso de la prueba (the weight of the evidence), they decided to keep the original formal 
term because it belongs in the legal field even if it is a difficult term. In this sense, 
participants were making an effort to maintain the original register despite their 
inclination to simplify it. Not only did FG 1 participants consistently remind themselves 
and each other to conserve the spirit of the original, but the five other certified 
interpreters who were invited to examine the translations confirmed that the original 
register was conserved in the target sentences. They concluded that the five translations 
did correspond to O’Barr’s category of formal spoken language (see 4.3. above) and 
that the register level was comparable between both versions. Chesterman explains that 
in order to show the existence of norms, evidence such as belief statements, norm 
statements, and explicit criticism must be linked to observed regularities. Although the 
translation produced in this focus group was not a simultaneous interpreting exercise, it 
nevertheless could be construed as representing the observed regularities that must be 
linked to the evidence of normative force that is necessary for proposing the existence 
of norms, as called for by Chesterman (1993) (see chapter 6). 
Interpreters in FG 2 were in charge of simplifying the register of the five Spanish 
sentences used in the listening comprehension test. Although some simplification was 
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apparently achieved in several cases, participants did not feel they could turn the 
sentences into an explanation, provide examples, or arrive at the degree of 
simplification that was used in the redrafting of California jury instructions, for example 
(see chapter 5). This may denote some resistance to manipulating the legal register, or 
even lack of practice, as this is not usually taught or required. Even though they had the 
freedom to make any change they deemed necessary, they left some terms unchanged 
believing they would be comprehensible for Spanish speakers, but lay Spanish speakers 
in focus group 3 did not, in fact, understand some of them. This showed different 
criteria regarding register variation and accessibility between interpreters and Spanish 
speakers. The impossibility of simplifying legal terminology to be understood without 
referential knowledge was also acknowledged by some participants: “It cannot be 
lowered much there; for the person to understand this it must be explained; it’s the only 
way; that is why the judges made the new instructions giving examples to show that 
register could not be lowered” (P4) and “We have to understand something, there are 
concepts that are more abstract than others and cannot be simplified” (P1). These 
statements imply that comprehension might not be fully achieved even with register 
simplification, and that unmodified legal register might not be conducive to 
comprehension. 
 
2. Register is defined (only) as the “level of language” (only “formal” is mentioned)  
From this section of the code, people who have not received any training or instruction 
on language register would conclude that register can only be formal or easier, which is 
reflected in participants’ definitions. As described in chapter 4, the level of formality 
corresponds only to the tenor, which is also described by some scholars as style. Given 
that the register determines the language variety that will be used, it would seem 
fundamental for interpreters to be thoroughly familiar with the semantic and syntactic 
features that will be required both in English and in Spanish, as well as the features that 
define a specific register. As stated above, however, none of the interpreters interviewed 
both in the main and in the pilot study reported receiving any specific instruction or 
training in legal register before starting to work as interpreters. However, the experience 
interpreters gained at work helped them construct a wider definition of register than the 
one provided in the code. The definitions provided by interpreters in the pilot study 
related the register to education as a condition for comprehension: “high register... 
might possibly mean that a person needs to have had many years of some specialized 
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education to fully comprehend something” (P2), and only one participant related it to 
the setting or circumstances (P5). In the main study, interpreters interviewed defined 
register mainly in terms of high vs. low, formal vs. informal, and level of sophistication, 
difficulty, correctness, or politeness. Also in their definitions, one interpreter related it 
to the source context (P8), seven interpreters defined register as a factor of education, 
one interpreter related it to the formality of the situation (P9), two interpreters related 
language register to comprehension (P1 and P6), and four interpreters defined the 
register as something that should not be modified. 
Interpreters in FG 1 reported that register can be instinctively identified or self-
learned after years of experience (differentiating between a high and low register only), 
and discussed their lack of training: “And then when you leave something up for 
interpretation, you throw it out there, like register, if someone doesn’t have it in them to 
decipher what exactly that means, cause we all do that when we’re studying... you do it 
alone, nobody teaches you this” (P1). Participants in FG 1 also showed awareness of the 
need to specialize for years after receiving formal education in order to comprehend 
legal register, as stated by P1: “I think I speak for everybody, we all brought to the table 
everything else. I mean, the proficiency in both languages, the education, university 
degrees from other countries, so we have a whole bunch of stuff there, and then we 
specialize for two years or a year.” In summary, interpreters are aware of the 
educational, cognitive, and social requirements to access the legal register, and of the 
way these barriers to accessibility might lead to non-comprehension.  
   
3. Register should not be altered to make language “easier to understand” or to bring it 
“down to the witness’s level.” Examples include not changing “observe” to “see,” or 
“subsequently” to “next” 
The phrases “easier to understand” and “down to the witness’s level” were left in 
quotation marks because as written they imply that register will be “hard to understand” 
or “above the witness’s level,” respectively. This implication was observed in 
interpreters’ definitions of register as well.  
Spanish speakers in California originate from many different countries, even the 
United States. Sociocultural traits, educational attainment levels, and degrees of 
language proficiency are of course diverse, even among members of the same speech 
communities. Although Latin American countries follow civil law systems, differences 
among them abound, starting with Mexico’s efforts to implement oral trials and other 
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countries following suit. These and several other reasons make it impossible to arrive at 
an accurate description that would encompass every Spanish speaker in California, or 
that could predict sociocultural, linguistic, and comprehension constraints for all. That 
is why the literature on California’s Hispanics describes a general list of traits 
apparently found in high-context cultures, and particularly in Mexicans, given that they 
are a majority in the state. It also partly explains the impossibility for the U.S. Census 
Bureau to arrive at accurate numbers to describe individual educational attainment 
levels, providing instead a general determination only of an average close to less than 
nine years of education. As stated in chapter 2, these numbers include non-Hispanics, 
do not include all the Hispanics, and do not include data that would differentiate those 
with no education from those who have completed nine years. To arrive at a more 
accurate depiction of average educational levels among Hispanics in California for the 
purpose of this research, inquiries were made with all participants who work in close 
proximity with them and are privy to this data. Overwhelmingly, all participants in all 
components of this study reported similar results: interpreters interviewed for the main 
study (6.1 years), attorneys interviewed for the main study (6.2 years), attorneys 
interviewed for the pilot study (primary school for P1, one to three years for P2), and 
interpreters interviewed for the pilot study (“they never went to school,” P4). Equally 
low educational attainment levels were reported by interpreters in focus group 1:  
 
The defendants that we work with, if they come here, they have what, first grade 
education?... for the most part, you’re not only dealing with people who have not 
been educated, school-wise, but you’re dealing with people who have not been 
exposed to parents. We see the sad realities of people that have been raised by 
cows basically, and I’m not being facetious. I’m not lying, not exaggerating. (P1) 
 
  This was also discussed by interpreters in FG 2: “... the syntax, when you try to 
explain it it becomes an academic definition, and with sixth graders or less, or an IQ 
of... as it is being shown now that many defendants have an IQ of around 70, they 
cannot get it” (P4). The average educational attainment level for English speakers, on 
the other hand, is twice as high: 13.5 years of education reported by attorneys 
interviewed in the main study, the same number reported by the literature. Attorneys 
interviewed both for the main study and the pilot study also reported that these 
education levels cause communication problems with Spanish-speaking clients. The 
literature reveals certain educational requirements to access the legal register. For 
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example, Dueñas González found that the average difficulty level of legal language 
corresponded to 14 years of formal education (1977), and Moore et al. found that 
comprehension of legal language requires 12 years of formal education plus familiarity 
with specialized legal language (1999: 32). Dueñas González et al. also refer to these 
limitations and their effect, for example, on the comprehension of the Miranda warning: 
“... it is highly unlikely that an LEP suspect with limited education and poor literacy—
from a rural or otherwise isolated background—would be able to understand the 
Miranda text” (2012: 459).  
Spanish speakers’ difficulty in understanding the language used in court can be 
explained, then, by their lack of formal education, specialized education, and interaction 
in the judicial speech community. Hale et al. explain that choosing among registers to 
use in each situation is only possible for expert language users who have mastered 
multiple registers (2013). The correlation between literacy, reading, and vocabulary 
richness and comprehension has long been established (Sternberg et al. 1983, Shen 
2013, Fang et al. 2006, Rose 1999, Cazden et al. 1981), as has been the need to learn, 
develop special competencies, and interact with specific speech communities to access 
and use specialized registers (Johnson 2009, Sánchez Muñoz 2012). Rose also explains 
that the mastery of professional discourses requires a prior mastery of the 
“recontextualized discourses of schooling ... from early primary to senior secondary 
school” (1999: 224). Furthermore, U.S. Spanish speakers have not developed the 
registers required to communicate using academic, formal, or professional styles 
(Sánchez Muñoz 2012), and the linguistic features found in the U.S. Spanish variety are 
consistent with features of informal registers, such as code switching, borrowings, and 
colloquialisms (Otheguy 1989, Silva-Corvalán 1994, Valdés and Geoffrion-Vinci 1998) 
(see chapter 4).  
As immigrants from civil-system countries, Spanish speakers also lack enough 
familiarity with the U.S. common-law system and the different proceedings, either from 
direct experience, school, or the media (Moore 1999: 25, 167, Demuth 2003, Palerm et 
al. 1999). The effects of this lack of exposure were also reported by nine attorneys 
interviewed both in the main study and in the pilot study, interpreters interviewed in the 
main study, and interpreters from focus groups. Among the attorneys interviewed in the 
main study, for example, P6 referred to Spanish speakers as “clueless,” and P8 to “zero 
familiarity.” Going through a deposition, for example, was described by P8 as a 
traumatic experience that hinders comprehension and leads to deponents concealing 
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non-comprehension, and equated by P6 to a gynecological exam or delivering a baby. 
P8 also explained how attorneys take comprehension for granted in a system that 
“doesn’t work for non-native speakers without a high educational level.” From the 
interpreters interviewed in the main study, P5 also reported on a situation requiring 
interpreter’s intervention to prevent a Spanish speaker from being declared incompetent 
because he was unable to answer questions about the legal actors and their roles. This 
lack of familiarity was also discussed in FG 1 by P9, referring to interpreters performing 
comparative law (see chapter 5): 
 
I also believe that we have a big problem because we are interpreting in 
California, United States, under the penal code of the U.S. But we are interpreting 
for Spanish speakers that most of them grew up and lived in Mexico, Guatemala, 
Honduras, that had followed a complete different penal code and system. I mean, 
in Mexico you are guilty until proven innocent. In here, you are innocent until 
proven guilty. So when I interpret, many times in court when the judges ask an 
arraignment question, the judge goes, “And how do you plead to the charges?” 
and then the defendant looks at you and says, “So I can just say not guilty?” “Of 
course!” “Really? Not guilty, that means you are not guilty and that’s it, I’m 
going home?” “No, no, wait a minute. Now we have to go through the process of 
trial.” “What do you mean trial? I already said not guilty” and he put not guilty! 
So those are concepts that are completely different. So I mean, we are talking of 
completely different systems, so we can only, I think, interpret to the extent that 
we are kind of like transforming an American Penal Code... (P9) 
 
 
The defendant’s lack of familiarity with the system might lead him to plead one 
way or another without being aware of the consequences of such a plea, for example. 
The lack of exposure to the U.S. legal system and to legal language means Spanish 
speakers might not have enough prior and specialized knowledge to understand the 
consequences of their actions. This lack of knowledge would also prevent them from 
identifying and interpreting (understanding) new concepts because they cannot be tied 
to any previous knowledge, or schemata. Chapter 5 described how all accounts of 
communication and comprehension established that prior knowledge is the sine qua non 
of understanding.  
Participants in FG 1 also discussed frequent cases of interlingual asymmetry of 
cognates, that is, cognates having different levels of use or formality in different 
languages. Lexical classification based on register class membership is not the same 
across languages, and there is, so far, no “register dictionary” that would assign levels 
of formality or intimacy to each word and for each language. The reason for not using 
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next, or see, however, is not articulated in the code, particularly when the translation 
into Spanish has no effect on jurors’ perception. In summary, the lack of formal and 
specialized education, interaction in specialized speech communities, and exposure to 
the U.S. legal system, would contribute to Spanish speakers’ non-comprehension. 
Compliance with this norm, therefore, would imply not “making it easier” to understand 
or promote the effective communication as provided in the code. 
 
4. Register should not be altered to make it more “socially acceptable” 
As in the previous section, the language in the code would imply that the register used 
might be “socially unacceptable.” Sociocultural traits affecting comprehension as 
reported by all participants and supported by the literature (see chapter 2) include issues 
of respect for authority, indirectness, low assertiveness and involvement, a desire to 
explain and cooperate, fear, intimidation, anxiety, all of which are also consistent with 
traits of collectivist high-context cultures with high power distance and strong 
uncertainty avoidance, where “citizen protest should be repressed” (Hofstede et al. 
2005: 180). In high-context systems, indirect, ambiguous and non-confrontational styles 
are preferred (Hammera et al. 2002: 555). These factors lead attorneys to perceive 
Spanish speakers’ answers as non-responsive, usually loaded with much more 
information than requested, “volunteering” information, or a tendency to want to “tell a 
story.” Attorneys also reported, for example, that English-speaking clients ask more 
questions, provide more feedback, and show more involvement and assertiveness, while 
Spanish-speaking clients’ mind appears to wander off. This desire to cooperate and 
provide more information than requested is problematic, as Spanish speakers may 
inadvertently waive their rights by volunteering information at the wrong place or the 
wrong time (P9). English speakers’ conversational style, on the other hand, is itemized 
in Grice’s maxims: sincerity, brevity, and relevance (chapter 5). When and how to flout 
these maxims depends on culturally specific and relative norms (Silva-Corvalán 2001: 
197; Alexieva 1997: 228), as other cultures may favor different values and emphasize 
one maxim at the expense of others. While some authors claim that Grice’s maxims are 
universal, language-specific rhetoric styles, culture-specific values, and discourse styles, 
among other factors, seem to imply the opposite. The relevance and quantity maxims, 
for example, create a frequent clash during judicial proceedings with non-English 
speakers, as reported by several participants, who mentioned frequent non-responsive 
and long answers when the opposite is expected and requested. As described by 
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Montaño-Harmon (1991), English speakers and Spanish speakers use very different 
conversational styles that vary in terms of sentence length, language elaboration, 
prosodic features, directness, and topic deviation, and basically in how they say what 
they mean, and how they mean what they say. During testimony, the prosecutors’ duty 
is to extract as much damaging information from the witness as possible, so they may 
use conversational resources to get witnesses to say more than they should. The 
interpreter is caught in the middle, knowing that speakers’ inability to interpret each 
other’s contextualization cues and conversational styles might cause misunderstandings. 
When witnesses are prepared by their own attorneys to testify, they are told that the 
proceeding is not a social conversation, and that they should answer only yes or no and 
not volunteer information. In most cases, this is impossible for Spanish speakers 
because they struggle to respect the attorney’s request not to violate the cooperative 
principle and the maxims of quantity and quality. The maxims of manner and relevance 
also may cause difficulties when Spanish speakers consider certain subjects taboo or 
very private, such as sex, bodily functions, or family matters (Palerm et al. 1999, HRSA 
2001, among others) (see chapter 2). Not disclosing information about private matters 
might be understood by attorneys as lack of cooperation. It could be concluded, as 
pointed out by Charrow, that the cooperative principle described by Grice works better 
as a way of showing the reasons legal language is often not conducive to 
communication. She proposes that instead of considering these instances as violations, 
they should be considered signs of an uncooperative principle: “the use of language to 
constrain others from doing certain things, to protect people, information, or things, and 
to penalize others for violating those constraints and protections” (emphasis in original) 
(1982: 98). Since what to say and how to say it are fundamental aspects whose 
variability across cultures causes problems in communication (Tannen 1984, Gumperz 
1995), conversational styles could be another factor hindering comprehension, and the 
same applies to other contextualization cues described in chapter 5. Since 
contextualization cues are part of the communication context and contribute to 
constructing meaning, the inability to interpret these cues correctly would mean that 
part of the message cannot be decoded. This is exemplified by attorneys’ answers to 
question 2 in the main study, and also by attorneys’ answers in the pilot study 
interviews. Regarding the differences in the way they communicate with English 
speakers and Spanish speakers, all English-Spanish bilingual attorneys—who have a 
comparatively stronger membership in Spanish speakers’ speech community—reported 
UNIVERSITAT ROVIRA I VIRGILI 
COMPREHENSION OF LEGAL DISCOURSE IN INTERPRETER-MEDIATED JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS 
Julia Lambertini Andreotti
227 
obstacles attributable to clients’ low education and low comprehension, leading 
attorneys to use simple language and cultural examples. On the other hand, except for 
one participant avoiding slang or colloquialisms, the only difference reported by 
monolingual English-speaking attorneys was an added instruction for the client to 
depend only on the interpreter’s words. For this group, communication problems are a 
result of lack of education and not language, and four out of the five monolingual 
participants reported communicating with English-speaking clients and Spanish-
speaking clients the same way. From the pilot study (all monolingual English speakers), 
aside from one participant’s indication that the volume used might be louder, all 
participants claimed to communicate the same way with English speakers and Spanish 
speakers except “when interpreters suggest I may be using difficult words or syntax” 
(P2) or when being asked to slow down (P3). This difference between the two groups of 
attorneys reflects their different access to contextualization cues used by non-English 
speakers. In summary, the sociocultural cues that would indicate non-comprehension 
and that might change the literal meaning of the message might not be interpreted by 
non-members of the speech community, while the interpreter might be the only one able 
to do so. Complying with this norm, not adapting the message to the sociocultural 
constraints of the target receiver, or not conveying the sociocultural cues from the 
source message, then, would mean that the messages might arrive with different (and 
incongruent) literal and contextual meanings.  
 
5. Interpreters should not intervene to say that the witness will not understand the 
question or evaluate or give opinions on witnesses’ comprehension abilities. When a 
witness does not understand, that witness (or an attorney) is responsible for saying so 
All interpreters interviewed both in the main and the pilot study found that at times the 
register may not be the most appropriate for the Spanish speaker to understand, and 
showed awareness of non-comprehension issues as a consequence of the high register of 
legal language. It is also relevant that two participants stated that attorneys or judges 
would not know how to make language easier for the client to understand, being limited 
to the vocabulary they learned in law school. Participants in FG 1 also reported that 
attorneys do not always seem to show awareness of the gap between the language 
register and comprehension, despite Spanish speakers indicating a low educational 
attainment level: 
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The question that I really don’t understand is “How many years of education did 
you finish?” That’s a key question and it comes within the first five minutes of a 
deposition. Most of the people that I‘m interpreting for are gonna say, “Oh I 
didn’t go to school,” or “Sixth grade in Mexico,” “Third grade in Mexico,” “I 
don’t know how to read or write.” I mean, that’s a very common response when 
you are dealing with... and after that the attorney continues asking these questions 
that are like, incomprehensible, that I look at him and I’m like, “Ok, didn’t he just 
tell you that he didn’t go to school? Are you fucking kidding me or what?” (P9) 
 
 
Regarding the possibility of achieving equal footing, participants in FG 1 believed 
that the statement “To place non-English speaking participants in legal proceedings on 
an equal footing with those who understand English” (CAJC 2013a: 3) should include 
“[those who understand English]... at their same level or register” (P3) and it would 
only be achieved by bringing “both worlds together” (P1). Furthermore, P4 added, “I 
think many times they are not on an equal footing regardless of how good the interpreter 
is, because they don’t all necessarily understand everything we’re saying.” One of the 
reasons for incomplete comprehension discussed in this group was the lack of parity of 
concepts, or terms that may belong to a high register in one language but the cognate 
may belong to a lower register in another, and vice versa, as the case of subsequently 
above in 3. The lack of comprehension as a consequence of unfamiliarity with the legal 
register and system was also discussed by participants in FG 1:  
 
Well, there are concepts in court like, “Do you waive your right to a preliminary 
hearing?” I mean, who understands that? And especially when the judges are 
going, “You know, you have the right to a preliminary hearing to be set in ten 
days from the day that you were arraigned, now if you waive you give up your 
right to that preliminary hearing...” and here I am [fast] “Usted tiene el derecho a 
una audiencia preliminar en diez días del día que lo instruimos de cargos y si 
usted quiere renunciar al derecho...” Who understands that? Well, I leave it 
exactly the same and the man’s face is like uhm, and the attorney says “say yes” 
and they say “yes.” (P9)  
 
Lately I found myself in court, more and more frustrated, wondering why there 
isn’t a movement amongst judges and attorneys to make the language simple for 
everyone to understand, because I see a lot of English-speaking defendants and I 
can see that they have no idea what’s going on. I’m like, can you not see that the 
words that you are using are completely incomprehensible to these people? (P7) 
 
As described above, interpreters might be the only ones who can identify non-
comprehension because they are members of or have access to the same speech 
community as Spanish speakers, and are therefore able to identify contextualization 
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cues that convey non-comprehension the same way any person would be able to tell 
when the other in the conversation is not understanding. Furthermore, the code states 
that the interpreter is there for “the defendant to understand the proceedings” (CAJC 
2013a: 28), so this represents a conflict of requirements for the interpreter whose goal is 
to comply with both. This conflict was also reported by interpreters in the main study in 
terms of leaving a “bad taste” in their mouth (P2). In summary, interpreters and 
attorneys are consistently aware of Spanish speakers’ non-comprehension, and this is 
also reported in the literature.  
This norm again places on the Spanish speaker (or an attorney) all responsibility 
for articulating non-comprehension, and prevents the interpreter from intervening to 
warn attorneys that this might be happening. Respect for authority, intimidation, and 
fear, mostly because of the defendant’s immigration status or attributed to their 
sociocultural traits, have an important influence in this context because they lead 
Spanish speakers to hide non-comprehension, claim they understand when they do not, 
or even agree with statements even if they don’t believe them to be true, as expressed by 
P14 in the main study. Not only the interpreters and attorneys interviewed, but also the 
literature, including Fundamentals of Court Interpretation, explain that Spanish 
speakers do not commonly state that they do not understand, and this phenomenon even 
has a name: “gratuitous acquiescence” or “gratuitous concurrence” (Berk Seligson 
2009: 104, Dueñas González et al. 2012: 195, Buys et al. 2010: 471). Acknowledging 
non-comprehension in a defendant whose culture prevents him from speaking up, and at 
the same time not being able to alert the other speakers in order to comply with the 
comprehension requirement, represents the same ethical conflict for the interpreter as 
described above. Should the interpreter comply with the section of the code that 
prevents intervention, or should the interpreter comply with other sections in the code 
that assign interpreters the duty of facilitating comprehension? Compliance with this 
norm, then, might not be conducive to effective communication between the speakers. 
As stated above, interpreters’ membership in Spanish speakers’ speech communities 
allows them to notice when speakers are not understanding, an assessment that would 
probably not be available for non-Spanish speakers (Roy 1999: 6). As interpreters 
realize a witness or defendant might not be understanding, they are precluded from 
alerting attorneys or judges and therefore precluded from facilitating communication 
between speakers. Interpreters and attorneys’ observations of non-comprehension will 
be further discussed in the next section on findings about observed non-comprehension.  
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6. Register is maintained so that jurors can evaluate witnesses’ sophistication, 
intelligence, and credibility based on the interpreter’s choice of words, style, and tone, 
the same way they would if there were no interpreter present 
This norm assumes that the only difference between English and Spanish speakers is the 
language, and that English-speaking jurors will be able to evaluate non-English 
speakers’ sophistication, intelligence, and credibility based on interpreters’ renditions. 
The influence of interpreters’ decisions on jurors’ evaluation has been extensively 
reported in studies by Berk-Seligson (1990) and Hale (2004), among others. This norm 
also ignores contextualization cues, conversational styles, and other factors that are 
culture bound and not readily interpretable by members of different speech 
communities. Examples abound in the literature, from different interpretations of a 
witness’ gaze to indirectness. The speech, linguistic, sociocultural, and contextual 
markers that denote credibility, intelligence, competence, and politeness are culture and 
language specific, and in many if not most cases impossible to translate without 
additional comments to explain how speakers mean what they say (see chapter 5). 
Furthermore, interactional norms, demeanors, and verbal and non-verbal expressions of 
sincerity, remorse, and contrition also vary across cultures and speech communities 
(Fought 2006, Martin et al. 2012, Cole et al. 1997). The code also states that the 
interpreter is there “to enable the court to understand all non-English speakers” (CAJC 
2013a: 28), so when interpreters see that Spanish speakers’ discourse markers or 
demeanor is understood by English speakers in a way that was not intended and are not 
able to intervene, this represents the same difficulty described above for interpreters, 
who are again caught between conflicting norms and purposes.  
Jurors’ evaluation of witnesses is also the only reason provided in the code for 
maintaining the original register, and it only involves interpreting into English. 
Although this is the only reason provided in the code, interpreters offered many more 
reasons for not adjusting the register. According to interpreters interviewed in the main 
study, the original register must be maintained when interpreting from Spanish into 
English: to allow the jury and others to get an accurate picture of the defendant or 
witness; because the defendant or witness must sound as though speaking at his same 
level of language (in terms of origin, education and sophistication); because it is the 
register used by the court and attorneys, the one they understand and feel most 
comfortable with; and because it is the language of the record. Register adjustment was 
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equated with changing the real meaning, embellishing a word, and presenting something 
that doesn’t exist. When interpreting from English into Spanish, the original register 
must be maintained because: Spanish speakers must hear the same language variety as 
an English speaker would; be provided equal footing; experience fairness; perceive 
themselves as being on the same playing field, at the same level, and undergoing the 
same experience as English speakers, because English speakers are not afforded the 
luxury of explanations. Maintaining the register is also viewed as essential because: it’s 
the only way to go; not doing so would be a violation of the code of ethics and would 
mean interfering with legal strategy if non-comprehension was intended; some jurors 
may be bilingual and understand; interpreters are transparent; interpreters don’t exist; 
and “just because you have to” (P7). Register adjustment was equated with explaining, 
dumbing down the language, changing the meaning, being seen as an advocate, 
interceding, assisting in understanding, leading to feelings of guilt about looking for 
“the easiest.” Other reasons include not wanting to appear argumentative or difficult, 
and not wanting the interpreter’s own opinions or feelings to be part of the record. 
Interpreters interviewed in the pilot study offered reasons related to jurors’ perception of 
defendants, and equated register adjustment with explaining. Interpreters in FG 1 
believed that modifying the original register would mean changing the author of the 
source message, becoming the spokesperson for the Spanish speaker and therefore 
stepping out of the conduit role, and maintaining the register was equated with staying 
true to the source and the message, respecting the decorum of the venue, and not 
diminishing institutional value, or the “ceremonial quality in language” (P8):  
 
What you’re communicating is the institution which needs to be delivered at a 
particular level. Other than, if you do not do that then the institution diminishes in 
value... so there’s more than just the words; there’s an entire structure and a 
symbolic structure and... all of that. (P8) 
 
This rather extensive list of reasons and equated meanings reflects, among other 
things, interpreters’ lack of information regarding language register, and their conflict in 
trying to comply with contradicting norms. These reasons could be organized in five 
main categories based on different inferential sources: the code, the institutional 
framework, perceived role constraints, personal feelings, and misconceptions. Reasons 
derived from the code include jurors’ perception of witnesses, providing an equal 
footing, not facilitating comprehension, staying true to the source message, and not 
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interfering with legal strategy (the last two related to the verbatim requirement). 
Reasons derived from the institutional framework include register being the language of 
the court or the record, respecting the decorum of the venue, and not diminishing 
institutional value or the ceremonial quality in language. Perceived role constraints lead 
interpreters to maintain the original register because it’s the only way to go, it would be 
a violation of the code of ethics, interpreters are transparent, they do not exist, it would 
mean stepping out of the conduit role, or just because they have to. Personal reasons 
include fear of repercussions, of third parties listening and reporting interpreters, being 
seen as an advocate, appearing argumentative or difficult, not wanting the record to 
reflect the interpreter’s feelings or opinions, and feelings of guilt about looking for “the 
easiest.” This risk relates to criticism by colleagues and challenge from other legal 
actors, which was articulated by several participants, such as P8 in the main study:  
 
If you start questioning what you’re doing and you start exposing all these doubts 
you have within yourself, they start looking at you like a persona non grata or 
traitor, or something, like you’re going against the system. Well, I mean, I think 
most interpreters are afraid of retaliation. (P8) 
 
Lastly, misconceptions include the belief that modifying the register would mean 
changing the real meaning, embellishing, explaining, dumbing down the language, 
changing the author’s message, and that maintaining the original register would actually 
place English speakers and Spanish speakers on the same level, since the opposite was 
articulated by most interpreters, such as P9: “More than likely he’s not gonna 
understand half the crap you’re saying if you maintain the register.” In summary, 
although interpreters have incorporated the reasons stated in the code for not adjusting 
the register, they also show awareness of the non-comprehension that results from 
following this norm with Spanish speakers who cannot understand this language 
variety. Although they articulated the official reasons, they also articulated 
disagreement with this norm and fear of being singled out or reported. Again in this 
case, the code requires compliance with contradictory norms that might hinder 
comprehension, mainly due to the conservation of the legal register and to interpreters’ 
non-intervention.  
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10.2. Findings about observed non-comprehension 
In an article describing the redrafting of jury instructions, Tiersma (1993) quotes a 
renowned California jurist, Roger Traynor, who wrote that “In the absence of definitive 
studies to the contrary, we must assume that juries for the most part understand and 
faithfully follow instructions” (1970: 73-74). As described in chapter 5, research 
showed that this was not the case. So far the court interpreting system has been 
functioning without major overt debate except for claims describing the narrowness of 
the interpreter’s role and the consequences of stepping out of it. Extensive research on 
court interpreting has focused mainly on the dialogic aspect of judicial proceedings, and 
on the way interpreters’ decisions affect jurors’ perception. Extensive research has also 
been undertaken on the comprehension of (English) legal language by English speakers, 
and efforts by the Plain Language movement, plain language legislation, and Title VI 
have made important progress, mostly in the written word and the providing of 
interpreters. Applying Traynor’s view to this context, the equal footing premise assumes 
that non-English speakers are receiving the same information as English speakers, 
probably because so far there has not been evidence to the contrary. There is enough 
evidence, however, to suspect that this is not so. Findings by Dueñas González (1977) 
and Moore et al. (1999) regarding educational requirements to understand legal 
language, findings by Sánchez Muñoz (2007) and Valdés et al. (1998) regarding the 
registers accessible to U.S. Spanish speakers, data from the U.S. Census Bureau and the 
literature regarding educational attainment levels for U.S. Spanish speakers, their lack 
of exposure to the U.S. legal system due to their immigrant status, and relevant 
literature describing how legal language cannot be learned without specialized 
education and socialization into a specific speech community (see chapter 4), for 
example, imply that Spanish speakers might not have the same tools to understand or 
apply the information they receive. Spanish speakers’ comprehension of legal language 
in judicial proceedings is not only a matter of fairness, it is a matter of law.  
The listening comprehension test conducted in this research study was designed 
to test this implied claim of equal access to language by comparing the comprehension 
levels achieved by English speakers and Spanish speakers, and exploring the possibility 
of enhancing Spanish speakers’ comprehension by simplifying the language register. 
The test results indicate that while the average level of comprehension of English 
speakers was 59 percent, the first group of Spanish speakers scored only 3 percent, and 
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the second group of Spanish speakers scored 37 percent. While the English speakers’ 
scores were not ideal, they were nearly twenty times as high as the scores of the first 
group of Spanish speakers (equal register), and much higher than those of the second 
group of Spanish speakers (simplified register). Based on these results, the equal footing 
assumption is no longer tenable. 
This test showed marked differences between English speakers’ and Spanish 
speakers’ comprehension, in many regards. In addition to the final results above, a 








This table shows that even after register simplification, Spanish speakers had only 
about half the number of perfect-score answers as English speakers, in other words, 
only 24 percent of answers were indicative of full comprehension. Incorrect answers 
provided by English speakers and Spanish speakers also showed significant differences 
in their content. None of the answers provided by English speakers were irrelevant or 
incoherent, and none showed personal involvement. The answers reflected a good 
knowledge of legal language and of the legal system, and many participants were able 
to convey legal meaning using standard language. Participant 2 in question 3, for 
example, explained the meaning of circumstantial evidence in these terms: “If this then 
that, it’s an inference, so if this is true then that is true, it’s not direct evidence, it’s 
supposing that this is true then we can assume that that is true.” Non-perfect scores 
among English speakers were due to answers that were incomplete, that resembled the 
original sentence but were non-responsive, that seemed to grasp the idea but did not 
convey the exact meaning, or that incorporated outside legal words or concepts and did 
not answer the question asked. For example, P10 in question 5 attempted to state why 
the defendant’s explanation was not convincing: “Because it doesn't rise to the level of 
credibility required by the courts.” While it did not answer the question, it did show 
perfect legal language use. 
Table 15. Perfect score vs. zero-score answers 
 0 points 2 points 
English speakers 14 (28%) 23 (46%) 
Spanish speakers group 1 48 (96%) 1 (2%) 
Spanish speakers group 2 24 (48%) 12 (24%) 
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Besides the low levels of comprehension exhibited by Spanish speakers, what was 
also significant was the profound lack of relevance, sense, coherence, and even 
grammar in their answers. These can be grouped in three categories: correct and 
partially correct answers, irrelevant and/or incoherent answers, and no answer. 
Participants who did not provide an answer either apologized for not being educated or 
articulated non-comprehension (“I don’t know,” “I don’t understand”), and irrelevant 
and/or incoherent answers contained a number of phenomena that deserve attention: 
words replaced by phonologically similar real words, words replaced by phonologically 
similar non-words, incorporation of words or concepts from previous sentences, 
incorporation of unrelated words and concepts, incorporation of personal beliefs and 
values, and answers based on personal opinion instead of the content of the sentence. 
These non-responsive answers were provided with utmost conviction and certainty, at 
times even in a louder tone. A striking example of an irrelevant, unintelligible, and 
ungrammatical answer was provided by P27 in Q3, from the simplified-register group: 
“Preguntas son respuestas verdaderas” (Questions are true answers). Except for the 
replacement of two words by phonetically similar words, none of this was observed 
among English-speaking participants. Most of these findings were also present in the 
pilot study. Also as in the pilot study, most English speakers asked for repetitions and 
complained about not getting them, but almost none of the Spanish speakers did. 
Furthermore, in both studies there was a marked difference in their reactions to the 
sentences. While English speakers were noticeably displeased and irritated when they 
were not able to produce a correct answer and expressed it in terms of “This sentence is 
not correct” or “Nobody could understand this,” Spanish speakers would either express 
embarrassment and apologize, or provide an irrelevant answer.  
As described in chapter 5, discourse comprehension follows a sequence from the 
phonetic identification of the input to its integration into a text base. The first step in 
word recognition is identifying the phonemes, which leads to word identification, and 
then to word interpretation. In brief, the word is recognized after the acoustic 
information is mapped onto the phonological, morphological, syntactic, and semantic 
information in the lexicon, and a semantic field is activated. Once the word has been 
recognized and its information is found to be consistent with the semantic information 
from the lexicon, the word can be interpreted. When the word interpretation fits in its 
context, the word is understood (Tabossi 1991). Understanding, then, involves a 
combination of bottom-up and top-down processes that require information from long-
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term memory (lexicon, schemata, world knowledge) and from the context. Almost 
every word recognition model agrees that “A word is recognized in the context of 
similar sounding words in the memory” (Luce et al. 1998). What all of this means is 
very simple: listeners cannot recognize words they do not know. Since the lexicon does 
not contain information to match the input, there is no semantic or syntactic 
representation; since there is no world knowledge, there is no integration.  
The listening comprehension test yielded results related to the comprehension of 
sentences, but did not explain why the levels were so low. The feedback received in 
focus group 3, on the other hand, allowed a view that goes beyond the results of the test. 
Although the group met for only one hour and the task was intense, it was possible to 
gain valuable information, for example, about (most of) the words that hindered 
comprehension of the sentences. These words were inferir (to infer), preponderancia 
(preponderance), fuerza de convicción (convincing force), alegar (allege), divulgar 
(disclose), en cuanto a (regarding), partes (parties), corroborada (corroborated), 
indirecta (circumstantial/indirect), and convincente (convincing). Furthermore, two 
phrases were modified: de determinarse to si se determina (if found to if it is found), 
and la existencia to que existe (the existence to that there exists). The reasons for these 
difficulties, however, were not the same for all the words.  
Some of these words were flagged as unknown by participants: preponderancia, 
convicción, convincente, and corroborada. Other categories of words included terms 
that were familiar to participants, but not with the meanings used in the legal context. In 
consequence, they understood them to mean something else, expressed in terms of “For 
us it means...” This was the case of convicción, which some related to “convict”; 
divulgar, which for participants meant “slandering,” “gossip,” or “washing dirty linen in 
public”; partes, which required the addition of “involved in the case” because in 
Spanish it also means “parts” and participants did not know who the parties were; and 
indirecta, which for participants meant a hint or insinuation, as described in chapter 9. 
The words alegar and en cuanto a were not initially flagged by participants, but 
discussed at my request when trying to determine why the sentence was still not 
understood. In this discussion, participants stated that for them alegar meant “fighting” 
or “arguing,” and they were not familiar with the meaning of en cuanto a. The semantic 
fields activated for these terms, then, corresponded to the meanings known by 
participants and not to the legal or contextual meanings necessary to make sense of the 
sentence. Some of these terms were not flagged by participants in FG 2 while 
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simplifying the sentences for the test, as they assumed they would be understood in the 
listening comprehension test: corroborada, convincente, and of course parties. 
Participants in FG 3 disagreed.  
One of the phenomena observed in the listening comprehension test was the 
replacement of terms by phonologically similar words, both by English speakers and 
Spanish speakers. Among English speakers, P5 replaced before with because, and P6 
replaced force with form, in both cases rendering an intelligible sentence that could 
make sense in the context. Among Spanish speakers, P27 replaced corroborada with 
elaborada (developed, manufactured, skillful, well thought out) in question 5. In the 
pilot study, P3 replaced preponderancia with prepondera (preponderates), a real word 
in Spanish but unknown to the participant; and P4 replaced it with propone (proposes), 
rendering an unrelated sentence that would not fit in the context due to the activation of 
a different semantic field. This phenomenon is explained by McClelland et al., who 
show that in the competition among possible candidates, “if no word matches perfectly, 
a word that provides a close fit to the phoneme sequence can eventually win out over 
words that provide less adequate matches” (1986: 56). Since there was no representation 
for preponderancia in the lexicon, the closest fits were prepondera and propone, as it 
also happened with corroborada and elaborada.  
A similar phenomenon involved the replacement of words with phonetically 
similar non-words, which was observed only among Spanish speakers. Such is the case 
of the words corroborada (corroborated) and preponderancia (preponderance). The 
word corroborada was used in the answer as corraborada* (P26), and coloborando* 
(P21). The word preponderancia in question 2 of the first group yielded the largest 
variety of non-words: prepolderancia* (P18), prepodancia* (P15), proderancia* (P19) 
and pronderancia* (P16). This word could not be identified, and in these cases the 
responses included phonetically similar non-words. This is explained by Felty et al.: 
“when listeners made non-word responses, the errors reflected responses based on 
bottom-up, sensory-based processes and hence shared the overall acoustic-phonetic 
structure of the target word” (2013). This is the word that caused the most difficulty in 
all groups. During the register simplification task in FG 2, participants commented on 
this word:  
 
- I am not concerned about them not understanding the term preponderancia 
(preponderance) because that is the reason it is explained, the idea is that it is 
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not understood in English either and that is why an explanation is given, the 
problem is if they still don’t understand when you finish giving the definition 
(P2) 
- But of course, you find a way to say it, anyone understands the evidence that 
has more weight (P3) 
- But if we had a word for preponderance that everyone understood, we 
wouldn’t have to explain anything, because there is no word that can be 
understood in English and in Spanish (P2) 
 
The sentence containing this word explained the meaning of preponderance of the 
evidence, and the comprehension question asked what preponderance of the evidence 
was. This word, even when it was not understood and even in its non-word form, 
elicited some attempts at a definition, involving unrelated legal terms not included in 
the sentence: 
 
Ah pues la palabra prepolderancia* para mí viene siendo como -como que -o sea 
que me están -cómo le dijera la palabra... que me están acusando o sea me están 
haciendo algo... que no es correcto con este... más... cómo le dijera usted... no se 
me viene a la mente cómo es la palabra que usamos nosotros... Algo como como 
que están -como que me quieren como - cómo es la palabra -decirle que me están 
poniendo en el mismo lugar, con -con -cómo le dicen la palabra... alevosía (Ah 
well the word prepolderance* for me would be like -like -I mean, they’re -what’s 
the word I could use here... that they are accusing me I mean they are doing 
something to me... that is not correct with er... now how can I say this... it doesn’t 
come to mind what the word is that we use... Something like, like they are -like 
they want me to, like -what is the word -tell you that they are putting me in the 
same place, with -with -what is the word... malice aforethought). (P18) 
  
Another phenomenon observed was the incorporation of words from previous 
sentences in the answers, such as P28 in question 3, regarding circumstantial evidence: 
“¿La que tiene más peso?” (The one that has more weight?), which is the answer 
corresponding to sentence 2 about preponderance. This was also observed in FG 3, 
when I asked who the parties were in question 5: 
 
Las partes es por ejemplo una pregunta antes dijimos un abogado le dijo a otro 
abogado información confidencial del caso del acusado, entonces esta pregunta 
viene a ser el seguimiento de eso digamos, por ejemplo los testigos no supieron si 
este abogado le pasó información al otro abogado, si es cierto o no es cierto, yo 
así es como lo tomé (The parties is for example a question earlier we said an 
attorney told the other attorney confidential information about the defendant’s 
case, then this question is like the follow-up of that, say, for example the witnesses 
didn’t know if this attorney gave information to the other attorney, if it’s true or 
not true, that is the way I took it). (P5) 
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The incorporation of words not found in the context and words from other 
sentences could be understood as an attempt at establishing cohesion and resolving 
inferences to construct meaning. Furthermore, the frequency of unknown words makes 
it difficult to use contextual information to establish coherence. Without contextual 
information, corresponding schemata, or world knowledge, no proposition can be 
identified. As described in chapter 5, every account of comprehension shows that it is 
not achievable without knowledge of the world, of specific domains, and of language 
use in context. Since Spanish speakers lack all of these, non-comprehension is highly 
predictable.  
Lastly, participants answered questions based on personal opinion and not on the 
content of the sentence. This happened mostly in the first question, which was a part of 
the jury instructions that explained what to do when a witness is willfully false. 
Although participants were informed that this instruction was addressed to jurors, and 
were also asked to base the response only on the sentence, the question “what should 
you do when...?” elicited several personal opinions instead. This may have been due to 
the fact that they have never served in juries and might not be familiar with the role or 
the process, but the first question was not the only one to elicit personal involvement. 
The most representative example was provided by P14, who gave the same unrelated 
answer twice to two consecutive questions: “Pues que a veces no es verdad lo que ellos 
nos dicen pero es por no tener papeles nos echamos nosotros la culpa” (Well, it’s that 
sometimes what they tell us is not true but it’s because of not having papers we blame 
ourselves) in Q4, and “Porque a veces decimos y a veces no -no creen lo que uno haga 
y a veces por medio de no tener documentos nos echamos la culpa aunque no sea 
verdad” (Because sometimes we say and sometimes they don’t -don’t believe what one 
does and sometimes through not having documents we blame ourselves even if it’s not 
true) in Q5. This could be interpreted as “because we don’t have legal documents, 
sometimes we take the blame even when what they tell us is not true.” It could be 
argued that this participant found a safe space to share what is otherwise not visible to 
others but has been extensively documented in the literature: assenting and agreeing due 
to fear of deportation (see chapter 2). 
These reactions were shared with the psychologists consulted for data analysis, 
both of whom work with this population and one of whom is also an attorney. They 
explained that unlike Americans, who learn in school to question and investigate, 
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Spanish speakers are taught to respect, obey, and not to question or doubt. They also 
explained that it is very difficult for Spanish speakers to say no and very embarrassing 
for them to appear uneducated, and offered as an example that many Spanish speakers 
would give directions if asked, even if the location were unknown to them. Regarding 
the incorporation of personal opinions and feelings in the answers, the consultants 
explained that since participants lack referents in their world of formal knowledge, they 
can only refer to the only knowledge they have, which is their own. This phenomenon 
seems to relate to the difference between people who have received formal education 
and those who have not, and the ability to understand abstract concepts or not. This 
leads those who do not understand to answer from the only knowledge they can refer to 
from their own experience. This experience sustains their individual knowledge: we 
must tell the truth, we must report those who do not (P11, P12, P13, for example), 
almost as a mandate or as a matter of personal ethics, which seems consistent across the 
answers in the first group of Spanish speakers (significantly to question 1), and 
evidenced in the simplicity of their information processing. According to the 
consultants, whether a speaker gives an authoritative irrelevant answer or articulates 
non-comprehension with embarrassment depends on whether fear or intimidation 
prevail over embarrassment or pride. When the sentence is simplified it becomes more 
direct and targets a possible area of comprehension, which at the same time triggers the 
ability to respond in a more coherent manner. Evidence of this reference to familiar 
contexts can be observed in question 3 about circumstantial evidence, which was 
translated as pruebas indirectas, and which Spanish speakers related to their only 
referent: the noun indirecta. As it happened in FG 3 with Spanish speakers, several 
participants attempted to give an unrelated definition of an indirecta in question 3, such 
as Participant 18 and Participant 22. Another important example of bringing the 
personal into the answers were the answers provided by Participant 14 to questions 4 
and 5, related to the consequences of being undocumented. Lexical items and meanings 
used to construct answers were also taken from previous sentences as newly acquired 
knowledge in play, such as Participant 10 in question 3, and Participant 28 in question 
3. This is exemplified by the final comment from participants in FG 3: “We are 
learning.” 
Non-comprehension can be identified in different ways: when participants say 
they do not understand, when they state they understand but their discourse proves the 
opposite, and when they do not ask for clarification and still provide an irrelevant 
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answer. Some of the participants articulated non-comprehension in the listening 









This table shows that Spanish speakers articulated non-comprehension nine times 
instead of answering the question. Verbalizing non-comprehension in this context 
should not be confused with Spanish speakers volunteering they do not understand 
when there is no question pending. And even so, against these nine times Spanish 
speakers said they did not understand in lieu of giving an answer, they opted for 
answering the question 78 times without articulating non-comprehension and without 
fully understanding the sentence.  
Participants in FG 3 expressed their non-comprehension more explicitly because 
they were openly asked about the words or sentences they did not understand, and it 
was clear for everyone that it was the purpose of the meeting. Besides mentioning 
unfamiliar words, participants in FG 3 made some comments about the general 
difficulty of the language used in the sentences: “Para mí [es claro] porque lo explicó 
pero no por la oración” (To me [it is clear] because you explained it but not from the 
sentence) (P3), “Si hicieran una pregunta más corta con las palabras usuales o comunes, 
sí se entendería” (If they asked a shorter question with the usual or common words, it 
would be understood) (P2). Non-comprehension was also articulated by English 
speakers after the test was completed, as stated above, but in the form of a complaint.  
Not asking for a repetition or clarification before answering a question without 
understanding, which happened both in the listening comprehension test and in FG 3, 
also shows that participants opted for not verbalizing the fact that they did not 
understand. In fact, each irrelevant or nonsensical answer in the listening 
comprehension test is evidence of unarticulated non-comprehension. English speakers, 
on the other hand, asked for repetitions frequently. From the interpreters interviewed in 
the main study, only two stated that Spanish speakers might ask for clarification, and 
Table 16. Non-comprehension articulated 
 Instead After 
English speakers 2 1 
Spanish speakers group 1 7 5 
Spanish speakers group 2 2 1 
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one of them provided an example of a witness asking for clarification and the judge 
ordering him to stop talking (P5). All attorneys interviewed reported that Spanish-
speaking clients fail to ask for clarification or say when do not understand. The reasons 
offered by attorneys included feelings of embarrassment and intimidation:  
 
Spanish speakers, the clients that I’ve been dealing with, they’re much more 
intimidated by the process, much more hesitant to speak up and ask for 
clarification even when it’s apparent that I would not expect them to understand. 
English speakers tend to just say, “I don’t understand, I’m really confused.” (P8) 
 
Interpreters in FG 1 also showed agreement regarding Spanish speakers not 
asking for clarification when they do not understand, and made several comments in 
this regard: “Rarely have I met a defendant who will be truthful and say I don’t 
understand,” “Those are very few and far between that are assertive,” and “Most of the 
time, we know, they just say ‘Sí sí, yeah, I do understand.’” This “gratuitous 
acquiescence" phenomenon was discussed under (7) above. 
Non-comprehension was also observed in FG 3 each time participants said they 
understood but would keep silent when asked to repeat or rephrase the sentences after 
each simplification process. In some of these cases, I decided to ask about words 
participants had not flagged as unfamiliar to try to identify the problem, and found there 
were words they had not understood but failed to say so: en cuanto a (regarding), alegar 
(allege), and divulgar (disclose), for example. These words (and probably others) were 
not understood, although participants claimed to understand them. 
All attorneys interviewed in the main study reported that Spanish speakers answer 
questions without understanding: “they just won’t make any sense... answer something 
completely different, off topic” (P8), again interpreted as feelings of embarrassment, 
politeness, nervousness, pride, or because “they don’t wanna be a bother” (P4), “they 
don’t wanna look or feel that they’re dumb... they feel that that’s a sign of weakness” 
(P5). All interpreters interviewed in both studies reported that Spanish speakers claim to 
understand when the opposite is true, in one case even when the defendant did not speak 
Spanish but another indigenous language. They attribute it to cultural reasons, 
embarrassment, obligation, fear of angering the judge, receiving a harsher sentence, or 
“because they don’t wanna get beaten... Where they come from, up in Antigua or 
Guatemala, [if] you don’t say yes, you get slapped around. So their concept is yes, of 
course, whatever you want” (P9). Participants in FG 1 also showed agreement regarding 
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Spanish speakers not asking for clarification when they do not understand, or claiming 
they do when they actually do not. Participants in the pilot study also made comments 
in this regard: 
 
They rarely say they don’t [understand]. For many years, I’ve wondered why 
not... they assume it’s legal and they’re not even supposed to understand, that’s 
my conclusion because I’ve been wondering why they don’t. But I wonder the 
same thing when I see new interpreters sitting there and I know the guy is sitting 
at the table not getting a word of it. If you have a kid and you see the look of the 
first time they hear a word and they go “huh?” well you gotta know like a mother 
would know what the kid means, you just know when people get it or not. For 
years I’m waiting for someone to turn around and say “What the hell are they 
talking about?” ‘cause I’ve never heard it yet. (P4) 
 
 
Interpreters in FG 1 also showed awareness of Spanish speakers’ non-
comprehension, mostly due to differences in education levels, legal systems, and 
cultural traits. All participants in this focus group claimed to be able to tell when non-
English speakers do not understand, either by their answers or their body language. All 
interpreters interviewed both in the pilot and the main study also showed awareness of 
non-comprehension issues as a consequence of the high register of legal language. 
Furthermore, all interpreters from all components claimed to be able to tell when 
Spanish speakers do not understand, and the signs are many and diverse: facial 
expressions (the look of confusion, despair, looking down or away, a blank expression, 
staring, and frowning), body language (palpitations, sweating, rubbing hands, yawning, 
hanging the head, and nodding), and their answers (non-responsive answers, 
stammering, hesitation, false starts, pauses, longer answers, mumbling, asking more 
questions, saying “yes” too many times, talking directly to the interpreter, remaining 
silent, or using a higher register than the one they can handle). All these signs are 
contextualization cues that are interpretable mostly only by interpreters, because they 
share the language and either have constant interaction with members of Spanish 
speakers’ speech communities, or are members themselves. This is one of the main 
reasons interpreters can identify non-comprehension, as summarized by P1: “Because of 
the way they look at me I realize they do not understand.” In fact, mostly everyone can 
tell when the other in a conversation is not understanding; the opposite would be true 
only for speakers of other languages or non-members of the speech community. 
Furthermore, it is very easy for interpreters to know in advance that most Spanish 
speakers will not understand: interpreters themselves had to undergo years of 
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specialization after completing (at least) high school in order to understand this register, 
so without such specialization, non-comprehension can be expected. Nine of the 
attorneys interviewed also reported that Spanish speakers had difficulty understanding 
the case and the system, and that they could tell by the non-responsive answers they 
receive: “When the lawyer tells him, these are the consequences for the conviction of 
this charge, and they’re just like, ‘Oh, ok,’ it tends to be a sign that they didn’t quite 
understand” (P9). 
 In summary, these results confirmed that equal footing in terms of comprehension 
was not achieved in the listening comprehension test or in focus group 3, and also 
showed how interpreters as well as others who work with Spanish speakers can 
legitimately tell when Spanish speakers do not understand. Comprehension is 
fundamental for all three: the Spanish speaker, as a matter of justice; attorneys, to help 
their clients effectively; and interpreters, because one of the basic reasons for having an 
interpreter is “to enable the defendant to understand the proceedings” (CAJC 2013a: 8).  
10.3. Findings about factors that might enhance comprehension 
The first section of this chapter described some of the institutional norms established for 
court interpreters, and the way these norms might hinder comprehension by non-English 
speakers. Mainly, this relates to interpreters not being allowed to adjust the legal 
register to account for Spanish speakers’ lack of specialized domain education, and not 
being able to alert the parties when the Spanish speaker is having difficulty to 
understand the language. These norms, which are internalized by interpreters almost as 
rules, were articulated by every interpreter interviewed, such as P5 from the main study, 
who stated that “There’s ways an interpreter should go and rules an interpreter should 
follow without changing the registers. It’s not my place to either use a lower register 
word or explain what the word means, even if I see the person does not understand.” 
Regarding the norm preventing interpreters from adjusting the register, some 
participants also expressed their disagreement in certain terms, such as P1: “[Why do 
you think it’s important?] I don’t think it is. I do it because I have to”; P5, regarding 
simplifying the register: “I don’t feel comfortable... not because I don’t think it 
shouldn’t be done, but because of the repercussions,” and regarding interventions: “If it 
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was acceptable, if it was expected, I would” (P6). Attorneys interviewed also reported 
that these limitations are “unfortunate” (P5) and unhelpful for understanding (P1).  
The first section also described an ethical conflict: on one hand, the role of the 
interpreter is prescribed as facilitator of communication and of comprehension (CAJC 
2013a), and on the other hand, this context involves target-language receivers who 
cannot fully understand for reasons that were probably not considered when this code 
was developed. These particular target-language receivers do not have the cognitive, 
contextual, or world knowledge to understand the high legal register in a way that 
would allow them to communicate or make decisions based on this knowledge. Despite 
adherence to these norms, this research found that some interpreters do take the 
initiative to follow their professional sense instead, such as these participants 
interviewed in the main study:  
 
During the whispered part of the trial I do not keep the same register, because it’s 
impractical, because I can’t speak that many words by so many people so quickly 
at that level, because they’re not doing it for our benefit. They’re not trying to 
help the interpretation. And also I find the defendant or the witness is very 
confused by all of the speaking, so I lower the register and I tend to summarize in 
order to make sure they understand what’s happening. (P3) 
 
So if that means we have to interrupt up to an attorney, even a judge, a prosecutor, 
whatever, even a witness... And it’s up to us, we are the orchestra leaders. We 
direct, it’s not every interpreter who knows that. The more experienced I get, the 
older I get, the more sure of myself I am in a courtroom, the less hesitant am I to 
interrupt. (P4) 
 
I do change the register for the sake of making sure my listener understands. I do 
it for the defendant... and even at the witness stand. My choice of words does not 
necessarily change the meaning, nor do I consider it changing the register when I 
simply use more common terms or a different word to make myself understood. 
That’s the difference between a new interpreter and a seasoned one, you develop a 
common sense approach to interpreting, it becomes more intuitive. Lastly, the 
more comfortable you are in the delivery the less you'll be questioned as to your 
choices. (P6) 
 
Although some experienced interpreters might feel comfortable interrupting or 
adjusting the language register in all settings, others expressed many reasons for not 
doing so, as reviewed in the first section. Besides adhering to the norms and the 
institutional decorum, there are also personal reasons: fear of repercussions, of third 
parties listening and reporting interpreters, being seen as an advocate, appearing 
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argumentative or difficult, not wanting the be part of the record, and guilt. All these 
reasons involve risks, and these risks might carry consequences that interpreters might 
not be willing to face. However, interpreters are not without resources. This ethical and 
professional conflict has led interpreters to find opportunities to intervene when the risk 
is not that high. One way or another, interpreters seem to find strategies to address the 
gap between the legal register and non-English speakers’ comprehension level, in most 
cases depending on the setting, the record being the main determining factor. The code 
makes no reference to a different application of norms according to the setting; 
however, based on interpreters’ responses, the setting does seem to play a role. This 
difference is also acknowledged by some attorneys, such as P6: “you have to distinguish 
between the interpreter during the deposition and the interpreters during the preparation, 
‘cause I think their roles are somewhat different.” All interpreters interviewed reported 
that the setting affects their interpreting style, mostly in terms of the strategies they 
might use to facilitate comprehension and the freedom to step out of the prescribed role, 
as described by participants in the pilot study: “What you can do or the possibilities of 
your role are different in an informal or a formal setting because of reality” (P4), and 
“I’m more at liberty to be an explainer and a clarifier if there is no record being done” 
(P2). In the main study, except for one participant admitting to simplifying the register 
and then denying it, all interpreters reported that they simplify the register either in 
formal settings, informal settings, or both: “I just started taking away the unnecessary 
words that were convoluted without changing the register of the verb or anything, but I 
did it because I figured I could have been speaking Chinese and the person was not 
gonna react so I might as well get him something” (P4, pilot study). The most surprising 
finding was the diversity of strategies to facilitate comprehension used by interpreters 
when they feel they are safe, mostly in informal settings, in private meetings, or even in 
the hallway. These strategies include: 
- Simplifying the register 
- Intervening to ask attorneys to simplify the register 
- Intervening to ask permission to simplify the register 
- Intervening to alert attorneys about non-comprehension 
- Maintaining the register but adding a few words for clarification 
- Clarifying concepts to the non-English speaker outside the room 
- Maintaining the register and repeating the message with simplified register 
- Warning non-English speakers about the limitations of the interpreter’s role  
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- Advising the non-English speaker before the proceeding to speak up in case of 
non-comprehension 
- Using a slow and louder rendition or body language to indicate to attorneys that 
the register is too high or that there is no comprehension (eye contact, shrug)  
 
Interpreters’ deviation from norms has already been described in the literature 
(Hale 1997, 2004, Jacobsen 2002, Berk-Seligson 1990, 1999, Rigney 1999, Shlesinger 
1991, Morris 1989, among others). Like some of the deviations found in these studies, 
the deviations found in this study are intentional strategies used to facilitate 
comprehension. Interpreters make conscious decisions based on personal, ethical, and 
professional values and attitudes toward established institutional norms, and deviate 
from them when they feel communication and comprehension will improve by doing so. 
This shows that although most interpreters interviewed follow the norms in formal 
settings, informal settings seem to give them the freedom to deviate from these norms to 
facilitate comprehension when the risk of criticism or challenge is not that high, or to 
address conflicts between these norms and professional and personal ethics. The 
following is an example of a frequent conflict faced by interpreters, and the different 
strategies they might use to address it. This case was described by a participant in focus 
group 1: 
 
I disqualified myself at a deposition when the defense attorney didn’t allow me to 
inquire from the witness, and at that point I told the defense attorney that the 
interpreter wasn’t able to continue interpreting, and would have to disqualify 
herself. So he of course said, “What are you talking about?” And I said “Well, 
you’re not allowing me to inquire from the witness and I’m quite sure that if I just 
interpret what he’s saying I might be mistaken, the interpreter might be mistaken, 
so I am not able to continue.” So he said “Ok fine, inquire from the witness.” It 
was quite obvious to me that, because the gentleman was from Mexico, and he 
kept referring to his mano, I pretty much knew that he was referring to the entire 
arm, especially when he’s pointing to the entire arm throughout the entire 
deposition so I couldn’t just say mano, I had to go with arm. So, but the reason 
why I’m saying it is because as soon as I said “My entire arm hurts” or “My right 
arm hurts” he said “You see? That’s why I didn’t want you to inquire.” And there 
is a reason behind that, no le conviene [it’s detrimental for him] because this 
gentleman has been to many medical appointments where he’s been asked by the 
examiners “What’s your problem?” And he said mano and they’ve been 
concentrating on the mano. And right now when the qualified or certified 
interpreter just said on the record that mano actually means arm, his claim is 
valid. (P9) 
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This interpreter had to choose between interfering with legal strategy, or 
preventing an injured person from receiving treatment and compensation for his arm. 
This is a typical conflict of professional vs. personal ethics that interpreters face often. 
As described in 3.4.2. above, some Spanish speakers often use the term mano (hand) to 
describe the arm, pie (foot) to refer to the leg, and cintura (waist) to refer to the low 
back (see chapter 3). To explore this issue, the interview included several questions 
about the action interpreters might consider appropriate in different circumstances in 
which a witness would use the term mano: while pointing to the arm in plain view; 
while pointing to the arm only in the interpreter’s view; without pointing but with 
interpreter’s knowledge of the case; and without pointing and absent any prior 
knowledge. Dueñas González et al. state that “When the witness points to a part of his 
or her body to describe where an injury occurred or where the pain is felt, the interpreter 
should simply interpret whatever the witness said... and let the other parties see where 
the witness is pointing” (2012: 1105). The code of ethics states the following in this 
regard:  
 
It is up to the attorney—not the interpreter—to describe any physical movement 
made by the witness so that the transcript will accurately reflect it (for example, 
by saying, “Let the record reflect that the witness has pointed to her right 
shoulder”)... If the attorney does not notice the gesture or chooses to ignore it, the 
interpreter should not interject or act as an expert witness except as a last resort 
and only if the gesture at issue is vital to the testimony. In this case, you may 
politely inform the judge that nonverbal testimony accompanied the response, or 
that the witness responded only with a gesture, but do not offer any further 
information or explanation unless asked to give it by the judge or one of the 
attorneys. (CAJC 2013a: 11) 
 
However, the findings from this exercise showed the widest array of strategies:  
 
Table 5. Summary results – hand/arm scenarios  
 S 1 S 2 S 3 S 4 
Interpret mano as hand with no comment 45% 25% 50% 50% 
Interpret mano as hand with comment about pointing 10% 20%   
Interpret mano as hand with comment about dual meaning   10% 20% 
Interpret mano as arm 5% 5% 10%  
Request to clarify the term before attempting a translation 20% 10% 20% 20% 
Comment about pointing before attempting a translation 10% 30%   
Comment about dual meaning before attempting a translation 10% 10% 10% 10% 
 
Not only in these scenarios but throughout the interviews, the most remarkable 
finding was the wide diversity of answers and strategies among participants who follow 
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the same code and comply with the same norms, working with the same population and 
the same language combination. This diversity may be caused by a combination of 
many factors, some of which were reviewed in this study. First, since there is no 
specific education requirement to practice, interpreters may prepare for the exam (and 
the profession) in many different ways. Some interpreters may attend certification 
programs, some may receive private individual training, and some may prepare on their 
own. Even among those who attend interpreting programs, these programs do not 
follow specific rules regarding content and structure; and although they may be similar, 
instructors are mostly court interpreters who teach from their own experience and 
approach. Second, the degree of familiarity with the setting and the judges or attorneys 
may give interpreters more confidence to do what they believe could or should be done. 
As expressed by some respondents, if they know the attorney or the judge, or if they are 
working out of court, they may proceed differently. Third, there are personal differences 
regarding their individual idea of the interpreter’s role, what it entails, and what 
interpreters can and cannot do, or should or should not do. In other terms, the degree of 
exposure or involvement interpreters are willing to invest to facilitate comprehension or 
to get a clear record. Fourth, not all attorneys and judges are thoroughly familiar with 
the interpreting profession and the interpreter’s duties, and in consequence, some 
venues may be more rigorous or more lenient than others. Fifth, as described above, 
there are many Spanish varieties at play, including the U.S. Spanish variety. This may 
lead some interpreters to ask for clarification of unfamiliar terms that may be familiar to 
others. Lastly, although the code is presented and perceived as a strict set of norms that 
must be followed, it does leave many decisions in the hands of interpreters, who must 
use their best judgment to interrupt or not, or make a comment or not; in other words, to 
be seen or not. As with the hand/arm scenarios described above, other sections in the 
code leave decisions in the hands of interpreters (CAJC 2013a): 
1) Regarding clarifications, although the code provides that interpreters should do their 
best not to intervene during courtroom proceedings, it also acknowledges interpreters 
may need at times to clarify a term so the record is accurate. The standard states “For 
the most part, stepping out of the role of interpreter should be undertaken with great 
caution ... if communication begins to break down and you feel you can easily resolve 
the issue ... if it appears that the attorney will be able to clarify the situation through 
follow-up questions...” Using caution, “feeling” one can solve the issue, and acting (or 
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not) on a belief that counsel will clarify the issue, all seem to involve and imply 
personal decisions (p. 4). 
2) Regarding repetitions and redundancies, interpreters are expected to translate exactly 
what was said including repeated words and hesitations, except “in the case of persons 
who stutter due to a physiological or psychological condition.” Is the interpreter 
qualified to determine if each repetition or redundancy is physiological, psychological, 
or otherwise? In the case of repetitions used for emphasis, such as the example provided 
in the code “she was talking and talking,” the code provides a) “it is acceptable and may 
be more idiomatically correct to convey the meaning using a corresponding linguistic 
device of the target language, such as “she kept on talking,” and b) “However, giving a 
literal interpretation may not be wrong either,” concluding with “as is often the case in 
interpretation work, it comes down to using your best judgment” (p. 5-6). 
3) Regarding emotions shown by witnesses or counsel, interpreters should preserve 
them “through moderate voice modulation,” where “moderate” is a subjective term, 
again, subject to the interpreter’s criteria (p. 10). 
4) Regarding non-verbal communication, as stated above, interpreters should intervene 
“as a last resort and only if the gesture at issue is vital to the testimony,” leaving this 
legal decision to the interpreter (p. 11). 
5) Regarding misunderstandings, interpreters should not attempt to clarify them unless 
“communication breaks down and it is apparent from the questions and answers that 
false assumptions are being made due to cultural or linguistic misunderstandings,” 
concluding again with “be very cautious about intervening in the process.” What is 
apparent depends on individual perception, on which interpreters should base their 
decision using caution, also based on personal decisions (p. 16). 
Attorneys interviewed both in the main and the pilot study also reported using 
strategies to facilitate comprehension and favoring interpreter interventions to alert them 
when it is not achieved. Attorneys also mentioned how they cope with the situation: “I 
go to great lengths to make sure they understand” (P2), “Constantly I’m asking, ‘Ok did 
you understand that? Does it make sense?’” (P3), and “You have to ask them if you feel 
that they’re not understanding, and you have to help them” (P4). Besides using simpler 
terms, more cultural examples, or repeating instructions several times to make sure non-
English speakers understand, attorneys also hope to find in the interpreter an ally to 
work with as though on a team. Interpreter interventions were characterized by 
attorneys as positive: a sign of a good interpreter, sensitivity toward the client, a source 
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of learning, legal integrity, working as a team, and a sign of experience. All attorneys 
stated that they hope to find an interpreter who would alert them when there are cultural 
differences, or comprehension or communication problems, and not work like a “robot,” 
“literally,” or “automatically.” Attorneys interviewed in the pilot study would also 
welcome interpreters’ interventions, as stated by P2: “... there is a duty and it is an 
affirmative duty to say ‘Look, may the interpreter inquire?’... That’s I think where an 
interpreter could have a duty, if you will, to assist” (P2), and attorneys from the main 
study:  
 
And actually those are the good interpreters for me. The ones that are able to stop 
me and say, “Listen I don’t think your client is getting it,” or “May I explain it in 
a different way?” And I usually appreciate that, I’ve learned so much that way. I 
get caught up in my legalese so I don’t know how to bring it down to my client’s 
level, and a good interpreter is able to do that. I know they’re not supposed to, 
unfortunately, but it usually helps me a lot and I’ve learned a lot from interpreters 
that do that. (P5) 
 
If I’m not being clear or it’s not coming out right, I would like an interpreter who 
will say, “You know, you didn’t explain it right” or whatever, who would help me 
clarify. To say that the client is not understanding it doesn’t happen very often, 
not enough. I wish they would do it more. If the interpreter is actually 
conscientious, I would say, and not just going by the book, sometimes... rarely in 
the depo[sition] will they say, “They didn’t understand the question,” but 
occasionally. I wish they’d work as a team a little bit with me. (P10) 
 
 
In this sense, attorneys also showed behavior that deviates from the norm, as 
interpreters’ expertise is valued and taken into account particularly to advise them 
where communication might not be achieved. 
Although the average educational level of English speakers is twice as high as that 
of Spanish speakers, and although English speakers have been exposed to the U.S. legal 
system, the government has taken further steps to assure English speakers fully 
understand legal language, such as the redrafting of jury instructions and plain language 
legislation. Although the simplification of legal language and general legal education is 
supported by many scholars (Tiersma 1999, Bhatia 1993, Eagleson 1991, Aiken 1960, 
Hyland 1986, among others), this simplification is mainly addressed to written texts and 
not to judicial proceedings. In few places other than the courtroom is full 
comprehension necessary, a context in which, as in a medical examination, the Spanish 
speaker’s life or wellbeing might be at stake. But Spanish speakers cannot be 
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realistically expected to learn the U.S. legal system, complete 14 years of formal 
education, and acquire specialized domain terminology in order to access the legal 
register, nor can judges and attorneys be realistically expected to conduct trials in 
Spanish, or discuss motions and objections in standard English. In other words, neither 
side can be expected to adjust to the register of the other side. However, both sides must 
communicate, this communication must be effective, and the responsibility for this 
successful communication lies with the interpreter (CAJC 2013a: 28). If comprehension 
is so paramount to the preservation of justice, it is no wonder interpreters might take 
matters into their hands and attempt to bridge this gap to fulfill their task in keeping 
with the skopos of the interaction. 
Several strategies seem to come into play when interpreters perceive a conflict 
between established norms and target constraints, perceived as a conflict of role, norms, 
and skopoi. While interpreters do their utmost to abide by the norms because they “have 
to” or because not doing so would mean violating the code, being criticized, being seen 
as an advocate, interfering with legal strategy or merely because of fear, they do find or 
create opportunities to simplify the register, warn attorneys when Spanish speakers do 
not understand, add words for clarification, or simply ask (and receive) permission to 
adjust the register. In this sense, even if not in plain view, interpreters do behave as the 
experts who make translation decisions based on target constraints, as suggested by 
skopos theory. The interpreter does not always make expert decisions due to external 
impositions and restrictions on the role that are beyond interpreters’ control, but it is a 
definite possibility, one that occurs only when it is allowed, or when circumstances 
permit. As observed in the results, a new set of ethical norms seems to materialize in a 
way that contradicts established official norms. This “common sense” approach is not 
learned and is rarely observed in plain view. If interpreters did not receive any other 
training or instructions than these established norms, and are expected by authorities 
and colleagues to abide by them, where do these other norms originate? The motivation 
seems to arise from a place that lies deeper than professional expectations: from the 
interpreter anticipating unarticulated expectancy norms, from a perceived 
incompatibility between established norms and reality, or from the humane feeling of 
acknowledging the need of the other, linked to the perceived and prescribed 
professional duty of communicating. This was expressed by interpreters in terms such as 
“the point is to be able to communicate... that’s what interpreting is all about” (P8). The 
new requirements to improve language services for LEPs introduced by Title VI afford 
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the interpreter a broader role to enhance comprehension by non-English speakers, as 
articulated by the Department of Justice: 
 
There may be languages which do not have an appropriate direct interpretation of 
some courtroom or legal terms and the interpreter should be so aware and be able 
to provide the most appropriate interpretation. The interpreter should likely make 
the recipient aware of the issue and the interpreter and recipient can then work to 
develop a consistent and appropriate set of descriptions of these terms in that 
language that can be used again, when appropriate. (USDJ 2015b) 
 
This requirement, however, has not been incorporated into the code of ethics. This 
quote was shared with interpreters in focus group 1, who found it liberating and 
empowering: “I have a comment concerning this order. It almost like, it trumps 
everything else. It sort of gives the interpreter permission to do what we’re supposed to 
do” (P2), “I’m gonna start reading this order before every freaking deposition” (P7), and 
“The quotes that you have shared are very revealing to me and actually very liberating 
as well, because I feel that it’s empowering what we are already doing, which is a 
tendency to want to help people, and both sides, to be understood” (P2). This seems to 
substantiate the underlying communicative nature of the interpreter’s role as prescribed 
in the code, which finds a way to materialize even when established norms would not 
seem to facilitate it, or when the verbatim requirement may lead to a breakdown in 
communication. Based on the results of this study and at least in this particular 
communicative context, it would seem that established norms are precisely what 
prevent interpreters from meeting the equal-footing purpose defined within the judicial 
system.  
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Chapter 11. Conclusion 
 
According to the code of ethics for court interpreters, the purpose of providing an 
interpreter during judicial proceedings is to place English speakers and non-English 
speakers on an equal footing, and facilitating comprehension and communication. The 
code also requires that interpreters convey both the content and the form of the source 
message, including the high register of legal language. The literature reviewed on the 
sociocultural and educational characteristics of Spanish speakers in California, the 
features of legal language and divergent legal systems, and the limited options afforded 
to interpreters in the code, suggest that this purpose might not always be achieved. The 
primary aim of this research study has been to test this equal footing claim by 
comparing the comprehension levels achieved by English speakers and Spanish 
speakers, and to explore the possibility of enhancing this comprehension level by 
simplifying the language register. The secondary aim of this research study has been to 
gather information from lay Spanish speakers, interpreters, and attorneys, to better 
understand how and what each of them contribute to the construction of meaning during 
this intercultural communicative event. To answer these questions, it was first necessary 
to examine each constraining angle individually: the setting, the participants, the 
languages, the purpose(s), and the institutional norms established for this interaction.  
11.1. Key findings from the literature reviewed 
- California is home to the largest immigrant population in the nation—Hispanics—who 
have surpassed the White population since 2014. The average educational attainment 
level reported for this population is 6-8 years of schooling, and the average reported 
for English speakers is 13.5 years of schooling.  
- Due to their immigrant status, Spanish speakers lack sufficient familiarity with the 
U.S. legal system to understand the law and make informed decisions. English 
speakers, on the other hand, are exposed to this legal system through personal 
experience, school, and the media.  
- Sociocultural traits such as pride, respect, and fear of authority might lead Hispanics to 
avoid disagreement and conceal non-comprehension, a phenomenon known as 
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“gratuitous acquiescence" or “gratuitous concurrence” (Berk Seligson 2009: 104, 
Dueñas González et al. 2012: 195, Buys et al. 2010: 471). 
- The Spanish language variety spoken by most Hispanics in California bears a strong 
influence of English, which is evidenced in borrowings, code switching, anglicisms, 
and calques. Several studies have shown that the language used by most Spanish 
speakers in California does not include high registers (Silva-Corvalan 1991, Valdés 
and Geoffrion-Vinci 1998, Said-Mohand 2011, Sánchez Muñoz 2007). English is the 
high-register language of power and business, while Spanish is the low-register, casual 
language of everyday interactions (Valdés 2000, Roca 2000, Giambruno 2007, 
Mendoza-Denton 1999, Otheguy et al. 2010: 86). This lack of professional register 
development is also true for interpreter candidates attempting the certification exams 
(Dueñas González et al. 2012: 1177).  
- Although the interpreter is deemed an officer of the court, a medium of 
communication, and an expert witness, established norms prevent the interpreter from 
adjusting the register to adapt the language to the educational and sociocultural 
constraints of the target-language receiver, and from alerting the parties in cases of 
non-comprehension. This assumes that the only difference between the English 
speaker and the Spanish speaker is the language, and that this gap can be overcome by 
providing an interpreter. 
- There is no education requirement to become a court interpreter, but the difficulty and 
the low passing rates of the certification exams make it necessary to undertake some 
type of training, whether institutionally or privately. The training programs, however, 
only prepare interpreters for the exam and lack components of intercultural 
communication, pragmatics, or comparative law, among others relevant subjects. 
Features of legal register and legal language are not part of these programs either, so 
newly-certified interpreters start working without a sound knowledge foundation that 
would assist them in complying with the register standard or understanding its 
implications.   
- The language of the law, “a profession-specific, relatively antiquated, and anomalous 
category of English” (Dueñas González et al. 2012: 749), does not resemble everyday 
language or the variety spoken by this particular Hispanic community. Besides the 
commonly known features of vocabulary, ambiguity, polysemy, unusual syntax, and 
high abstraction, the legal language makes use of referents outside the world 
knowledge of the Spanish speaker. This system, culture, and context-bound variety has 
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been called a restricted language (Halliday et al. 1964: 96), a sub-language (Danet 
1985, Ferguson 1994, Gemar 2006: 69), a dialect (Charrow et al. 1978), and a 
language in its own right (Hatim and Munday 2004: 77). 
- Studies by Dueñas González (1977) and Moore et al. (1999), among others, showed 
that access to legal register requires 14 years and 12 years of formal education, 
respectively. Moore et al. also indicate that besides schooling, understanding legal 
language at the same level as an English speaker would also require familiarity with 
legal vocabulary.   
- Studies about comprehension of English legal language have prompted authorities to 
redraft California jury instructions and enact legislation to require a simpler and more 
accessible language that the (English-speaking) jurors can understand. Although Title 
VI would seem to afford interpreters a degree of freedom to use terminology that 
would be more accessible to Spanish speakers, this freedom has not been incorporated 
into the code of ethics. 
- Every account of understanding shows that achieving comprehension during 
communication requires 1) knowledge of the world and specific domains to make 
sense of discourse, 2) knowledge of language use in context, or communicative 
competence, and 3) world, domain and language knowledge shared by participants. 
- Comprehension of legal language has been shown to be difficult, even for English 
speakers and law students, who experience it as a foreign language (Alcaraz Varó 
1994: 72), and people with little or no education may not understand it at all 
(Mikkelson 2000: 60).  
- Legal register accessibility requires specialized education and interaction in specific 
speech communities (Schleppegrell 2004, Ure 1982, Melinkoff 1982: 109, Dueñas 
González et al. 2012: 709). Furthermore, “No interpreter can be expected to have 
mastered all areas of specialized terminology” (CAJC 2013a: 30). 
- The purpose of the interpreter is to provide an equal footing for non-English speakers 
and facilitate comprehension and communication (CAJC 2013a), which is consistent 
with NCSC in that every litigant must show a “complete understanding” of courtroom 
language “in order to achieve equal access to justice for all” (2013).  
 
In brief, the gap between the high legal register and the lack of Spanish speakers’ 
access to said register is mediated by an interpreter who is not able to make any kind of 
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adaptation for either speaker. In such an uneven intercultural communicative event, 
non-comprehension can be expected. 
11.2. Key empirical findings 
1. The first question this research study aimed to answer was whether English speakers 
and Spanish speakers would show the same level of comprehension of legal language, 
in other words, whether the equal footing purpose would be achieved. To this end, a 
listening comprehension test was designed, tested in a pilot study, and adjusted. This 
test was then used in the main study with a group of English speakers and a group of 
Spanish speakers, who listened to sentences with the same legal register and were asked 
to answer a question to assess comprehension. The results of this test indicated that the 
average level of comprehension for English speakers was 59 percent, and the average 
level of comprehension for Spanish speakers was 3 percent, nearly twenty times lower 
than the scores achieved by English speakers. Similar findings were obtained in a focus 
group with lay Spanish speakers who met to discuss the comprehension difficulties in 
the sentences used in the test. Although the population sample in this test was rather 
small, the test indicated that the equal footing purpose was not achieved.  
 
2. The second question this research study aimed to answer was whether Spanish 
speakers’ comprehension would improve by simplifying the legal register. To this end, 
a second test was administered to another group of Spanish speakers who listened to the 
same sentences with a simplified register, also followed by a question to assess 
comprehension. The average comprehension level achieved by this group was 37 
percent, still much lower than the scores achieved by English speakers in the first test. 
Although the equal footing purpose was not achieved in this test either, register 
simplification did lead to improved comprehension. 
 
3. The third question this research study aimed to answer was related to interpreters’ 
views on register, register adjustment, and intervention. To answer these questions, 
semi-structured interviews were conducted with certified court interpreters working in 
California with this population. The results showed that the interpreters interviewed 
lack enough information about register, register features, and the significance and 
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implications of register adjustment. However, they acknowledge the comprehension gap 
caused by the inaccessibility of the legal register for Spanish speakers and their inability 
to articulate non-comprehension. The results also showed that although most 
interpreters follow established institutional norms in plain view, they do not necessarily 
agree with them, and instead follow a different set of norms that were not learned or 
prescribed. Consequently, interpreters use a wide variety of strategies to bridge said gap 
when the risk of exposure is low. These strategies include register simplification (on 
their own initiative or with attorneys’ permission), clarification, explicitation, and 
intervention to alert attorneys in cases of non-comprehension, among others.  
 
4. The fourth question this research study aimed to answer was related to attorneys’ 
views on Spanish speakers’ comprehension and interpreter interventions. To answer 
these questions, semi-structured interviews were conducted with attorneys working in 
California with this population. The results showed that attorneys acknowledge Spanish 
speakers’ lack of familiarity with the legal system, lack of comprehension of the 
language used, and inability to articulate non-comprehension. Furthermore, attorneys 
welcome and value interpreters’ interventions, as they consider them part of a team 
working together to achieve the purpose of communication. Attorneys also reported 
asking interpreters to intervene and simplify the language to improve Spanish speakers’ 
comprehension. 
 
Based on the above findings, the following conclusions can be formulated: 
 
1. Established institutional norms prevent interpreters from achieving the equal footing 
purpose 
2. To attempt to achieve this purpose, interpreters behave as experts when 
circumstances allow and the risk of criticism or challenge is low 
3. To attempt to achieve this purpose, attorneys expect and request interpreters’ 
intervention and cooperation  
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11.3. Limitations of this study 
The first limitation of this study relates to the fact that the courts still do not allow live 
recording of the proceedings, and the transcripts only contain the English version. 
Consequently, most data regarding interpreters’ attitude toward register adjustment and 
intervention had to be collected through semi-structured interviews and focus groups 
rather than observation. The second limitation of this study is the statistical significance 
of the findings, which cannot be generalized without further research. It was my 
intention to possibly expand the number of participants for the listening comprehension 
test. However, the “legal” content of the instruments and the request to sign a consent 
form were enough to dissuade many Spanish speakers from participating. Another 
limitation of this study was related to the sentences selected for the listening 
comprehension test. Although they were representative of the legal language 
interpreters commonly find at work, and although they were condensed following the 
pilot study, the sentences still proved to be very difficult for Spanish speakers. 
Consequently, arriving at a more meticulous analysis of comprehension with this 
population might require the use of simpler language, and possibly of individual terms. 
11.4. Implications for future research 
1. Non-English speakers must understand judicial proceedings in order to be fully 
present, as required by the fundamental principle of fairness afforded by law (NCSC 
2013, DOJ 2015, ABA 2012: 20). Non-comprehension by Spanish speakers, in this 
case, implies that their ability to participate and make informed decisions on their 
welfare and future might be impaired. Given the limited size of the population 
sample used in this study, further research is needed to assess the comprehension 
levels achieved by this and other non-English-speaking populations in California. As 
in this study, further research should include non-English speakers’ feedback and 
participation in the process. To prevent issues related to fear and distrust and 
improve participants’ involvement, focus groups are recommended because mutual 
support among members helps promote participation by reducing feelings of anxiety 
and uncertainty.  
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2. Legal language is the instrument attorneys and judges use to apply the law. It is 
therefore understandable that legal authorities fear that interpreters’ intervention or 
register adjustment might interfere with legal strategy. This intervention or 
simplification, however, does not interfere with legal strategy when the legal 
discourse is not addressed to the non-English speaker, who might not achieve the 
comprehension that is legally required for non-English speakers to be fully present. 
If the purpose of providing an interpreter is to facilitate comprehension, further 
research is needed on the ways this could be facilitated. Translation and 
communication theories offer an ample theoretical basis for developing strategic 
ways to facilitate communication in judicial proceedings.  
3. There are millions of Spanish speakers in California, and almost two thousand court 
interpreters working with this population. Although the sample was small, the high 
level of similarity and agreement among interpreters in all components of this study 
suggests that it is possible to come closer to achieving the equal footing purpose 
through the implementation of different strategies. These strategies, however, are not 
consistent with current established norms for court interpreting, which are still 
guided by principles of formal equivalence and source orientedness. Further research 
is needed on the effectiveness of the code of ethics in order to learn, through 
observation of professional interpreters at work, the best practices they use to 
achieve the equal footing purpose in this setting and with this population. In addition, 
further research could benefit from using focus groups, as these have been an 
excellent forum for interpreters to discuss openly their views on role constraints and 
possibilities.  
4. This research has drawn on the fields of sociolinguistics, ethnography studies, 
intercultural communication, comparative law, psycholinguistics, and translation 
theory, among others. This is evidence of the interdisciplinarity that has come to be 
indispensable in order to understand and explore this unique interaction. Further 
research should contemplate the combination of different approaches in order to take 
advantage of what each can offer toward expanding the understanding of this 
intercultural communicative event.  
5. Finally, further research is needed in the area of interpreter education, which is of 
utmost significance both for increasing the number of qualified and certified 
interpreters, and improving the proper delivery of professional interpreting services. 
Numerous scholars have described the subjects that should be part of interpreter 
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education programs, many of which are lacking in California’s programs: 
intercultural communication, pragmatics, discourse analysis, comparative law, 
professional ethics, and translation theory, among others. Further research should 
explore the educational needs of this particular population, taking into account the 
disparity between language proficiencies, the lack of professional register 
development, and possibly the incorporation of aspects of heritage learner pedagogy. 
The first step in this direction might be a thorough assessment of interpreting 
students’ demographics in California. 
 
It is my hope that despite its limited number of participants, this study represents 
a valuable contribution to the field of Interpreting Studies, and a first step toward 
exploring the target-language receiver’s side of this interaction. This research study is 
important because, to the best of my knowledge, it is the first one to explore the 
effectiveness of providing court interpreters for the purpose of achieving the equal 
footing claim, and it is the first to explore target-language receivers’ comprehension and 
feedback about this effectiveness. Given the limited sample size in this research study, it 
is my hope that other researchers will be motivated to continue this avenue of research 
and develop other productive methods to study and understand this fundamental issue. It 
is also my hope that these results will invite judicial authorities to take a closer look at 
the role interpreters should play in judicial proceedings in California, cause program 
directors to advance and revise the training for court interpreters to include the 
fundamental aspects of theory and professional role, and encourage fellow court 
interpreters to reflect on their profession in a different light: they might explore the 
significance of the set of norms that seems to guide them in their decisions when 
nobody is looking, and which they use to foster what Participant 4 in focus group 1 
called a “tendency to want to help people, and both sides, to be understood.”   
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Appendix 1. Consent form - English 
Intercultural Studies Group, Universitat Rovira i Virgili 
Tarragona, Spain 
 
Consent to Participate in a Research Study: 
Comprehension of Legal Discourse in Interpreter-Mediated Judicial Proceedings 
 
You are invited to participate in a research study conducted by Julia Lambertini Andreotti. This 
research focuses on the treatment of legal language used during judicial proceedings. 
Approximately 50 individuals will participate in the study, and each individual's participation 
will last between 10 minutes and 3 hours. All tests and activities will be recorded. 
 
The purpose of this research is to investigate the comprehension of legal discourse in interpreted 
judicial proceedings. Your participation may involve taking part in an interview, a short English 
into Spanish translation exercise, a short listening comprehension test, or a discussion in a focus 
group.  
 
All your responses will be confidential (in the sense that your name will not appear in any 
public records or publications) and only Julia Lambertini Andreotti and her research assistants 
will have access to these data. The data will be used over the next three years, although they will 
be retained indefinitely as records. If a report of this study is published, or the results are 
presented at a professional conference, no identifiable information will be provided that could 
relate the results to your name.  
 
Participation in this study is voluntary. You may choose not to participate, and you may 
withdraw at any time. In addition, you may choose not to answer any questions with which you 
are not comfortable. There are no risks, benefits, or compensation associated to participation in 
this study. All documentation and recordings are the property of the researcher. 
 
You are free to ask questions concerning the procedure. If you would like more information 
about this research, you can contact Julia Lambertini Andreotti at jlatran@att.net. All questions 
about your rights as a research subject should be directed toward the current chair of the Ethics 
Committee, Dr. Anthony Pym, at anthony.pym@urv.cat. 
 
I have read and I understand the above. I have been offered a copy of this informed consent 
form. 
 
    
Participant's Signature  Date 
 
  
Participant's Printed Name 
 
 
I have explained and defined in detail the research procedure in which the participant has agreed 
to participate, and have offered the participant a copy of this informed consent form. 
 
    
Investigator's Signature  Date 
 
Julia Lambertini Andreotti 
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Appendix 2. Consent form - Spanish 
Intercultural Studies Group, Universitat Rovira i Virgili 
Tarragona, España 
 
Consentimiento para participar en un estudio de investigación: 
Comprensión del discurso jurídico en procedimientos judiciales interpretados al 
español 
 
Se le invita a participar en un estudio de investigación a cargo de Julia Lambertini Andreotti. El 
propósito de este estudio es investigar la comprensión del lenguaje jurídico en los 
procedimientos judiciales en los que hay intérpretes. Participarán alrededor de 50 personas en el 
estudio, y la participación de cada persona durará entre treinta minutos y una hora. Su 
participación puede incluir un ejercicio de comprensión auditiva o un diálogo grupal sobre la 
comprensión de cierto texto jurídico en español. 
 
Todas sus respuestas son confidenciales, es decir, su nombre no aparecerá en ningún documento 
ni en ninguna publicación, y solo Julia Lambertini Andreotti y sus asistentes tendrán acceso a 
los datos. Sus respuestas se usarán durante los próximos tres años pero se conservarán para 
siempre. Si se publica un informe de este estudio, o si los resultados se presentan en un 
congreso profesional, no se proporcionará información que pueda relacionar los resultados con 
su nombre. 
 
La participación en el estudio es voluntaria. Puede decidir no participar, y puede abandonar el 
estudio en cualquier momento. Asimismo, puede decidir no responder ninguna pregunta con la 
que no se sienta cómodo. Este estudio no tiene riesgos, beneficios, ni compensación alguna. 
Toda la documentación y las grabaciones son propiedad de la investigadora. 
 
Si desea obtener más información, puede comunicarse con Julia Lambertini Andreotti 
(jlatran@att.net). Todas las preguntas sobre sus derechos como participante en una 
investigación se deben dirigir al presidente del Comité de Ética, Dr. Anthony Pym, 
(anthony.pym@urv.cat).  
 
He leído y entiendo este documento, del cual se me ha ofrecido una copia. 
 
    




Nombre del participante 
 
 
Le he explicado el procedimiento del estudio en detalle al firmante, quien ha decidido participar, 
y le he ofrecido una copia de este formulario de consentimiento con conocimiento previo. 
 
    
Firma de la investigadora  Fecha 
 
Julia Lambertini Andreotti 
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Appendix 3. Pilot study. Listening comprehension test 
Pilot study - English speakers - Question 1 
1. A witness who is willfully false in one material aspect of his or her testimony is to be distrusted in others. You 
may reject the whole testimony of a witness who willfully has testified falsely as to a material point, unless, from all 
the evidence, you believe the probability of truth favors his or her testimony in other particulars. Question: what 
should you do when a witness is willfully false in one material aspect of his or her testimony? 
Participant 1 Well, I consider them to be a liar 
Participant 2 I wouldn't believe them 
 
Pilot study - English speakers - Question 2 
2. Circumstantial evidence is evidence that, if found to be true, proves a fact from which an inference of the existence 
of another fact may be drawn. A factual inference is a deduction that may logically and reasonably be drawn from 
one or more facts established by the evidence. Question: What is circumstantial evidence? 
Participant 1 It's not exactly scientific, it’s not proven, it's... we have this evidence and you’re supposed to make a 
judgment based on this but it might be leading into something else without actually being factual 
Participant 2 I’m not exactly sure how to phrase it 
 
Pilot study - English speakers - Question 3 
3. “Preponderance of the evidence” means evidence that has more convincing force than that opposed to it. If the 
evidence is so evenly balanced that you are unable to say that the evidence on either side of an issue preponderates, 
your finding on that issue must be against the party who had the burden of proving it. Question: What is 
preponderance of the evidence? 
Participant 1 No idea 
Participant 2 Evidence that you would feel more certain of being true  
 
Pilot study - English speakers - Question 4 
4. The defendant further alleges that it was his perception that his attorney had disclosed privileged information to co-
counsel, before the case was severed, that later led him to enter into a guilty plea. Question: What does the defendant 
allege? 
Participant 1 He thinks that his lawyer told another lawyer the information 
Participant 2 That his attorney led him to believe something that he later regretted agreeing to 
 
Pilot study - English speakers - Question 5 
5. Since the defendant’s explanation as to the behavior of the parties is not supported by the sworn statement of any 
witnesses, it scarcely rises to the level of clear and convincing evidence. Question: Why does the defendant’s 
explanation not seem believable? 
Participant 1 What was the first part? I don't know 
Participant 2 Because the evidence did not seem clear 
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Pilot study - Spanish speakers group 1 (original register) - Question 1 
1. Si un testigo declara voluntariamente en falso en un aspecto esencial de su testimonio, se debe desconfiar de él en 
otros. Usted puede rechazar todo el testimonio de un testigo que ha declarado voluntariamente en falso sobre un 
punto importante, a menos que al conocer todas las pruebas, usted considere que la probabilidad de que sea verdad 
favorece su testimonio en otros puntos. Question: ¿Qué debe hacer cuando un testigo declara voluntariamente de 
manera falsa en un aspecto esencial de su testimonio? 
P 1 ¿Qué debo de hacer? Yo digo que [unintelligible] No, pues la verdad no no... está muy difícil... muy enredado 
 What should I do? I’d say that [unintelligible] No, well, honestly no no... it’s very difficult… very confusing 
P 2 Qué debo hacer... primeramente no voy a confiar en lo que está atestiguando- porque no lo conozco... y puede 
ser... que lo que está diciendo que sea falso... que no sea concreto lo que esté diciendo... entonces yo tengo 
que asegurarme primero... si realmente es verdadero lo que está diciendo y posteriormente seguir 
 What should I do... first of all I am not going to trust what he is testifying to- because I don’t know him… and 
it could be… that what he is saying is false… or maybe what he is saying isn’t concrete… so I have to make 
sure first… if what he is saying is really true and then continue 
 
Pilot study - Spanish speakers group 1 (original register) - Question 2 
2. Las pruebas circunstanciales son pruebas que, de determinarse que son verdaderas, prueban un hecho del cual 
puede efectuarse una inferencia de la existencia de otro hecho. Una inferencia de hechos es una deducción que puede 
efectuarse lógica y razonablemente de uno o más hechos establecidos por las pruebas. Question: ¿Qué son las pruebas 
circunstanciales? 
P 1 No no le... no no le entiendo nada no... está... está enredado, sabe  
 No I do not… I do not understand it at all no… it’s… it’s confusing, you know 
P 2 Eh yo pienso que son las que se presentan al momento o… las que vieron... o algo concreto 
 Er, I think they are the ones that are presented on the spot or… the ones [plural pronoun] saw… or something 
concrete 
 
Pilot study - Spanish speakers group 1 (original register) - Question 3 
3. “Preponderancia de la prueba” significa prueba que tiene más fuerza de convicción que la que se le opone. Si la 
prueba está tan uniformemente equilibrada que usted no puede decir que la prueba de ninguna de las partes 
prepondera, su decisión sobre ese punto debe ser en contra de la parte que tenía la carga de probarla. Question: ¿Qué 
es preponderancia de la prueba? 
P 1 La palabra prepondera no, no...  
 The word preponderates, no, no...  
P 2 Pues lo que... propone, nada más, ¿no? Lo que yo entiendo es decir lo que... lo que más o menos... proponen 
ellos, algo así 
 Well what… [singular pronoun] proposes, that’s all, right? What I understand, I mean, what...what more or 
less... they propose, something like that 
 
Pilot study - Spanish speakers group 1 (original register) - Question 4 
4. El acusado alega, además, que su percepción de que su abogado había divulgado información privilegiada al co-
abogado antes de que el caso fuese separado, fue lo que luego lo llevó a darse culpable. Question: ¿Qué alega el 
acusado? 
P 1 No sé que alega. No, no sé nada 
 I don’t know what he alleges. No, I don’t know anything 
P 2 ¿Pues en este caso qué puede alegar?... si si hubo intercambio no, de... del abogado o sea de como quien dice 
se adelantó, algo así le entiendo yo 
 Well, in this case what can he allege?… if if there was an exchange, right? of… the attorney I mean of, you 
might say he acted too quickly, that’s more or less what I get out of it 
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Pilot study - Spanish speakers group 1 (original register) - Question 5 
5. Puesto que la explicación del acusado en cuanto al comportamiento de las partes no está apoyada por la 
declaración jurada de ningún testigo, dista mucho de alcanzar el nivel requerido para constituir una prueba clara y 
convincente. Question: ¿Por qué no parece creíble la explicación del acusado?  
P 1 No, no pues no, no .. no sé qué nada 
 No no, well, no no... I don’t know what anything 
P 2 Porque está manejado primeramente... por- por ejemplo... con pruebas de que posiblemente sean ciertas o no. 
Luego... eh... está manejado por los abogados... es la palabra de él contra dos o tres personas más, entonces es 
bien difícil, muy difícil  
 Because it is handled firstly… by- for example… with evidence that is possibly true or not. Then… er… it is 
handled by the attorneys… it’s his word against two or three more people, so it’s very difficult, very difficult 
 
Pilot study - Spanish speakers group 2 (simplified register) - Question 1 
1. Si usted decide que un testigo mintió a propósito sobre algo importante, usted debe considerar no creer nada que 
ese testigo diga. Por otro lado, si usted piensa que el testigo mintió sobre algunas cosas pero dijo la verdad sobre 
otras, usted puede aceptar la parte que cree que es verdad y puede ignorar el resto. Question: ¿Qué debe hacer usted si 
un testigo miente adrede sobre algo importante? 
P 1 A propósito mm no sé... sólo que... no, no sé 
 On purpose hmm I don’t know… I only know... no, I don’t know 
P 2 Tratar de que diga la verdad, lo correcto... eh por ejemplo si dice la mitad de palabras- o sea tratar de que 
explique lo que fue sucedido, un hecho 
 Try to get him to tell the truth, the right thing… er for example if he says half of the words- I mean try to get 
him to explain what was happened, an event 
 
 
Pilot study - Spanish speakers group 2 (simplified register) - Question 2 
2. Algunas pruebas demuestran algo de forma directa, como por ejemplo la declaración de un testigo que vio un avión 
volando en el cielo. Algunas pruebas demuestran algo de forma indirecta, como por ejemplo la declaración de un 
testigo que vio sólo el humo blanco que a veces dejan los aviones. Estas pruebas indirectas a veces se llaman 
“pruebas circunstanciales”. En cualquiera de los casos, la declaración del testigo demuestra que un avión voló por el 
cielo. Question: ¿Qué son las pruebas circunstanciales? 
P 1 Las pruebas... de eso... no, fíjese que no le entendí eso [giggle] 
 The evidence... of that… no, you know what, I did not understand you [giggle] 
P 2 Circunstanciales... pues... si vio el avión volar, tiene que decir que lo vio. Si no lo vio volar o sea si vio un 
humo, no tiene que decir nada si... si fue un avión porque no puede decir un avión puede ser otra cosa. O sea 
si tuvo que haber visto un avión, tiene que ser el avión 
 Circumstantial… well… if he saw the plane fly, he has to say he saw it. If he did not see it fly I mean if he saw 
a smoke, he does not have to say anything if… if it was a plane because he can’t say a plane it can be 
something else. I mean if he had to have seen a plane, it has to be the plane 
 
 
Pilot study - Spanish speakers group 2 (simplified register) - Question 3 
3. Una de las partes debe convencerlo con las pruebas que presenta en el tribunal, de que es más probable que lo que 
esa parte tiene que probar sea cierto que falso. Esto se llama “obligación de probar”. Question: ¿De qué tiene que 
convencerlo una de las partes? 
P 1 De una parte esa... yo digo que... tal vez... probar, ¿no? O algo 
 Of one party that... I’d say that… maybe… prove, right? Or something 
P 2 Eh... pues si es falso o si no tiene la culpa tiene que decir pues yo no fui, pero si tiene la culpa tiene que 
aceptar la culpabilidad que haya hecho 
 Er… well if it’s false or if he’s not guilty he has to say well, it wasn’t me, but if he’s guilty he has to accept the 
guilt he had done 
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Pilot study - Spanish speakers group 2 (simplified register) - Question 4 
4. El acusado también dice que se declaró culpable porque le pareció que su abogado le había revelado información 
confidencial al otro abogado antes de que se separe el caso. Question: ¿Qué dice el acusado? 
P 1 ¿El acusado? No, no sé nada... no sé 
 The defendant? No, I don’t know anything… I don’t know 
P 2 Eh... pues ahí yo no se que decir 
 Er… now there I don’t know what to say  
 
Pilot study - Spanish speakers group 2 (simplified register) - Question 5 
5. La explicación del acusado no parece una prueba clara ni convincente porque lo que dijo sobre la conducta de las 
partes no coincide con lo que dijeron los testigos bajo juramento. Question: ¿Por qué no parece convincente la 
explicación del acusado? 
P 1 [giggle] No sé 
 [giggle] I don’t know 
P 2 Porque en este caso tiene que haber muchas... muchas cosas que a veces son falsas o ciertas... y por eso se 
siente como decir la verdad o no  
 Because in this case there have to be many… many things that sometimes are false or true… and that’s why it 
feels like telling the truth or not  
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Appendix 4. Pilot study. Interviews with interpreters 
Pilot study - Interpreters’ interviews - Question 1 
Are you familiar with the meaning of the term “register” as related to language? How would you define it in your own words? 
P 1 I believe I do. I believe it is when you are... speaking, and I’m going to resort to our work in court, if there is a witness on 
the stand and that witness is talking in their register and they use slang expressions... 
P 2 I believe so. Well, perhaps low register and high register might be... low register is a simpler way to convey the same 
meaning that a greater number of members of the population can comprehend it, and a high register not necessarily but 
might possible mean that a person needs to have had many years of some specialized education to fully comprehend 
something. 
P 3 Yes, I do. I believe you're referring to leaving the language or word or phrase as is, with the meaning of the actual word or 
phrase. 
P 4 Yes, I do. The intellectual level, level of education, of both parties, of the party speaking... yeah, the level... you can’t define 
it but you know it when you see it. The registry... [sic] I can give you examples easier than I can define it verbally, there is if 
I’m talking, there is street talking, there is polite, there is formal, and there is extremely formal, the level of formality, that's 
the best I can put it. 
P 5 Yes, I do. I think it’s maybe for lack of a better term, I’d say it’s the level in which a statement is made, and by level, I’m 
not sure its very well defined, uh, in terms of whether it’s uh... let’s say a person who has better education would be on a 
higher register level, and a person who is just talking with his friends casually, would have a different level or register of 
expressing themselves. I think it’s more related to maybe the setting and circumstances that the statement is made. but I 
mean it does have some bearings on education as well. That in general I would say a person who is more educated is able to 
use a higher register. 
 
Pilot study - Interpreters’ interviews - Question 2 
Are you aware of any rule or standard regarding how to handle register during interpreting? How would you describe it in your own 
words? 
P 1 Yes. We are supposed to interpret in that same register. In other words, if they use an expression in slang, we are supposed 
to find something as close as possible in that expression and use it in English. 
P 2 Just informally from having attended workshops and listened to colleagues, but I’m not aware of any particular existing 
rule, no. Well I have my own way that I try to do things and I always aim for the solution that has the greatest possibility, in 
my opinion, of being understood. I use synonyms as often as I can squeeze them in when there may be a misunderstanding, 
and I seem to have a little radar that lights up in my brain when I think that what I’m saying can be understood in more than 
one particular way, so I’m always searching for clarity as far as when others are listening to me. 
P 3 I think there is a standard, not a rule. The standard is that you should always leave the register untouched, that the meaning 
of the word should always be interpreted in the same register, the same meaning has to be conveyed.  
P 4 I am self made, I just know. You keep it. You maintain it. 
P 5 Yes, I am. I understand that you have to do your best to adhere to the register in the source language, I am not a hundred 
percent sure but I would say it’s more of a message that is conveyed. At least in my experience when I learned to become an 
interpreter but also I know that the code of ethics in California says that you are not to embellish or take away from the 
original that I would say implies, you are not supposed to change the register. 
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Pilot study - Interpreters’ interviews - Question 3 
Are you familiar with the reasons for interpreters not to change the register during interpreting? 
P 1 We are supposed to keep the register because it is important for the person getting the interpretation into English, probably 
the attorney or the judge, to know what the exact register of the answer or conversation is, or for example if there is a 
person who is not very educated, it is important that that comes across in the interpretation. I believe... we were told we are 
not supposed to change the register, we were trained that way. And it is something that we have always been told, we were 
basically told to do it. 
P 2 I can't tell you off the top of my head right now. It made sense at the time that I heard it but I can't regurgitate the words 
back to you right now. 
P 3 No, I’m not. I do wonder and I probably think because I’m an interpreter, I’m not supposed to explain the meaning of words 
but just leave something in the same way as its being said. Changing the register would be the same as explaining. 
P 4 Because otherwise you're basically changing the environment. If there were no interpreter, and the two people came from 
different levels of environment, the person who you’re interpreting for that wouldn’t have an interpreter would have said, 
“What do you mean?” So you’re giving your guys the same chance. Basically it’s up to him to ask for an explanation, not 
up to you to explain it. Without a translation the register will be maintained unless somebody asks for an explanation or 
please rephrase it. So I’m not supposed to be there. 
P 5 Because you need to be as faithful as possible to the source. Because we are the mouths and ears of people who don't speak 
English so we need to render into any language, something that would be as close to the source as possible. Because these 
are legal matters, and the expectation is that many of these words have a very... most of the words if not all, in court, have a 
very important meaning to these people's life in cases in court so you need to be very close and careful of being faithful to 
the source. 
 
Pilot study - Interpreters’ interviews - Question 4 
Have you ever received any training on the register/style of legal language? 
P 1 When I went to UCLA to take the court interpretation examination, I was told that we were supposed to keep the register 
and we did practice an exercise, using the same register, but as far as I remember, that is the full training that we received. I 
don't remember receiving anything more extensive than that. 
P 2 I’m one of those who learned from the school of life. 
P 3 No, I haven't. The only thing that I received training in is in vocabulary and basic interpreting skills. 
P 4 Never, but I love playing with words, keeping registry [sic] and maintaining a person sounding like their native language so 
they don't look translated and sound stupid when you read it for example, that's what keeps me not getting bored to death 
about it. 
P 5 No, no classes on that, but you know it’s very interesting that you ask this because it’s kind of a given, because I don't 
question this all that much. And I'm not sure I shouldn't, or interpreters shouldn't, but in general, it’s a very general concept 
of always being faithful or trying to be as faithful as possible. 
 
Pilot study - Interpreters’ interviews - Question 5 
Do you ever find yourself in situations in which you feel the register may not be quite appropriate for the Spanish speaker to 
understand? 
P 1 Oh yes, many times. 
P 2 I think it may have happened but right now I cannot think of any examples. 
P 3 Oh yes, very much so. 
P 4 All the time. Both ways actually. Attorneys have a lot of trouble dealing with some of the people that I interpret for into 
English, they never went to school and attorneys are so close minded they don’t get that the person doesn’t know... because 
the level of education is too low for them to distinguish registry [sic] and level of formality and they use the home language 
in every situation, everywhere. So they don't look for the appropriate word, they don't feel the difference of registry [sic] or 
environment. 
P 5 Yes. 
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Pilot study - Interpreters’ interviews - Question 6 
What do you do in those cases? Do you ever change the register? 
P 1 If it is in a formal setting, again I’m referring to a courtroom, and it is a hearing or trial before a judge, I do not change the 
register, the attorney who is asking questions is supposed to find out through his questions what is going on if it doesn't feel 
right. 
P 2 If given the choice of two different words that in my opinion mean the same thing I might have a bias towards saying the 
simpler one. But I do not try to oversimplify a text, I still try to sound as if I was the, for example the judge speaking to the 
defendant. 
P 3 Unfortunately, or I shouldn't say unfortunately, I just interpret the way it's being said. I do not change the register. I wish I 
would but I have never done it, except in an informal setting. If I am in an informal setting such as a deposition 
prep[aration], I often find myself telling the attorney that I believe the witness is not understanding because of the register 
being used. I wouldn’t do that in a formal setting, I would feel intimidated to do so because I would be scared of someone 
telling me “You’re just the interpreter and your job is to interpret.” 
P 4 Yeah if they want to hire me as an expert, I can do that too but as long as I’m pretending not to be there I’ll maintain the 
register. As an interpreter supposedly you’re a mouthpiece, you’re not supposed to put your own bend onto things. 
P 5 No, no, I feel that I need to be faithful to the register. Well, my voice is not being heard but I am on the record. I try, not 
sure to what degree I’m being successful, try to remain faithful to the same register I hear. 
 
Pilot study - Interpreters’ interviews - Question 7 
Are there circumstances in which you can tell that a Spanish-speaking witness or defendant does not understand what he or she is 
hearing? If so, how can you tell? 
P 1 Yes. Well, the person might ask me directly, they might answer something different and I might realize through the answer 
that they did not understand what was asked of them, they might look at me with a puzzled look on their face, or they might 
just turn to me and not say anything, because of the way they look at me I realize they do not understand. 
P 2 It may have happened, and when I realized that I may have said a word that caused the deponent to go in a different 
direction, then I interrupt the proceedings and I say “Excuse me. I believe the interpreter may have misspoken.” 
P 3 That happens quite often, yes. Many times you can tell by facial expressions, many times body language, but mainly I 
would have to say when the answer is not responsive and you definitely know the person is not understanding you. 
P 4 These are people who you ask “What's your name?” and they look at their prisoner's bracelet to tell you their name, so that's 
the starting point. “Uh?” is the most common answer I ever get in a courtroom. A lot of people I deal with don't even have 
that many words in their vocabulary. “Uh” means, “¿Qué dijo?” [what did he say?] not even “I didn't understand,” but “I 
didn't even get what it's about.” They always look puzzled! 
P 5 Yes, body language, also when a certain motion or hearing, I interpret the whole motion, and let’s say the judge rules 
against the defendant and then they come back into custody and it’s the second that he has when he gets up, he asks me 
“Am I gonna be released from jail or not?” So that obviously means that he didn't understand the outcome or what was 
going on. 
 
Pilot study - Interpreters’ interviews - Question 8 
Are there circumstances in which a Spanish-speaking witness or defendant may state they understand when you clearly know or 
later find out that they don’t? 
P 1 Yes. That happens too. They tend to say yes when you realize that probably they did not understand what was just said. 
P 2 Yeah, it could be fear perhaps if they speak up they will make the judge angry and get a harsher sentence. 
P 3 Yes, and that happens and I think sometimes the witness feels intimidated, embarrassed, they don’t want to look dumb in 
front of people and they will say yes just to say yes. 
P 4 Yes. They rarely say they don’t. For many years, I’ve wondered why not... they assume it’s legal and they’re not even 
supposed to understand, that’s my conclusion because I’ve been wondering why they don’t. But I wonder the same thing 
when I see new interpreters sitting there and I know the guy is sitting at the table not getting a word of it. If you have a kid 
and you see the look of the first time they hear a word and they go “Huh?” well you gotta know like a mother knows what 
the kid means, you just know when people get it or not. For years I’m waiting for someone to turn around and say “What 
the hell are they talking about?” ‘cause I’ve never heard it yet. 
P 5 Yeah, that happens. 
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Pilot study - Interpreters’ interviews - Question 9 
And in those circumstances do you do anything about it or do you let it go? 
P 1 Again, it depends where I am. If I am in an informal setting where I might have the opportunity of talking to the attorney 
and telling them that I have the feeling that the person did not understand or does not understand what is going on, I will do 
that. Or I might just tell the attorney directly, “Would you mind if I explain what you just said in simpler terms, because I 
think that that way he'll probably grasp the concept better.” The reaction to that request has always been a positive one. 
They have always told me “Please go ahead, please do, do whatever you think you need to do, of course, be my guest...” 
P 2 I don't know if the person is honestly understanding or not. I’m not a mind reader so if the person says that he or she does 
understand then I have to accept their word, I cannot just go into the brain and say, “But did you really understand a word or 
phrase?” That's not my job. 
P 3 - 
P 4 It depends on the circumstances. If I'm in a deposition or in a non-jury environment at some point I will interrupt and say 
“The interpreter believes that...” at some point I will just say you know, there's three languages going on. If you're in front 
of a jury, unless it really gets beyond... also it depends on how smart the attorneys are. I mean, at some point if you can 
make it obvious to the attorney by answering whatever nonsense that the person is saying and making it sound as nonsense, 
even using your body language to the attorneys so they inquire and clear it up, but when the attorneys are pretty dumb too 
and they are not getting that the person is not getting it no matter what your body language is, at some point you have to 
interrupt, and say... [During simultaneous] I might simplify, I wouldn't use a lower register language, but I would kick the 
convoluted part if I think it's gotta be clearer. I didn't do it for years because I figured, like I said, I'm supposed to be 
invisible and I was hoping someone would say, “What did he say?” But nobody ever did. So I figure the whole point of not 
affecting the outcome is lost if the person is not gonna ask the question, they could be talking Chinese and it wouldn't make 
a difference. At first I didn't because I was hoping... he would say, “What did you say?” I didn't understand that, but it never 
happened, so over the years I started finding ways of not changing too much and at the same time, un-convoluting it, I know 
its not a word but it makes sense. “Is there any particular reason why we cannot start your deposition now?” into “Can we 
start your deposition” or “Why can we not?” I just started taking away the unnecessary words that were convoluted without 
changing the register of the verb or anything, but I did it because I figured I could have been speaking Chinese and the 
person was not gonna react so I might as well get him something. 
P 5 I must say that when I get into those situations I try to interpret the best that I can again, keeping you know... usually it’s 
also the pace is so crazy that you just try to hold onto... and continue interpreting and keeping up with the pace. And 
sometimes if I have a chance I could even tell the person, “So do you understand?” and they say “Yes,” and I say “That’s a 
good thing because I don't.” Just to make a joke about it. 
 
 
Pilot study - Interpreters’ interviews - Unsolicited information - 1 
Unsolicited information - Role and invisibility 
P 2 I think an interpreter should be as invisible as possible... I love it when people say something like, “Oh I never thought that I 
could communicate with this person directly, but it was almost as if you weren't even there!...” That’s why I often have to 
say, “Could you please address the person directly, just pretend that I’m a telephone that happens to breathe...” I'd rather be 
more of an invisible language person involved with transferring meaning from one language to another, than be in the 
headlines due to some words that I chose to say... or that somebody would seize the opportunity to try to twist my words 
around. 
P 4 I think you should be [visible]. But people don't want you there. That’s the bottom line. Because attorneys are fairly 
paranoid and they assume that the moment you have an opinion your opinion means leaning for or against sides and it has 
nothing to do with the language... So I’m not supposed to be there. 
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Pilot study - Interpreters’ interviews - Unsolicited information - 2 
Unsolicited information - Formal vs. informal settings  
P 1 As far as I know, when I am in a formal setting and by formal setting I mean in a courtroom during a hearing or a trial, I am 
supposed to keep the same register when interpreting from English into Spanish. If it is in a formal setting... and it is a 
hearing or trial before a judge, I do not change the register, the attorney who is asking questions is supposed to find out 
through his questions what is going on if it doesn't feel right. I think that the role should be the same, it's just not as easy to 
do in a formal setting.  
P 2 The place that’s the most informal where I have to be less worried about is when I’m not on the record, obviously I'm less 
concerned about upsetting the proceedings if I am in a setting such as a jail interview because then I think I’m more of a 
facilitator and the only record being done is the probation officer taking notes. I’m more at liberty to be an explainer and a 
clarifier if there is no record being done and I’m most constricted when a record is being done in a high profile trial when 
the parties may seize the opportunities to attack the testimony and say, the interpreter caused this to be said, or the 
interpreter stated this and that, or another expert has said the interpreter didn’t say this or that, made appeals, and people 
might be trying to blame me for something just because they’re trying to win a case on appeal or something like that. I’d 
rather blend into the woodwork than be the central star or the bad guy in something and be blamed for words that were said 
the wrong way. When the only party listening to me is the defendant in Spanish and not going on the record, to me there is 
no difference. It would be mentally too exhausting to have one set of rules going in one direction and one set of rules in the 
other. I don't have any different rules, I like to believe I work the same in both directions. 
P 3 If I am in an informal setting such as a deposition prep[aration], I often find myself telling the attorney that I believe the 
witness is not understanding because of the register being used. I wouldn’t do that in a formal setting. I would feel 
intimidated to do so because I would be scared of someone telling me you’re just the interpreter and your job is to interpret 
P 4 Not on the record. I do it in the interview and I’ll tell attorneys that’s what I’m doing because we’re not getting through... 
because then the record will reflect something that didn’t really happen. Let’s just say the person being interpreted from 
Spanish into English has a really low informal register that would be really embarrassing in that sort of setting. If I fix it, I 
put on the record something that didn’t happen or maybe something that happened. I’m changing what the person naturally 
said, on the record, yes off the record might not make a big difference but the record should reflect what actually happened 
because the credibility of a person, let’s say of a person with very low level of education, if I fix it, then he sounds less 
credible when things don’t make sense at some point. 
In simultaneous I may simplify the words where you can maintain formality without being stuffy, let me put it this way, 
having a choice of two words I would use the most common word. I wouldn’t get into paraphrasing or explanations or 
really bring it down to that person, if he needs to ask he needs to ask. But I would bring it down to two choices of the word. 
I’m not gonna say I really want to change it to the level of a first-grade student, but there are a few words that are legalese 
for example and you can find a common English word as an equivalent that you can translate and still be formal without 
being technical. So the concepts sometimes are too complicated for this person, which obviously there’s nothing I can do 
about that, if you can simplify you simplify. In informal settings, I think even in front of a jury if you get really, really bad 
that communication is completely being distorted you would have to interrupt and talk to a judge, but that never happened. 
What you can do or the possibilities of your role are different in an informal or a formal setting because of reality. If I’m 
locked up with fifty or sixty people and the person and you have to be yelling and screaming at the top of your lungs and the 
person is not getting it and is not hearing and at some point the attorney turns to you and you say “Ok, can I just ask him 
that sentence please?” Like “Have you ever been on probation? can I just ask him ‘Have you ever been arrested, so it's a 
simple start?’” So I do stuff like that. But if it's an interview and the acoustics are horrible and I can't do that in a formal... 
yeah I think in an informal setting everyone gets a little more informal, me too. In a formal setting I try to use, as best as I 
can, my own body language when I’m getting nonsensical answers so the attorney realizes that yeah, I know that what I said 
made no sense, so maybe they didn't understand your question, you know the shrug? the interpreter shrug? But sometimes 
attorneys don't get it so you need to interrupt, but usually you hope the attorney will clarify himself. basically your level of 
formality is comparable to the level of formality around you, so how much are you going to fudge with?  
P 5 If I’m interpreting on the record I am concerned that I try to be in my definition, faithful to the source and it really doesn't 
matter into which language I’m going, but if I’m interpreting in a more informal setting, especially during an attorney client 
interview, I really want to make sure the message is conveyed, and I actually do tell the attorney, “I think that your client 
isn't understanding.” On the record, many times it doesn’t [get conveyed]. [In informal settings] I actually take it upon 
myself to make sure the messages are conveyed back and forth, into English or Spanish. And that’s why I tamper a little bit 
with the register, according to my subjection, it’s very subjective, I think that oh they’re not understanding many times and 
they are, in either language. 
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Appendix 5. Pilot study. Interviews with attorneys 
Pilot study - Attorneys’ interviews - Question 1 
Do you feel you can speak the same way when you work with Spanish speakers and English speakers? 
P 1 I feel like sometimes I speak louder, the language is the same. 
P 2 Unfortunately, yes (laughs). 
P 3 Yes. 
 
Pilot study - Attorneys’ interviews - Question 2 
Could you remember or identify a time when you changed the way you speak to Spanish speakers? 
P 1 Yes. 
P 2 When interpreters suggest I may be using difficult words or syntax. 
P 3 I’ve only been asked to slow down. Sometimes I speak too fast that even the interpreters are having a hard 
time keeping up. 
 
Pilot study - Attorneys’ interviews - Question 3 
Do interpreters often suggest that a non-English speaker may not be understanding a question? 
P 1 Not often. 
P 2 It's definitely not frequent. 
P 3 Once in a blue moon, very, very rarely. 
 
Pilot study - Attorneys’ interviews - Question 4 
Do you welcome interpreters’ suggestions regarding non-English speakers’ lack of comprehension?  
P 1 I welcome it if the client is not understanding I want to know that, definitely. 
P 2 I definitely welcome it. 
P 3 Yes, absolutely. Because I need to make sure that the communication between my client and I is absolutely 
clear. We are dealing with serious matters and it might involve somebody's freedom, he needs to understand 
every word I say, and if the interpreter feels like he is not understanding it based on the way he answered the 
question, I will work with him to try and rephrase or whatever we can do. [So you do not feel that the 
interpreter might be stepping out of his or her role?] Never. 
 
Pilot study - Attorneys’ interviews - Question 5 
Do you find more instances of misunderstandings or miscommunication when working with Spanish-speaking 
clients? If so, what do you attribute these to? 
P 1 Maybe a bit more with Spanish. Spanish speakers they often have less education in my experience, the 
average level of education is primary school. 
P 2 Yes. Lack of knowledge of the language and the process. 
P 3 No, I’d say they're about equal, honestly. 
 
Pilot study - Attorneys’ interviews - Question 6 
When the interpreter comes on board, do you feel you can continue the line of conversation the same way as with an 
English-speaking client? 
P 1 Yes. 
P 2 Yes. 
P 3 That’s correct. 
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Pilot study - Attorneys’ interviews - Characterizations 
Characterizations – Interpreter interventions 
P 2 I definitely welcome it. Because I’m not arrogant enough to think that I have the ability to communicate to someone whose 
idiomatic experience may be different than my own... [when interpreters] talk to me, [and say] “Look, you speak in very 
complex phrases, your ideas are very much at a well-educated level and you're trying to talk to someone who is a very 
simple person without even the rudimentary essences of first or second or third year education, and their life experiences are 
so simple that they really can't grasp what you say. And your sentences are very complicated and very elaborate and your 
points are very complex, but you're not being heard.” And when I’ve been told that... I stop and I try to figure out what it is 
I’m doing and I try to break it down so that my client can understand, and one of the things I did notice, especially from 
those experiences, is that it went from a hugely blank look on the client's face to someone who was animated and interested 
in what I had to say, as opposed to a zoned-out zombie who is sitting there, probably who feels and experiences being 
talked to, or talked at. The client has transformed into someone who is being respected and listened to and willing to listen 
back. I think that the fact that the interpreter is bridging the world of English speaker and the Spanish speaker, for example, 
that the translator is able to understand that the translation is impeded and that there is a duty and it is an affirmative duty to 
say “Look, may the interpreter inquire? I don't think the use of the language as defined or spoken is something the client is 
going to hear, so can it be perhaps, do you have some other suggestions for how to communicate it?” And leave it to the 
speaker to try, and if that doesn't work then suggest, for example, if you speak in shorter sentences or less complex ideas or 
you try to break it down, so it's not telling somebody the content, rather suggesting the methodology. That's I think where an 
interpreter could have a duty, if you will, to assist. 
 
Pilot study - Attorneys’ interviews - Unsolicited information 
Unsolicited information 
P 2 I think a highly efficient interpreter is someone who acts as an advocate for the client. My general experience has been that 
the interpreters are almost conduits, that they are just the vessels for speech, they listen to the words that outpour in the 
translation, and given that I don't have the capacity to know Spanish at this point, I don't know necessarily whether what 
I’m saying or intending is being communicated to the client. One of the things of effective interpreters that I noticed is that 
they actually have a dual function, one of which is not only to be a conduit for my words and a vessel for my words that 
come in and out translated into the language, but also they have the ability to stop me and say “You are using this language, 
(or) using this syntax (or) using this context, but in the context of the client, it's not being processed.” I think the role of the 
interpreter is not somebody who just comes in and zones out and the language comes in one ear and out the mouth, but 
rather someone who is able to absorb and process the experience not only of the person trying to communicate, but also of 
the person who is sitting there, receiving the translation. 
I think that the interpreter's job is to not only be aware of the words and to accurately translate it but also to sense internally, 
on a non-verbal level, what the person who is receiving the translation is experiencing. The person who is overwhelmed by 
the process, let's take the example I gave of the person without a formal education and very rudimentary life experiences, 
really not someone enmeshed in the society as a functioning part of it, but rather someone on the periphery, that the 
effective translator would be someone who is watching the verbal responses of the client as the translation is going by, 
listening and processing, is the client able to process this? Are they a part of the process? Is their facial expression such that 
they have totally zoned out and they are wanting to be some place else or do they really feel part of the process? And 
language that's translated should have that effect of being inclusive. You have to understand that the person being translated 
doesn't want to appear stupid and they may feel humiliated to ask for help, so in that way the translator can assist by 
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Appendix 6. Focus group 1 - Transcription summary 
About the interpreter’s role 
[Submitted to the group for discussion] “The role of the interpreter is to allow a non-English 
speaking defendant or witness to participate in judicial proceedings” (CAJC 2005: 5). What are 
your thoughts about this statement? 
- Facilitate that participation, not allow it, because we don’t make that call. I mean, if you’re 
gonna get picky about the language. 
- Not only that, but I dislike the use of allow because that could also be, we could do summary 
interpretation and allow them to participate. We could be telling them, “And isn’t that a really 
nice suit that the prosecutor has on?” this is how I’m participating. To me, it’s not a specific 
enough or broad enough description of what it is that we, I think, together, know is our 
function and our role. Because just to allow is not sufficient. 
 
[Submitted to the group for discussion] Reasons for providing an interpreter: “To place non-
English speaking participants in legal proceedings on an equal footing with those who 
understand English” (CAJC 2013a: 3). What are your thoughts about this statement? 
- It’s good, if you insert: “people who understand English at their same level or register,” I 
think. 
- If they’re equal register, yes. 
- If he has a good interpreter, I feel like I do my job to do the best possible to give him that 
opportunity. 
- Not always. I think many times they are not on an equal footing regardless of how good the 
interpreter is, because they don’t all necessarily understand everything we’re saying.  
- Yeah, but that’s not our role.  
- I have one thing to add that even... I try to do this but I don’t know if we all accomplish it, but 
I think that even if you are the best interpreter in this room or whatever, if you don’t bring in 
the cultural liaison to it, it’s impossible. It doesn’t matter how well you do word for word 
normalizing, and the only way to give equal footing is to bring the both worlds together. And 
that’s I think what we talk about, is one thing you can do.  
- You know, keep in mind that here it says to the extent reasonably possible. There’s only so 
much we can do, there are defendants who have a very limited vocabulary, and even if you try 
to do your best to interpret for them in a clear manner that they can understand, they won’t. 
And there are English speakers who don’t know the words. There was... one time I had this 
English defendant plead “no concept,” and everybody laughed, and the judge said, “That’s the 
most honest answer that I’ve heard all day.” They don’t even know what’s going on. So, you 
know, yes, we help them get on an equal footing, to the extent reasonably possible. 
- I also believe that we have a big problem because we are interpreting in California, United 
States, under the penal code of the U.S. But we are interpreting for Spanish speakers that most 
of them grew up and lived in Mexico, Guatemala, Honduras, that had followed a complete 
different penal code and system. I mean, in Mexico you are guilty until proven innocent. In 
here, you are innocent until proven guilty. So when I interpret, many times in court when the 
judges ask an arraignment question, the judge goes, “And how do you plead to the charges?” 
and then the defendant looks at you and says, “So I can just say not guilty?” “Of course!” 
“Really? Not guilty, that means you are not guilty and that’s it, I’m going home?” “No, no, 
wait a minute. Now we have to go through the process of trial.” “What do you mean trial? I 
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already said not guilty” and he put not guilty! So those are concepts that are completely 
different. So I mean, we are talking of completely different systems, so we can only, I think, 
interpret to the extent that we are kind of like transforming an American Penal Code, and... 
- Also, I think that we tend to conflate our function with that of the attorney, which I find 
happens way too often, particularly in non-Spanish languages. We know we have a closer 
understanding of our function. To me, clearly stated, I need to be a clear conduit of 
information into that language, of what’s coming here is coming to you. It is not my function 
and it should not be because I don’t have the degree in law to explain these concepts to my 
client.  
Moderator - Can we maybe consider other alternatives between verbatim legal register and 
explaining the law? 
- We know how to, I think... to have the clarity with the defendant or the witness, we should 
choose those concepts which have the broadest use in the cultures that are still specific to what 
we want to say, rather than take it upon ourselves to say “This person’s not going to 
understand what I’m saying,” so I therefore use a different concept.  
- I just have one thing to add, that also when we comment on these things that it’s important to 
keep in mind that what we all do is so broad, and I have a feeling that sometimes we’re 
sticking to what we do, for example, in arraignment court, which is strict interpreting that we 
don’t have too much contact and we just have to say what we hear and good luck. And there’s 
other types of work we do, if you interview, if you assist an agency, where the information 
that is passed on has a completely different level of importance because when the judge is 
saying what he has to say, and this guy’s going to answer, everything’s already prepped. He’s 
going to answer if it’s a serious... if it’s a misdemeanor or up, the attorney’s already been 
coaching him so basically we can explain it later or we can walk outside and say, “Señor, esto 
es lo que pasa...” [Sir, this is what is going on] 
- We’re drifting away from something very important, which is education. And the defendants 
that we work with, if they come here, they have what, first grade education?  
 
[Submitted to the group for discussion] “Official court interpreters act strictly in the interest of 
the court they serve” (Code of Professional Responsibility of the Official Interpreters of the 
United States Courts, Canon 1, in Dueñas González et al. 2012: 1303). What are your thoughts 
about this statement? 
- No, absolutely not.  
- No. 
- That’s completely against... let’s raise our hands if we actually do this... 
 
About the language register 
[Submitted to the group for discussion] The code of ethics states that interpreters should 
conserve the language register. Before you started practicing and received this code to follow, 
were you familiar with the concept of language register? 
- The only reason I knew it was because my father was an anthropologist with a particular 
interest in linguistics.  
- No [General answer] 
- The term register perhaps was not familiar to me, but once it was defined, “Oh, I know that,” 
so I didn’t have to learn the register, I just knew what it was instinctively. 
- Ok, but then we all learn in the code, in the Model for Professional Standards, that we are 
supposed to keep the register. 
- But that’s a reality that is never the case. 
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- Yeah, ‘cause I was just thinking about what [Participant’s name] just said about instinctively, 
and I think that I agree with that, but I don’t know if it has a lot to do with instinct, but it has to 
do with each of our cultural and intellectual experience which, in this particular room, seems 
to be pretty even, but it is not true across the board for all other colleagues. And then when 
you leave something up for interpretation, you throw it out there, like register, if someone 
doesn’t have it in them to decipher what exactly that means, ‘cause we all do that when we’re 
studying, like you said, you do it alone, nobody teaches you this... 
- It’s something that I think everybody has, to be able to determine what the register is. But they 
just don’t... it’s not as important in everyday life as it is in this particular profession. 
- But I’m saying the opposite. I’m saying it is not instinct. I’m saying it’s implicit education that 
we all bring to the table because we all say this career is technically two years, I mean, one or 
two depending on if you’re going to school when you have 25 jobs on the side... but it takes 
one to two years as a whole because, I think I speak for everybody, we all brought to the table 
everything else. I mean, the proficiency in both languages, the education, university degrees 
from other countries, so we have a whole bunch of stuff there, and then we specialize for 2 
years or a year.  
- What I was gonna say eventually like, we do go to school to learn the techniques of 
interpreting, and we learn certain phrases that we use, and then later it just dawns on us, it 
comes in naturally in that your personal touch comes into play. “Well, I’m not changing the 
meaning but if I use this other word... ” And it does develop, and it takes more years to get to 
that comfort zone. 
- But I agree that it is an instinctive—and later trained—thing, but it is an instinctive thing. As 
kids, we know if someone’s talking hoity-toity, or we know if somebody’s talking street. 
Those are two different registers to say the same thing but we can hear the difference between 
the registers. We can tell the difference between our parents’ register when they’re dealing 
with us, and our parents’ register when they are dealing with their friends. It’s a different level 
of language, and those levels of language are registers.  
- But that’s- and I’m not being picky about it, I’m just gonna say this... I think it’s learned, it’s 
not an instinct, you learn it when your parents say... When I’m talking to my son and he knows 
he’s in trouble, I speak to him one way and when we’re playing it’s a different way, I’m 
teaching him that, so why is it important? Because when you talk about register and you bring 
it to the table when you’re working, and you’re dealing with people from a completely 
different level of cultural and social education than where you come from, you need to adjust 
to that. Because for the most part, you’re not only dealing with people who have not been 
educated, school-wise, but you’re dealing with people who have not been exposed to parents. 
We see the sad realities of people that have been raised by cows basically, and I’m not being 
facetious. I’m not lying, not exaggerating. So what I mean is like, they might not be able to tell 
the distinction... 
- There is one question, and I’m leaving the court system a little bit, but during depositions, to 
me, there is a key question that nobody, I mean, I don’t even know why they ask that question, 
to me it’s stupid. The question that I really don’t understand is “How many years of education 
did you finish?” That’s a key question and it comes within the first five minutes of a 
deposition. Most of the people that I‘m interpreting for are gonna say, “Oh I didn’t go to 
school,” or “Sixth grade in Mexico,” “Third grade in Mexico,” “I don’t know how to read or 
write.” I mean, that’s a very common response when you are dealing with... and after that the 
attorney continues asking these questions that are like, incomprehensible, that I look at him 
and I’m like, “Ok, didn’t he just tell you that he didn’t go to school? Are you fucking kidding 
me or what?”  
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 [Submitted to the group for discussion] What do you think are the reasons for this standard to 
leave the original register unchanged?  
- I... this was my first guess, and I think it’s proven out when I first came into interpreting, it’s 
because again, I am not the one who decides what will be asked of this person or how this 
person’s gonna answer. If I were to change the register to any large degree, then I am taking it 
upon myself to be this person’s spokesperson, not their interpreter, and to me, there’s a huge 
difference between being the interpreter and being the spokesperson. I am not counsel, I am 
not the judge, I am not the defendant, I am the conduit of information for this person, of the 
concept. And the concepts must be given at the same level of nuance as they came out. To me, 
that’s why you preserve register. 
- Yeah, to stay true to the translation and the message. 
- Yeah, to the translation, the source, and the message. 
- Also there is a ceremonial quality in language, because language is not just words, it’s also 
communication. What you’re communicating it’s the institution which needs to be delivered at 
a particular level. Other than, if you do not do that then the institution diminishes in value. 
There’s a certain ceremonial aspect of legal language, and I think that that needs to be 
preserved, as well as whatever communication to the person that you are interpreting for, or 
the people that are inputting, it shows either lack of respect, or respect, or whatever it is that 
the person is trying to communicate. So there’s more than just the words; there’s an entire 
structure and a symbolic structure and... all of that. 
 
[Submitted to the group for discussion] There are examples about register variation that would 
not be permissible: “For instance, if the attorney asks, ‘What did you observe the subject to do 
subsequently?’ you should not say in the target language, ‘What did you see him do next?’” 
(CAJC 2013a: 7). What do you think would be the difference or the consequences if we say 
“next” instead of “subsequently”? 
-Well, here’s the problem with language. There’s some words where in one language they’re 
perfectly common. “Renunciar” in Spanish is a completely different register from “renounce” 
in English, so we don’t have parity of cognates. You go to different registers sometimes with 
the same word, with a cognate word. So that’s something for which have to watch out for. So, 
“subsiguientemente” is not quite the same as “subsequently,” so you also have to worry about 
parity of cognates when you’re thinking about register.  
- Well no, we found that even from the English common law to most Mexican Napoleonic 
system, most Hispanic Napoleonic systems, we do not have a parity of concepts, period. 
 
[Submitted to the group for discussion] “Many languages have ‘regionalisms,’ or differences in 
usage. For instance, a word that may be understood to mean something in Spanish for someone 
from Cuba may not be so understood by someone from Mexico. In addition, because there may 
be languages which do not have an appropriate direct interpretation of some courtroom or legal 
terms and the interpreter should be so aware and be able to provide the most appropriate 
interpretation. The interpreter should likely make the recipient aware of the issue and the 
interpreter and recipient can then work to develop a consistent and appropriate set of 
descriptions of these terms in that language that can be used again, when appropriate” (U.S. 
Department of Justice 2002). What are your thoughts about this statement?  
- I have a comment concerning this order. It almost like, it trumps everything else. It sort of 
gives the interpreter permission to do what we’re supposed to do. 
- I’m gonna start reading this order before every freaking deposition.  
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- You know what? That’s not a bad idea, to take it. 
 
About the hand and the arm and the foot and the leg 
[This discussion ensued spontaneusly among participants] 
- I disqualified myself at a deposition when the defense attorney didn’t allow me to inquire from 
the witness, and at that point I told the defense attorney that the interpreter wasn’t able to 
continue interpreting, and would have to disqualify herself. So he of course said, “What are you 
talking about?” And I said “Well, you’re not allowing me to inquire from the witness and I’m 
quite sure that if I just interpret what he’s saying I might be mistaken, the interpreter might be 
mistaken, so I am not able to continue.” So he said “Ok fine, inquire from the witness.” It was 
quite obvious to me that, because the gentleman was from Mexico, and he kept referring to his 
mano [hand], I pretty much knew that he was referring to the entire arm, especially when he’s 
pointing to the entire arm throughout the entire deposition so I couldn’t just say mano, I had to 
go with arm. So, but the reason why I’m saying it is because as soon as I said “My entire arm 
hurts” or “My right arm hurts” he said “You see? That’s why I didn’t want you to inquire.” And 
there is a reason behind that, no le conviene [it’s detrimental for him] because this gentleman 
has been to many medical appointments where he’s been asked by the examiners “What’s your 
problem?” And he said mano and they’ve been concentrating on the mano. And right now when 
the qualified or certified interpreter just said on the record that mano actually means arm, his 
claim is valid.  
Moderator - Following what we just heard, how do you usually handle the mano and brazo 
situation? 
- I always ask. 
- Always inquire. 
- I always inquire and I offer an explanation on the record. 
- Eighty percent of the time I inquire. 
- Always do. 
- But I think that goes into what we talked about, because we normalize translation. You know 
that that person is saying the word pie [foot] like it’s common, maybe you go to a different 
Spanish-speaking country and they won’t use it in the same way, but we all know by now that 
in that culture, pie is referring to any part of the leg. And there are even people who refer to 
the parts of their body with the terms of an animal’s parts of the body. 
- I guess I’m alone here because I say foot, and I say... 
- It’s incorrect. 
- But every single time the attorney has inquired and every single time it has been clarified, but I 
just say foot and I just say hand, and because they’re pointing then the attorney always says 
“Ok you say hand, but you’re...” 
- They don’t always point.  
- But we know that there’s a communication issue, because you know that the way, if you say 
back to them mano, like translating, in their head they are still hearing brazo. So it’s an 
implicit communication issue and you’re aware of this. 
- And for medical records, these are body parts that are either gonna be examined or not, this is 
a person that doesn’t have... I mean, most people don’t understand that the arm is made out of 
the forearm, your elbow... 
- Yes I know, but all this time we have been assuming that it is the attorney’s responsibility to 
clarify... 
- No, I don’t think so. [Group agreement] 
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- The attorneys don’t always know, and many times they are not even listening. The thing is, if 
the guy means the arm and you say hand because he says mano, not only he’s not getting 
compensation, but he’s not getting treatment either. 
- Exactly. 
- Especially when we already know that that’s a term that is used in that context. 
- In our professional experience, we have learned that contextually this is the use for that term. 
So when I know that a person is most likely speaking of an arm or a leg when they say mano o 
pie, then I would say “May I inquire?” And I would say “Dice la mano de la muñeca para 
abajo o todo el brazo, cuando dice mano?” [When you say hand, do you mean the hand from 
the wrist down or the whole arm?] 
- Or you can even inquire without even leading, because you can say, “Señora, cuando usa la 
palabra mano…” [Madam, when you use the word hand] 
- That’s the way I do it. 
- You can even say “Esta es la mano, este es el brazo, what do you mean?” [This is the hand, 
this is the arm, what do you mean?] 
- Pie es lo que está en el zapato [Foot is what goes in the shoe] 
- I always ask “To you, what is a mano?” and he says “Esto es la mano” [This is the hand]. Ok.  
- One of the things that I would occasionally do is state “The interpreter would like to state that 
in some parts of Mexico a foot means pierna y la mano... ” and then it’s up to them what they 
wanna do, without me inquiring. 
- That’s what I do too. 
- Another reason why that’s important is if you’re doing it in front of the jury, there will always 
be some juror there who knows the word mano and if you say arm he will doubt everything 
else you say... 
- You’re just throwing everything back into the attorney to clarify. 
- But that is a different environment in which you have a... there’s the formality, as you said, 
there is a way “The interpreter would like to state on the record that culturally, when the 
person is saying hand...” or you may ask permission to inquire. So it’s a different way of 
approaching it for the same reason, we want to make sure that it’s understood.  
- And cintura [waist] too. My grandmother says, I mean, I hear... I’m not trying to be anecdotal 
but I have my 87 year old grandmother visiting and just to bring it back to cultural, the 
conversation, and she uses terms to refer to her body especially that we hear in our clients all 
the time and it’s cultural, and it has to do with education level, la cintura, me duele todo el 
cuerpo [the waist, my whole body hurts] and her nose is the only part that hurts, that’s a matter 
of... it’s a way to express herself and she’s not lying, and you have to take that into account 
when you bring it to the table, and you now have a different culture and a different language 
that you’re speaking, that you have to normalize all of that, not just the words. 
- Because as pointed out, a person’s veracity might be determined by the use [of words]. 
- So as an interpreter, I take it upon myself to be that person. I don’t solve the problem because 
it’s not my place but I do make the room aware of that fact. It doesn’t matter if it’s worker’s 
comp or of it’s a proffer session with the AUSA’s. I take them out or I say “Stop for a minute” 
and I offer an explanation, “Culturally this may be happening, and this happened, you do 
whatever you want with that,” but that’s my job because I see that the communication... 
sometimes attorneys ask a question and they get an answer they consider non-responsive, and 
I love it when they say “Is it something that doesn’t have a, there’s no interpretation for that 
term?” “No, there is a translation, you guys just don’t know how to ask questions, that’s your 
problem.”  
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[Submitted to the group for discussion] Professional standards: “For instance, expert testimony 
as to whether a non-English speaker has clearly understood a police officer’s questions as 
uttered in the foreign language is beyond an interpreter’s expertise. A psychologist might be 
better suited to provide this kind of testimony” (CAJC 2013a: 37). My question to you is this: 
Do you know or can you tell when Spanish speakers do not understand? How can you tell? 
- Yes. [General answer]  
- By the look on his face. By the blank look on his face.  
- A deer in headlights. 
- By the answer. 
- There is all kinds of body language and signals that the person emits, and the answer. 
- So in other words, this is saying that the interpreter should not testify as to the comprehension 
of the person you’re interpreting for, but the psychologist may come over here and say “No, he 
didn’t understand the interpreter.” 
- So it requires a psychologist to come and say that versus an interpreter, basically that’s all 
there is. 
- But we, as interpreters, are interpreting not only language, we’re also interpreting the person. 
The communication of the person listening to this, we’re interpreting their reaction, we’re 
interpreting that in our mind, not through words, but… 
- Yeah, but you cannot testify whether the defendant understood or not. 
- I agree with that. 
- No, no, but I don’t think it’s accurate to say that we can never tell if they’ve understood, we 
can often tell if they understood. I know we can’t read their minds but we often can tell. 
- I think we can agree that we can always tell when the person didn’t understand, we know that. 
We’re just not always sure that he did. Because he may answer, he may give an answer that 
indicates comprehension when he didn’t, but when he gives an answer that indicates lack of 
comprehension, we know at that point that he’s not understanding what was said. We’re 
always pretty sure that he didn’t... 
- We will always know, we will always be able to tell when they didn’t get it, but there will 
always be a question of whether they did.  
- Still, I don’t think that’s my role whatsoever. I will never, ever... 
- We’re not technically allowed to say hey, he didn’t get it. 
- I say that with defense attorneys when I’m interviewing a defendant, you know, and he’s 
going pa-pa-pa-pa, and the other is going da-da-da, and at the end I look at the defense counsel 
and go, “You do understand that he didn’t get a word, right?” “What do you mean by that?”  
- But that’s the role of his counsel. The party’s counsel. That means they’re not paying 
attention. 
- I was thinking in keeping the register, in federal court the families of the defendants get to 
write letters to the judge. These letters are translated and the letters sometimes are from people 
that have very very basic level of education, and even trying to keep that register is sometimes 
as hard as translating a highly technical thing. So the funny thing about this is that even if you 
lower it as much as you can, as much as my possibility, unless you start writing hey dawg, that 
kind of thing, because it’s a humble Spanish, it’s not an improper Spanish, it’s a humble... 
when I read it in English, it still represents somebody that this person is not.  
- Exactly, but when you bring that to the interpretation and what we’re talking about, and 
knowing if somebody’s comprehending, I keep in mind that the attorneys, the judge, 
everybody, even if we’re trying to do the best job possible, they’re still hearing you and 
they’re seeing you, you’re not invisible. So, we have that ability and that subtlety to tell if 
somebody’s not getting it, like she said, the face, the reaction, the answer, it goes through us as 
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true as you wanna be to it, it’s still filtered, even if we don’t want it to be filtered, it still is 
sometimes, so we know when they didn’t understand and I say it, “I think they’re not getting 
it.” But you can say that when you’re interviewing with an attorney, you can’t say that to the 
jury or to a judge, you do what you can.  
- You can’t. 
- It often comes out as a non sequitur, the answers that they answer, nada que ver [totally 
unrelated]. 
 
About the language register 
 [Submitted to the group for discussion] “Therefore, among the range of possible equivalents 
that conserve the register, meaning, and style of the original message, the interpreter should 
select the most transparent and meaningful option most likely to be comprehended by the 
listener” (Dueñas González et al. 2012: 18). So therefore, among the possible equivalents of the 
same register, do you find we have a range of possibilities to choose from?  
- No, if you’re going to keep the register, not a lot. 
- Here’s the thing. I think for us, if we’re using, frases de cajón [set phrases], if we’re taking 
them as a solidified, codified, written in stone, this is how it must be used, then we don’t have 
too many. But if we go into understanding what the concept is in English and realize that it 
doesn’t have parity in the legal terminology in Spanish, then we can render the concept as a 
concept phrase. But it’s the same thing that we did with convicción y convincente? [conviction 
and convincing] Both words in the register have parity, simply choose the one that people are 
most likely to have heard and understand. And I think we can do that when the concept is 
completely conserved. 
- For example, interpreting the Miranda rights, “los derechos que le garantiza la Constitución” 
[the rights guaranteed by the Constitution] would be something that somebody would 
understand. “Los derechos constitucionales” [Constitutional rights] sounds obscure, but just 
changing it a little but, you’re not changing the phrase... 
- What I’m saying is that we’ve been doing that throughout our profession I think, and we don’t 
really realize that we’re making it easier. We are modifying things without changing the 
original. 
Moderator - With that in mind then, once again, what do you think the difference or the 
consequences would be if we used “next” instead of “subsequently”? 
- I think it makes a difference but it’s a positive difference. Because if we’re sure the word is a 
synonym and we maintain the register, if you say next instead of subsequently, the person may 
answer the question, and it’s posed in the way it was asked. But if you say subsequently and 
they don’t understand that term, it may cause them to say “No entiendo” [I don’t understand], 
which, in turn, may cause the attorney to say, “Oh, so you don’t understand what I’m asking 
you?” And I’ve seen that happen where it turns around the tone and it makes it seem like he’s 
playing dumb and poor guy just doesn’t understand the term, and it’s like, “Which part of 
subsequently don’t you understand? Or you understood it before...” 
- Rarely have I met a defendant who will be truthful and say “I don’t understand.”  
- Those are very few and far between that are assertive. 
- Most of the time, we know, they just say “Sí sí, yeah, I do understand.”  
- Lately I found myself in court, more and more frustrated, wondering why there isn’t a 
movement amongst judges and attorneys to make the language simple for everyone to 
understand, because I see a lot of English-speaking defendants and I can see that they have no 
idea what’s going on. I’m like, can you not see that the words that you are using are 
completely incomprehensible to these people? 
UNIVERSITAT ROVIRA I VIRGILI 
COMPREHENSION OF LEGAL DISCOURSE IN INTERPRETER-MEDIATED JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS 
Julia Lambertini Andreotti
318 
- But all the codes and all the laws are written in that language, they have to change the whole 
written legal system.  
Moderator - What about when you are not in court? When you are with an attorney and a client, 
what happens? Do you still go strictly by the book and conserve the register? 
- No, I don’t. It depends what the situation is.  
- Then you interrupt the lawyer. 
- If the attorney is coaching his client, if for example the client’s gonna go in and enter a plea of 
guilty the next day in a federal court, the attorney very specifically tells the client the 
questions the judge is gonna ask him. I keep the register there, absolutely, because he is 
structuring it in such a way that he will be knowing what he’s gonna hear. 
- Looking out for him, yeah. 
- However, if I see the deer-in-headlights look on the defendant, with most of the attorneys I go, 
“Those are the words... I don’t think he’s understanding the concept.” “Oh, ok.” If the 
attorney’s simply talking to the client, and we know attorneys, they use double negatives, and 
this is just the way they speak, we’re not gonna retrain them. I will simplify, and we’ll go that 
way.  
- Even attorneys may lower their register when talking informally to their clients, therefore that 
makes our job a lot easier. 
- And we have a freedom to say “Hey, you know, come on, can you change the word? Because I 
don’t think... change the register.” I mean, I feel comfortable with the attorneys that I work 
with, and they know that. 
- Well, there are concepts in court like, “Do you waive your right to a preliminary hearing?” I 
mean, who understands that? And especially when the judges are going, “You know, you have 
the right to a preliminary hearing to be set in ten days from the day that you were arraigned, 
now if you waive you give up your right to that preliminary hearing... ” and here I am [very 
fast] “Usted tiene el derecho a una audiencia preliminar en diez días del día que lo instruimos 
de cargos y si usted quiere renunciar al derecho... ” Who understands that? Well, I leave it 
exactly the same and the man’s face is like uhm, and the attorney says “Say yes” and they say 
“Yes.” 
- But I wanna say that the comments and the quotes that you have shared are very revealing to 
me and actually very liberating as well, because I feel that it’s empowering what we are 
already doing, which is a tendency to want to help people, and both sides, to be understood. 
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Appendix 7. Focus group 2 - Transcription summary 
Sentence 1. Si un testigo declara intencionalmente en falso en un aspecto importante de su 
testimonio, se debe desconfiar del resto de su declaración. [A witness who is willfully false in 
one material aspect of his or her testimony is to be distrusted in others.] 
 
- What about declara intencionalmente en falso [is willfully false], we can say miente [lies] 
- An American would never use the term lie because it is not good manners. For us mentir 
[lying] does not have that connotation. If I were thinking in Spanish and not translating I could 
say miente... but in English we do not say you are lying 
- In Clinton’s case they said everything but lie, Americans do not say it in public but we do 
- It’s not a matter of manners, what happens is with you are lying is you are provoking, it’s a 
call to war, that is why they don’t say it like that 
- I agree that mentir in Spanish does not have the more offensive force it has in English...  
- Instead of se debe desconfiar [is to be distrusted] say no se debe confiar [is not to be trusted] 
- Sometimes [in court] they say they have a choice [to trust or not], discard the rest and believe 
one part and not the other 
- No tendría que confiar [you should not/would not have to trust] 
- The is to be gives us the possibility of doing it [trusting], so we could easily say that, because 
that is what it really means 
- To me it’s an order 
- I always hear it as se puede desconfiar [you may distrust]  
- It’s a should, not a must 
- But tendría [should/would] means that he must and doesn’t do it 
- Se ha de desconfiar [is to be distrusted] 
- For a sixth grader, unless the person is from Spain, se ha would not be understood 
- I was going to say that, it is correct but a higher register than the other options offered 
- I would say puede ponerse en duda [it may be doubted] 
- Pueden desconfiar [you may distrust], the judge is telling the jurors 
- No tienen por qué creer [there is no reason for you to believe] 
- No tienen por qué creer looks good, perfect 
- They are not obligated 
 
Final version: Si un testigo miente en una parte importante de su testimonio, no tienen por qué 
creer el resto de su declaración. [If a witness lies in one material aspect of his or her testimony, 
there is no reason for you to believe the rest of his or her testimony] 
 
Sentence 2. Las pruebas indirectas son pruebas que, de determinarse que son verdaderas, 
prueban un hecho del cual se puede inferir la existencia de otro hecho. [Circumstantial evidence 
is evidence that, if found to be true, proves a fact from which an inference of the existence of 
another fact may be drawn.] 
 
- Instead of de determinarse [if found] let’s change to si se cree [if believed] 
- It is not a matter of believing 
- Circumstantial evidence shows something, from there it can be deduced 
- Instead of inferir [to infer] I feel they wouldn’t understand, I would say deducir [to deduce] 
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- Or se puede concluir [it can be concluded] 
- There is a lot of metalanguage here that you cannot really lower the register that much 
- Can de determinarse que son verdaderas [if found to be true] be moved to another place in the 
sentence, because it is rather interrupting the definition in the middle of the sentence 
- If they turn out to be true, circumstantial evidence... 
- It is a rather complex concept 
- Circumstantial evidence is evidence that... the repetition, the redundancy sometimes is 
necessary 
- If circumstantial evidence is true... I would not repeat evidence 
- We cannot begin with if... we have to begin with circumstantial evidence 
- At the end of the sentence it does not look clear, I do experiments with my audience and in 
these cases I use inflexions, we should use pauses  
- We should leave it where it is 
- I would change inferir [to infer/draw] to deducir [to deduce] 
- It cannot be lowered much there, for the person to understand this it must be explained, it’s the 
only way, that is why the judges made the new instructions giving examples, to show that 
register could not be lowered. That is why I’m saying because precisely the syntax, when you 
try to explain it it becomes an academic definition, and with sixth graders or less, or an IQ of... 
as it is being shown now that many defendants have an IQ of around 70, they cannot get it. 
One must concentrate to change it, even 
- Decide [to decide] looks very similar to determina [to determine] 
- Concluir [to conclude] to them means to finish 
- Se puede deducir [it can be deduced] 
 
Final version: Las pruebas indirectas son pruebas que, si se decide que son verdaderas, 
demuestran un hecho del cual se puede deducir la existencia de otro hecho. [Circumstantial 
evidence is evidence that, if it is decided they are true, they prove a fact from which the 
existence of another fact can be deduced]. 
 
Sentence 3. “Preponderancia de la prueba” se refiere a la prueba que tiene más fuerza de 
convicción que la prueba contraria. [“Preponderance of the evidence” means evidence that has 
more convincing force than that opposed to it.] 
 
- It is clear, it doesn’t make much sense to change it 
- I would like a different word for convicción [conviction/convincing force] 
- That it is more convincing 
- Es más convincente [it is more convincing] I believe it’s easier to understand 
- La prueba más convincente [the most convincing evidence], period, not than the opposite 
- Well no, I understand the comparison  
- No, more convincing is not the same... more capacity to convince 
- The one that has more force than the one opposed to it, remember the scale, which has more 
weight than which, then we cannot leave la contraria [the one opposed to it] out 
- But this refers to the most convincing evidence, I believe it is redundant, in Spanish 
redundancy is grammatically incorrect, but not in English. It is obvious in Spanish that it is 
more convincing than another, what are the options, more convincing than the other one, there 
is no other option 
- In English it is obvious too, this can be applied in any language 
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- We have to say it because it is comparing, it is obvious for people who know, but for those 
who never heard it... 
- In English they speak convolutedly and it sounds well, not in Spanish  
- If we say preponderance of the evidence means the most convincing evidence it is understood 
exactly the same, and the idea is to simplify 
- To simplify does not mean to change the idea, the problem is preponderance makes no sense 
in itself if we do not mention two sets of evidence, outside a comparison 
- One on each side, the strongest wins 
- That it’s more convincente [more convincing]? 
- Yes, that is much more clearer than fuerza de convicción [convincing force], because for a lot 
of people who understand English will think of convicción as in to convict 
- And what do you think of preponderance? 
- We cannot change that one 
- Preeminence... superiority... dominant...  
- Or the evidence que tiene más peso [that has more weight] 
- I say graphic language is what makes people understand, the simplest people work with a more 
graphic language, and the weight is graphic so they can understand the idea 
 
Final version: La prueba que tiene más peso es la prueba que es más convincente que la prueba 
que demuestra lo contrario. [The evidence that has more weight is the evidence that is more 
convincing than the evidence that proves the opposite.] 
 
Sentence 4. El acusado además alega que a él le pareció que su abogado le había divulgado 
información confidencial a su colega en el caso antes de que se separara el caso, y eso lo llevó a 
declararse culpable. [The defendant further alleges that it was his perception that his attorney 
had disclosed privileged information to co-counsel, before the case was severed, that later led 
him to enter into a guilty plea.] 
 
- I would change divulgar [to disclose] to dio información [gave information] 
- Also alega [alleges] can be changed to afirma [affirms] or dice [says] 
- We could turn it around and say the defendant pled guilty because... 
- I think later is important, do you feel it changes without it? 
- I would say it as it is or posteriormente [subsequently] or después [after] 
- But it is obvious that it was later, it cannot be before he found out about the disclosure 
- No, in English later may mean some time has passed 
- We can work it out differently, he ended up pleading guilty because he thought... he ended up 
deciding to plead guilty... a way to change it and say the same thing 
- Y por eso se declaró [and that is why he pled] 
[Group agreement] 
- My problem is with caso [case] when in legal it’s causa [case], se separaron las causas [the 
cases were severed] 
- I never say caso, ever... in fifteen years nobody asked me or didn’t understand 
- I would say caso because you can say fue un caso difícil [it was a difficult case] but causa 
número xxx [case number xxx], in general and colloquial form you say caso, in the OJ 
Simpson case nobody said causa 
- But there are two different concepts 
- But in this case it’s about the causas that were severed and not the caso 
- You may think I’m crazy but I would use caso the first time and causa the second time 
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- The second one must be plural 
- Nobody talks to me about causa no matter how many times I use it, we want to make this 
simpler? I agree the first one is caso and the second one causas, but in my humble opinion 
people watch Caso cerrado [Closed Case] and La corte del pueblo [People’s Court] [TV 
programs] 
 
Final version: El acusado además dice que a él le pareció que su abogado le había dado 
información confidencial a su colega en el caso antes de que se separaran las causas, y por eso 
se declaró culpable. [The defendant also says that he believed his attorney had given 
confidential information to his colleague in the case before the cases were severed, and that is 
why he pled guilty] 
 
Sentence 5. Ya que la explicación del acusado en cuanto al comportamiento de las partes no está 
corroborada por la declaración jurada de ningún testigo, no alcanza a ser una prueba clara y 
convincente. [Since the defendant’s explanation as to the behavior of the parties is not 
supported by the sworn statement of any witnesses, it scarcely rises to the level of clear and 
convincing evidence.] 
 
- If we change ya que [since] to como [since/given that] they will understand you sooner 
- What about if we start from the end, the defendant’s explanation is not clear and convincing 
because... 
- Exactly 
- Some time ago I had a woman from Bolivia testifying and she said bueno, lo pueden 
corroborar [well, you can corroborate it] and the prosecutor jumped to the roof thinking she 
had been coached to testify because she couldn’t understand that corroborar were standard 
- In Spanish it’s a standard word, maybe not in English 
- We can also change en cuanto a [as to the]... to sobre [about] 
 
Final version: La explicación del acusado sobre el comportamiento de las partes no llega a ser 
una prueba clara y convincente porque no está corroborada por la declaración jurada de ningún 
testigo. [The defendant’s explanation as to the behavior of the parties scarcely rises to the level 
of clear and convincing evidence because it is not supported by the sworn statement of any 
witness.] [Sentence inversion] 
 
Additional comments offered by participants: 
 
- I am not concerned about them not understanding the term preponderancia [preponderance] 
because that is the reason it is explained, the idea is that it is not understood in English either 
and that is why an explanation is given, the problem is if they still don’t understand when you 
finish giving the definition 
- But of course, you find a way to say it, anyone understands the evidence that has more weight  
- But if we had a word for preponderance that everyone understood, we wouldn’t have to 
explain anything, because there is no word that can be understood in English and in Spanish 
- We have to understand something, there are concepts that are more abstract than others and 
cannot be simplified, and even if you write everything for a sixth grader, it’s like explaining 
drugs to a 4 year old, so some things can be simplified and others cannot. 
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Appendix 8. Main study. Listening comprehension test 
Main study - English speakers - Question 1 
A witness who is willfully false in one material aspect of his or her testimony is to be distrusted in others. Question: What should 
you do when a witness is willfully false in one material aspect of his or her testimony, or, why would you not believe him? 
P 1 2 When the witness is willfully false in his or her testimony 
P 2 2 So a witness who is willfully false in the answers they should not be trusted after they are caught in the first lie all 
the testimony is skewed 
P 3 2 Eh... once a witness has been false or willfully -meaning they... they did it knowingly, they should be distrusted in 
all other... in other or whatever it was, interviews [giggle] 
P 4 2 When a witness is willfully false 
P 5 2 A witness should be distrusted if they give a false statement 
P 6 2 When he is willfully false 
P 7 2 You should disregard their whole testimony unless you see that they... that there's reasons to override it based on 
their credibility or something, otherwise you should disregard their whole testimony 
P 8 2 Well definitely cast disparaging credibility on anything that he was saying later, is what I would proposition. If he's 
dishonest about one thing, he very well may be about others. His credibility would be impaired 
P 9 2 [You should] distrust him when he is lying or falsifying evidence 
P 10 1 You are allowed to discount all of their testimony, if you so choose 
 
Main study - English speakers - Question 2 
 “Preponderance of the evidence” means evidence that has more convincing force than that opposed to it. Question: What is 
preponderance of the evidence? 
P 1 2 It’s evidence that has more force than that that is opposed to it? 
P 2 2 It’s more evidence than the opposite, wait wait let me figure how to phrase this, I know what it means... It means the 
majority of the evidence points in one direction as opposed to the other direction 
P 3 2 Er... preponderance of the evidence is evidence that is more powerful than the other side of the story 
P 4 1 Preponderance has more convincing force behind it 
P 5 1 Preponderance means... it’s evidence that has more proof than other evidence 
P 6 0 It’s the one that has... I would say more convincing form  
P 7 0 If it's more to the person who's testifying then there has to be more to it, if it's exactly equal then you go against them 
but otherwise you go in their favor 
P 8 2 Well, an overwhelming amount of evidence which would indicate, that would sway a decision one way or the other 
P 9 0 Something that is proven evidence that is shown to the court 
P 10 2 Preponderance of the evidence is adequate evidence that there is more evidence that would lead to the conclusion 
that evidence against, in other words, is not evenly balanced, but there’s... the majority of the evidence would lead 
you to rule in the part of the person that has the burden of proof 
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Main study - English speakers - Question 3 
Circumstantial evidence is evidence that, if found to be true, proves a fact from which an inference of the existence of another fact 
may be drawn. Question: What is circumstantial evidence? 
P 1 1 It’s evidence that proves a fact 
P 2 2 If this then that, it’s an inference, so if this is true then that is true, it’s not direct evidence, it’s supposing that this is 
true then we can assume that that is true 
P 3 0 Er... circumstantial evidence is when there is a fact that was er... proven to be true, but before it was like more of a 
hypothesis? 
P 4 0 Circumstantial evidence proves that there is an inference to be drawn that [giggle]... I don’t know 
P 5 1 Circumstantial evidence is evidence that can have a bearing on something else 
P 6 1 It is evidence that proves another fact, I would think 
P 7 0 Evidence that can be inferred from what's presented to you during the case 
P 8 2 Well it's like, if a equals b then b equals c, if you're using that as an analogy, it’s like for example, the fire was set... it 
was an arson fire. If it was determined, it was determined, if it could be proven that it was set at a certain time, that 
the person had flammable stuff on his person, he had some incinerary* type of device to ignite the flammable stuff, 
and he was the only person in that area, that's circumstantial. He wasn't seen doing it, but it's rock solid 
P 9 0 Something that is proven in court or has proof of actual evidence 
P 10 1 It's evidence that can lead to inferential conclusions 
 
Main study - English speakers - Question 4 
The defendant further alleges that it was his perception that his attorney had disclosed privileged information to co-counsel, before 
the case was severed, that later led him to enter into a guilty plea. Question: What does the defendant allege? 
P 1 1 That his attorney released information to co-counsel? 
P 2 2 That his attorney-client privilege was violated and therefore he thought that it was more evident than the other side 
or somebody else did more than they did, and then he plead guilty figuring that his chances were less, but mostly that 
his attorney-client privilege was violated 
P 3 1 That he perceives that his attorney shared information that should have been between the two of them to the co-
counsel and therefore it affected how he pleaded 
P 4 1 The defendant alleges that his attorney had disclosed privileged information prior to the case being severed 
P 5 0 The defendant alleges that his lawyer talked to other counsel because the -the case was dismissed 
P 6 2 The defendant says that he pled guilty because the co-counsel... his attorney gave the co-counsel, you know, 
confidential information before the case went in... was separated 
P 7 0 I guess I didn’t get that question 
P 8 0 I guess I’m now confused by it 
P 9 0 The defendant is saying that he was guilty of whatever he was accused of before going to court 
P 10 1 That his or her attorney shared information with co-counsel that was probably inappropriate before the defendant 
agreed to a particular plea 
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Main study - English speakers – Question 5 
Since the defendant’s explanation as to the behavior of the parties is not supported by the sworn statement of any witnesses, it 
scarcely rises to the level of clear and convincing evidence. Question: Why does the defendant’s explanation scarcely rise to the 
level of clear and convincing evidence? 
P 1 0 The defendant’s behavior is not supported by... the... party or witnesses? 
P 2 2 Because there is no witness testimony to support it 
P 3 2 Because the statements don’t corroborate with er... the witnesses’ accounts 
P 4 2 Because it’s not supported by the sworn evidence 
P 5 0 The uhm... the statements are not supported by the actions of people from the sworn statements 
P 6 2 Well, it’s not supported by the witnesses’ statements 
P 7 2 Because there's no sworn testimony to support it 
P 8 1 Because it's not supported by substantial evidence, substantiated evidence 
P 9 1 Basically he is testifying something that is incorrect and isn’t proven by other -other witnesses 
P 10 0 Because it doesn't rise to the level of credibility required by the courts 
 
Main study - Spanish speakers group 1 (original register) - Question 1 
Si un testigo declara intencionalmente en falso en un aspecto importante de su testimonio, se debe desconfiar del resto de su 
declaración. Question: ¿Qué debe hacer cuando un testigo declara intencionalmente en falso en un aspecto importante de su 
testimonio, o por qué no le creería?  
(A witness who is willfully false in one material aspect of his or her testimony is to be distrusted in others. Question: What should 
you do when a witness is willfully false in one material aspect of his or her testimony, or, why would you not believe him?) 
P 11 0 Pues si yo sé la verdad, eh... la digo, eh... y también -también le digo a la corte que él está diciendo -que está 
diciendo información falsa 
  Well, if I know the truth, er... I say it, er... and also -I also tell the court that he is saying -that he is saying false 
information 
P 12 0 Pues, decir que está mintiendo, que no... que es falso todo lo que él está diciendo 
  Well, say he is lying, that not... that everything he is saying is false 
P 13  0 Pues si yo fuera el testigo, pues decir la verdad. Sea buena o sea mala pero siempre con la verdad enfrente 
  Well if I were the witness, well, tell the truth. Whether good or bad but always with the truth up front 
P 14  0 Pues a veces culpable 
  Well, sometimes guilty 
P 15  0 Como- como- como dijo que -de alguien que -diga eh eh... pues... pues no sé [giggle] 
  Like, like, like [Pronoun] said that -about someone who -say er er... well... I don’t know [giggle] 
P 16 2 Ok... no confiar en él 
  Ok... not trust him 
P 17 0 ¿Tal vez cambiar de persona? 
  Maybe switching persons? 
P 18 0 Entonces lo que tendría yo que hacer es este que... pedir más explicación, por qué razón me está -está haciendo eso 
  Then what I would have to do is, er, to... to ask for more explanation, why is -is [Singular pronoun] doing that to me 
P 19 0 Pues quedar callado 
  Well, remain silent 
P 20 0 Es malo dar una una información falsa y yo pienso que... que esa persona no merece estar ahí en la corte 
  It is bad to give false information and I think that... that person does not deserve to be there in court 
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Main study - Spanish speakers group 1 (original register) - Question 2 
“Preponderancia de la prueba” se refiere a la prueba que tiene más fuerza de convicción que la prueba contraria. Question: ¿Qué es 
la preponderancia de la prueba?  
(“Preponderance of the evidence” means evidence that has more convincing force than that opposed to it. Question: What is 
preponderance of the evidence?) 
P 11 0 Ese sí no sé que es pre- ... eso no sé qué es 
  That one I really don’t know what it is pre-... I don’t know what that is 
P 12 0 Esa no la entendí nada. Perdón 
  That one I didn’t understand anything. I’m sorry 
P 13  0 No 
  No 
P 14  0 Pues que sea verdad lo que uno está haciendo 
  Well, that it be true what one is doing 
P 15  0 La prepodancia* de la prueba es... ay no sabría decirle 
  Prepodance* of the evidence is... oh my I wouldn’t know 
P 16 0 La pronderancia* de la prueba es la prueba en sí la que te está acusando a ti, no?  
  Pronderance* of the evidence is the evidence itself the one that is accusing you, isn’t it? 
P 17 0 ¿Exagerarla? 
  To exaggerate it? 
P 18 0 Ah pues la palabra prepolderancia* para mí viene siendo como -como que -o sea que me están -cómo le dijera la 
palabra... que me están acusando o sea me están haciendo algo... que no es correcto con este... más... cómo le dijera 
usted... no se me viene a la mente cómo es la palabra que usamos nosotros... Algo como como que están -como que 
me quieren como - cómo es la palabra -decirle que me están poniendo en el mismo lugar, con -con -cómo le dicen la 
palabra... alevosía 
  Ah well the word prepolderance* for me would be like -like -I mean, they’re -what’s the word I could use here... that 
they are accusing me I mean they are doing something to me... that is not correct with er... more... now how can I say 
this... it doesn’t come to mind what the word is that we use... Something like, like they are -like they want me to, like -
what is the word -tell you that they are putting me in the same place, with -with -what is the word... malice 
aforethought 
P 19 0 La prod- la proderancia*? Esa sí, esa palabra no la entiendo 
  The prod -the proderance*? Now that one, that word I don’t understand 
P 20 0 Tampoco lo entiendo 
  I don’t understand it either 
 
Main study - Spanish speakers group 1 (original register) - Question 3 
Las pruebas indirectas son pruebas que, de determinarse que son verdaderas, prueban un hecho del cual se puede inferir la existencia 
de otro hecho. Question: ¿Qué son las pruebas indirectas?  
(Circumstantial evidence is evidence that, if found to be true, proves a fact from which an inference of the existence of another fact 
may be drawn. Question: What is circumstantial evidence?) 
 
P 11 0 Que no son verdaderas. Necesitan confirma-este... investigar si son verdaderas 
  That they are not true. They need to confir- er... investigate if they are true 
P 12 0 Que nada más lo está diciendo y que no, por decir, no tiene ninguna evidencia 
  That he’s just saying that and he doesn’t, say, he doesn’t have any evidence  
P 13  0 Eso no lo entiendo 
  That I don’t understand 
P 14  0 ¿Indirectas? Como que a veces no eh... no es verdad, o a veces son verdades 
  Circumstantial? Like sometimes it’s not er... it’s not true, or sometimes they are truths 
P 15  0 Uhm las pruebas indirectas son... ay no sé no sabría decirle 
  Hmm circumstantial evidence is... oh my, I couldn’t tell you  
P 16 0 Pruebas indirectas son aquellas que eh... te inculpan algo, que te inculpan a ti en algo 
  Circumstantial evidence is the one that er... accuse you something, that accuse you of something  
P 17 0 Es como presentar... eh cosas falsas...uhm... que no vengan al caso 
  It’s like showing... er false things... er... that aren’t related 
P 18 0 Las indirectas para mí son las que le hacen a uno, que le están poniendo pruebas que no son correctas, verdad? O sea, 
es es indirecto, que no es algo que es falso 
  The circumstantial ones [indirect] to me is the kind that is done to one, like when they are showing evidence that is not 
correct, right? That is, it’s, it’s circumstantial [indirect], that it’s not something that is false 
P 19 0 Este... pues es como juzgar mal y también quedar callado 
  Er... well it’s like misjudging and also remaining silent 
P 20 0 No lo oí bien bien 
  I didn’t really hear it well 
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Main study - Spanish speakers group 1 (original register) - Question 4 
El acusado además alega que a él le pareció que su abogado le había divulgado información confidencial a su colega en el caso antes 
de que se separara el caso, y eso lo llevó a declararse culpable. Question: ¿Qué alega el acusado?  
(The defendant further alleges that it was his perception that his attorney had disclosed privileged information to co-counsel, before 
the case was severed, that later led him to enter into a guilty plea. Question: What does the defendant allege?) 
 
P 11 1 Que este... eh... su abogado no lo defendió como debió de haber hecho, porque eh... porque le dio información al otro 
-al abogado, al otro abogado que no debía de haber hecho 
  That er... er... his attorney didn’t defend him as he should have done, because er... because he gave information to 
the other -to the attorney, to the other attorney that he should not have done 
P 12 0 Que su abogado le dijo lo que él había declarado, por decir, al otro licenciado de la otra persona 
  That his attorney told him what he had testified, in other words, to the other attorney of the other person 
P 13  0 Pues que alguien le dijo de que... que estaban... que había denunciado falsamente entonces fue acusado culpable 
  Well that someone told him that... that they were... that [Pronoun] had made a false report so he was found guilty  
P 14  0 Pues que a veces no es verdad lo que ellos nos dicen pero es por no tener papeles nos echamos nosotros la culpa 
  Well, it’s that sometimes what they tell us is not true but it’s because of not having papers we blame ourselves 
P 15  0 El que él es eh... como diré... es en falso, en falso su testimonio, algo así 
  It’s that he is er... how could I say... it’s false, his testimony is false, something like that 
P 16 0 El acusado alega que es inocente 
  The defendant alleges he is innocent 
P 17 0 Que el abogado, su abogado le comunicó otras palabras al otro abogado, de la parte, digamos, contraria 
  That the attorney, his attorney communicated other words to the other attorney, from the, let’s say, opposing party  
P 18 0 Que -que le dio información a su defensor, no? Y que -que el defensor le había dado -habíamos este... había este 
dado - dado la información a otra persona, no? 
  That -that [Pronoun] gave information to his defense attorney, right? And that -that the defense attorney had given -
we had, er... had er given -given the information to another person, right? 
P 19 0 A divulgar y con el otro este aboga- abogado, esa parte tampoco la entendí 
  To disclose and with the other er attorn- attorney, that part I didn’t understand either 
P 20 0 Que divulgó una información al abogado y no debería de haber sido eso 
  That [Pronoun] disclosed some information to the attorney and it shouldn’t have been that 
 
Main study - Spanish speakers group 1 (original register) - Question 5 
Ya que la explicación del acusado en cuanto al comportamiento de las partes no está corroborada por la declaración jurada de 
ningún testigo, no alcanza a ser una prueba clara y convincente. Question: ¿Por qué la explicación del acusado no alcanza a ser una 
prueba clara y convincente?  
(Since the defendant’s explanation as to the behavior of the parties is not supported by the sworn statement of any witnesses, it 
scarcely rises to the level of clear and convincing evidence. Question: Why does the defendant’s explanation not seem to be clear 
and convincing evidence?) 
P 11 0 Uhm... no le entendí a la pregunta  
  Er... I didn’t understand the question 
P 12 0 Porque no -no tiene pruebas y no no le son válidas, nada más yo pienso, lo que él está diciendo 
  Because he doesn’t -doesn’t have evidence and no they are not valid / admissible to him, nothing else, I think, what 
he is saying 
P 13  0 Porque no ha sido sincero siempre, siempre hay mentira, hay verdad, y pues están confundidos 
  Because he hasn’t always been honest, there are always lies, there is truth, and, well, they are confused 
P 14  0 Porque a veces decimos y a veces no -no creen lo que uno haga y a veces por medio de no tener documentos nos 
echamos la culpa aunque no sea verdad 
  Because sometimes we say and sometimes they don’t -don’t believe what one does and sometimes through not having 
documents we blame ourselves even if it’s not true 
P 15  0 Pues me imagino que no se explicó bien, es todo 
  Well I imagine he didn’t explain himself well, that’s all 
P 16 0 Digo porque es... su... su declaración fue malinterpretada en todo eso 
  I say because it’s... his... his testimony was misinterpreted in all that 
P 17 0 Porque la acusación que las personas le dieron no con... no conjunta con la de él, están equivocados, la parte de cómo 
le diré, la acusadora 
  Because the accusation that the people gave him does not ma-... does not match his, they are mistaken, the party, 
how should I say, the accusing party  
P 18 0 Uhm es tal vez será porque -porque su -su defensor lo haiga* confundido en su declaración 
  Hmm it is maybe it is because -because his -his defense attorney may have confused him in his testimony 
P 19 0 Tampoco esa parte no la entendí 
  That part I didn’t understand either 
P 20 0 Porque no había ningún testigo para estar al lado de él y se tuvo que dar culpable por eso, porque no tenía testigos 
  Because there was no witness to be by his side and he had to plead guilty because of that, because he had no 
witnesses 
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Main study - Spanish speakers group 2 (simplified register) - Question 1 
Si un testigo miente en una parte importante de su testimonio, no tienen por qué creer el resto de su declaración. Question: ¿ En qué 
caso o por qué no creería la declaración de un testigo?  
(If a witness lies in one material aspect of his or her testimony, there is no reason for you to believe the rest of his or her testimony. 
Question: When or why would you not believe a witness’ testimony?) 
P 21  1 Si un testigo mien-miente en la primera declaración no tienen que er seguir oyéndolo? 
  If a witness lie- lies in the first testimony [Pronoun] don’t have to, er- continue listening to him? 
P 22 2 Porque está mintiendo 
  Because he is lying 
P 23  2 En ninguna porque está mintiendo desde un principio 
  None because he is lying from the start 
P 24  2 Porque está mintiendo? 
  Because he is lying? 
P 25  2 Porque al empezar ya estaba mintiendo 
  Because he was already lying from the start 
P 26 2 Si un testigo miente en alguna parte de su declaración... ¿en qué situación yo no lo creería? Pues yo creo que no le 
creería en ninguna situación  
  If a witness lies in some part of his testimony... in what situation I would not believe him? Well I think I would not 
believe him in any situation 
P 27 2 Nunca porque está diciendo mentiras desde el principio 
  Never, because he is telling lies from the beginning 
P 28 2 Cuando sé que está mintiendo 
  When I know he is lying 
P 29 2 No pues ya con el solo hecho de que está mintiendo, para nada 
  No well just the mere fact that he is lying, not at all 
P 30 2 Si la eh... cómo se llama... si ya mintió desde un principio, pues va a mentir hasta el final 
  If the, er... what is it called... if he already lied from the start, well he will lie until the end 
 
Main study - Spanish speakers group 2 (simplified register) - Question 2 
La prueba que tiene más peso es la prueba que es más convincente que la prueba que demuestra lo contrario. Question: ¿Cuál es la 
prueba que tiene más peso?  
(The evidence that has more weight is the evidence that is more convincing than the evidence that proves the opposite. Question: 
Which is the evidence that has more weight?) 
 
P 21  1 La prueba más convincente 
  The most convincing evidence 
P 22 0 La prueba que tiene más peso... ¿La verdad? No sé 
  The evidence that has more weight... honestly? I don’t know 
P 23  1 ¿La prueba más convincente? 
  The most convincing evidence? 
P 24  1 ¿La que se escuchó más convincente? 
  The one that sounded most convincing?   
P 25  0 Sí es la misma, sí es la misma, porque es la... eh es -es- él no se basa a una -a una, [daughter’s interruption] pérame 
m’ija, a una... es que no -no se interroga algo más específico, es la misma prueba, es la misma prueba porque él no 
dice otra. 
  Yes it’s the same, yes it’s the same, because it’s the... er it’s -it’s - he doesn’t rely to a -on a [daughter’s interruption] 
hold on sweetheart, to a... it’s that no -nothing more specific is questioned, it’s the same evidence, it’s the same 
evidence because he does not say any other 
P 26 1 La prueba que es más convincente... es la que tiene más peso 
  The evidence that is most convincing... is the one that has more weight 
P 27 1 La prueba convincente 
  The convincing evidence 
P 28 1 ¿Eh, la prueba que- más convincente? 
  Er, the evidence that- most convincing?  
P 29 1 La que es más convincente 
  The one that is most convincing 
P 30 1 La prueba convincente 
  The convincing evidence 
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Main study - Spanish speakers group 2 (simplified register) - Question 3 
 Las pruebas indirectas son pruebas que, si se decide que son verdaderas, demuestran un hecho del cual se puede deducir la 
existencia de otro hecho. Question: ¿Qué son las pruebas indirectas?  
(Circumstantial evidence is evidence that, if it is decided they are true, they prove a fact from which the existence of another fact 
can be deduced. Question: What is circumstantial evidence?) 
P 21  0 Las pruebas indirectas son las... [giggle] ... sorry 
  Circumstantial evidence is... [giggle] ... sorry 
P 22 0 Las pruebas indirectas es que le están preguntando como, con otra persona, no están preguntándole al... no están 
agarrando pruebas suficientes para ver si no hay otro medio, otra manera u otra persona que está juntando pruebas 
  Circumstantial evidence is that they are asking him like -with another person, they are not asking... they are not 
getting enough evidence to see if there might be other means, another way or another person who is gathering 
evidence 
P 23  0 La pruebas que aseguran... lo que es el... ¿el caso? 
  The evidence that establish... what it is the... the case? 
P 24  0 Las indirectas son las que se prueban que son verdaderas y de ahí se deduce eh que... que es...¿es buena prueba? 
  The circumstantial ones are the ones that are proven true and from there it can be inferred er that... that it is... good 
evidence? 
P 25  0 Ok, aquí dice que... haz de cuenta como la prueba no ocupa al... como traer a alguien, no? O sea eh -si ya tiene una 
prueba grande ahí ya se va a quedar, no ocupa más hechos 
  Ok, here it says that... let’s say as the evidence does not need the... like bringing somebody in, right? That is er -if 
[Pronoun] has major evidence there it’s going to stay,[Pronoun] does not need any more facts 
P 26 1 Pruebas indirectas... Las pruebas indirectas son las que pueden demostrar un hecho con otro hecho 
  Circumstantial evidence... Circumstantial evidence is the kind that can prove a fact with another fact 
P 27 0 Preguntas son respuestas verdaderas 
  Questions are true answers 
P 28 0 ¿La que tiene más peso? 
  The one that has more weight? 
P 29 0 No, no sé [giggle] ... Que salen de lo indirecto y que entonces qué son -qué realmente -cuales son las pruebas 
realmente valoradas, no? o verdaderas... ahí es donde un juego de palabras que complica la situación, verdad? 
  No, I don’t know [giggle] ... That they are drawn from circumstance and then what are they -what really -which is 
the truly valued evidence, right? Or true... that is where a play on words that complicates the situation, right? 
P 30 0 Yo creo que son pues, mentiras, ¿verdad? 
  I believe they are well, lies, right? 
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Main study - Spanish speakers group 2 (simplified register) - Question 4 
El acusado además dice que a él le pareció que su abogado le había dado información confidencial a su colega en el caso antes de 
que se separaran las causas, y por eso se declaró culpable. Question: ¿Qué dice el acusado?  
(The defendant also says that he believed his attorney had given confidential information to his colleague in the case before the 
cases were severed, and that is why he pled guilty. Question: What does the defendant say?) 
P 21  0 El acusado dice que le dio información er confidencial antes que -antes que separara de su colega 
  The defendant says that [Pronoun] gave, uh, confidential information before -before separating from his colleague 
P 22 1 Como que el... el su abogado del muchacho le dio información a... a su colega y por eso él se hizo como culpable 
porque- como que hubo un algo ahí... malo 
  Like he... he his attorney of the young man gave information to... to his colleague and that’s why he pled like guilty 
because -like there was a something there... wrong  
P 23  0 Que él eh... no le dio las respuestas correctas desde un principio -que... que... el mismo abogado le dijo que uhm... 
ay! 
  That he er... didn’t give him the correct answers from the beginning -that... that... the same attorney told him that 
hmm... Geez! 
P 24  0 Que su abogado le dijo que se... declarara culpable? Uhm... no sé. Es todo [giggle] 
  That his attorney told him to... plead guilty? Er... I don’t know. That is all [lgiggle] 
P 25  0 Él le dijo información al -al otro al -al que... al como quien dice al contrario -al contrario de... del abogado, o sea, del 
abogado sí 
  He told information to -to the other one to -to the... to, so to speak, to the opposing -the opposing of -of the attorney, 
I mean, of the attorney, yes 
P 26 0 El acusado dice que su abogado le dio información confidencial antes de que empezara el caso 
  The defendant says that his attorney gave [Pronoun] confidential information before the case started 
P 27 0 Que le dio las- que le dio las- ¿cómo se dice? las pruebas? solamente eso, que él le dio las pruebas 
  That [Pronoun] gave [Pronoun] the -that [Pronoun] gave [Pronoun] the -what is it called? The evidence? Just that, 
that he gave [Pronoun] the evidence 
P 28 1 ¿Que su abogado le dio información a su colega? 
  That his attorney gave information to his colleague? 
P 29 1 Que le dio a su colega información y que no sé qué son las... hay otra palabra que no sé qué es, cómo se escribe, 
buen no sé hay otra no -no le entendí bien, y por eso es que se había declarado él culpable 
  That [Pronoun] gave information to his colleague and that I don’t know what are... there is another word that I 
don’t know what it is, how it is spelled, well I don’t know there is another one not -I didn’t understand it well, and 
that is why he had pled guilty 
P 30 1 Que le había dado eh... información antes a su colega y por eso se declaró culpable 
  That [Pronoun] had given [Pronoun] er ... information to his colleague earlier and that is why he pled guilty 
 
Main study - Spanish speakers group 2 (simplified register) - Question 5 
La explicación del acusado sobre el comportamiento de las partes no llega a ser una prueba clara y convincente porque no está 
corroborada por la declaración jurada de ningún testigo. Question: ¿Por qué la explicación del acusado no llega a ser una prueba 
clara y convincente?  
(The defendant’s explanation as to the behavior of the parties scarcely rises to the level of clear and convincing evidence because it 
is not supported by the sworn statement of any witness. Question: Why isn’t the defendant’s explanation clear and convincing 
evidence?) 
P 21  0 Porque no está coloborando* y no este... no está coloborando* y no es convincente 
  Because [Pronoun] is not colloborating* and not er... is not colloborating* and it is not convincing  
P 22 0 ¿La verdad? no sé 
  Honestly? I don’t know 
P 23  2 ¿Porque no está corroborada por los testigos? 
  Because it is not corroborated by the witnesses? 
P 24  2 ¿Porque no está corroborada por ningún testigo? 
  Because it is not corroborated by any witness? 
P 25  0 Híjole no sé... eso sí no sé, creo que no sé, no -no -no sé 
  Darn, I don’t know ... that I don’t know, I believe I don’t know, no -no -I don’t know 
P 26 0 OK la información corraborada* no puede ser... no puede ser clara porque no está corraborada*... y no puede ser 
convincente 
  Ok corraborated* information cannot be... cannot be clear because it is not corraborated*... and cannot be 
convincing 
P 27 0 Porque no está bien eh... elaborada 
  Because it is not well, er... elaborated 
P 28 0 Porque no tienen pruebas 
  Because they have no evidence 
P 29 1 Creo que dice que no está corroborada, ¿no? No sé así le entiendo yo 
  I believe he says that it is not corroborated, right? I don’t know, that is how I understand it 
P 30 0 Porque no la dijo eh... no fue verdad, no fue clara, la pues, lo que él declaró, ¿verdad? 
  Because [Pronoun] didn’t say it er... it was not true, it was not clear, the, well, what he testified, right? 
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Appendix 9. Main study. Interviews with interpreters 
Main study - Interpreters’ interviews - Question 1 
Demographics (SSC: Spanish-speaking country; L/A: Learning and/or acquisition) 
 
     
 Place of Birth Schooling Spanish L/A English L/A 
     
P 1 SSC  SSC SSC SSC/US 
     
P 2 US SSC/US SSC/US  SSC/US  
     
P 3 US US SSC US 
     
P 4 US  US SSC/US US 
     
P 5 SSC  SSC SSC SSC 
     
P 6 SSC  SSC/US SSC US 
     
P 7 US US US US 
     
P 8 US SSC SSC US 
     
P 9 US US US SSC/US 
     
P 10 SSC  SSC SSC  SSC/US 
  
 
Main study - Interpreters’ interviews - Question 2 
Certifications held - Attempts at examinations before passing 
 
 California State Court Interpreter Exam Federal Court Interpreter Exam 
     
 Written Oral Written Oral 
     
P 1 1 1 1 2 
     
P 2 1 2 - - 
     
P 3 1 4 1 2 
     
P 4 1 2 1 1 
     
P 5 2 2 1 2 
     
P 6 5 4 3 1 
     
P 7 5 5 2 - 
     
P 8 1 1 1 1 
     
P 9 1 1 2 2 
     
P 10 1 3 1 1 
  
 
Main study - Interpreters’ interviews – Question 3 
Training 
 
P 1 Private instruction 
  
P 2 Interpreting program 
  
P 3 Interpreting program, Private instruction 
  
P 4 Private instruction 
  
P 5 Interpreting program 
  
P 6 Interpreting program 
  
P 7 Interpreting program, Private instruction  
  
P 8 None 
  
P 9 Interpreting program 
  
P 10 Interpreting program 
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Main study - Interpreters’ interviews - Question 4 
How would you define the term “language register” in your own words? 
 
P 1 I guess it would be the level of sophistication, the level of difficulty, or the level... I dunno whether I can talk 
about the register as an isolated thing. I would have to think. The level at which a person will understand or... 
a level with which a person is more familiarized, perhaps?... I still feel that if I’m interpreting for the 
defendant it is not as... I mean, I’m not going to start distorting the English version but to me it is more 
important, more crucial, more significant or more important, to keep the exact same register when you’re 
interpreting from Spanish into English. Because that will convey to the judge, and I’m talking now about 
court. 
  
P 2 I’m familiar with the term, I don’t understand the question though. I believe what you’re asking me is, or 
maybe the definition that I would have is that we need to keep a register when we are interpreting. I’m 
thinking keeping the syntax, the... you know, I’m having a hard time answering that question. 
  
P 3 Cultural and educational sophistication of a word. 
  
P 4 Register reflects a level of speech as well as a kind of tone or attitude towards the interlocutor. It’s both of 
those things. 
  
P 5 In my own words I would say the register is the level in terms of how educated a word is. How literate the 
word sounds. A lower register word is more commonly used within people of lower education, higher register 
is used hopefully by professionals and people who have to address things in a more high-register way. 
  
P 6 The register... the way I interpret register would be, depending if we are in a courtroom setting, the legalese 
would be a high register. So somebody with a little more education may be able to understand it better. If a 
person doesn’t have a lot of formal training, they may speak a different register, a lower register, so it’s... we 
work with both registers, or any type of register, but that’s mostly how I understand. If a person may speak a 
low register means that they may be not familiar with the subject matter I’m talking about. 
  
P 7 To me it just means that you have to maintain the same level of speech as the speaker. So if it’s an attorney 
usually their register is higher, a more educated vocabulary. And you have to maintain the register. 
  
P 8 I mean, it means that you are trying to put whatever you hear in the same context as used in the original 
language. In the court’s language, ok? I am going to... I mean, if somebody in Spanish says in a sex case, the 
victim comes and because of the social economic background that she had, educational background and such, 
she comes and tells me, or she looks up from the witness stand, she says, “Me comió” (he ate me), ok, it’s not 
the same as saying “Me hizo el amor” (he made love to me), right? 
  
P 9 Well, to me, language register is really a factor of formal education. And to me, that’s one of the factors to 
consider, the amount of formal education, if there’s less or more. And there’s another factor that comes into it 
which I would say formal vs. informal. That to me is register. Also you could consider things like polite vs. 
rude. These can all play into register. I’m saying that all three of those things, the term and what a register is 
of a person who’s speaking; their level of formal education, whether they intend to be rude or polite or cut 
you out, you know what I’m saying, rude or polite. And also register is also a factor of, what was the third 
thing I said? formal education, whether you want to be rude or polite, and register can also have to do with the 
words you select and depending on the formality or informality of the situation you are in. If you’re in a bar, 
having a few copas (drinks), you’re probably gonna use a different register or word selections than in court. 
  
P 10 It means the level of correctness or politeness that is associated to that word. Like the socioeconomical level 
and all those things. 
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Main study - Interpreters’ interviews - Question 5 
Have you ever received any training on register, register manipulation, or the features of legal language before 
beginning to practice? 
 
P 1 No. If I received a class, it was after. I did a lot of self-teaching. And then when it came to legal, I checked 
all the most common and potential ways to translate or interpret a legal term into Spanish. I did try to have a 
collection so that at the time, when you’re actually in the setting of where you’re interpreting... all of them 
have to be correct, and try to find the one that will be easier to understand by the person. But it was all my 
own at the time. 
  
P 2 No. All I received was vocabulary. 
  
P 3 No and no. 
  
P 4 I don’t think I have received specific training on the issue of register, no. Training in the features of legal 
language? I’m mostly self-trained in that area. 
  
P 5 No. I was only told that there is a register that has to be kept, but not how to raise it or lower it or any kind of 
hands-on exercises. 
  
P 6 I don’t believe I have. 
  
P 7 No. 
  
P 8 We had to take a seminar on ethics when we first came to LA. Everybody, before we started working in 
courts at the time, we had to go through, not that I’m gonna say it’s enough, I believe it was a four or six-
hour training kind of thing where they explained all this. And then they gave it to you in writing as well. 
  
P 9 I don’t remember actually getting anything that specific, no. 
  





UNIVERSITAT ROVIRA I VIRGILI 
COMPREHENSION OF LEGAL DISCOURSE IN INTERPRETER-MEDIATED JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS 
Julia Lambertini Andreotti
334 
Main study - Interpreters’ interviews - Question 6 
Based on your opinion or your professional knowledge, why do you think it’s important to maintain the original 
register when interpreting from Spanish into English? 
 
P 1 Everything I’ve always heard or read is after. When it comes to, whether it’s the defendant or a witness, the 
main thought I have always had from what I’ve heard are the experts, I wanna call the experts, those who 
were the instructors, was simply so that the judge, the jurors, the attorneys, they got to hear not only the 
meaning that the person is conveying through his testimony, but also the level of sophistication, the level of 
education, the level of how well rounded the person may be or not. 
  
P 2 Well, I believe as communicators, as interpreters, our duty is to make the person sound... I’m not going to use 
the word exact, but as close to what they would sound in his or her native language. That would be the reason. 
  
P 3 So that third parties can evaluate the person’s testimony accurately. 
  
P 4 The reason is the attorney, just as the defendant has... in order for the full conveyance of all the language, both 
register content and substance and lexicon and everything to be effective, all of those elements have to be 
there. Whether it’s coming from the attorney to the witness, or the witness back to the attorney. Also, it’s for 
the benefit of the jury in a jury trial, so that the jury will appreciate the actual level or grasp the language level 
of expression, vocabulary, and also rhetorical intent of the witness. For sure, it’s the same principles. 
  
P 5 You would change many things by changing the register. You would change the real meaning of what the 
person is trying... you would convey a different meaning, you would not convey the level of education of the 
person, you would not convey maybe the area where the person comes from. I’m talking about embellishing 
and changing the word so the person doesn’t sound so uneducated.  
  
P 6 As we were trained to do, the register from Spanish into English is for the Court to ascertain the speaker's 
education and sophistication. 
  
P 7 Because it’s very important to get the message relayed in the... with the same level of speech that the speaker 
is speaking in, and especially when it comes from Spanish into English because oftentimes we run into a lot 
of cases when they are saying, let’s say, gang-related terminology or slang-related terminology, or insulting 
kind of language. You want to make sure that you relay it in the same rude level that it’s in, “Le di un 
chingazo” (I smacked/hit him) or, just, the simple terminology that they use. Yeah, and it’s important because 
the people listening and the jury have to understand the severity of the language that the person is using. The 
level of the language. And it’s important in getting the message relayed.  
  
P 8 I’m talking about as far as the reaction of the jury. So the jury has to have the same expression in English 
because that is gonna tell them where this victim is coming from. It’s like if this happens in LA with an 
English-speaking victim, it’s not the same having, no disrespect to anybody, but somebody with a third grade 
education, as somebody who is a graduate student from USC, both of whom suffered the same, were victims 
of the same crime, they are not going to put it to the jury in the same words. So you cannot tell them, the jury, 
“Look, this victim has this level of education” because it’s not my place to do it, but by her own words, she is 
gonna convey that. And I have to go between. Well, I mean, because you have to put the jury or the judge or 
the court officers or anybody on the same level that they would be if the witness or whomever is on the 
witness stand would put it if she was speaking English at the same level. If a witness spoke English, he 
wouldn’t be cleaning up his act. If he comes and blurts four-letter words and this and that and the other, the 
jury or the judge or everybody would understand exactly where that person is coming from. And I don’t see 
why it should change just because a person is not English speaking. 
  
P 9 But the reason why we do it into English is because in a courtroom situation, English is the language of the 
record. And to not maintain the register is to present something that doesn’t exist. If you do not maintain the 
register, you are not giving a true rendition of what this person’s character or personage is like. For instance, 
if a guy has a third grade education you can’t make him sound like Harry Potter. You have to, to the best of 
your abilities, maintain the register [so the jury and the judge get] not just a clear picture, but a true picture. 
  
P 10 Because that’s the register used by the court, the attorneys, the people, and that’s the one that they understand 
and feel more comfortable with. And it’s also for fairness, for everybody who listens to your interpretation, 
they have to listen to it on the same level as whatever language they’re using, whatever words, cuss words. 
But honestly, to tell you the truth, I think it applies to both, I think it goes both ways. I think it’s clarity and 
fairness, those are the main reasons. 
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Main study - Interpreters’ interviews – Question 7 
Based on your opinion or your professional knowledge, why do you think it’s important to maintain the original 
register when interpreting from English into Spanish? 
 
P 1 I think that when it comes to that, and I am going to tell you at this stage in my career, I am not going to be 
worried to say this because I know that many of my colleagues will agree with me. I have been guilty of, 
when I have a defendant next to me, and I am interpreting into Spanish, I have often looked for the easiest. As 
long as I was not distorting, I looked for the easiest. I think it is so that it’s at the same playing field, footing, 
as a person who, in the same exact situation, lack of education, lack of sophistication, lack of training, lack of 
being exposed to judicial terminology, does not need an interpreter, speaks perfect English, but has to listen to 
this jargon which they are not accustomed to listening to. So then both of them, the Spanish speaker and the 
English speaking person are at the same level. 
  
P 2 I believe [it’s the same] for both [directions] [From previous question: “To make the person sound... I’m not 
going to use the word exact, but as close to what they would sound in his or her native language”]. [Why do 
you think it’s important?] I don’t think it is. I do it because I have to. 
  
P 3 So that the party’s witness, or defendant, can have the same experience as an English speaking person would 
have. 
  
P 4 Because in approximating or even duplicating register, in approximating register, interpreters deliver to the 
witness or defendant the full rhetorical and substantive content that the attorney wants to convey.  
  
P 5 You would be violating your code of ethics by basically explaining or dumbing down the language to the 
person that doesn’t understand legalese. If the person doesn’t understand the legal term or the way the judge 
or the attorneys are speaking, although we may go in circles, there’s ways an interpreter should go and rules 
an interpreter should follow without changing the registers. It’s not my place to either use a lower register 
word or explain what the word means, even if I see the person does not understand. I don’t know if I was ever 
taught strictly why, other than saying that it’s a violation because you’re changing things, and you’re 
supposed to go as verbatim as possible. I don’t think I was ever given a reason other than you cannot change 
things because you could change meaning, the person could see you maybe as an advocate, or someone that’s 
trying... the district attorney may be bilingual and can figure out that you are not saying what you’re supposed 
to say, part of the jurors may be bilingual and understand. Other than that I really don’t know. 
  
P 6 Well, I’m just assuming in the argument if we change it to make it easier to understand to the other speaker, 
in my case the Spanish speaker, then we’re assisting in their understanding, whereas if the Court were to 
speak to an English speaker, that English speaker doesn’t have the luxury of somebody explaining to him or 
telling him what the Court’s meaning. 
  
P 7 Just because you have to maintain the register. And I know a lot of times they don’t understand, but it’s really 
not my job, it’s the person asking the questions to make sure that they are understanding. I think it’s just, I 
just think that they do it because they don’t feel that it’s our responsibility to take it upon ourselves to lower 
the register because to them it’s extremely important that we remain as neutral parties and we relay the 
message and that’s all we do. Regardless of what level of speech the person is using, they feel that it’s not our 
place to lower it... [we would stop being neutral] because we are taking it upon ourselves to make it easier for 
the listener to understand when a lot of times there’s a strategy that they use with certain vocabulary. There’s 
always a strategy, especially by the person asking the question. And you can’t interrupt that, you know, 
basically we’re transparent, we don’t exist.  
  
P 8 Because the same reason. If the defendant spoke English and if he didn’t understand what’s going on, he 
would ask his attorney. So you expect the defendant, I mean, you’re not gonna give the person for whom 
you’re interpreting into Spanish, whispering mode if need be, although I try to use wire equipment because 
it’s less of a strain on my neck and my voice. But if he doesn’t understand something, he has lost. I am not 
there to explain what they are trying to tell him. I’m there to convey exactly what they are saying at the same 
register, the same way. And it’s the only way around. 
  
P 9 More than likely he’s not gonna understand half the crap you’re saying if you maintain the register, but you 
maintain it because it is a true and accurate rendition of what these people are saying. You have to maintain 
the register to the best of your abilities. If he doesn’t understand something, if a judge sits there and says 
something like “Sir, if you’re so impecunious as to afford your own representation,” I can’t change that, “Si 
no tiene dinero para pagar” (if you don’t have money to pay), that’s not the same register, see what I’m 
saying?... It is not, as a judicial interpreter, you should not change that because then you are interceding, and 
you’re trying not to intercede. But if you sit there and say, well, you really gotta maintain the register here, 
you know, if I have to choose something I always choose to maintain the most accurate meaning.  
  
P 10 Also because going from English into Spanish for instance, another reason it’s really important is fairness. If 
a guy who is American, born and raised here, he listens to those words and that’s what he hears. Even if he 
doesn’t understand the high register, that’s what it is. So the same goes to Spanish speakers, even if we’re 
using terms that are like, resquicio legal for loophole, whatever, and then it is their job to ask, or it is their job 
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Main study - Interpreters’ interviews – Question 8 
Does your interpreting style vary according to the setting? In what way(s)? 
 
P 1 I am much more careful in the courtroom because... I’m not worried about if they hear me, I’m more worried 
about the fact that... they need to understand the whole thing. One word, unless it’s a crucial key word, is not 
gonna cause a miscarriage of justice. But I just concentrate on this thing, I want to make sure to the whole... 
because usually, it’s the whole concept, more than one legal term, more than one legal concept in the whole 
paragraph. So if the guy is not going to get it, I want the judge and the attorney to deal with that. What 
happens is, say we’re having an interview, maybe I don’t change the register, but what I do is I interpret 
exactly what the attorney says, and then I say, “Señor,” and then I say, using other words, like two words, I 
say, “This means, blah blah” so I tell the attorney, “I just told him blah blah” and he’ll say “Ok ok no 
problem.” That’s what I’m saying, I use my judgment. I am very very careful. There have been times when an 
attorney can say, “Oh I don’t want so and so coming to interview at the jail anymore because she says things 
that I never said” and so if I’m going to... it’s not like every other word I’m coming up with a second 
explanation. I’m more likely to tell the attorney, “I’m sorry but you know what? I don’t think he got what you 
said” and let him... 
  
P 2 Yes, I feel more freedom when... particularly when I’m off the record, I feel more freedom for example if the 
witness is not understanding what I am saying, and it is obvious to me that he or she is not understanding, I 
feel the liberty, the freedom of interrupting and telling the attorney that I believe the witness is not 
understanding me. On the record or in court I just don’t want to... I want to be as invisible as possible and just 
there as a communicator, and I don’t want my feelings or my opinions to be recorded or to become part of the 
record. 
  
P 3 Absolutely. It affects the way I handle the register, I may feel more freedom to lower or request to lower the 
register. 
  
P 4 The setting can, it’d be disingenuous of me to say that the setting has no effect. The setting does have an 
effect, yes it does. Well, if you’re going to talk about all kinds of events, let’s start with a depo prep. A depo 
prep has no court reporter on hand, and is unusual in all the interpreting events in that the formality of... the 
rigidity of interpreting high register exactly as-is is loosened somewhat, and a different kind of bond is 
created between the interpreter and the attorney. And so, in a depo prep an interpreter can, and I sometimes 
do, become something like an aid to the attorney to convey language that is difficult on its face in a way that 
will be understandable, comprehensible, to the defendant. In other words, I can change the language, the 
register, a little bit to make sure that the point has gotten across. In a depo prep, that’s because no one has 
taken any oath, there’s no court reporter, and I’ve told the attorney outright, “I’m going to work with you here 
and when the language is difficult I’m going to let you know, and I’m going to ask for your permission, I’m 
gonna say it in a way that he’ll get it.” That’s in a depo prep. In a sworn deposition, that possibility is off the 
table. [And in court] it’s off the table, out the door. The record is a decisive factor, and for instance, not only 
the record all the time, another influential factor in a setting might be a lock-up interview. A lock-up 
interview resembles a depo prep in a certain way, but falls sort of halfway between the courtroom setting for 
the record and the far looser depo prep. Especially if one has a lot of cases to get through and there’s a lot of 
people in the lock-up, the attorney has a heavy caseload, has certain charges to read, and information to 
convey to the defendant. There is frankly no time to create a kind of loose, linguistic bond and loosen 
everything up and make sure everything gets across. In that case, you may do a little bit of loosening but 
mostly you’re gonna go verbatim. 
  
P 5 You do. In depositions there’s a little bit more leeway and you may interrupt, you address yourself in third 
person, and you say “This is the interpreter for the record, counsel if I may would you like to rephrase the 
question, your client is not understanding, or is not being responsive of the question,” because they look at me 
like “What are you telling them?” And another problem I have a lot is with objections. If my witness is not 
prepped, by the attorney and I don’t have a chance to prep him with permission of the attorney, the witness 
will not know what the objection is and that creates a lot of problems too. And there’s specific circumstances 
in which time is of the essence and there’s a lot of factors that determine my changing in doing things the way 
I would do if I’m on the record, if I’m in front of a judge, if I’m in front of an attorney. If I am just having an 
attorney-client conference in a hallway or a private room and there is no one else listening to me, and I need 
that person, that person was giving testimony and said something that could compromise the case, and the 
attorney tells me, interpreter please do this quickly, he needs to understand right away, what are the 
consequences of his plea. And I start by using my, the same register the attorney is using, the person is not 
understanding, I switch. I switch to a lower register so the person has the right to understand what is really 
going on, and what is happening, and what he should say according to what’s informed to him by his counsel.  
I don’t think I’m less of an interpreter because I say corte (court) instead of tribunal (court). I think that’s a 
matter of insecurity on the interpreter’s side who feels like he or she is less because he or she is using a more 
adequate language that can adapt to the person you’re interpreting for. Ok so there’s not only I wouldn’t do it 
on the record because the judge is listening, there might be bilingual jurors that are highly educated and they 
might feel like I’m dumbing down the language and using a lower register, like I said, I would do it in a one-
on-one situation with counsel and defendants. I would also not do it in front of a colleague, especially if I do 
not know the person. You are subject to criticism and opinions and people saying that you may not even 
know the word and that’s why you’re using a lower register word, which may be the case for some 
individuals but not for everyone. But they will criticize you, that’s not the correct word, and I would say 80 
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percent of interpreters do.  
  
P 6 Yes it is. It does affect my interpretation style. Sometimes I feel more freedom to maybe adjust the register 
and make comprehension easier. In fact, I may just say the word that comes to mind, the word that I was 
trying to say, and then I may add a couple of words, making sure that the message has been conveyed.  
  
P 7 Yeah, again, I only lower the register when I get the impression that, well, let me rephrase that. Nine times 
out of ten the person asking the questions will realize that something’s amiss. So they’ll usually interrupt the 
session, and they’ll say “Ok help me out, can you give me any suggestions?” And at that point I will tell 
them, “You need to lower the register, that may work.” And the same thing goes like, when you’re doing an 
interview, you have a little bit more freedom cause you’re not on the record. So I will use the same register 
that the speaker will use but at that point, same thing. It’s the kind of situation where if they’re not 
understanding the register, I’ll tell them. 
  
P 8 It depends not only on the setting, but on the level at which I know that I can work with certain attorneys. I 
am going to go on record saying this. There are times and I have worked with attorneys, I have worked with 
them over and over again. And there are attorneys who have told me, “Just put it in your words, I want him to 
understand what’s going on, I don’t want him just to hear words.” Especially in a jail interview. 
  
P 9 Yeah, you have a little more leeway to focus on communicating and maintaining meaning. The way it 
changes is, since it’s not a formal situation, what’s most important is accuracy and meaning and 
understanding. When you’re in a, quite frankly, the interview process is the most important process in the 
whole judicial system. The interview process is the process from which everything else is gonna be decided. 
Everything else that you decide on this case, if you’re a defense lawyer, am I gonna fight it, am I gonna try 
and go with the deal, am I gonna stall it and do more investigation? All of that will come out of your 
interviews. Same for DA’s, is this a good witness? Should I lower the level from misdemeanor or raise it from 
misdemeanor to felony? The precision and meaningful communication is most important during the interview 
process. That’s what I strive for even more than register. In formal settings I keep very close to the syntactical 
structures, and put every little utterance in there, uh, um, well uh, well um. In informal settings I have the 
ability to relax and create a more natural language structure... in simultaneous I can lag behind more, in 
consecutive come up with the most natural, native way of expressing the communication. Striving for 
meaning and precision is all about keeping in mind the shades of meaning, don’t always jump for the first 
thing that comes to mind for the word or phrase. Allow the context a moment to sink in. 
  
P 10 I’m very careful with things I do on the record and off the record. So off the record I can tell the attorney, I 
think that this is happening, and you know... or even when it comes to their speed, they’re going too fast or 
the register’s too high or the person has poor cognitive skills, I tell them. Usually in court, the thing is that in 
court there’s more decorum. I think there’s a little bit more fear because there’s a judge sitting there. I think 
that’s one of the reasons, there’s a little bit of fear too, there’s more decorum, especially in federal court. Fear 
that they’re going to think that you are an argumentative, difficult interpreter. Especially in federal court. In 
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Main study - Interpreters’ interviews – Question 9 
Is there any setting or situation in which you may feel comfortable to adjust the language register? 
 
P 1 When interpreting from English into Spanish comments made by an attorney to his or her client, during an 
interview or conference, not during a court hearing, I maintain the register used by the attorney, and 
depending on the circumstances, I add a couple of words to make it easier for the person to understand. When 
I do this, I always let the attorney know. It is never legal advice, only information. Also, I often ask, 
"¿Comprende?" (Do you understand?) This gives the person a chance to ask questions and the attorney a 
chance to clarify, to simplify, to communicate better. It is a way to educate attorneys. In a trial or a motions 
hearing when interpreting the oral arguments by attorneys and comments or rulings by the judge, we are 
dealing with more complex concepts, it isn't just having to interpret technical or legal words into Spanish that 
the defendant might not understand. With legal terms, it is what it is. I concentrate on speaking as coherently 
and clearly as possible. If I think that a statement, while expressed well by an attorney, is confusing or 
difficult, I do my best to make it easier to understand, yes... I may add a couple of words to clarify or I may 
use an easier word. However, this depends on the pace of the hearing, how much time I have, because I do my 
best not to fall behind, not to skip anything. Sometimes, at the end of a hearing, I say to the defendant “Sir, if 
you are not clear on some of the things he discussed during this hearing, let your attorney know.” 
  
P 2 I never do. 
  
P 3 In court I would not feel comfortable to do so because it needs to be exactly what the attorney meant to ask 
and vice versa, exactly what the witness meant to say so everyone can evaluate their demeanors, their 
education, their sophistication, all of that is relevant and needs to be exactly how it was supposed to be said. 
During the whispered part of the trial I do not keep the same register, because it's impractical, because I can’t 
speak that many words by so many people so quickly at that level, because they’re not doing it for our 
benefit. They’re not trying to help the interpretation. And also I find the defendant or the witness is very 
confused by all of the speaking, so I lower the register and I tend to summarize in order to make sure they 
understand what’s happening. 
  
P 4 In prep[aration]s, and I would add to that. Because of the nature of the language itself, the register in a depo 
prep, this is why I enjoy them, tends to find after a few minutes, tends to settle, where comprehension will be 
the most fluid. So, register in a depo prep soon finds a comfortable place to be and you don’t have register 
problems after a short time in a depo prep. If you have time in a lock-up interview, register will also find a 
comfortable groove, so to speak, and you won’t have anymore problems with register, if the attorney 
understands where the language should be in order to make him or herself understood, register ceases to be a 
problem. Register will find a way because in conveying an answer to an attorney to a question that was 
framed in register that was too high, it will be clear to the attorney from the answer, which will be confused 
and off-target, that the attorney has to change the register. The answers themselves, the language itself will 
drive that, that’s why I say it will find itself. And also, outside the courtroom, a pretrial conference, whose 
purpose is really for you to get a sense of the person’s language, or Spanish in my case. The attorney will ask 
a few questions and usually that is very loose and informal language.. 
  
P 5 There are very few instances in which I feel comfortable [to change it], and that would be for example if I’m 
in the hallway, if there is an attorney-client conference, or in a room where its just the attorney, the person 
I’m interpreting for and me. In any of the other more formal settings I don’t feel comfortable because I know 
if there is... not because I don’t think it shouldn’t be done, but because of the repercussions. The repercussions 
could be that if another fellow interpreter hears me or sees me doing that, that person is going to tell the world 
that I’m not following the code of ethics, or if there is a bilingual attorney that may want to do some harm 
may report me to a supervisor, if maybe because of that explanation there was an answer that his client was 
not supposed to understand, or complex, and there could be a lot of repercussions, I’m sure they would feel 
pretty strong about it. In the whispered part [of the trial] that is really hard, it’s hard because you are in such a 
fast-paced rhythm, that to add stress trying to find a more suitable word may become a little too much for me. 
  
P 6 I do change the register for the sake of making sure my listener understands. I do it for the defendant, in 
private settings, and even at the witness stand. My choice of words does not necessarily change the meaning, 
nor do I consider it changing the register when I simply use more common terms or a different word to make 
myself understood. That's the difference between a new interpreter and a seasoned one, you develop a 
common sense approach to interpreting, it becomes more intuitive. Lastly, the more comfortable you are in 
the delivery the less you'll be questioned as to your choices. 
  
P 7 I only lower the register when the attorney does. 
  
P 8 Yes, sometimes we have much more clarity, so to speak, to, not necessarily change anything but to bend the 
register a little bit to get through to this person’s level. What I do is I normally put it to the attorney in English 
in the register I’m gonna use in Spanish before I put it to the person. I ask, “Do you think this would be 
something you would want to tell him?” I’m not talking with the witness, I am not in the courtroom, I’m in a 
one-on-one with the attorney.  
  
P 9 [Follows from previous response, “So you always maintain the register?”] Unfortunately, yes. My thing is 
that if I’m in a hearing, I maintain the register in any direction, in any situation. If there’s confusion, it’s up to 
them how they’re gonna explain it to this poor guy. So you’ve got a judge or a lawyer with 21 years of formal 
higher education trying to explain to a 3rd grader what’s going on, and they just don’t see it. They just don’t 
see how to make it understandable, other than using the register and vocabulary that they learned in law 
UNIVERSITAT ROVIRA I VIRGILI 
COMPREHENSION OF LEGAL DISCOURSE IN INTERPRETER-MEDIATED JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS 
Julia Lambertini Andreotti
339 
school or university. 
  
P 10 Yes, I have lowered the register in court, on my own, sometimes, if I see that an attorney is careless and has 
left and won't bother explaining in lay terms what is taking place.  
When that happens, sometimes I discuss it with the attorney. I tell them “You know what, I think that your 
client is having a really hard time understanding, harder than normal, and if it’s ok I’m going to lower the 
register, I’m going to use...” actually they should do it. Sometimes they don’t even know how to do it. But 
sometimes I’ve done that, and the attorneys are ok with it, because sometimes they don’t understand. I have 
never done it in open court.  
  
 
Main study - Interpreters’ interviews – Question 10 
What is the general educational attainment level you find in the Spanish speakers you interpret for? 
 
P 1 From what I hear is 6th grade. 
  
P 2 6th grade. 
  
P 3 6th grade. 
  
P 4 I’d be willing to bet that in all the people I interpret for the average comes up to something like 7th or 8th 
grade. 
  
P 5 In general, if they finish, elementary school, around 6th grade.  
  
P 6 I would say 50% of the people I interpret for have an elementary level of education, primary school.  
  
P 7 Elementary, 6th grade usually. 
  
P 8 In my experience, I believe the vast majority of people we interpret for have an educational level of 6th 
grade, elementary school if they come from Mexico.  
  
P 9 I would say here in the southwest, among the immigrant population, 6th grade.  
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Main study - Interpreters’ interviews – Question 11 
Do you ever find yourself in a situation in which you may feel that the register may not be the most appropriate for 
the Spanish speaker you are interpreting for? 
 
P 1 Yes. To me, the top thing is we’re communicators. And if we’re gonna be communicators, what I have done 
is kept the register but before we started I have told the person, “Sir, I am here to interpret for you. If there’s 
something you cannot understand, even if I can tell you did not understand, there’s nothing I can do. So if you 
do not understand, when the judge says did you understand? You need to say yes when you do, and no when 
you don’t, and then you might want to say, I need to talk to my attorney. Because once the question comes to 
you, and I have to interpret what the judge is saying...” I try to do it as often as I can. Because I know and I 
tell them from the get go, “I cannot give you legal advice, I’m an interpreter. So if you don’t get it, you need 
to express that.” 
  
P 2 Absolutely. I find that I would say eight out of ten times. In court I feel it’s just a whole bunch of terminology 
that defendants, because in court it is criminal, they’re not understanding but I don’t really know if they 
would understand the term in their native language, Spanish. I find that if attorneys would keep their register 
down, if they would say, they could use other words, people would be able to understand much much better.  
  
P 3 Yes. 
  
P 4 Many times, yes. Of course I do. Many times. When you interpret objections and then the argument about 
objections, if the judge accepts it, for a defendant in a trial, you are running no more or no less the same risk 
that you would run in having an English speaking witness listen to them. The witness or defendant may or 
may not have the comprehension or the grasp of the language. That is not your job to make judgment about 
that. Your job is to get it to them. In those cases I interpret, unfortunately, I interpret however they are, and I 
say little tricks, eye contact with the attorneys, for the most part. Also, subtle body language, but in either 
case a largely involuntary reaction on my part. For example, the failure of a witness or deponent to capture a 
question that as an interpreter I have conveyed with confidence, will cause me to catch my breath, raise my 
head suddenly, hesitate... in short, it will show that the question hasn't been well understood, has failed, or 
was pitched at the wrong register, and I will let the attorney see that. I'll stare back a little longer, let the 
frustration show just a bit in my face, something like that. This, of course, only conveys failure but not 
the reason for the failure. The only way I have ever found to dispassionately and harmlessly convey to an 
attorney that the register is too high is by keeping my eyes on the attorney for the first several words of my 
interpretation of his question and, additionally, rendering my interpretation somewhat slowly and deliberately 
and perhaps in a slightly louder and more emphatic voice than I really need. This conveys a bit of doubt or 
incredulity on my part without compromising communication with the witness, or the jury, in the least. It's 
just a way to convey to the attorney that, somewhat to my surprise, I am being asked to formulate high-
register language.  
  
P 5 Many times. It varies according to the situation. In some instances the ultimate change of the register takes a 
lot longer, because there is a cycle that starts let’s say I’m in a deposition and even if I try to change the 
register the attorney may understand, “Interpreter, that’s not what I said, just tell the deponent exactly what I 
said” and I say it and the person doesn’t understand, then finally the attorney understands that I need to lower 
the register.  
[When] you need to read the advisement of rights... at a speed that you run out of saliva... they have no clue 
whatsoever. And not only that, when they go before the judge, the judge says, “Ok, would you like me to read 
you your indicated sentence?” And then you interpret. They don’t understand the interpretation for indicated 
sentence. And they look at me like, “¿Y qué quiere decir eso?” (And what does that mean?) So I look at the 
judge and say “What does that mean?” blah blah blah. “Oh no, but I wanna plead guilty.” Ok so you need to 
go back into the audience, sit down, and read all the advisement of rights again, which is a two-page sight 
translation... [Do they ever ask what it means, or ask for a repetition?] No. There’s a mix of embarrassment, 
self consciousness, and I don’t know, there’s a big temptation to tell them “Do you really understand what’s 
going on here?” but it’s like opening a can of worms.  
  
P 6 In my own estimation, I may think that the person listening to me may not understand what I’m saying. I try 
to simplify, within the scope I may use easier terms to understand because there’s more than one word that 
can explain the same meaning. 
  
P 7 Oh yeah, definitely. There’s times though that in the deposition the register is too high and the witnesses can’t 
decipher it, period. Eventually as the session proceeds the person asking the question is going to stop and ask, 
ok, they’ll interrupt the session and say, “Ok, what’s going on? why isn’t he getting it?” And at that point is 
when I will say, “Perhaps counsel may want to lower the register.”  
  
P 8 I might feel that way, but that’s not my call. It may very well be, I might think about it, but we don’t have 
much time to think, as you probably know. I do think that many times they go way over a witness’ head. But 
that’s not for me to do anything about, I mean, everybody’s going to notice if the witness has a look of 
bewilderment on his or her face. They’re probably not going to answer correctly, or if they do, you know, 
lucky, but that’s not for me to decide. I can be in situations where I thought, I mean, and I’m not trying to 
belittle anybody, but it is easier for me to grasp what the educational level of a witness is than for the attorney 
asking the questions or the judge or anybody, and I can pretty much tell that the witness is not understanding 
what is being said. But I mean, there are several things that can happen at that juncture. Either he or she, the 
witness is going to give a totally off-the-wall answer or they’re gonna ask, “What do you mean? I don’t 
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P 9 Yeah, I’d say that’s about 70% of the time or more. I would say yes. That’s the minimum. Quite frankly, if I 
were to sit there with the numbers it might be higher but just off the top of my head, 70% of people, the 
register in court isn’t appropriate for them to understand clearly. 
  
P 10 Yes. Sometimes I discuss it with the attorney. I am no expert in cognitive skills, but I know, I mean I can tell 
when a person has poor cognitive skills. And sometimes it doesn’t even have to do with how many years of 
education. Sometimes they went to 6th grade and they’re pretty good at understanding, or they went to high 
school and they’re terrible. So sometimes it’s not, I don’t know what it is, what the term is, cognitive skills. 
But I know there are certain people who are horrible, they don’t get it. They don’t understand even just a 





UNIVERSITAT ROVIRA I VIRGILI 
COMPREHENSION OF LEGAL DISCOURSE IN INTERPRETER-MEDIATED JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS 
Julia Lambertini Andreotti
342 
Main study - Interpreters’ interviews – Question 12 
Are there circumstances in which you can tell that the Spanish speaker is not understanding what is being said? What 
are the signs?  
 
P 1 Yes. To me it’s like, I hate to say this, the look in the face, the expression in the face, they are hanging their 
head or the whole demeanor... and then, depending on the answer they give... the thing that I do, is often the 
judge or the attorney will say, “Do you understand that blah blah” and they look down or look around. So I 
always, I do not think there’s anything wrong with that, I always, I say “Do you understand?” at the 
beginning, and I say “¿Entiende? ¿Comprende?” (Do you understand?) Because that opens the door for the 
person to say “Yes, I do” or “No, I don’t” because I don’t think I am committing any unethical... you know, 
by doing that... But then you get the ones that you could be talking like you’re talking to a 5 year old and you 
can tell that, you know... you can tell that they don’t understand you.  
  
P 2 Yes. Ok, their face of confusion. That they’re answering something totally different than what was asked. 
Basically the face, the body language. 
  
P 3 Yes. I would say facial gestures primarily and then non-responsive answers. 
  
P 4 Yes. There is a hesitancy that comes from a lack of understanding where the person will halt a lot and 
stammer, and start to try to answer, and give clear evidence to the fact that they don’t know how to grapple 
what the question you’ve asked. So that’s one of the signs. Another sign is the person tells you they don’t 
understand. And in a deposition, they’re told to tell you that. Another sign is when the person tries to speak at 
a higher register than they’re really capable of handling well to conceal the fact, and this is often a matter of 
dignity and pride, to conceal the fact that they’re embarrassed that they don’t have the language skills to cope 
with the situation. [Body language or facial expressions] are part of the vocabulary of communication and so 
sure, they have something to do, usually it’s in the face, sometimes in the fidgeting of the hands. Usually it’s 
a blank expression, you know? A kind of expression that says, “I don’t know what to do with what I just 
heard.” 
  
P 5 Yes. They start talking to me directly. You can tell by the look in their eyes, the look of despair, they get 
nervous, sometimes you can see their heart, you can see the palpitations through their shirt, they get nervous, 
they start rubbing their hands because they get sweaty, they don’t respond to the question. Like, where are 
you? And they understand, how are you?  
[During the whispered part of the trial] I’m listening to what the judge is saying, I am familiar with that lingo, 
if it’s fast, even if I see that the person... and it has happened to me, you can tell, you look at their faces and 
you can see that they have no idea of what the judge or the attorney are talking about. But it’s not a matter of 
one or two words, its sometimes the whole thing. For example, ok “Objection your honor,” if they were not 
prepped, they don’t even know what an objection is, and it has happened to me, they interrupt, and I’m 
interpreting and they stop me in the middle of interpreting the objection, and they start talking to me asking 
me what an objection means, that they don’t understand, the judge stops to tell me “Interpreter, tell the 
witness to stop talking because there is an objection,” so it’s like I would need to go back again explain what 
an objection is, and then the judge may perfectly say “Ok interpreter, interpret the question,” by that time I 
forgot the question. 
  
P 6 Yes. There is hesitation in their answers. They may ask more questions or they may not, they may look away, 
they may look down, they may say yes too many times.  
  
P 7 Oh, yeah. First of all, when you’re dealing with a very tense situation like a deposition, the person that is 
providing the testimony is already in a very uncomfortable position. All eyes are on them, so they feel the 
need to respond even though they don’t understand. They just look puzzled and they’re kind of like “Uh...” 
and you can just tell. And by the way they’re answering you can tell they are not comprehending, which I 
think is something you pick up through experience. I’ve been doing this for 25 years so I can pick it up very 
quickly, I can just tell you can just tell that they are not understanding.  
  
P 8 Yes, absolutely. There can be several signs. There are people that will tell you, “What are you talking about?” 
But I feel it, you know, if a person is looking at me like, you know, what’s happening? Again, it’s not my job 
to tell the attorney giving the interview because he’s looking at the same thing I’m looking at. If the attorney 
asks me, in that kind of a situation, I’ll tell them, “I don’t think the client is grasping anything that you’re 
saying.”  
  
P 9 Yeah, that happens fairly frequently. It’s always extralinguistic clues, it’s always facial expressions. Whether 
it’s a vapid kind of stare the way they look at you, las cejas fruncidas (frowning), any of those things could, 
it’s always extralinguistic just to let you know that they have no idea. They kind of back off and look at you 
like what the hell? There are extralinguistic clues. They will tell you everything. There’s the clue like what 
they actually say, and then they say extralinguistic clue. Some people sit there and say, well it’s a body 
language. It’s not just body language. It’s the nod of the head, it’s the way they tilt their head when they’re 
talking, whether they blink at you... there’s a ton of things that bring more meaning to everything. If you 
cannot see the extralinguistic clues, you probably aren’t getting the full communication of what’s going on... 
Because nobody in a Spanish-speaking country puts their hands completely at their side while they’re talking. 
The language has a culture, expresses a culture, and a culture has a language with which to express itself. So 
when you take away any of those elements, you are hindering communication. 
  
P 10 Yes. The first one is they are not replying to the question, and it’s not a difficult, personal, like loss of 
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consortium, no, it’s a very simple, non-committal question, and they’re not responding to that question, 
they’re responding to something else. And they keep going and going and going I think because in their mind 
they know there’s something they’re not getting. So because they don’t want to feel embarrassed, so they 
keep going and going and going and they give you a longer answer, so I think that’s what happens is they’re 
mumbling, they keep going and they’re not responding to that. In many cases, I know that it’s just a very 
simple... like “What color is your car?” Something super simple, and they’re not getting it for whatever 
reason. They hesitate, they have like a little lapse where they’re not talking at first. Then they give you a 
longer answer, they start giving you longer and longer answers, or they start yawning sometimes. They look 







Main study - Interpreters’ interviews – Question 13 
Do you ever find circumstances in which a witness or defendant may say that they understand, but you can tell that 
they don’t?  
 
P 1 Yes. Not in a courtroom or before the judge setting, but during an out-of-court meeting, if I can tell the person 
does not understand, even if he says he does, I let the attorney know. I'll say “He thinks you are referring to 
XYZ, when you are actually talking about ABC.”  
  
P 2 Yes. It happens all the time.  
  
P 3 Yes. Not often, but it does happen. 
  
P 4 Well, yes. The reason I would know that they didn’t understand would be if a similar language had been used 
previously and they didn’t understand it and this kind of language comes and now they say they do, I know 
from what I’ve already heard that they don’t. So, usually that kind of thing comes from halfway through, 
when you’ve had a chance to get to know the person’s level. And if you realize that other language has gone 
by that they didn’t understand and this is no different from that language and now they’re saying they do 
understand, then you kind of get a good feeling then that they probably didn’t. I do see that happen a lot, and 
a lot of times. 
  
P 5 Oh yes. What I would do depends on the consequences of the misunderstanding, and the repercussions. If I 
see that he starts answering things that make no sense I would inquire with his attorney. Sometimes attorneys 
get upset and tell me let to things take their course, or if they are more considerate they may say “Go ahead 
interpreter, and just say it in a way that he will for sure understand.”  
  
P 6 Exactly. I haven’t experienced that in a long time because I do a lot of interviews on a one-to-one with the 
attorney so usually all the questions are answered. But in court it does happen more often, when you’re 
rushing through something there may not be understanding right away... They may say “yes” too many times, 
because they’re too embarrassed to say “I don’t understand” so they may just agree, because it’s part of the 
culture. But there may be, because of understanding different legal systems, there may be a lower 
understanding. Maybe my Spanish will be understood but the concept itself will not be understood. 
  
P 7 Yeah, and they don’t. You can tell by the way they answer the questions if they’re understanding or not... 
And a lot of times they’ll answer a question without understanding it because they simply feel like they have 
to answer the question. 
  
P 8 Yes, there are. [And in those circumstances you just continue interpreting?] Well, that’s what I do for a living 
and I am not going to do something that... I mean, I am not going to, you know, unless the person tells me “I 
don’t understand” or the attorney asks me “What do you think?” And obviously in court it wouldn’t happen, 
but if I know the attorney well enough, you know, there will be times when I will, if I work with an attorney 
and we are on those kinds of terms, I’ll tell him, “Counsel, your client is just lost” or at least “She is not 
understanding.”  
  
P 9 Yes! Especially with these people that really don’t speak Spanish or Castilian is their first language. You do 
this whole thing with them and they go “Sí, sí, sí,” and then you find out they speak Zapotec or some other 
language, some other indigenous language, from Mexico or... [But they still say they understand?] Oh yeah, 
they’ll say that, because they don’t wanna get beaten, you know? Where they come from, up in Antigua or 
Guatemala, [if] you don’t say yes, you get slapped around. So their concept is yes, of course, whatever you 
want. They do not order their world the way we do. They’ll still say yes even if they don’t understand because 
that’s just what you do in front of authority. There’s not just a language element to look at, there’s a cultural 
element to look at. Yeah, I took an entire plea, a guilty plea, and sentencing, before we realized that the guy 
was just saying “Yes yes yes” and he didn’t really know what the hell else to say. 
  
P 10 Yes. Even just doing the admonitions at beginning of the depo, “Do you know the difference between a guess 
and [an estimate?]..., do you want me to explain?” “Ah, no no no.” 
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Main study - Interpreters’ interviews – Question 14 
Do you ever feel comfortable enough to interrupt a proceeding, either to clarify a term you hear, to advise on a 
possible language or cultural issue, or because you believe the witness or defendant is not understanding? 
 
P 1 [In a private setting] I usually try to tell the attorney at the moment, I do not think he understood your 
question. I do not think he got it. In court what happens most of the time is the guy will sound confused or 
will sound like “Uh... sí” so I’ll go “Uh... yes” and the judge can hear him. I also have to say that to me there’s 
a major difference between federal court and state court. In state court, the number of cases is always larger. 
The judge has to go like an assembly line. So then sometimes there is not much time and some of the judges, I 
hate to say this, but some of the judges don’t care. They just want to get it done. But in federal court, 
everything takes longer. The process, the time from when the guy gets arrested to when the guy gets 
sentenced, it’s usually five or six months at least. Depending on the situation, I probably will [interrupt], but it 
doesn’t happen often because the answer that comes back is one that the judge can tell, the guy didn’t get it. 
So he will say, “Let’s try this again, Mr. so and so.” And if not the attorney, the attorney will say, “May I 
have a moment please,” and he will talk. Or I will look at the attorney, I will just look at him like, help! 
  
P 2 I only feel the freedom to do that when I have worked with a specific attorney for a while, and I will interrupt. 
I will tell the attorney, “Counsel, I believe the plaintiff or the applicant is not understanding that word.” 
Otherwise I don’t because it has happened to me many years ago, and this was in a prep setting, so very 
informal, that I told the attorney, “I don’t think the witness is understanding you,” and he told me, “Well, let 
the witness tell me.” So it kind of threw me off, because I was only trying to help. And I thought, ok he’s 
putting me in my place and maybe I shouldn’t be saying anything. I think my instinct in that moment, and I 
remember that case in particular, that the attorney was making it seem as if the witness was just dumb. And 
he wasn’t dumb, maybe he was uneducated, but he wasn’t dumb. It’s just that he was unable to understand the 
words that this attorney was using. By all means, he wasn’t dumb so it bothered me. I think that... and again, 
it’s not up to me, and I should not put any emotion into it, but I did at that moment, and that’s why I said 
“Counsel I believe he’s not understanding.” I just wanted to make it clear that he wasn’t stupid... So ethically, 
this happens to me all the time, that I think ok, I have to say something, but I don’t. I don’t because I know 
that I shouldn’t, because I have been trained not to. The only time that I interrupt, and maybe this is wrong, 
but the only time that I interrupt is when I don’t understand. When I cannot give a rendition of what the 
witness said because I did not understand, because it was unintelligible, but other than that, if I understand the 
word, if I can give a rendition of the interpretation, I do. I think that we should be allowed in certain cases to 
make comments, but then again, we’re not. I totally believe that it is ethical for us to point that out. I’ll give 
you an example Julia, every single day I come across this, “State and spell your name for the record.” And the 
person will state their name and start spelling it, let’s say Mario, and they’ll say “M-r-i-o,” and I don’t care 
how educated or uneducated the person is, we in Spanish do not spell out loud. We don’t, we separate in 
syllables. I never in my native country have had to spell [Participant’s name] out loud, x-x-x-x in Spanish, or 
spell words. And they’ll look at the person like, what? And I don’t know if you’ve ever encountered that, but 
sometimes they roll their eyes, I’ve been in settings where everybody in the room rolls their eyes like “Oh my 
God give me a break, they don’t know how to spell their name.”  
  
P 3 Yes. I would say in any setting. 
  
P 4 I consider myself, in any setting, I’ll interrupt. I consider the interpreter basically the sort of, like, orchestra 
director in a bilingual situation. It all turns on the interpreter’s ability to keep things running smoothly. So it’s 
up to me to make sure that happens. And so, long ago, 10 years ago out of the 17 that I’ve been in this, long 
ago abandoned sort of a timid, subservient attitude towards the courts and the people in them. The situation is 
bilingual people depend on us, and we have to make sure that everything gets handled right and that the 
language gets across and that everything is conveyed, it’s up to us, really. So if that means we have to 
interrupt up to an attorney, even a judge, a prosecutor, whatever, even a witness. And it’s up to us, we are the 
orchestra leaders. We direct, it’s not every interpreter who knows that. The more experienced I get, the older I 
get, the more sure of myself I am in a courtroom, the less hesitant am I to interrupt. To interrupt an attorney, 
even to interrupt, well I wouldn’t interrupt a judge. But I have no problem interrupting an attorney to 
straighten problems out. And that has something to do with the fact that I’m no longer a beginner. If it’s a 
matter of not understanding, it’s about half and half. And sometimes it’s just a matter of me needing to clarify 
with a witness that I haven’t understood him or her. It may be because I didn’t, maybe because the attorney’s 
question is not clear. 
  
P 5 Not right away. You know, the judge is the king in his courtroom and judges usually don’t like to be told 
things. I try to be as unobtrusive as possible, but sometimes I’ve done it because I see the situation going in 
circles and going nowhere. And maybe you get a new attorney or an attorney that got the case but isn’t used 
to working with people who don’t speak the language. And for the sake of the proceeding to go smoothly, I 
have interrupted, but I really try not to. I try to let the things get resolved by the judge. I think people should 
have the right to culture.  
And there are things that in the deponent’s or witness’ culture are right or are okay and here are perceive as 
really bad. For example this: About a month ago I went to the jail for an interview. It was a competency 
interview, but they were alleging mental issues. Of course as an interpreter, you have your own ideas and 
thoughts about what’s really going on because you learn through the years, you can, although you’re not a 
psychologist, I already know the questions by heart. I know what the psychologist or the psychiatrist is gonna 
ask. And most of the time I know when the person is lying or trying to get away, I know what they’re gonna 
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answer. This specific person was being interviewed for competency in terms of mental health. It turned out 
that this psychologist, after we left, she told me, “What do you think?” And this is where there’s a really thin 
line for me, the interpreter, to determine where is the right to culture present, and where is my opinion, as 
something not being called for taking place? So I thought in this particular case I had to speak up, because 
they started asking the defendant, “Are you ready to stand trial?” and then I interpreted. And he said, “Well I 
don’t know.” “Do you know what a public defender is?” “Is that my attorney?” “Yeah yeah yeah.” “Do you 
know who the prosecutor is?” “No.” “What does the prosecutor do?” “I don’t know.” “Do you know what the 
judge does?” “No.” “Do you know how many members of the jury are in the jury box?” “Uhh...” He didn’t 
know anything. So I thought that my input was necessary to let this psychologist know that in the country of 
origin where this person comes from there are no oral trials, so this person doesn’t have any idea about how 
the judicial process, how the system works here, so if someone is found guilty of a crime, it’s because the 
judge ruled and that was it. Yeah, you go to jail for so and so months, go to a rehab center, whatever. None of 
this show happens. So in that specific instance, yes, I did think that this person had the right to culture, 
because of lack of competence, cultural competence.  
  
P 6 I don’t interrupt the proceeding, I don’t feel free to do so. In my experience because of the work I do now, by 
the time the defendant goes before the court that person has already been... has already talked to his attorney 
at length so all his questions would have been answered by then. And that’s at the federal level. In state court, 
usually I catch during the proceeding that this person may not understand. I catch their attorney after we’re 
done and will say, “please explain to your client once again because I think there’s doubt in his mind.” If it 
was a different format, if it was acceptable, if it was expected, I would. 
  
P 7 No. Never. Maybe in a private interview I might say, you know what, “I don’t think he’s getting it.” But when 
we’re in a deposition or in court or in trial or on the stand, I let them figure it out, the person asking the 
questions. ‘Cause it’s like I said, it’s not my responsibility to make sure they understand each other. If I’m 
using the register that the attorney’s using, and the witness is not understanding it, then that’s that. 
  
P 8 I don’t have any problems doing that either. I would go a different way with it and say “Your honor, the 
interpreter needs clarification.” I don’t have any problem doing that at all.  
  
P 9 No, not in a formal proceeding. Although there’s things that have happened, you know, you can sit there and 
see, there’ll be all this kind of confusion and it’s because of a cultural thing or because of a radical dialect 
thing or something, and if the judges and justice partners are wise, they’ll ask for a break or they’ll ask me 
and I’ll be able to explain during a break. You can’t do it while the thing’s going on, because then the mess 
becomes a mess. But if there’s an opportunity or I’m with the defendant and there’s a problem, I ask the 
lawyer, “Could we just take a break? It’s really important, could we take a break?” But I don’t interrupt 
anything, I don’t stop anything... because I am not one of the parties to the action. And there’s a legal concept 
that, you’re not a party to the action, whether it’s the prosecutorial side, whatever it may be, you don’t have 
legal standing to sit there and stop things, interrupt things. You know, as an interpreter, I could sit there and 
say “Your honor, I think there’s been a problem, I’d like to talk to everybody” or “I’d like there to be a break 
so I could talk to all the parties in your chamber.” You could maybe say that, believe me, that is a card that if 
you put that on the table... I have done that maybe twice in my career. So it’s a very very touchy thing to do, 
and dangerous. Touchy and dangerous to do that kind of stuff. Say for instance I get one of these central 
Americans or Mexicans who don’t really speak Spanish, they speak an indigenous language. The way I 
interrupt it, is “Excuse me, your honor, as a friend of the court, as an amicus curie I have a doubt as to 
whether Castilian Spanish is his first language.” And then you can ask the guy, “Do you understand the 
interpreter? What is your first language?” The guy will say “Quiche” or he’ll say “Zapotec,” there’s a 
gazillion things. They say they’re different languages, they’re usually just different dialects of the same 
language group, you know? But that’s the only time, and I do it in that fashion. 
  
P 10 Yes, I have. Especially at depos, there are words such as canilla that people use to mean either shin or knee, 
so I have asked for clarification and I indicate to the attorneys that the word has multiple meanings, 
depending on the country of origin or the person. Sometimes I struggle a little bit with the need to clarify or 
not, just be accurate and if it doesn’t make sense, just say it… Sometimes I find it difficult to discern whether 
I need to bring something up that is culturally important, or not. Because I don’t want anybody to think that 
I’m leading the witness. So that sometimes is like I need to really use my common sense, my experience, my 
intelligence. But it also depends on the personalities of the attorneys I’m working with. If they are very very 
anal and difficult, I just stick to protocol more like one hundred percent. If I can tell that they really wanna 
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Main study - Interpreters’ interviews – Question 15 
The witness says mano (hand) but points at the arm in plain view of all present. What do you think would be the best 
way to proceed in this case? 
 
P 1 I would definitely, if he said hand, I would say hand. I would say hand because everybody can see and so it’s 
the duty of his attorney, because that would show that this guy even didn’t get it, or qué le pasa?(What is the 
matter with him?). 
  
P 2 What I will do is interpret the word hand. What I would like to do is make an interpreter comment on the 
record. Not a comment as to the pointing, I would just like to state on the record that in several areas of 
different countries, I believe that happens a lot with Mexican nationals but I cannot guarantee that it is only 
with Mexican nationals... And I would like to be able to state that, as an interpreter, to put that on the record, 
that that exists, that it’s not just this witness was doing that, but it is common. But again, that’s not what I 
would do. 
  
P 3 I say hand and then I say, “Interpreter note: witness is indicating his arm.” 
  
P 4 In that case, given the picture you presented, I just say hand. If I thought there was any doubt, then yes, I 
might make a comment. But if there’s no doubt, I’m gonna have no need to make a comment.  
  
P 5 In court, I would hesitate a little more because I don’t want to be called off for offering things that are not 
asked of me. So I would say the hand, and the attorney is looking at the witness and will say, “But you are 
pointing to your arm” and I will interpret that, and it may be resolved that way. [Considering] other options, I 
would inquire. I would directly on the record, ask the judge directly. “May the interpreter clarify?” [In a 
deposition ] I would, although I was once called on that, on adding “Deponent is saying hand, is pointing at 
the whole arm.” Most attorneys appreciate the help because sometimes they are taking notes, but this one 
specifically didn’t. In court, unless the person has the arm under the little desk... 
  
P 6 I’ve done both where I’ve said hand vs. arm and then in other occasions I just say arm. So we know it is a 
cultural thing that most people refer to a body part as a whole, they consider the hand an extension of the arm 
and so forth. And it’s not just the Spanish culture, but in other languages people do use different body names 
for the same part. So I’ve used both, in medical settings I actually point to the same, the correct, if they say 
“My hand hurts” but they point to the arm, I will say the correct term. Not necessarily what the witness has 
said but what they are pointing to. 
  
P 7 I say “This is the interpreter speaking. The witness is using a term that can mean hand or arm.” 
  
P 8 I go to the judge and say “Your honor, the witness used the word for hand but he pointed at his arm.” And 
that’s one thing that helps a lot because Hispanics are usually very animated. They’re not just quietly sitting 
there, they point, you know, that helps a lot. 
  
P 9 I have to be really honest, what I do when that happens, I don’t care what the extralinguistic clue is. Because 
it’s such a simple word, and because we have so many Spanish-speaking judges, lawyers and everything else, 
I say the hand. And then they’ll say “Don’t you mean the arm?” “¿No es cierto que usted quería decir el 
brazo?” (Isn’t it true that you meant to say the arm?) You see what I’m saying? And they’ll say “Oh ok, 
you’re right.” Sometimes when you tell the word out to them, then they remember, oh yeah, that’s what this 
whole thing is. And some of them just don’t have the level of education or experience. They are real words 
that they use in Spanish. 
  
P 10 If the attorney doesn’t, sometimes the attorney says, “I’d like the record to say that he’s pointing at his arm, 
do you mean your arm?” So if that doesn’t happen, I would just ask the attorney “May I clarify, because in 
Mexican English they use hand and arm for both, so may I clarify?” So usually that’s what I do. And the 
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Main study - Interpreters’ interviews – Question 16 
The witness says mano (hand) but points at the arm in a way that only the interpreter can see it. What do you think 
would be the best way to proceed in this case? 
 
P 1 I probably ask for permission to clarify or I might, in a situation like that, say “Your honor, the witness 
pointed at an area in his body and I think I was the only one that could see that.” So then it becomes my 
responsibility. Or maybe I could say that it doesn’t match the word that he used or something. I think it’d be 
safer, I haven’t done a deposition in so long, I do not dare talk about the rules. But I would probably say, 
“Your honor, if I may, Mr. so and so just pointed at an area in his body but I think I’m the only one that was 
able to see that so I just wanted to make the court aware.” And if he says “Ok, move on,” then at least I told 
you, it’s on the record. 
  
P 2 Ok. What I will do once again is interpret hand, but this is the main reason why I would like to be able to 
make an interpreter comment. And the reason I don’t do it is out of fear... I don’t wanna find myself in the 
situation of being told, “Well that’s not your job.” It’s really not my job to be looking at the witness, but 
ethically, and now I’m not talking about the Judicial Council ethics, I’m talking about my moral ethics. I feel 
horrible in situations like that, Julia. I really feel horrible because I know what he is saying, I know that I’m 
the only one looking at him, ‘cause it has happened and I know nobody saw him. So they’re not going to 
clarify it, and it may be a very important part of the case that he’s pointing at the arm and saying hand, and I 
have to say hand, and I leave with that bad taste in my mouth. I could [ask for permission to clarify] but my 
style, I interrupt, I hardly ever interrupt.  
  
P 3 Same thing [I say hand and then I say, “Interpreter note: witness is indicating his arm.”] 
  
P 4 Oh no, in that case I would interject. I would make a formal interpreter’s interjection and say, “My hand 
hurts, but the interpreter will interject that the witness was pointing to his arm under the, out of sight of the 
jury,” or whatever. 
  
P 5 Yes, but again, I would talk to the judge and I would say that I don’t know if everyone else saw what 
happened, but the witness was pointing to some parts of the body that no one else could see. 
  
P 6 Most of the times I would default to just saying the word that he’s using, because in that instance I don’t 
know if it’s the hand or the arm. I would probably say arm as well, if he’s pointing. 
  
P 7 Same thing [I say “This is the interpreter speaking. The witness is using a term that can mean hand or arm.”] 
  
P 8 I do the same [I go to the judge and say “Your honor, the witness used the word for hand but he pointed at his 
arm.”] 
  
P 9 I still say the hand. 
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Main study - Interpreters’ interviews – Question 17 
The witness says mano (hand) without pointing, but everyone -including the interpreter- knows that the case is only 
about an arm injury, with no hand involvement. What do you think would be the best way to proceed in this case? 
 
P 1 I would say hand and then let them figure it out, either the opposing attorney, or his own attorney needs to 
show the judge and jury that he’s paying attention. 
  
P 2 I say hand. 
  
P 3 I ask for clarification. 
  
P 4 I think I would also interject there. I would say as briefly as I could, “The interpreter will interject that the 
witness has said hand,” and I have done this, “The interpreter will note that the witness said hand, some 
Spanish speakers habitually say hand meaning arm.” Something like that.  
  
P 5 Nothing. I would say whatever he says and let them take care of that. They will find a way because I was not 
the only one doing the case for a week, they were too. So I know whoever is there, that’s really totally out of 
my league, I wouldn’t say anything. 
  
P 6 If I’m familiar with the case, I’ll probably use arm rather than hand. And I can, one of the things about using 
the different words is being able to argue in favor of your choice. So if somebody from a juror says, the 
witness says hand but the interpreter says arm, I can argue, I can give a good argument as to the cultural 
implication of the term. I can justify my choice. 
  
P 7 I still do the same [I say “This is the interpreter speaking. The witness is using a term that can mean hand or 
arm.”] 
  
P 8 I am going to repeat the words that he said, and it’s up to the person doing the questioning to clarify. 
  
P 9 I still say hand because I can’t assume that he just didn’t make a Freudian slip or make a mistake himself. I 
have to go with him still. [Would you think of maybe asking for permission to clarify with the witness at that 
time?] Well no, because it’s very clear to any Spanish speaker that he’s saying the word hand. Any Spanish 
speaker knows that he’s saying the word hand, I’m not gonna sit there and say arm. 
  
P 10 I would clarify it. 
  
 
Main study - Interpreters’ interviews – Question 18 
The witness says mano (hand), no pointing, no knowledge about the case, only the interpreter’s suspicion, based on 
experience, that the witness may mean the arm. What do you think would be the best way to proceed in this case? 
 
P 1 I would say hand. 
  
P 2 I say hand. 
  
P 3 I ask for clarification. 
  
P 4 In that case, I think I would also note that for the record, for the attorney, “The interpreter will note that 
although the witness has said hand, there is a distinct possibility that he meant arm.”  
  
P 5 When in doubt, I would always ask the judge to ask for clarification. Always. 
  
P 6 I would just say what he said. 
  
P 7 Yes, same. [I say “This is the interpreter speaking. The witness is using a term that can mean hand or arm.”] 
You can’t assume facts not in evidence. 
  
P 8 I would use the word hand because that is what the witness said and I don’t have any indication otherwise. 
  
P 9 In a court proceeding I would say hand for every single scenario. In an interview I would probably say, you 
know, “He’s saying the word hand, but I think he might be saying arm, let’s clarify.” He may not have the 
vocabulary word for that. I would do it in an interview outside of a judicial hearing because in a judicial 
hearing the most important thing is to not become a proactive person in the proceeding. And if I were to sit 
there and start throwing out, well I think this may be this or that, I’ve become proactive. That’s not the role of 
the interpreter in a judicial proceeding. But in an interview process, that’s completely different, what’s most 
important is meaningful communication, accuracy, and the meaning. 
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Main study - Interpreters’ interviews – Question 19 
What is the translation you usually use for cintura (waist)? 
 
P 1 I would say waist, I would never say back. Now, if it repeats itself, if it happens the first time and no one does 
anything, the attorney doesn’t, the next time around, I will probably say, “I need a second to clarify with the 
witness,” “Señor, cuando usted está diciendo cintura, a qué se refiere?” (Sir, when you are saying cintura, 
what are you referring to?) because, ok, this is another thing. There are some people that are extremely strict 
and by the book with no situational awareness and they are actually out there teaching and being instructors. 
And they are saying that the attorney might be doing that on purpose to help his case or to discredit the 
witness or to whatever. And so it’s not your place, you know. That’s why I’m saying a lot of it has to do with 
your own judgment at the moment. If you can tell that it’s not an issue of the attorney playing games to 
benefit his own position or whatever, but it is actually an issue of, I don’t know, the guy being nervous and 
having made a mistake and nothing. But that’s what I’m saying, situational awareness. 
  
P 2 Low back... but if you ask me always, I had a deposition with an Argentinean man a few years ago and I did 
not say low back. 
  
P 3 Low back. 
  
P 4 Well now, from experience, I just say lower back, and I’ll tell you why. The reason I say lower back directly 
and immediately for cintura (waist) is because it would be highly unlikely for any actual English speaker to 
say “My waist hurts.” It’s not a part of the body, really. A waist is an abstraction; a waist is a description 
rather than an anatomical part, strictly speaking. And so I have no problem because I know, as I think all of us 
interpreters know, that when a Spanish speaker says la cintura and especially our Spanish speakers, say 
cintura, they mean lower back, precisely. Let me add something to that. For the first number of years as an 
interpreter, whenever I had that problem I would stop and ask counsel, usually in depositions, I would ask if I 
could please clarify. And in clarifying, I would add an additional unnecessary three minutes of exchange with 
the applicant, witness, whatever, talking about la espalda, (the back) la parte inferior de la espalda, la parte 
baja de la espalda, (lower back) “¿No es eso lo que quiere decir?” (Isn’t that what you mean?) and the net 
game in doing this would be absolutely zero. Because I could have just simply, I knew, at the beginning I 
knew, but after a thousand times you know so much more, so much better, that all along the person has meant 
lower back and nothing but lower back, and so I simply dropped that whole little interference because it 
wasn’t gaining anybody anything. 
  
P 5 I use lower back. 
  
P 6 I would say low back for that. 
  
P 7 I would say “This is the interpreter speaking. The witness is using a term that can either mean the waist area 
or the lower back.” 
  
P 8 I use waist. 
  
P 9 Nine times out of ten I say the waist. 
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P 8 There might be instances where you are doing what your “formal education” in California, and your code of 
ethics, or the Canons of the profession, as they call them, they tell you you’re supposed to do a, b, c in this 
order and this way. But if the person that you are interpreting for is not understanding, you’re not getting the 
concept through to the person that you’re interpreting for, I mean, you might be doing what they told you to 
do, however, that doesn’t mean that you’re doing what an interpreter is supposed to be doing. An interpreter 
should convey a clear concept of what the person is being told in such a way that the target, be it witness, 
defendant, interviewee, understands and grasps the concept in their own language, and they don’t have the 
same level of education as the person that’s trying to explain to them whatever it is that they are trying to 
explain. But at the same time, I mean, I don’t necessarily agree with it, because if somebody has lived in the 
United States all his life, at least in theory, they are supposed to understand what their legal system is about or 
how it works. If somebody comes from a different country, first of all, I’m not talking in my personal opinion, 
I came from Mexico, and the legal system is completely different down there. But the thing is, and let’s not 
kid ourselves either, the person that you’re interpreting for is not going to understand the legal system either 
in Mexico or here, but they don’t have the level of education to... they have never... that’s not something that 
you’re taught in school. I don’t know in Spain, but in Mexico they don’t teach you even the basics of the legal 
system, even at the high school level. I don’t know, but they don’t go into a legal system, and I don’t know 
that they do that here either. But at least somebody in the United States who speaks the language all their life 
and all that, they have a better chance of understanding and to ask the questions that they need to ask. But a 
Hispanic person, I’m talking especially about Hispanics, they are gonna be too scared to even ask anything. 
And I cannot question, and I have done so, you know, not on the record, but I have had conversations with 
judges and attorneys and this and that, but if you start questioning what you’re doing and you start exposing 
all these doubts you have within yourself, they start looking at you like a persona non grata or traitor, or 
something, like you’re going against the system. Well, I mean, I think most interpreters are afraid of 
retaliation. I was never afraid of that kind of thing because, look, a judge has a black robe, that doesn’t make 
him a better person than I am. But that’s not the point, the point is to be able to communicate. That’s what 
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Appendix 10. Main study. Interviews with attorneys 
Main study - Attorneys’ interviews - Question 1 
What is the percentage of English speakers and Spanish speakers among your clients? 
  
P 1 I would say it’s probably 30% English, 70% Spanish. 
  
P 2 I don’t know for sure, my estimate would maybe be 70-80% Spanish. 
  
P 3 I think that it would be approximately 95% Spanish speakers and 5% English speakers. 
  
P 4 I would say that 75% are Spanish speaking. 
  
P 5 In my clients I would say, probably about 95% of the clients that I deal with are Spanish speaking. 
  
P 6 I would say my clients, I’d estimate at least 70-80% require an interpreter. 
  
P 7 I’d say at least half of them are Spanish, maybe 60%. 
  
P 8 Approximately 90% Spanish and 10% English. 
  
P 9 When I was a public defender, I’d say it was closer to 50%. 
  
P 10 At least 80-90% Spanish speakers. 
 
 
Main study - Attorneys’ interviews - Question 2 
When you work with Spanish speakers, do you feel you can communicate the same way as when you speak with 
English speakers? If not, what are the differences?  
 
P 1 Well, sometimes I can get the sense that the Spanish speakers are less educated and I will consciously try and 
keep things even more simple. Like, I don’t want to overwhelm them with details so I will try to just keep in 
mind that the comprehension is going to probably be lower so I’ll use the simpler language.  
  
P 2 Not exactly the same way. But I feel that I can communicate properly with them. Sometimes people are from 
different areas though and have different dialects. Generally my Spanish-speaking clientele is less educated 
than my English speaking clients so I have to use simpler terms when describing things. I feel that 
everybody’s entitled to the same information. And if they don’t understand it, then I’ll just go over it as many 
times as it takes. 
  
P 3 No. When I speak to the Spanish-speaking clients, I give them more examples than I do with my English 
speaking clients. I use more cultural examples and words as well, that I think that they’ll be more familiar, 
whereas with my English-speaking clients I’m actually a little bit more, I don’t want to say professional, but 
it’s more cold, formal. And with my Spanish-speaking clients, it’s more, I make it seem more like we’re in a 
dining room setting and we’re just talking like friends. [They feel] more comfortable, and they trust me. 
That’s what I need to make sure, is that they trust me. Because a lot of the times, that’s the very first time that 
we meet. 
  
P 4 The Spanish-speaking clientele that I have in general, a lot of them are very smart but not well educated, so 
what I find is that I tend to speak more simply. And also my English is better than my Spanish, but I think 
that when I speak Spanish it’s more on a basic level than when I speak English. I think that with the Spanish-
speaking clientele, I think in general, but I think as a group they’re taught to be more polite than Americans. 
So in a deposition setting, which is an adversarial setting, I tend to warn them more than the other side is not 
their friend, and that they need to be very careful what they say. And I think that as a society, Hispanics are 
more polite. So I think you have to protect them more when you prepare them for the deposition. 
  
P 5 No. First of all, me communicating with a Spanish speaker, I am limited in how I can express myself. I find 
that, maybe I’m a little bit biased because I know Spanish fluently; I just find that the Spanish language is a 
lot more rich. There’s so many different words to explain something, I can actually lower the legal terms to a 
level that... in English I find it harder to do that when I’m using an interpreter, especially because the 
interpreter is limited to only interpreting what I am saying so it’s all up to me. If I cannot put it in terms that 
the interpreter can translate exactly, then my client is not gonna understand... Well to me, it’s important to 
illustrate to them, give them examples to try to explain to them what certain things mean... and it’s also the 
levels of education, most of the English-speaking clients graduated from high school at least so they can 
understand a little bit more. But if I’m explaining this to a person that has a second or third grade education 
and some of them don’t even have that, or know how to read and write, then it’s hard for me to explain those 
terms to them.  
  
P 6 No. Because there’s an interpreter, I go through all the procedures, some of the procedures of what the 
interpreter is for, the purpose of the interpreter... and if they do understand or speak some English, to not 
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listen to me, and only listen to the interpreter, and even if they understand it in English to only answer in 
Spanish. I would say pretty much the same, I would say the difference is more in education levels. That if I 
have someone who English is their native language and they just have a grammar school education, I will 
treat them differently than someone with a college or high school education, and the same with Spanish 
speakers. So the way we’ll communicate will be different just because of the level of education, not because 
of the language. I’d say basically based on the education level, not just because they’re speaking Spanish. So 
given the same education levels and background I would say the same thing, generally the same thing to my 
English speakers as I would to my Spanish speakers.  
  
P 7 I think it depends, for the most part, but it depends a little bit on the individual and that’s the same with 
English, I mean, even when I’m talking with someone in English, depending on their sophistication and 
education level, you have to change the way you approach it. But I don’t see any real difference between the 
[communication with] Spanish and English. 
  
P 8 Yes. The same instructions, sometimes I may add an additional instruction that deals with the language of the 
process so I instruct the client that they must only depend on the words of the interpreter, and then I instruct 
them that I’m going to sit them in a way that they’re not distracted by English speakers so they’re not facing 
English speakers, they face the interpreter. 
  
P 9 Well, I try to avoid using slang or colloquialisms that might get lost in translation. I try to be conscious of 
that. I think it’s more normal that when we’re talking to another English speaker, particularly someone from 
the same area, there tends to be use of slang or terms that would be considered slang or colloquialisms to 
convey thoughts, and I try to not do that when I’m speaking to Spanish speakers and using an interpreter 
because I feel it will create confusion, cause when I’ve done it in the past, they don’t understand what I’m 
talking about. So that’s the most, I guess, obvious example. I don’t know if I attribute it to Spanish speakers, 
per say, as opposed to kind of the level of education or sophistication of the person I’m talking to. And by 
and large, my Spanish speaking clients tend to be less educated, or less sophisticated than my English 
speaking clients.  
  
P 10 More or less. English is a little easier, I would say, since there’s no translation. I guess the communication 
with the English speakers is a little better, because the interpreter, the Spanish interpreter, is trying to 
interpret what to interpret, kind of thing, so sometimes there’s some miscommunication. Yeah, there are 
some additional instructions because they are Spanish speaking. Theoretically the same, just listen, other than 
just making sure you just, there’s always a possible problem where they’ll know some English and they don’t 
always listen to the Spanish only, so I give that instruction too, you know, listen. So I think the Spanish 
sometimes becomes pretty difficult. Sometimes their explanations are a little unclear… they start to ramble a 
bit more than the English do, speaking.  
 
 
Main study - Attorneys’ interviews - Question 3 
How would you characterize the differences between English and Spanish speakers in terms of awareness, 
comprehension, participation, or familiarity with the proceeding at hand? 
  
P 1 I would definitely say that the English speakers are more assertive, even to the point of being aggressive. 
There are some Spanish speakers that are assertive with their questions and that they don’t understand, but 
overwhelmingly they’re much more passive. They seem quieter and I have to make a lot of effort to make 
sure that they understand what I’m saying. 
  
P 2 I find that English speakers tend to ask more questions more often. They call in a lot more than the Spanish 
speakers. Most of my Spanish speaking clients will tell me that they trust me to handle their file and they 
don’t call in as often. English speakers tend to know a little bit more about the law than Spanish speakers do, 
sometimes I have to go into more detail with Spanish speakers. sometimes I have to explain things over and 
over to Spanish speakers to make sure that they understand. 
  
P 3 I feel that the English- speaking clients, I get more feedback from them, they’re more into the conversation. 
Whereas with my Spanish-speaking clients, I feel like they’re looking at me, but their mind is wandering 
somewhere else. 
  
P 4 I think the Spanish-speaking clientele are very good in terms of, I really find that they’re more helpful. When 
I give them instructions, I find that, and if they really feel that you care, they will follow your instructions 
completely. But with the Americans I feel that they tend to do more of what they wanna do. I think the 
Spanish speaking people understand when you explain things to them very simply and clearly.  
 
P 5 I find that English-speaking clients are usually more aware and understanding of the legal system here in the 
US. I think they’ve either been exposed to it by shows like Law and Order, or basic principles that you learn 
in school, so they’re more comfortable and aware of the simple process that’s going on. But I think the 
biggest difference between one and the other, I think that the Spanish-speaking community is less exposed to 
the legal system vs. the English-speaking community.  
 
P 6 I would say far less, and again, I think this has to do with the educational level as much as a lack of 
sophistication. And I will probably ask them more questions in one day and they will probably talk more in 
one day than they ever have. They’re basically clueless. They don’t understand even though it’s been 
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explained, the fundamental concept of a [legal] system. Even though we’ve told them, most of them are 
clueless as to how the system works. They have trouble concentrating, they have trouble focusing. And I 
don’t know if it’s a cultural thing or what, but you need to trigger things, and I find that you need much more 
leading questions. Especially with the less educated, they lack... their ability to do critical thinking or 
independent thinking or abstract thinking is very very limited, and you’ve gotta basically feed them 
questions. In many cases, because of their education level or their background, they cannot give a clear 
narrative. They have great difficulty in being specific. They have great difficulty coming up with concepts or 
ideas on their own. And they use phrases like “all the time” or “many times” and... the way they talk is just 
different. For example, I had one, “Do you have any pets?” and the answer is “No, only one dog,” rather than 
in English or more sophisticated education, “Yes, I have a dog.” So sometimes the context and the syntax, the 
way they answer is just different. The other thing that I find culturally is that a lot of people have long term 
relationships and they’ll call them their wife or their husband and they’re technically not married. And that’s 
important to us in the legal field to know whether they’re married for all kinds of reasons. “So did you go to a 
wedding ceremony to formally get married?” “No, but I call this person my wife or my husband,” those kinds 
of things. 
 
P 7 Overall, I can’t say that I do. I would say I see the English speaking clients, the same percentage, probably, 
have more interest or want to participate or be involved in the case. I wouldn’t say it’s any more so with the 
English speaking than the Spanish speaking. I’d say it’s a stronger level of knowledge with the English 
speaking as opposed to Spanish speaking. I think that, not sure if it’s accurate, but I perceive that, just 
because of the feedback that I get and I’m not sure if they’re actually understanding a lot of what I say. So 
my perception is that it’s more difficult to get them to understand. 
 
P 8 Almost zero percentage familiarity with the system for the Spanish speaker, because culturally they’re not 
affiliated with it, they don’t grow up watching TV, they don’t understand what English speakers take for 
granted. 
 
P 9 I do think with many of my Spanish-speaking clients... with the ones that trust me, I have Spanish-speaking 
clients that are difficult clients where they don’t trust me. When I’ve been a public defender or I’ve been a 
court appointed and they’re not actually paying for my services, sometimes with people there’s a distrust or 
they don’t trust what you’re saying. But with Spanish-speaking clients who trust me... the problem becomes 
more about being overly deferential to me. They don’t tell me something unless I ask specifically. They don’t 
necessarily appreciate or don’t understand what I’m telling them about what is important and not important in 
the case. I have a couple memories of learning later in the case where my reaction was, “Why didn’t you tell 
me this earlier?” And they say, “Well, you didn’t ask me,” even though to me, it seemed obviously relevant 
to the charges against them. So I think there is this, especially with people from Mexico, and I don’t wanna 
generalize, but it seems like with people from Mexico there is this almost, deference to authority, and once 
I’m perceived as the authority they’re trying to be cooperative and be respectful, and the way that they’re 
cooperative and respectful is to only answer specifically what I’ve asked. When it is their first time, I think 
that there is this, they think, and it varies, they seem relatively unsophisticated. They seem to think that if 
they just cooperate with everybody that everything will be alright, and that oftentimes leads to them waiving 
important rights before I even see them.  
 
P 10 Well, sometimes the English speakers have more comprehension I think, of what’s going on, because the 
Spanish speakers are often from another country originally or what have you. So I’d say, yeah. sometimes the 
translation is a little bit difficult depending on where they came from, right? whether they come from Mexico 
or a different South-American country. Sometimes the interpreters are from you know, different countries 
which don’t necessarily match up, and also the dialect. There’s cultural differences. One recently said that the 
legal systems were different and that’s why she was having trouble understanding. I think it’s a little more 
difficult with the Spanish speakers, but on the other hand, sometimes the Spanish speakers are more, maybe I 
shouldn’t say this, English speakers think they know too much maybe sometimes, they kind of argue with 
you a little bit. So I think the comprehension is lower, which, they don’t get the point of the question a lot of 
times, that’s what I feel. Some of them just aren’t getting it as easily. They don’t seem to get, sometimes, of 
course it depends on the person, but I think it has to do with their education a lot of times. A lot of times they 
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Main study - Attorneys’ interviews - Question 4 
How would you characterize the difference in their attitude and/or reaction when there is something they don’t 
understand? Do you find Spanish speakers tend to ask for repetitions or clarifications spontaneously? 
P 1 Spanish speakers do not generally volunteer the fact that they do not understand what’s going on, and they 
don’t always show it in their faces. So it’s oftentimes hard for me to know that they don’t understand 
something. I’ve gotten a little better at reading the subtle facial cues that they don’t really understand 
something, but they don’t tell me as often as the English speakers, although there are some English speakers 
that also don’t tell me that they don’t understand.  
 
P 2 Sometimes I think that Spanish speakers are a little more embarrassed if they don’t understand so they’ll keep 
quiet. So I go to great lengths to make sure they understand.  
 
P 3 With my English-speaking clients, they’re more likely to say “I didn’t understand.” Whereas my Spanish-
speaking clients, they usually get embarrassed and don’t say anything, so I really need to be more perceptive 
with respect to their body language as well as their facial expressions. And constantly I’m asking, “Ok, did 
you understand that? Does it make sense?” 
 
P 4 No, I don’t think so. I think you have to watch out for that, cause a lot of times they feel very intimidated and 
they don’t speak up for themselves so you have to ask them if you feel that they’re not understanding, and 
you have to help them. 
 
P 5 If there’s something that they don’t understand, an English speaker will challenge you, they will ask you, 
they will let you know, “I don’t understand this.” I find that the Spanish speaker doesn’t. I mean one of two 
things usually happens. Either they won’t say anything and just sort of close themselves up and be very shy, 
or they’ll answer without understanding the question. Just to give an answer, just to feel, make you think that 
they understand. 
 
P 6 They’re just clueless to what’s going on and they’re too embarrassed to say that they don’t understand, and 
it’s all over their head and they don’t understand. More sophisticated ones ask for clarification. Most of the 
time I realize they didn’t understand by the answer that they give. Or many times what they will do, they will 
answer a question, but not the one asked. So they’ll give information, but they don’t ask, for example, “Did 
you see Dr. Jones last month?” it’s a yes or no question, and the answer is “I saw him for pain in my back.” 
“I don’t think you answered the question, the question was have you seen Dr. Jones in the last month, I didn’t 
ask what you saw him for, I wanna know, have you seen Dr. Jones in the last month?” So that’s an example 
where they’ll give information, but it’s not what you need to know. ‘Cause you’re trying to find a timeframe 
and they’ll give information and it’s not the question being asked at all.  
 
P 7 I believe Spanish-speaking deponents rarely ask for clarification even when they really don’t seem to grasp 
the question. English speakers are much more willing to ask for clarification. Not sure why. 
 
P 8 No, not at all. [Even if they don’t understand], they don’t ask. Spanish speakers, the clients that I’ve been 
dealing with, they’re much more intimidated by the process, much more hesitant to speak up and ask for 
clarification even when it’s apparent that I would not expect them to understand. English speakers tend to just 
say, “I don’t understand, I’m really confused.”  
 
P 9 The more assertive ones do, and actually the more intelligent ones do, they tend to ask for clarification. Of 
course, the problems arise when you have the less assertive or less intelligent ones, right? Because the lawyer 
believes if they’re not asking questions that they understand what they’re saying. And frankly over time, I’ve 
learned that that’s not necessarily true. If they’re being silent, particularly too silent at points in the 
conversation where you’d think they’d have questions, then that’s usually a sign to me that they’re not really 
understanding what you’re telling them. Because you know, the kind of thing that a person who’s essentially 
just been told the equivalent that he has a serious disease would wanna know more about it. It’s like the 
doctor telling him, you know, “You have this serious disease,” and their response is “Ok.” When the lawyer 
tells him, “These are the consequences for the conviction of this charge” and they’re just like, “Oh, ok,” it 
tends to be a sign that they didn’t quite understand.  
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1. Main study - Attorneys’ interviews - Question 5 
2. Are there circumstances in which the Spanish speaker would claim to understand and you can tell he or she clearly 
doesn’t? 
P 1 Yes, a lot. I find that both English and Spanish speakers, but Spanish speakers more often, and maybe it’s 
because I deal with more Spanish speakers, they’re less willing to tell me that they don’t understand 
something. And I only figure it out later, when I ask them a question that involves them needing to apply 
something I’ve told them about, and then I realize that they did not understand a word of what I was saying. 
 
P 2 Yes I can usually see in their eyes when they don’t understand. They’re kind of glazed over but they say they 
understand. So that’s a signal for me to go back and explain again. 
 
P 3 Yeah, I do. That happens. 
 
P 4 Yes, sometimes they don’t understand, they’re more polite, no doubt about it. I think it’s an aspect of being 
polite. They just, they don’t wanna be a bother. They’re more polite, you always have to be on the lookout for 
that. A lot of times when you’re going through the instructions for the deposition you should go over certain 
things more than once.  
 
P 5 Yes, sometimes they don’t wanna look... I find especially within the male community they don’t wanna look 
or feel that they’re dumb or that they don’t understand. I think that they feel that that’s a sign of weakness. So 
they’ll say yes, I understand. Or they’ll answer the question even though they don’t understand what they’re 
answering.  
 
P 6 Oh, sure. Many many times. And so there’s many times they’ll answer a question when they clearly do not 
understand. And I’ll try to emphasize, it’s okay to say I don’t know, it’s ok to say I don’t understand, but I 
think a lot of them get, they’re very nervous, they’re very embarrassed. What do you do for fun? Or tell me 
the things you do outside of work? And they start explaining things at work. These kinds of things.  
 
P 7 Oh yeah. A lot of times, and you see it both in the preparation and you’ll see it in the deposition where they 
just feel compelled to go along and agree. And I always caution them in the prep, you know, if I’m seeing 
that happening, you can’t let the attorney do that in the deposition cause they’ll lead you right down to saying 
that nothing ever happened and you’re fine. And sometimes they just feel that they have to just follow the 
path that they’re being led.  
 
P 8 Yes, they just won’t make any sense. I know many times when someone answers a question, they believe, 
they say that they understood it, and they may answer something completely different, off topic. And it’s very 
difficult, especially when the answer seems to be almost right, whether it’s right or not, or whether it’s 
responsive. 
 
P 9 I think I have had some like that but there tends to be the more common scenario is… once I confirm for 
myself that they do understand, oftentimes then it’s like, well I don’t believe you basically. You’re just telling 
me this because you don’t wanna do anything for me, or I’m gonna go talk to another lawyer, or whatever 
that might be, there tends to be this denial. I do mostly fairly serious cases, I don’t do misdemeanors, I don’t 
do things that are just gonna get people put on probation. If they have me for their lawyer, they’re… and they 
get convicted, they are very likely going to federal prison, and oftentimes for a very long period of time. And 
so I have to, it’s a constant battle to make sure that they understand the seriousness of what’s going on, while, 
at the same time, maintain their trust and confidence.  
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3. Main study - Attorneys’ interviews - Question 6 
4. Could you estimate the average educational attainment level of your English-speaking and Spanish-speaking clients? 
P 1 I guess I tend to assume that the Spanish speakers will have about a 6th grade education, as that is what I 
understand is customary in Latin American countries. And I will assume that English speakers are out of high 
school. 
 
P 2 [Spanish speakers] anywhere from 5th grade up to 10th grade usually, we don’t get lots of high school 
graduates. The English speakers I’d say most have a high school diploma, some have an AA or some college 
and a few have higher education. 
 
P 3 0 to 6 [years] for Spanish, high school to 2 years of college for English. 
 
P 4 If I was going to average out the Hispanic clientele I would say that they have a junior high level of 
education. The average amount, whereas with the American I would say that they have a high school level of 
education. 
 
P 5 I would say the average would be 4th or 5th grade education. It’s very hard to see someone that has a high 
school degree or anything higher than maybe a 6th grade degree. English speakers, 14-18 years. 
  
P 6 My English-speaking clients one year of college average, and the Spanish speakers 6th or 7th grade from 
Mexico. 
 
P 7 Spanish 8 years to 11 years, English high school or GED to 2 years of college. 
 
P 8 Spanish 3 to 6 years, English some college, AA or some specialized certification. 
 
P 9 Usually my English speaking clients have at least some college and now more often than not in my private 
practice, either college degrees or post graduate degrees. A lot of my clients are now professionals, doctors, 
lawyers, things like that. [Spanish speakers] particularly the appointed ones, often times, you know, yeah, the 
equivalent of junior high education. 
 
P 10 Pretty much on the low end. Most of them have some education, some none, some zero... [an average of] 




5. Main study - Attorneys’ interviews - Question 7 
6. Are there circumstances in which an interpreter may interrupt to advice on a possible language or cultural issue, or 
suggest that a Spanish speaker may not be understanding the question? If so, do you welcome these interruptions? 
P 1 Yes. Some of the ones that are good at reading my clients, because sometimes I can’t read my clients, I can’t 
tell that they don’t understand, I can’t tell what’s confusing them. And sometimes the interpreter is a little bit 
more sensitive to my client and can tell which words or which concepts are tripping them up. And they say, 
“I think I understand where they’re confused, do you mind if I try to straighten this out?” and they try and 
help clear that up. I definitely prefer that they would, and sometimes they don’t when they should and I’m the 
one who catches that word that’s being used that can be interpreted several ways and they’ll translate into 
English using one interpretation and then [opposing] attorney will use that word as something that they get 
hung up on, and I have to say “Wait, stop. That’s not what they said.” I mean, it could be what they said, but 
there’s another word or possibility that matches that word. So I wish they would say it more, and I understand 
that they’re not supposed to be advocates of the people that they’re interpreting for, but if they’re trying their 
best to interpret what this client is saying and what the attorney asking the question is understanding, then I 
think that they should speak up and say, I think there’s a cultural difference in using that word, or I should 
seek further clarification to make sure that I really understand. So if somebody has gotten down or up on their 
level, I don’t mean to sound condescending, but if somebody has gotten on their level, and spoken in a level, 
in a language that they understand and we can all get on the same page, then it’s tremendously helpful, and 
that’s what good interpreters have done for me, is that they help me get on the same page, get on the same 
understanding, help me understand when my client is not understanding me, when I am not able to discern 
that for myself. 
 
P 2 Yes, that happens with some interpreters, and I appreciate that. Well, I find that a lot of the interpreters won’t 
ask for clarification in trial. It’s like a machine, you put in the interpretation and you get the exact 
interpretation and sometimes it’s wrong. And there are a couple interpreters that I love and I work with all the 
time who will speak up. [Do you welcome these interruptions?] I do, I do. Because I want to make sure that 
the client understands. It happens in court but not necessarily in trial. Before we get to trial, the interpreters 
are more likely to say, “Let me help you.” When we’re actually on the record, it doesn’t always happen. 
Every now and then they’ll say, “Wait, let me ask for clarification, I think the client is saying something 
else.” It happens less in trial. And sometimes I catch interpreters doing an interpretation that may be literal 
but I don’t think myself that that’s what the client is saying so I will ask them to clarify. 
 
P 3 They have. Actually I do appreciate when they do that, because sometimes I’m so focused on what I have to 
do that I’m not all the time paying attention to some of the cues. And so I do appreciate when the interpreters 
interrupt and say, “Oh I don’t think he understood that” or, “I don’t think we’re getting through to him.” 
 
P 4 Yeah, I’ve had depositions where they interject and they explain something or maybe that the client meant 
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what they were saying a particular way. I like it. I prefer it. They should... I think that’s part of their job. [To 
alert of non-comprehension] once in a while that happens, and I have no objection to them saying that. 
Because if the client doesn’t understand it’s very good that the interpreter says that. It doesn’t happen that 
often, I’m gonna be honest with you. I don’t find that it happens. Sometimes, the interpreters often will 
rephrase things. Like, they’ll say it one way and then if the client doesn’t understand they’ll say it another 
way. Yeah, it happens more in private meetings, at least once during the depo, generally the interpreter will 
bring up something. Of course, that’s part of their job, they speak Spanish better than anyone there, so that’s 
my expectation that of course they’ll do that. I want them to. I don’t want there to be any misunderstanding. 
 
P 5 It’s not common, but yes. And actually those are the good interpreters for me. The ones that are able to stop 
me and say, “Listen, I don’t think your client is getting it, or may I explain it in a different way?” And I 
usually appreciate that, I’ve learned so much that way. I’ve learned so much from the interpreters, because 
sometimes I get caught up in my legalese so I don’t know how to bring it down to my client’s level, and a 
good interpreter is able to do that. I know they’re not supposed to, unfortunately, but it usually helps me a lot 
and I’ve learned a lot from interpreters that do that. 
 
P 6 I... probably that’s happened maybe about ten times. That’s very very rare. Usually I’ll pick it up just when 
the interpreter does also. So, it’s very rare... Sometimes I’ll try in several ways, and I’ll ask the interpreter, 
can you help me on this, and try to explain it maybe in a different way or ask it in a different way? And most 
of them are very accommodating and helpful. [Do you welcome these interruptions?] Oh, absolutely. 
Because that means we’re not communicating. 
 
P 7 In depositions it’ll happen because the interpreter, I know they wanna make sure they’re getting it accurate, 
so they’ll sometimes say, can I inquire to get clarification, if they don’t understand the exact words or idiom 
whatever that’s being used. In preparation when you’re actually discussing the case with the client, I would 
say it’s much less formal so the interpreter feels more free and sometimes they’ll just start saying things, 
they’ll often tell me, I was just telling the client this. And so in very experienced interpreters I’m very 
comfortable with that because they’ve done this as many times or more than I have. I think the interruptions 
are good because it makes sure… I think the interpreter probably perceives better as to whether the person’s 
getting it or if they understood. So if they’re interrupting to explain things further, to ask me for clarification, 
I’m sure that’s a good thing, that I know that it’s sinking into the client, which is what’s the important thing.  
 
P 8 It depends on the interpreter. So the ones that are more experienced, more friendly to the process, and 
understand the legal integrity, will ask to, as a courtesy, will ask for, if we’re on the record, to go off the 
record. And at that point they will say, interpreter clarification, I need to inquire as to the client’s 
understanding, if I may, may ask permission. Those are the better interpreters. 
 
P 9 I have had that, occasionally. I can’t think of, I have had that in meetings, but not in court or testimonies. 
That’s not that uncommon actually, in meetings... There are other interpreters who, when a client makes that 
statement, they say, “Literally it would mean this but it is in context or is commonly understood to mean 
this.” I’ve had that happen as well, which has always been welcomed, because more often than not it’s what’s 
needed to give it clarity, and the failure to do that would actually lead to miscommunication. Absolutely. 
Cause they’re right. I’ve worked with them for so long, they know. And if it was a new interpreter, I’d be fine 
with that too, I don’t have a problem with that. 
 
P 10 Well, yes, sometimes. Two things. Sometimes the interpreters don’t listen very carefully to what I’m saying 
and sometimes they interrupt when they shouldn’t, and sometimes they interrupt for good reasons, so it 
depends. If I’ve misstated or misquoted something, I welcome that, yeah. If I’m not being clear or it’s not 
coming out right, I would like an interpreter who will say, you know, you didn’t explain it right or whatever, 
who would help me clarify. [From question 12] To say that the client is not understanding it doesn’t happen 
very often, not enough. I wish they would do it more. If the interpreter is actually conscientious, I would say, 
and not just going by the book, sometimes… rarely in the depo[sition] will they say, “They didn’t understand 
the question,” but occasionally. I wish they’d work as a team a little bit with me. Some do. They know better 
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7. Main study - Attorneys’ interviews - Question 8 
8. What are the main qualities you would hope to find in an interpreter you will be working with? 
P 1 I like when the interpreters ask my clients at the beginning of a deposition, “Where are you from?” Because 
then it makes them culturally sensitive to the language or to the dialect that the person speaks. I understand 
that interpreters make things kinda last longer and attorneys, judges, everybody just wants to get in and get 
out very quickly, but that can’t be the priority. The priority has to be our clients understanding what we’re 
trying to say and feeling connected to their attorney. They don’t feel connected, they don’t feel understood, 
they don’t feel like they have an advocate, then that puts me at a handicap. As much as I would like to just 
move on with my day, I need the interpreter to help me make sure I’m on the same page as my client. 
Because when you speak a different language, there’s other subtleties that go with that that make 
communication and understanding more difficult between two people, and I need an interpreter that not only 
translates the words, but translates the meaning and understanding that I am trying to convey to my client and 
that I’m trying to get from my client when I communicate with them.  
 
P 2 Well obviously a mastery of the language and knowing that certain people are from certain places and they 
speak different dialects. And connection with the client is really important. Not just sitting there like a robot, 
interpreting what I say, but actually engaging the client so that they understand, and telling me if they think 
that the client doesn’t understand, that really helps me.  
 
P 3 Well, I do like it when they’re friendly with the clients because it makes the clients feel comfortable and it 
makes the clients feel like they’re important and not just a number. It’s really important to me that they’re 
able to do simultaneous translation because we’ve got such time constraints. And that they’re sensitive to the 
different dialects that are around and, as I indicated earlier, what I do appreciate is when they see things that 
perhaps I’m missing. It’s like we’re working together to help one person. 
 
P 4 I want them to be nice to the client number one, and to be patient, because when they’re not nice and they’re 
not patient with the client, I think that they make the client very, more uncomfortable during the deposition 
and it affects their testimony. And also I want them to get the connotation of what the client is saying because 
sometimes the client will say something, and they mean it a particular way and it can’t, it shouldn’t be 
translated literally. They have to use their knowledge and their discretion. I think that it’s better that there’s an 
interruption and a clarification so that the record is clear.  
 
P 5 I hope to find someone that understands the Spanish speaking community well enough to know, and the 
client, someone that has had experience with immigrants. And not only that, but especially within the system, 
that knows the clients, that knows how to distinguish when a client is getting what is being interpreted to 
them. And also someone that is not gonna be afraid to stop me and say, “You know what, I’m sorry 
[Attorney’s name], but you’re not explaining this correctly, he or she is not understanding what you’re 
saying.” Then I appreciate that, because it challenges me. Or if they know how to explain it then go ahead, do 
it, let me learn from you. Those are the qualities that I like in an interpreter.  
 
P 6 The ones that I see in most of the good interpreters, and you have to distinguish between the interpreter 
during the deposition and the interpreters during the preparation, ‘cause I think their roles are somewhat 
different. Well, the difference is, the intimacy is a little different, but in the prep I can turn around and say, 
“Hi, could you help me explain this?,” or this kind of thing. I can go back more saying, “I don’t think they 
understand.” Or we could do the more show and tell kind of thing where I literally will get up and start doing 
all the movements. Whereas during the deposition, the main thing is if the clients don’t understand or ask for 
clarification, ask for it, and to do their job. And sometimes the attorneys make it difficult because they think 
they’re talking to some other lawyer or a graduate student, not someone who’s barely literate. And the poor 
interpreter, all they can do is translate these great big words, that, the client has no clue what they mean in 
Spanish. One time the guy was talking about the trapezoid muscles. I don’t know where those are. This kind 
of stuff. And sometimes I literally had to look up in the dictionary what those words are. And sometimes there 
are no words where they talk about particular parts of a machine. Where the client doesn’t know what the 
particular names are, and the interpreter wouldn’t know either. And I would say that’s a job, just interpret, 
and there’s a problem, or they want clarification, to do it. And when you make a mistake or realize you’ve 
done something wrong, to say it right away.  
 
P 7 I need somebody that can do simultaneous and I need somebody that would, when they’re perceiving that the 
person’s not understanding, that they can communicate that to me, ‘cause sometimes I don’t pick up on that, 
sometimes I’m just going through my outline. I don’t always pick that up because of the language. And 
sometimes it’s just, sometimes they’ll bond with the interpreter a little bit and they’ll open up a little bit more 
to an interpreter, let them know if they’re having difficulties with this or that. And I’m not getting that unless 
the interpreter tells me. So I certainly welcome that, it’s... seeing these things and letting me know. Things 
that I need to be aware of or clarify, because of the language.  
 
P 8 Someone who is pleasant, and aware. And what I mean by that is someone who just doesn’t turn their brain 
off and automatically have language going in their ear and words come out without being aware of the 
clients’ responses. And what I mean by that is that it takes an interpreter who is present and is aware, that the 
client really, that they are hearing the words actually translated at the level that the questioner has presented. 
Be aware that there’s a problem and they are aware of the body language, of the other aspects of language that 
are not just verbal, but tonal, or intensity, but they’re aware by their responses that they’re not understanding. 
Those are qualities that I really admire in an interpreter. 
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P 9 Well, the ability to do simultaneous translation... but the more... what I like and the people I build 
relationships with and use regularly is kind of, respect for the client. I like interpreters who are, feel like they 
can be honest to me. I tend to be, for people who don’t know me and haven’t worked for me in the past, I 
think people can be, particularly people who aren’t very assertive, might not be willing to tell me, “He doesn’t 
understand you,” “You’re not communicating this well enough” or whatever, because of some belief that they 
might offend me or something like that, and frankly I don’t get offended, but they don’t know that. And so I 
need an interpreter who’s assertive enough to tell me when they become aware that something here is getting 
lost in the translation. And that’s why I keep using the same three people basically, cause they’re respectful to 
the client, they do good translation, they’re available when I need them, and they are willing to tell me when 
it appears that the client is not understanding what I’m saying.  
 
P 10 Well, I think accuracy of what I’m saying to the client, and also like, if the client is not responding for 
cultural reasons or whatever, they’re pointing to the body part and saying the wrong body part for cultural 
reasons, I would like... I don’t want the interpreter to translate perfectly literally. I don’t think that’s 
necessarily a fair interpretation. I think it should be, give some sense of what she’s saying rather than literally, 
what comes out of a textbook or something. So I want them to volunteer what’s going on, let’s put it that way. 
Or if the client’s not understanding, which does happen somewhat frequently, the person doesn’t understand 
and needs it repeated in a different way or whatever. If I’m not being clear or it’s not coming out right, I 
would like an interpreter who will say, “You know, you didn’t explain it right” or whatever, who would help 
me clarify. I think that’s really good if the interpreter is a little proactive and isn’t just there to translate 





9. Main study - Attorneys’ interviews – Characterizations 1 
10. Assumptions  
P 6 Sometimes they will make assumptions that come from nowhere. For example, you’ll ask them... “What jobs 
have you had?” And they’ll talk about the jobs. So I’ll say, “So the first job you ever had was working at 
Taco Bell?” “Yes.” “So you never had any jobs in Mexico?” “Oh yeah I worked in Mexico.” “OK why didn’t 
you say the jobs you had in Mexico?” “Oh, I thought you wanted just the jobs in the United States.” I’m 
thinking, “What? I need to know all the jobs you’ve ever had in your life.” In my mind, why would you come 
out with that assumption when you’ve just asked them, anytime in their life... What I want from these people 
is their common sense answers. I don’t want them to assume or presume anything at all, which they do, and I 
give them some examples, but their assumptions, I don’t know where it comes from. Whether it’s, “I thought 
I was gonna get fired if I made a complaint,” “Well why do you think that?” “Well, I just heard.” “Well, why 
would you think that?” So they give an answer that they cannot explain and all they do is hurt their case.  
You ask someone, “Well, what do you clean?” “I clean everything.” “What do you mean by everything?” “I 
do everything.” Well, I don’t know what that means. And when you ask specifically do not volunteer 
[information], do not say anything except to answer the question, and they make assumptions that in my 
background don’t make any sense. For example, the women, you’ll ask them, “Have you ever been overnight 
in the hospital for any reason in your life whether it has to do with this case or not?” They say no. Then I’ll 
ask, “Where were your children born?” They’ll say “Oh, in the hospital.” I’ll say “Why didn’t you say that?” 
They say, “Oh, I thought you were only talking about the case.” So their ability to concentrate and focus, that 
if you give them a question or statement like that, it’s too long. They just don’t follow it. 
And the other thing is, I have found that when you have, “Who do you live with?” They will mention, my 
spouse or my children or something like that. And you need to ask additional leading questions, like “Who 
else do you live with?” And then they will say anybody else, anybody else, rather than most English speaking 
will say “Who do you live with?” they’ll give a list of everybody. Also, the Spanish speakers, “Who do you 
live with?” they will mention all the adults but they won’t mention the children. And I’ll find that sometimes 
they’ll just make assumptions that have no basis for at all, even when you try to make things clear, they 
sometimes just don’t understand. 
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Main study - Attorneys’ interviews – Characterizations 2 
Volunteering  
P 5 And I don’t know if it’s cultural or not, but it’s also, I see it a lot, most of my Spanish-speaking clients and 
when I was doing depositions and now even when I’m doing trials, they feel the need to tell me a story. They 
feel the need to start from the beginning and not answer the questions, and they wanna explain everything 
instead of just listening to my simple instructions, but it might not be so simple for them, for me it’s simple, 
but for them it’s not. And I’m not sure again if that’s cultural or if it’s an educational thing, but that is a 
difference. 
P 6 You ask about one body part and they may answer... “No, I’m only asking about the neck, I don’t wanna hear 
about your thighs or toes or anything else.” And again they will want to tell you things but it’s not the answer 
to the question. Or they’ll give a long story and I’ll say, “So your answer to the question is yes? The answer 
to the question is no?” and sometimes I interrupt, I say “It’s yes, no, I don’t know.” And sometimes the 
cultural thing will come through, that I generally, women especially, older women, when you ask them a 
simple yes or no question and they tell a story.  
Quite often they’ll give an answer and I’ll say, “I don’t think you understood.” And I’ll go back and they 
miss my, sometimes they miss my cues where I say, “You need to slow down, you need to wait and count to 
five” or something like that. Two seconds later, they’re answering right away rather than just waiting. Or you 
say, “I don’t want you to explain anything at all. I don’t wanna hear the word because, I don’t wanna hear 
why you did something, just answer the question.” And when you say, “Why did you tell me that?” they’ll 
say, “I thought you wanted to know this” or “That’s what I thought the question was”. And then I’ll look at 
the interpreter and say, “No, I did not ask that question.” 
 
P 9 And there is a tendency, I think, to want to explain everything, want to tell you the whole story, when you’re 
trying to simply take it step by step. And [they] also want to deal in generalities rather than, as a lawyer, I 
want to get into specifics, and particularly when you’re dealing with things like state of mind.  
P 10 Sometimes they... I can’t speak in generalities but sometimes they’re evasive a little bit, that’s one of the 
drawbacks of Spanish speakers, it’s that sometimes they don’t give the direct answer very well, and 
sometimes they ramble more than English speakers, I think. I need direct answers because I’ve only got 
limited time and they don’t give me the answer related to what I asked, they answer something else, you 
know, and I don’t know if that’s because of the translation or what, but they don’t always give me a direct 
answer. When they have no idea what I was asking at all, and just give a story which is partially irrelevant, I 
don’t, well it’s frustrating sometimes.  
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11. Main study - Attorneys’ interviews – Characterizations 3 
12. Time, dates and numbers 
P 6 And this is what I have noticed, that people admit if they cannot read or write Spanish very well, their 
educational levels, but they generally do not admit that they don’t understand numbers or math and this kind 
of stuff. So you have to make the questions real real simple because many of them if you ask how old their 
children are, they don’t know. When it comes to time differences, date sequences, this kind of thing. And just 
like I said, the level of sophistication that, when you say, “How many people live with you?” And then you 
find out they’re not really living [there], they moved out six months or a year ago, that kind of thing is right 
now, or they’ll make assumptions. Or note that the same word can have so many different meanings, like the 
word recently. And in English you have different definitions but here again, almost like childlike, “Well I 
haven’t seen grandma for a long time,” well that could be six months ago or last week. Many of them have no 
concept of time or time differences. 
P 8 The [next] problem has to do with the process itself. It’s an adversarial process. And when you have someone 
extremely nervous, in my experience, I don’t know if it’s true or not, but there is a problem with tenses. So 
when they are talking about what they experience, they may not have the same understanding or 
comprehension to explain that this happened a long time ago. So things that they may be explaining as having 
happened a time ago, they may only talk about it as happening within the last couple of months. And that’s a 
significant problem. In line with that, when they are asked about when a particular problem started, how long 
have they been experiencing this, they tend to compartmentalize their experience as only pertaining to the 
subject matter that they’re present for. So language itself becomes difficult. So if you were to ask someone 
who may have developed migraines, profound migraines “When was the first time you experienced this?,” in 
addition to the sense of tenses being completely messed up, they understand it as “When did you experience 
this problem as you experience it now?” Like, the deponents are asked questions in very vague, generalized 
manners to allow it to be overbroad, and they will not have the sophistication of language to understand that 
it could be from any headache or any neck ache, ever. Significant problems that come out of this is that for 
people that are not educated, who live in a world that is foreign to them, the clues that we have as native 
speakers, which could be newspapers, TV... But people who don’t have the same references, they have a 
difficult time knowing dates and they will guess the date because they feel they’re expected to give a date. 
 
P 9 Like, what they knew at a particular... you know, what’s important legally is what they knew at a particular 
point in time, not what they know now. And trying to get that, and get the answer to that, is sometimes 
difficult. And it does lead to miscommunication if you’re not conscious of it, because they’re telling you 
information that they now have when what you’re really asking them is what information did you have at this 
point in the past. So that’s actually a fairly common area of miscommunication. And over the years, I kind of 
expect that now, and I’m careful to be precise. 
P 10 If you ask “When did it first start?,” “When did you start to have pain?” that’s what I mean, they don’t get it 
sometimes. Even after I explain what a continuous trauma is, I’ll say, “Well when was the first time you 
noticed the pain?” they’ll say, “Well, when I slipped and fell,” or something specific. It’s kind of a strange 
concept anyway, the continuous trauma, hard for them to grasp. I should probably explain it better, it’s 
probably my own fault. But the interpreter could help that, couldn’t they? What I’m saying is, sometimes I’m 
not speaking very clearly, the interpreter could help rephrase the question a little bit. 
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13. Main study - Attorneys’ interviews – Characterizations 4 
14. Legal process 
P 4 I just think, though, that the Hispanic group tend to listen to you more as an attorney. They believe in you 
more and they trust you more than the American clients. 
 
P 5 I do find that with the Spanish-speaking clients, there’s sort of a, they don’t trust the system as much, they 
don’t understand it, they don’t understand the process, they don’t understand why they’re there, they get very 
intimidated, they’re afraid. I’ve... sometimes they don’t even trust me and I’m the attorney. They feel that I’m 
gonna sell them out, things like that. There’s a lot of questions, they’re afraid to go to trial a lot of the times, 
because they don’t understand the system. They don’t understand what’s gonna happen, they’re intimidated 
to talk to the judge, different things like that. 
 
P 6 But from a psychological standpoint, I don’t think most lawyers realize what they’re going through and 
especially for the women, when there’s psychological problems, I’ll say, “What was more difficult, going 
through this or having your baby?” and it’s amazing how many of them say that the deposition process was 
far worse than the pregnancy and the birth, which I wouldn’t think at all. Or, I hear again, only with the older 
women, I’ll say, especially ones who have had psychological problems... they know they’re sad but they 
don’t understand all these psychological terms. And I’ll say “What’s more embarrassing, having to go 
through these women’s checkups or having to go through the deposition process?” and it’s amazing how 
many women will say the deposition process. I think a man would say going through women’s checkups 
would be far more embarrassing than answering a bunch of questions. And here again, that’s good to know 
while they’re going through this, I think they have trouble concentrating, they get flustered, they’re 
embarrassed, they’re worried they’re gonna say the right name, right thing or not. 
 
P 8 Clients who are intimidated by the process break down and get extremely nervous, and that locks their ability 
to think. It’s almost as if someone is going through a traumatic experience, which causes them to not be able 
to understand, or say when they don’t. I feel strongly that the system that’s imposed doesn’t work. The 
system imposed is a formalized interaction with a non-native speaker. They’re being asked questions that we 
as attorneys take for granted, it is our language, and we take for granted that the deponent understands that 
language. But there are cultural nuances that shift between cultures of different countries. So somebody from 
El Salvador and Mexico or Argentina or France or wherever, they have a different life experience and 
educational background. And words have more formalized meanings to them, and they perceive it as a 
conversation. The consequences of a misunderstanding to the deponent can sometimes cost that client the 
case and cost them their credibility, because their entire believability is called into question. And the system 
that I work in or have worked in for the last 14 years doesn’t work for non-native speakers without a high 
educational level.  
 
P 9 They tend to, again, be deferential to all authority figures, so they tend to essentially give statements to the 
police, and even at times, they give statements thinking that’s going to help them without appreciating that 
the police are really gonna use it in a way to make them appear guilty. Yeah, that the statement, even if 
they’ve all been advised to their Miranda rights and told that their statement can be used against them in a 
criminal proceeding, but they view it as, well, for instance in a drug case, “It wasn’t my drugs it was the other 
guy in the car’s drugs,” and they think if they tell the police that, the police is just gonna let them go, but how 
the police view that statement is that you just admitted that you knew there were drugs in the car, right? 
Which is now an element of the crime we have to prove and therefore we’re gonna use that against you. So 
that’s actually a fairly common scenario. 
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15. Main study - Attorneys’ interviews – Characterizations 5 
16. Body parts 
P 6 They don’t know basic body parts, they don’t know the names in Spanish, they have trouble describing, for 
example, the word for wrist, rather than saying “I don’t know the name, it’s the part of the body between my 
hand and my elbow,” but that kind of sophistication is just beyond many of them. But here I’ve learned over 
time that when anybody talks about their arm or their hand, or their leg, that it can have many many different 
meanings. And I’ve also noticed between the hip and the thigh. That often they don’t know the words, but 
when they’re using the words, they’re different. And I have all my clients fill out a diagram showing the parts 
of the body, but many times they’ll say one word and they’ve marked a different word. For example, they’ve 
marked the hip but maybe they’re using waist or buttocks or something like that, or vice versa. But I welcome 
that because I need to know what they’re talking about. It’s a cultural thing. I’ll say, “Ok, what do you mean 
by your arm?” “I mean the whole arm.” I say “No, what do you mean, are you talking about the shoulder, yes 
or no? Upper arm?” I’m literally pointing to them so I say “When you explain you have to go through all 
these parts [of the arm].” They’ll say “Yeah, my arm.” And they don’t get, even though I’ve explained, we 
have to go part by part by part, all these are different, and sometimes they don’t understand it. I’ve had 
people say back, which is espalda in Spanish, but I’ve said upper back, middle back, and lower back, and 
sometimes they have no idea what I’m talking about, then I’m using layman’s terms, not medical terms, to 
explain what we are talking about, and I say “You need to be specific.” A lot of them have trouble using 
words and pointing and explaining like, “It hurts me over here when I go like this,” they conceptually cannot 
articulate in words what they’re trying to show with their movements or gestures. Or they just show, “Well it 
hurts me over here.” “What are you pointing to?” And then people mix up the left side and right side, they 
say “I’m all confused.” “What are you confused about?” And then I don’t get an answer, something, so I can 
help them out.  
 
P 10 I don’t see why you’re mandated in the code when it’s not on the record, or not during the deposition, period. 
But anyway, whether it is or not, the interpreters who I like, as far as the hand and foot, if they’re saying the 
wrong thing, the interpreter will work more efficiently...well the interpreter will say, “Be sure and say if you 
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